

RE: INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

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CONTRIBUTION OF RAF TO
THE SEARCH FOR THE
TRUTH ON THE RWANDAN
TRAGEDY

The War of October 1990 and the Tragedy of April 1994

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INTRODUCTION

The Rwandan tragedy has been the subject of books by many authors, who have adopted various viewpoints depending on their objectives and based on reports from human rights organisations, non-governmental organisations and the threadbare testimonies of people who were not directly involved in the Rwandan conflict.

Thus, the international community was forced to swallow a version of events concocted and served up by RPF following the media embargo that was imposed on those persons that RPF had named "genocidaires". The absence of a juxtaposition of views did not allow the international community to consider the Rwandan tragedy in a calm and objective manner.

Similarly, some works written by Rwandans did not sufficiently discuss the role of RPF army, which was in fact responsible for the Rwandan conflict. Thus, several authors dwelt on politics, while military matters escaped their notice or were simply ignored. This work, written for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, contains revelations about crimes committed by RPF, along with supporting documents, which will serve as appreciable proof. It also includes documents proving the actions carried out by RAF during the war.

As an institution that directly confronted RPF during the Rwandan conflict RAF [Forces armées rwandaïses] cannot remain silent about the events that plunged Rwanda into bereavement from the outbreak of war on 1 October 1990, and which degenerated into the disaster of April 1994. RAF consider that their opinion and contribution are indispensable to the enlightenment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

In this book, RAF accuse RPF of the following:

1. Invading Rwanda from Uganda on 1 October 1990 in violation of international treaties and conventions governing refugee status.
2. Planning and executing the genocide of Hutu with the objective of eliminating the political and intellectual Hutu elite, reducing their numbers to establish a Hutu-Tutsi ethnic balance and by this means putting an end to the myth of Hutu as a majority.
3. Committing crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes against peace.
4. Assassinating Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, as well as Major-General Déogratias Nsabimana and other distinguished persons who were accompanying them.
5. Causing the disaster of April 1994 by starting the war, interethnic massacres and the exodus of people and exposing them to epidemics.
6. Destroying infrastructure, public and private property.

RAF also accuses some UNAMIR elements of being RPF accomplices or being directly active on the battlefield.

I. RAF's Account of the Rwandan Tragedy

RPA, the armed wing of RPF, is the root cause of the Rwandan tragedy, insofar as it invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990, and resumed the war. RPF carried out the selective killing of Hutu political leaders and systematically massacred Hutu wherever it passed. The massacres of April to July 1994 were simply the end-result or culmination of the war. Therefore, those massacres must be viewed in the context of the war. That is why RAF are of the view that ITR's jurisdiction should be extended to cover the period of the conflict all the way through to the conclusion of the investigation. Indeed, such is the wish of both parties to the conflict. One therefore wonders why the UN Security Council limited ITR's jurisdiction to the year 1994. Was it in a bid to save ITR from dealing with a large volume of work? It will be noted that RPF killed or caused the disappearance of over 630,000 Hutu before April 1994. (*AJPR RWANDA. L'autre face du génocide, chapter 4, Section 4*). Was the aim to simply ignore the crime?

As concerns the characterisation of the offences, it is the opinion of RAF that reports prepared by human rights organisations, which were instrumental in the creation of ITR, were conspicuously biased with regard to the concept of genocide. In fact, their focus is on the scope and nature of the massacres, or *actus reus* rather than *mens rea*.

For RPF, the ethnic massacres were deliberately termed the genocide of the Tutsi at the hands of the Hutu in order to mislead public opinion and cover up the Hutu genocide, which was carefully prepared by RPF before and during the war and even currently, but about which the international community remains silent.

RAF are also of the view that during both the turmoil and the war, many more Hutu than Tutsi were massacred. Moreover, the Tutsi were killed as a consequence of the civil war started by those who attacked Rwanda and assassinated President Habyarimana, and not an intent or general plan of the Hutu to decimate the Tutsi. Without *mens rea*, the claim of Tutsi genocide, as touted by RPF, is unfounded.

If, indeed, there was a genocide plan that RAF must have been aware of, or a plan by RAF to resume hostilities in early April 1994, then:

- The G3, Chief of Operations of the Rwandan Army General Staff would not have been sent on mission to Egypt in late March 1994.
- The Minister of Defence and the G2, Chief of Military Intelligence of the Rwandan Army General Staff would not have been sent on mission to Cameroon to participate in a Conference of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Security in Central Africa, which took place in Yaounde from 4 - 8 April 1994, and proceed to Ghana for two weeks. Moreover, the airline tickets for the two aforementioned individuals were provided by the Kigali office of the UNDP.
- The Rwandan Army Chief of Staff would not have travelled to Dar es Salaam with the President knowing that he would perish with him in the 6 April 2004 assassination.

On the contrary, this is proof that RAF were seeking peace and were not on the warpath. This was a view espoused by all RAF units. No Operations Sector Commander or Unit Commander could take part in drafting a plan which existed neither in MINADEF nor in the army headquarters.

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II. Responsibility for the Rwandan tragedy

RPF and other RAF detractors blame the latter for all the crimes committed in Rwanda. Yet, in spite of the continuous attacks by RPF from October 1990, in spite of the difficult adjustment of the Rwandan people to multiparty system, which led to violent demonstrations and other acts of destruction and intimidation, in spite of the limited means and the irresponsible opposition of self-serving politicians, RAF made every effort through operations to restore and maintain order, pacification during political or ethnic unrest, crime fighting, protection of persons displaced as a result of war, and the international conspiracy. It is known that RPF is the tool of some major powers which, from the creation of the Republic of Rwanda, wished to bring Rwanda under their sphere of influence, but that the regimes that followed the 1959 revolution had opposed this. This is why the Rwandan tragedy has international ramifications.

For RPF, the objective is to conquer the country, kill as many Rwandans as possible and subjugate the remaining few, and destroy all development works that bring honour to the Habyarimana regime. All this means that RPF has never been an army for the liberation of the people, but a tool to conquer a country and surreptitiously annex it to Uganda. RAF, on the contrary, facing many attacks from RPF, have always acted as a real army of the Rwandan people who, today, trust and esteem their army.

