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② PK2
A mag jointly prep
w/ 31 Pal will need to be
sent to 3600 Pallaire explaining
DM's decision of 2 Feb.
Mag should be signed by
DCDS as it will be
extremely disappointing
for 3600.

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 25 JANUARY 1994

TO: DCDS\NDHQ\OTTAWA	FROM: DALLAIRE UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: 1-613-992-8812 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT: SITREP ON UNAMIR	
ATTN: J3 PK	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 3	

(Signature)
3 Feb.

1. BELATED SEASONS GREETING FROM RWANDA. CANADIAN CONTINGENT UNAMIR (MYSELF AND MAJ BEARDSLEY) WORKING HARD KEEPING THE PEACE IN DEEPEST DARKEST CENTRAL AFRICA.
2. I WOULD LIKE TO UPDATE YOU PERSONALLY ON OUR OPERATION AS OF 21 JAN 94 AND GIVE YOU A COMPLETE SITREP ON OUR MISSION. THE MISSION WAS MANDATED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