Thus, RAF denounce the complicity of certain foreign figures of authority who are allies of RPF and who took part in the planning and implementation of the invasion and occupation of Rwanda by RPF, who provided it with political, diplomatic, media, technical, material and military assistance and ordered the Rwandan tragedy. These include particularly President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda and NRA, President Bill Clinton of the United States and his government, Mrs. Linda Chalker of Great Britain, certain Belgian authorities, Major Pierre Buyoya, who was then President of Burundi, and the Burundian army as well as President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania. RAF also accuse Major-General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of UNAMIR and Colonel Bem Marchal, Commander of the Belgian Contingent in UNAMIR, for conspiring with RPF to assassinate President Habyarimana, preparing and prosecuting the war of April 1994, and the genocide of the Hutu.

Lastly, RAF denounces the conniving and irresponsible attitude of the international community and especially the UN and the OAU, which ignored the Rwandan conflict when it was still possible to contain the damage. This community is held responsible because the Government kept it continually informed of the killings and other acts of barbarism visited on the Rwandan people by RPF all through the offensives of unacknowledged intent. The UN and the OAU should look back and adjust their sights so as to grant the people of Rwanda, who have been forced into exile, their rights once more.

Indeed, as the invading force, RPF is the root cause of the Rwandan tragedy. RAF are of the view that RPF must be prosecuted for the Hutu genocide and for the other war crimes and crimes against humanity it committed in Rwanda during the war and the ones it continues to commit up to the present-day.

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There is no denying that as it has done in the past, RPA is still executing the Hutu genocide by way of commanded operations and isolated incidents. Moreover, RPF's practice has always been to hide the bodies of the people it kills in order to cover up the crime, and whenever exposed, it justifies itself by cunningly misleading the public and masking its true genocidal nature. In fact, President Bill Clinton proved that he was an accomplice of RPF criminals when he sent his special envoy to Kigali in a conspiracy of silence over the massacre of over 8,000 Hutu in Kibeho at the hands of RPA.

The truth on the Rwandan tragedy must be established without melodrama and emotiveness. Those who are responsible for the Hutu genocide must be prosecuted without leniency, or fear of ruffling RPF's allies or the manifestly biased UN Security Council. The diktat of certain super-powers, of which the Rwandan people were victims, should not weigh on the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

The *Forces Armées Rwandaises* support an independent, fair and impartial International Tribunal for Rwanda. They believe that no one should be made a scapegoat simply because the real culprits have not been identified, as it is up to every individual to answer for his criminal acts.

III. Content of the present document

This document, intended for the International Tribunal for Rwanda, sets out accusations against RPA. It also provides corroborated evidence to show that the accusations against RAF are false. It cites military intelligence which clearly shows that the President's assassination was carefully planned by RPF.

Considering that the Arusha Peace Agreement provided for an end to the war opposing the Government of Rwanda to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Article 1) and that RAF were totally in favour of the said Agreement, this document mainly sets out the acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by RPA between 4 August 1993 and 6 April 1994, during the war of April-July 1994, and from the time RPF seized power in Kigali to the present.

Nevertheless, the document contains flagrant examples of acts carried out by RPF before 4 August 1993, which cannot be dissociated from the ones committed later on and which built up to the final assault.

Chapter 1 deals with the various aspects of the war and demonstrates RPA's sadism on the one hand, and RAF's bravery, on the other. Chapter 2 is about the accusations against RPA and its accomplices for their responsibility in the conflict and the Rwandan tragedy, due to the numerous acts they committed during the war. Chapter 3 is about the activities of RAF during the conflict; Chapter 4 is about the civilian self-defence.

As aforementioned, the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* as an institution cannot remain silent about the events which plunged Rwanda into mourning, as they were directly involved in the Rwandan conflict. That is why RAF command has compiled incriminating evidence against RPF in general and RPA in particular, as well as materials that bear out the activities of RAF during the conflict.

However, it should be mentioned that the information provided in this document is only a sampling, because some of the evidence either disappeared or was destroyed, either during the war or by the

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bad weather during the exile. It is based on memory. However, the fact of the matter is that it existed or is still available somewhere, and is authoritative.

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As regards the passages that are not cited in this paper, the reader should refer to the content of RPF documents, particularly the messages, in which RPF attributes certain acts to the Government side. This is simply propaganda, something it was known to resort to in order to mobilise its combatants. Furthermore, it is a mistake to believe that the Rwandan tragedy started on 6 April 1994. The April-July 1994 massacres were simply the end-result or culmination of the war *per se*, for which RPF and its allies are responsible.

CHAPTER 1: THE WAR

Section 1: The RPF invasion of Rwanda from Uganda on 1 October 1990

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§ 1: The RPF attack of 1 October 1990

Since the end of the *Inyenzi* incursions of 1960s, Rwanda has not suffered any outside attack. On 1 October 1990, RAF and the people of Rwanda were surprised by news of the attack against the Kagitumba border post by troops from Uganda. Indeed, the war came as a surprise, because, despite certain warning signs in the Mutara region (robberies, cattle rustling and extortion, disappearances), the Ugandan President had stated several times that no attack on Rwanda could be launched from his country. However, while on a visit to the United States, President Museveni declared simply that his "boys" had slipped out of his control since he could not have been unaware of the attack considering the following obvious coincidences:

- RPA chief was none other than his Assistant Minister of Defence.
- Several RPF officers belonged to NRA and had helped President Museveni seize power in Kampala.
- RPF troops had NRA equipment, including heavy weapons.

The war, started jointly by NRA and RPF-*INKOTANYI* from outside, upset the peace and unity of the Rwandan people, who had been living in harmony for 17 years, and re-ignited the four-hundred-year-old resentment.

§ 2: Reaction of RAF

As of October 1990, RAF contributed to warding off the enemy and providing security to the civilian population. They liberated the entire Mutara region, which had been captured by RPF. In the interior of the country, they participated in deterring ethnic unrest along with the other security forces. In the combat zone, they participated in the resettlement of the people who had fled the *Inyenzi* and protected the displaced people in the camps.

§3: Causes of the war

Following the outbreak of the war, RPF inundated the world media with misleading information in a bid to legitimise its aggression. The present document does not claim to be an exhaustive account of what some have referred to as the real causes of the war. In fact, only RPF and its accomplices (close friends and allies) know the real causes. In the press, RPF often invoked two main reasons: the return of the refugees and the democratisation of Rwanda. However, on closer look, it is clear that RPF had entirely different designs. In fact, prior to the October 1990 war, it made the return of the refugees a key issue. Whereas the Rwandan authorities were quite prepared to tackle this problem head-on, as arrangements to reach a negotiated settlement were underway between the Rwandan Government, the UNHCR, the Ugandan Government and representatives of the refugees, RPF elected to launch an armed struggle in violation of international conventions (UN, OAU) prohibiting refugees from taking up [arms against their country<<<<missing segment>>>>]

In reality, what the RPF, particularly RPA, wanted was absolute power. The return of the refugees and democratisation were simply a ploy aimed at misleading public opinion.

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Indeed, after its military victory, RPA has assumed absolute control in Kigali. Paul Kagame has made himself Vice-President and Minister of Defence. He is the strongman in Kigali. Military personnel are everywhere: in the National Assembly, the Government, the administration, even the judiciary. The political parties have been muzzled. The RPF carries the majority in all the institutions. The judiciary is ineffectual. In fact, its decisions are not binding on RPA. The RPA was commended RPF political officials for massacring people during the war and after seizing power in Kigali. In fact, those political officials have commended it for the massacres it is committing currently.

Certain parameters changed because of the way the situation unfolded, as, having failed to attain immediate military victory, RPF accepted to participate in the negotiations that led to the agreement on RPA's integration into the *Forces Armées Rwandaises*. However, because of the lack of provision in the negotiations for absolute power or the integration of all its troops, it felt that it had no choice but to continue the war regardless of the consequences.

Due to RPF's plan, the war degenerated into the catastrophe of April 1994. However, RPF had attained its goal despite costing thousands of lives and destroying the country. It enjoys absolute power in Kigali and the current Army comprises all its soldiers.

The military leadership can assign themselves property, but the civilian authorities cannot do likewise. For example, brigade commanders are entitled to two houses (one at their duty station and another one in Kigali). Such was never the practice within RAF. Also, some soldiers unlawfully occupy the homes of people who have either gone into exile or have been killed and refuse to vacate them, with impunity. That shows that RPF (RPA) massacred the Hutus and forced them to go into exile in order to take over their property. It was not satisfied with the Arusha Peace Agreement, as the said Agreement did not provide them such benefits. That is why it violated it and resumed the war.

Even as it demonised President Habyarimana, RPF was not unaware that the people were very fond of him. It appeared impossible to oust him politically. Even the internal opposition had recently become divided. The RPF killed the President in order to clear the way to seizing power.

In addition to craving for power, the problem of the resettlement of the military refugees as part of the peaceful repatriation would ultimately crop up. With the peaceful repatriation, apart from the soldiers who had actually become citizens of the countries which had enlisted them in their armed forces, all non-military refugees were to be resettled in their respective fields of activity without difficulty. All the farmers/ herders simply needed was land for their crops and animals. Skilled workers were expected to compete for jobs on the open market. Adjustments could be made in order to absorb civil servants in the public sector, while others sought employment on the job market. As the political reforms and the implementation of the multiparty system were underway, each refugee could join a party of his choice and engage in political activities without further negotiations. However, military personnel requesting to be reintegrated in the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* had to relinquish the rights acquired in the foreign armies, because, as refugees, they could not justify being members of a foreign army.

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They thus took up arms against their country in order to justify their military status.

As RPF was sure of victory, its strategy being to drive the Hutus out of the country and exterminate them (See *Impuruza*, No. 17), it expected to take absolute power and create an army made up of refugee-soldiers who were serving in the armies of their host countries.

As regards democratisation, it should be recalled that a commission had been formed to seek the people's views on the best form of government for our country. The commission recommended the introduction of a multiparty system in Rwanda. However, that did not prevent or stop RPF from launching attacks. That is when the Rwandan people in general and RAF in particular realised that RPF's hidden agenda was to seize power in Kigali using force. Indeed, that view is shared by well-informed observers and those who are familiar with the history of Rwanda (Mr Jean Paul Harroy, *Dernier Résident du Ruanda-Urundi*; television debate in Belgium, October 1990).

The people of Rwanda are the victims of the current state of affairs viewed from a geopolitical standpoint, and the superpowers' fight for domination. Although RPF wanted to seize power, in a sense, it helped further the plan of certain superpowers for a presence in the heart of Africa to enable them to not only have easy control over the rest of the continent but also to spread their culture and influence.

The RPF readily conspired with them, because they had a common goal. The uncalled-for defence of RPF's interests by the United States and Anglo-Saxon presence in Rwanda speak for themselves.

Moreover, everyone knows those who sponsored the war against Rwanda, with Uganda as an intermediary. Indeed, the Arusha Peace Agreement did not provide for the repayment of the debts contracted by RPF. The RPF had no choice but to resume the war –if only because it was instigated or threatened by its sponsors– seize power and exploit the Hutus in order to settle its debts. Evidence of that is the current plundering of the country's reserves.

Section 2: November 1990 – December 1992

§1. Resumption of hostilities by RPF

Having been defeated in the Mutara region, RPF retreated to Uganda and later opened up a new front at Byumba (Gatuna, Kivuye and Cyungo) on 3 November 1990, and continued shelling Rwandan territory from Uganda. All the attacks from Byumba were also quickly repelled and the assailants driven back into Uganda. By the time the head of State visited Gabiro, on 7 December 1990, there were no more enemies on Rwandan soil.

Dissatisfied with ensuing negotiations (clearly, what RPF wanted was not peace, but seizing power by force), it launched an attack on the town of Ruhengeri on 23 January 1991 and carried out the selective killing of the Hutu civilian population and several gendarmes at the Muhoza gendarmerie station; it opened the doors of Ruhengeri prison, took "its people". That is when the escaped convicts seized the opportunity to disperse and create insecurity throughout the region. The RPF's selective killings caused ethnic clashes and anger among the population.

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Moreover, RPF engaged in torture and mutilation. It gathered people in houses or public places and massacred them by shooting them, throwing grenades at them or by torching the houses.

Moreover, it violated the ceasefire agreement signed in N'sele on 29 March 1991 by launching several attacks and shelling Ruhengeri, Byumba and Mutara. The Ministry of Defence letter (No. 0175/01.1.9 dated 4 February 1992) vividly describes the situation during the months of December 1991 and January 1992; so does the fax addressed to the MINAFFET as regards the period 3-18 June 1991. The killings and destruction of the camps for displaced persons at Rwebare and Rukomo reflect RPF's brutality. Because of the June 1992 attacks on Byumba, 300,000 people were forced to leave their homes and flock to camps for displaced persons. The RPF mistreated war prisoners and the many civilians who were kidnapped in the buffer zone and/or forcibly enlisted in RPA ranks (letter No. 2201/06.1.9 dated 6 October 1992, Ministry of Defence). Moreover, RPF stepped up its recruitment and infiltration of the opposition parties (Joint Declaration, Brussels, 29 May 1992). That led to an increase in political demonstrations, as well as ethnic and political clashes.

Shyongi and Kigali-Ville: November 1992 – Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kibuye and Cyangugu: November-December 1992, January 1993.

In addition to that, it launched grenade and bomb attacks and laid mines with the clear intent of causing chaos in the country. The negotiations enabled RPF to prepare new attacks rather than seek durable peace (letter No. 1660/01.1.0 dated 16 August 1992, Ministry of Defence). Hence, while the Government's efforts were focused on the negotiations (in compliance with the Arusha ceasefire protocol, repeated concessions), RPF engaged in subversive activities (letter No. 2098/06/1/0 dated 23 September 1992, Ministry of Defence). Even as that was going on, recruitment and sensitisation were in full swing and young Tutsis were organising clandestine training in archery and other military skills (letter No 2460/06.1.0 of 28 October 1992, Ministry of Defence and letter No. 2894/06.1.9 of 17 December 1992, Ministry of Defence).

§ 2. Activities of the Forces Armées Rwandaises

When the October 1990 war ended, RAF provided security at the borders and played a role in preventing and cracking down on ethnic unrest in the areas concerned. They also intervened in Kabaya *sous-préfecture*, Mutara *Commune* and Ruhengeri *préfecture* when RPF attacked Ruhengeri town, on 23 January 1991. While RPF violated the N'sele [ceasefire] Agreement as amended at Gbadolite, RAF were engaged in warding off its attacks, providing security for the civilian population and protecting the integrity of the country's borders. That was the case during RPF's widespread attacks on Ruhengeri, Byumba and Mutara, in June 1992. The Gendarmerie also participated in missions to restore and maintain order during political demonstrations in the wake of the introduction of the multiparty system (Constitution of 10 June 1991) and the installation of the coalition Government in April 1992 made up of the MRND, CDR, PSD, PL and PDC parties.

Section 3. January 1993 – 4 August 1993

§ 1. Resumption of hostilities by RPF

While RAF were engaged in the important task of restoring law and order following the ethnic unrest of late 1992 and had dispatched elements to protect displaced persons, RPF

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launched a large-scale attack on Ruhengeri town, as well as on Ruhengeri and Byumba *préfectures* on 8 February 1993, in violation of the N'sele Ceasefire Agreement, of 29 March 1991, as amended at Gbadolite on 16 September 1991 and at Arusha on 12 July 1992. During the attack, it massacred tens of thousands of Hutus (intellectuals, administrative, political and judicial officials, as well as peasants). As the attack was severely condemned by both the people of Rwanda and the international community, RPF was ordered to return to the positions it occupied before 8 February 1993 and a buffer zone was created to separate RPF from the Government forces (RAF). However, RPF did not fully evacuate the zone. It continued to engage in terrorist activities there, setting up roadblocks and conducting patrols. It massacred elected officials after suffering humiliating defeat in the elections for *bourgmestres* and *conseillers* in the said zone. It continued violating the ceasefire agreement so as to provoke RAF into launching a counter-attack and use that as a pretext for resuming the war.

§ 2. Activities of the Forces Armées Rwandaises

While continuing with the mission of protecting displaced persons and restoring order, RAF resisted and warded off RPF attack. After the creation of the buffer zone, RAF went about raising awareness about the Arusha peace negotiations and the measures aimed at ensuring the successful implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, including the demobilisation and integration of the Armed Forces of both parties. They strictly abided by the ceasefire (See related directives). They supported the coalition government's efforts to restore peace.

Section 4. 4 August 1993 - 6 April 1994

§ 1. Violation of the Arusha Peace Agreement by RPF

After the 4 August 1993 signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, putting an end to the war, RPF continued on the course that would inevitably lead to war:

- It violated the ceasefire
- It set up combat positions
- [Supplies in materiel (weapons *missing segment*] and ammunition) did not cease despite the presence of UNOMUR, deployed at the Rwanda-Uganda border.
- It engaged in large-scale infiltration of the government zone.
- It recruited personnel
- It increased sensitisation and incitement of hatred and violence by Radio Muhabura.
- Its infiltrators, in collaboration with UNAMIR's RPF team, engaged in widespread acts of terrorism and selective killings of political leaders in order to, once again, provoke ethnic unrest.

The Arusha Peace Agreement provided for the pre-positioning of RPF battalion charged with providing security for RPF authorities in Kigali. The battalion, based at the CND, turned out to be a Trojan horse and prepared the war (recruitment, infiltration of men and weapons, distribution of weapons to Tutsis, setting up of combat positions, etc.). Vehicles travelling to Mulindi would take recruits and bring back more soldiers and arms on their return trip. At the end of March, there were an estimated 3,000 RPF infiltrators in Kigali. That is how heavy weapons, including SAM 7 missiles, were introduced into the CND.

§ 2. Approach of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (RAF)

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In addition to performing the task of protecting displaced persons and maintaining order, RAF were coping with terrorist acts carried out by RPF infiltrators in the rear. At the front, RAF strictly complied with the ceasefire. The command at all levels focused on raising the awareness of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* to the benefits of the Arusha Peace Agreement and preparing the men for demobilisation and integration. Demobilisation and integration committees were formed and criteria for demobilisation were formulated and communicated to the troops. Directives on the rules of procedure were issued and well received.

Section 5. 6 April – 17 July 1994 (Rwandan tragedy)§1. Real causes of the Rwandan tragedy

The Rwandan tragedy was caused by the war that RPF imposed on the people of Rwanda; the war upset the peace of a people who had been living in harmony for 17 years, thanks to the Peace and Unity policy; it re-ignited resentment and inflamed violence, hatred and intolerance. Furthermore, RPF prosecuted the war by systematically killing the Hutus as it advanced.

The RPF dug in its heels throughout the war, as its intent in starting the war was to destroy whatever had been achieved in the political domain and the repatriation of the refugees, as those achievements were viewed as an obstacle to its quest for power. It considered the ceasefire and negotiations as an opportunity to reorganise itself in order to launch a more deadly offensive.

Despite the benefit of the lion's share and the concessions made by the Rwandan Government in the Arusha Peace Agreement and, RPF was not satisfied, because the Agreement did not provide for its having absolute power; it therefore stayed on the war course. It meddled in the internal affairs of the government and the political parties in a bid to obstruct the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement and use that as a pretext to resume the war.

The RPF's tactic prompted renewed awareness among the political parties, which had become allies out of self-interest. The parties realised that RPF was double-faced and that they had been taken in for quite sometime. The signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement ended the marriage of convenience contracted in Brussels between RPF and the parties united under the umbrella of *Forces Démocratiques du Changement* [democratic forces for change].

The renewed awareness led to the formation of a common front in keep things in check, because RPF wanted it all. In a bid to thwart this move, RPF assassinated influential political leaders and threatened others. The assassination victims included Félicien Gatabazi, National Secretary of the PSD party, who was assassinated during the night of 21 to 22 February 1994, and Martin Bucyana, CDR party Chairman, who was assassinated on 22 February 1994. The people threatened included Stanislas Mbonampeka of the PL party, Donat Murego, National Secretary of the MDR party, and Justin Mugenzi, PL party chairman.

It will be recalled that on 18 May 1993, RPF assassinated Emmanuel Gapyisi, leader of the MDR party for Gikongoro *préfecture*, president of the *Forum Paix et Démocratie* [peace

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and democracy forum], which was formed after RPF's February 1993 bloody attacks on the Hutu civilian populations in Ruhengeri and Byumba *préfectures*. The *Forum* condemned RPF's crimes and urged the Hutus to form a common front to fight it. The assassination intimidated the members of the Forum, as they did not pursue their goals.

However, they were not intimidated by the assassination of Félicien Gatabazi and Martin Bucyana or by threats and failed attacks directed against other political party leaders.

As President Habyarimana symbolised unity, despite his being calculatingly demonised by RPF and its sponsors in a bid to tarnish his image, RPF assassinated him on 6 April 1994 and resumed hostilities in order to, once again, impair the renewed awareness of the Hutus and seize power by force. It was not unaware that that by assassinating the President, it would trigger ethnic unrest and clashes which would enable it to massacre the Hutus during what it termed "punitive expeditions". However, it was unaware that its heinous act would spark things off and set the entire country ablaze.

As the country could not deploy soldiers on every square inch, RPF personnel, dressed in military uniform or civilian clothes, would circumvent [RAF positions to go and massacre the civilian population. This aroused the people's instinct to self-preservation *missing segment*]

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Majoy-General Juvenal Habyarimana, the Republic of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira and their entourage. The same night, RPF elements who had infiltrated the city of Kigali, began carrying out killings in the various parts of the city and to fire shots in order to cause panic and confusion. Already, in the morning of 7 April 1994, RPF battalion based at the CND went out and took strategic positions in the city of Kigali, particularly in Remera, Kicukiro, Gikondo, Gatsata and Gisozi. Groups of infiltrators in the city emerged from their hiding places. In the afternoon, the bulk of RPF battalion at the CND attacked the Presidential Guard barracks at Kimihurura, while the pre-positioned detachments started to fire shots and barricading the roads leading into the city.

The RPF battalion at the CND unleashed its heavy artillery and began pounding the Kacyiru gendarmerie barracks and certain parts of the city. At the front, RPF troops started advancing, crossed the buffer zone and attacked *Forces Armées Rwandaises* positions in Byumba, Ruhengeri and Mutara. Everywhere they passed, the RPF indiscriminately massacred more Hutu peasants, intellectuals, women, elderly people and children that it had done before. During the three and half months of fighting and after, RPF steadfastly carried out its plan consisting in the genocide of the Hutus, with the view to establish a numerical Hutu-to-Tutsi balance and end the "myth of the majority Hutu ethnic group". It therefore rejected the ceasefire RAF proposed on 7 and 12 April 1994 in order to free up military personnel for law enforcement duties, and opposed the negotiations undertaken to that effect. The RPF thus thwarted the efforts of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* by preventing them from intervening to put end to the ethnic massacres.

§3. Reaction of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises*

On hearing the news of the attack on the presidential plane, the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* issued a message to the Nation through the Ministry of Defence, urging the people to remain calm. The message was broadcast in the early morning hours on 7 April 1994. A crisis committee was formed 7 April 1994 in the morning, and was charged with the task of facilitating the putting in place of institutions and **FUNCTION**.

The committee, in turn, addressed a pacification message to the Nation in the evening of 7 April 1994. The message also urged RPF to cease hostilities they had resumed in order to allow the restoration of peace. Pacification orders were given to units. Despite the resumption of hostilities by RPF, the Gendarmerie provided protection to the people under their care (parishes, hotels, etc.) in the places it could reach, and went on pacification tours in the places where it was not come under attack by pre-positioned RPF groups.

On 11 April 1994, issued another pacification message to the population.

On 12 April 1994, RAF command proposed a truce to RPF in order to negotiate a ceasefire, free up troops for law enforcement duties and embark on the putting in place of the broad-based transitional institutions [missing segment] massacres at the expense of the population. On several occasions, the Ministry of Defence and the Army and Gendarmerie General Staffs urged the members of the public to remain calm. All the efforts were in vain until RPF threatened to sequester the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* delegation to the UNAMIR Headquarters at the Amahoro Hotel, on 17 June 1994. The negotiations were suspended. During three and half months of fighting, the military authorities issued repeated pacification messages by means of communiqués and interviews. The RPF ignored the

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recommendations made at the OAU Summit held in Tunis according to which the warring parties were to mark an immediate ceasefire.

CHAPTER II. ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE RPF: Planning and execution of the genocide by RPA

Section 1. Genocide of the Hutus at the hands of RPA

§1. The RPA plan for the Hutu genocide

III. Incitement of hatred and violence

The RPF planned the Hutu genocide by inciting ethnic hatred and violence, fostering aggressiveness and conceit amongst the Tutsis and putting the Hutus on the defensive:

- Already in the 1980s, in his review, *Impuruza* [mobilisation for combat, warning] edited in California, Alexandre Kimenyi embarked on a campaign aimed at mobilising the Tutsis all over the world against the Hutus in Rwanda.
- In December 1990, in Issue No. 17 of *Impuruza*, Kimenyi stated that the Tutsis had to expel the Hutus from Rwanda or exterminate them (physical and genetic extermination).
- Since 1990, the RPR radio station, *Radio Muhabura*, has instigated and exacerbated ethnic tension.
- In February 1993, the pro-RPF newspaper *Kanguka* wrote: "When will RPF arrive so that the Hutus can also go into exile for 30 years."
- In a special communiqué issued by the MDR party on 24 October 1992, Faustin Twagiramungu, RPF accomplice, who had infiltrated the MDR and later became RPF Prime Minister, incited the people to rise up, use force and challenge the authorities.
- The war RPF started on 1 October 1990, the incessant ceasefire violations, the violation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, the massacre of the Hutu populations wherever it passed and often on the indication of Tutsis, the assassination of Hutu political leaders by RPF, the infiltration of combatants and equipment, the arming of Tutsis, the 6 April 1994 assassination of the heads of state of Rwanda and Burundi and their delegations, including the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff; RPF's simultaneous resumption of the war on all fronts on 7 April 1994 ... those were all factors that caused a great deal of suffering among the people and forced them to defend themselves out of despair.
- Throughout the war, the Tutsis cheered every RPF achievement while the Hutus were left in mourning and anxiety. That was particularly the case in urban areas, where the Tutsis feasted while the Hutus grieved. The Tutsis provoked the Hutus in public and private schools, threatening them by saying that they were bound for exile and that RPF were coming. The worst was avoided thanks to President Habyarimana, whom the people regarded as the symbol of unity and peace despite the aspirations of RPF and their accomplices, from among the power-hungry politicians. In that sense, President Habyarimana's assassination destroyed the very foundation of peace and unity.

II. The RPF's misleading media campaign

- The RPF's strategy had always consisted in stirring up ethnic unrest, because it was aware that the Tutsi minority ethnic group would ultimately be the victims thereof. Its aim was to claim that it was a "genocide", that way it could set against the international community

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against the Hutus and thus justify its attacks. It will be recalled that already in 1990 and January 1993, RPF had attempted to accuse the Rwandan Government of genocide following the clashes which took place in the *Communes* of Kibilira, Mutura, Kayove, Rutsiro and Ndusu. The RPF used genocide as a trump card in order to win support from the international community. In every case, the regime in place and RAF averted clashes and thereby torpedoed RPF's evil designs. The RPF massacred Hutu elected officials and political leaders in order to rouse anger and unrest; once again, the regime in place and RAF were able to deal with the situation. The aim of RPF in assassinating political leaders was to cause unrest and use that a pretext to resume hostilities, massacre the Hutus in what it termed "punitive expeditions", and thereby realise its genocide plan consisting in trimming down the Hutu majority without the attracting the attention of the international community.

Hence, RPF's lists, on the basis of which certain countries to issue arrest warrants before the completion of the ITR investigations, contain names of people that RPF wants to "put out of action" because it considers them to be a problem.

Examples:

- ❖ Major General Augustin Bizimungu is an RPF target, because, while he was commander of the Ruhengeri Operation sector, RPF suffered many a humiliating RPF defeat and loss. He makes Kagame feel insecure because the Rwandan people are very fond of him; besides, he is educated and properly trained. Kagame does not want him in the National Army provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement, because he would become the chief of staff, and Kagame would only be his assistant. Major General Bizimungu was appointed army chief of staff on 17 April 1994 but did not take up his duties until 21 April 1994, i.e two weeks after the outbreak of the war and the massacres that his predecessor, Brigadier General Marcel Gatsinzi, had failed to stop. Moreover, RPF had rejected the ceasefire and was pursuing the war, thus preventing RAF from freeing up personnel for law enforcement duties. Nevertheless, RAF's efforts as well as their pacification messages to the people and RAF show that they were genuinely pursuing peace.
- ❖ Likewise, Brigadier General Gratien Kabiligi is an RPF target, because, while he was commander of the Byumba operation sector, RPF suffered many losses [he inflicted severe losses on RPF, which did not wish to have him in the national army either. And yet, this is a trained officer known for his valour. *missing segment*] + [*unintelligible segment*].
- ❖ Retired Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, *Directeur de Cabinet* of the Ministry of Defence, assumed his responsibilities as a politician in collaboration with RAF command during the difficult moments and the institutional void created by the assassination of the President, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana. Thanks to his determination, the coup d'état RPF was preparing to carry out within three days was foiled. Kagame does not want to see him as long as lives.
- ❖ Lt. Col Anatole Nsengiyumva, who was head of the military intelligence service of the Rwandan Army General Staff until June 1993, possesses a great deal of information on RPF's brutality, deceit, bad faith and weaknesses. He is another person Kagame does not want to see in the National Army.

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- ❖ All the officers who served with the Presidential Guard Battalion. Kagame hates and demonises them in the same way as he hated and demonised President Habyarimana.

In the final analysis, RPF drew up the list of alleged genocide perpetrators as part of its intellectual genocide plan consisting in eliminating the entire Hutu elite, as it was the obstacle to establishing the regime of the minority Tutsi ethnic group.

As regards the Presidential Guard Battalion, which RPF, the media and all the other detractors accuses of all the crimes, one wonders how it could have gone all across the country massacring the Tutsis while at the same time defending against the UNAMIR-backed RPF attacks on its Kimihurura barracks. The RAF recognise that some people in military uniform committed massacres. It should be mentioned that it was not possible to distinguish the Presidential Guard from the rest. It is therefore unfair to point the finger the Presidential Guard, particularly its officers. The fact of the matter is that RPF harbours hard feelings against the Presidential Guard, as explained earlier. In fact, it suggested its dissolution during the Arusha negotiations. The RPF does not want to have the Presidential Guard personnel in the National Army ranks.

- It [RPF] killed the head of State knowing that ethnic unrest would ensue, and immediately launched hostilities on all fronts in order to keep the *Forces Armées [Rwandaises]* from cracking down on the unrest. Indeed, if RPF had accepted the ceasefire proposed by RAF right after the resumption of hostilities, on 7 April 1994, and put down its arms, RAF would have had troops available for law enforcement duties and stopped the unrest without difficulty.
- Thanks to its misleading media campaign, RPF convinced the international community that President Habyarimana was a tyrant who was disliked by his people and that his political and/or physical elimination would be greeted with a sense of relief. That is how it won allies who helped it realise its evil plan. However, President Habyarimana's death proved the contrary.
- The RPF and its sponsors claim that the Tutsi genocide was prepared by President Habyarimana, his circle and RAF. However, logic would dictate that the person who plans genocide also expects carry it out. Now, given that the President's assassination is what triggered the ethnic massacres, the question is: did the President play the martyr in order to trigger the genocide by personally ordering his assassins to shoot down his plane on his return from Dar es Salaam? Did the President's circle, specifically his wife, order his assassination? And why would have acted in that manner? Could the Rwandan Army deprive itself of its Supreme Chief, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana, and Chief of Staff, General Déogratias Nsabimana, who were well liked and respected by the *Forces Armées* as whole, knowing that their death would create chaos in the Army and that RPF would make capital thereof?
- The RAF were in favour of President Habyarimana, whom they liked and respected as their elder brother and supreme chief.
- Furthermore, the presidential plane was shot down using Soviet-made SAM-7 missile, which the *Forces Armées* never had; besides, no one within the *Forces*

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Armées knew how to use them. Moreover, since the October 1990 war, RPF had shot down RAF planes using projectiles (one reconnaissance plane at Matimba on 3 October 1990, one Gazelle helicopter at Nyakayaga, on 23 October 1990, one Ecureuil helicopter in Cyeru Commune, Ruhengeri *préfecture*, on 13 March 1993). Captain Barril obtained eyewitness testimony. Also, a Belgian UNAMIR soldier told the Rwandan army military intelligence service that RPF battalion at the CND had SAM-7 missiles. Only RPF soldiers and the Belgian UNAMIR contingent knew how to use them. Furthermore, when the war started, RPF swore to eliminate President Habyarimana both politically and physically.

- Considering the presumptions, the assassin is the one who benefits from the crime. There is no foundation for accusing RAF of this crime, as they had nothing to gain from it even if they had defeated RPF militarily in the April-July 1994 war. Indeed, the successive RAF victories since October 1990 did not bring an end to the conflict. For their part, RAF welcomed the Arusha Peace Agreement despite the substantial concessions made to RPF. They did not expect any benefit besides the re-establishment of peace in the country, something the people of Rwanda thought they had achieved with the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, on 4 April 1994. Indeed, it will be recalled that RAF have always supported the Arusha Peace Agreement and, in fact, they demand its implementation *mutatis mutandis*. On the other hand, the fact that RPF stands to benefit from the crime needs no further proof. It not only afforded it an opportunity to fulfill its long-standing craving for absolute power, but it also enabled them to carry out, by means of successive reactions, the annihilation of the Hutu ethnic group as a form of revenge.

§ 2. The Hutu genocideIV. 1 October 1990 – 4 April 1993A. Massacre of the civilian population

In the early days of the fighting, RPF encountered few problems, as the Mutara region was inhabited mainly by ethnic Hima herders, a pro-RPF component of the Tutsi ethnic group. As they advanced, the *Inkotanyi* quickly became disillusioned, because the people put up fierce resistance. They thus started to carry out all manner of brutal acts: looting, forced recruitment, including that of children, kidnappings, massacres, torture and mutilation (ripping people's stomachs open, cutting off women's breasts, lopping off genitals, gouging people's eyes out, cutting people's tongues, etc.).

Already in 1990, in a bid to justify the massacre of thousands of Hutu civilians, Jacques Bihogagara, then RPF spokesperson in Europe, stated this: "Everyone must pay, even those who are not directly concerned." (*Africa International*, No. 260). Hence, RPF executed the plan to exterminate the Hutus, including children, old people, disabled people and pregnant women. Hundreds of people were grouped together in houses and public places and brutally massacred using guns, grenades, bayonets (breasts cut off, eyes gouged out, genitals lopped off, pregnant women's wombs ripped open, old people's stomachs ripped open, etc.). Patients were atrociously killed in hospitals and health centres during raids or shelling. People displaced by war were pursued in their camps and savagely massacred. During the bloody attack of 8 February 1993, over 150,000 Hutu civilians were segregated and massacred, and over 1,000,000 victims were displaced. (AJR: "*Rwanda, l'autre face du génocide*", p. 25). In fact, according to *Radio Muhabura*, the resumption of hostilities on 8 February 1993 was "an RPF punitive raid

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on the Hutus following the massacre of the Bagogwe, a people of Tutsi origin". The following examples illustrate how the plan was executed:

- In October 1990, RPA massacred tens of thousands of Hutu civilians (mainly peasants) in and around the Mutara region during an invasion that began on 1 October 1990.
- Between 23 January 1991 (invasion of Ruhengeri town) and April 1991, tens of thousands of Hutus were massacred by RPF-*Inkotanyi*.
- On 23 January 1991, it is estimated that tens of thousands of civilians were savagely massacred. In fact, a number of Tutsis of Bagogwe descent, who did not favour RPF, were massacred by RPF combatants in the *Communes* of Kinigi and Nkuli.
- On 19 February 1991, three hundred civilians were executed in the localities of Kinigi and Kigombe outside Ruhengeri.
- In March 1991, RPA attacked a camp for Rwandan refugees in Tanzania killing around ten people.
- The RPF has carried out bomb attacks since 1992, killing dozens of people.
- In June 1992, during RPF attack on Byumba, it killed tens of thousands of innocent civilians. Up to 350,000 people were displaced and more than 50 of them died from starvation or disease each day.
- [In September 1992, RPA attacked Nyabwishongwezi in Mutara, massacring thousands of *missing segment?*] Hutus, causing the exodus of hundreds of Hutu displaced persons.
- Between 8 and 26 February, during a NRA-backed RPA attack on Ruhengeri town, the Base area, Byumba and Ngarama, Hutu civilians (peasants, civil servants, teachers, traders and students) were systematically massacred. More than 150,000 were killed and up to 1,000,000 people were displaced.
- At the Gasiza health centre (*Kinigi Commune*), over 50 patients, including a one-day old baby, and the entire staff were executed on 12 February 1993.
- At Musanze secondary school (*Kigombe Commune*), 22 Hutu pupils were grouped together and killed with grenades, on 8 February 1993.
- At Nyamagumba (*Kigombe Commune*), 18 women and five babies were grouped together in a house and killed with bayonets, on 8 February 1993.
- On 10 February 1993, several people were tortured, mutilated (tongues cut, eyes gouged out) and killed with grenades after being grouped together in houses at Nyamagumba, Ruhengeri.
- On 11 February 1993, 1,500 people were grouped together in the Kidaho *Commune* office compound and mowed down with a machine gun.

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- During the night of 11 to 12 February 1993, more than 500 people were grouped together and killed in Nyarutovu *Commune*.
- Between 8 and 15 February 1993, more than 185 people were massacred at Base trading centre (Byumba), in Nyamugali *Commune*.
- On 17 February 1993, three hundred persons seeking safe heaven from war were massacred at Rebero camp, Bwesige *Commune*.
- In the *Communes* of Cyungo, Buyoga, Kibali, Tumba and Ngarama, more than 10,000 peasants were killed in February-March 1993.
- A mass grave containing more than 157 bodies was discovered in RPF zone in March 1993.
- The Hutu leaders assassinated during that period include:
 - GAPYISI Emmanuel, MDR leader, who was assassinated on 18 May 1993 outside his residence at Kicukiro, Kigali; his family believes that he was assassinated by RPF and Faustin Twagiramungu.
 - RWAMBUKA Fidèle, MRND *bourgmestre* of Kanzenze *Commune*.

B. Reference documents:

- Near Ruhengeri town, people were grouped together in houses and killed with grenades or edged weapons. Some of them had their eyes gouged out. (Telegram OPS/93/311, of 11 February 1993 from the Ruhengeri Ops Commander). Those atrocities were observed by, among others, Ministry of Defence and ORINFOR journalists who visited the area on 14 February 1993 (Telegram OPS/93/340 of February 1994 from the Ruhengeri Ops Cmd). They also discovered a mass grave containing an estimated 70 bodies in Gashangiro *secteur*, Mukingo *Commune* (Telegram OPS/93/670 of 25 March 1993 from the Ruhengeri Ops Cmd). That same night of 7 to 8 February 1993, RPF attacked camps for displaced persons, including Kisaro and Rebero. Several displaced persons were killed there.
- The massacres continued in the zone RPF had recently occupied. For example, in Nkumba and Kidaho *Communes*, around 15 February, RPF called the population to attend rallies. Once the people were grouped together, willingly or forcibly, it killed them using grenades (Telegram OPS/93/340 of 14 February 1993 from the Ruhengeri Ops Cmd). Likewise, during the night of 15 to 16 February 1993, no less than 500 civilians were killed around Mucaca and Kabuye. During the night of 23 to 24 February 1993, RPF elements kidnapped an estimated 100 people who had taken refuge at the Mugali Adventist church, Shingiro, Mukingo *Commune*. (Telegram OPS/93/434 of 24 February 1993 from the Ruhengeri Ops Cmd).
- The said kidnappings took place in Ruhengeri and Mutara. In fact, in early March 1993, a large number of people (over 2,000), mainly women and children from Kigasha, Rufunda and Ruyonza, poured into Nyagatare in the wake of the kidnappings of the previous nights (Telegram OPS/93/1134 of 3 March 1993 of the Kibungo Ops Cmdr). Such unlawful activities continued, the victims being people who were trying to return to their homes in

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search of their belongings (Telegram OPS/93/1228 of 7 March 1993 from the Mutara Ops Cmdr). Some people were deported to Uganda. Others were taken to Gisoro from Nkumba. (Telegram OPS/93/596 of 15 March 1993 from the Ruhengeri Ops Cmdr).

- On 9 March 1993, RPF fired on Byumba town with multi-barrelled rocket launchers, killing two prisoners (Telegram INT/OPS/93/730 of 9 March 1993 from the Byumba Ops Cmdr.).
- During the night of 9 to 10 March 1993, another massacre took place at Shingiro (Telegram OPS/93/542 of 10 March 1993 from the Ruhengeri Ops Cmdr).
- Other mass graves were discovered much later. For example, on 19 March 1993, the local civilian population found an estimated 20 bodies in a mass grave near the convent in Ngarama. (Telegram OPS/93/1450 of 19 March 1993 and OPS/93/1505 of 21 March 1993 from the Mutara Ops Cmdr). Likewise, on 6 April 1993, the people of Rukore *secteur*, Cyeru *Commune*, reported a mass grave near the primary school. More than 100 civilians were buried there (Telegram OPS/93/1198 of 6 April 1993, from the Rulindo Ops Cmdr).

V. 4 August 1993 (signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement) - 6 April 1994

A. Massacre of the civilian population

There is evidence that following the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, on 4 August 1993, RPF undermined the nascent peace process. That is evidenced by the many reprehensible acts that were consistent with RPF's strategy and *modus operandi*.

Such acts included violence against the people in the DMZ (buffer zone), repeated attacks to massacre the civilian population, preparations for the resumption of hostilities, including, procurement of arms and ammunition, and political assassinations, and led to the inefaceable Rwandan tragedy and violated the Agreement RPF had signed freely.

- The Hutu leaders assassinated during this period include:
 - Félicien GATABAZI, PSD party leader, during the night of 21 to 22 February 1994, in Kigali, outside his residence in Kimihurura, Kigali.
 - Martin BUCYANA, CDR party leader, on 22 February 1994, in Butare.
 - The director of the Cyohoha-Rukeli tea factory, his assistants and part of their families, in RPF zone, in March 1994.
- Massacres in the *Communes* of Kidaho, Nkumba, Nyamugali, Cyeru and Butaro during the night of 17 to 18 November 1993 which left 51 dead and several wounded.
- Massacre in Mutara *Commune* during the night of 29 to 30 November 1993, and a broad-daylight massacre in Ngenda *Commune*, on 29 November 1993.
- A mass grave containing over 80 bodies was discovered in the Cyohoha-Rukeli tea plantations in March 1994.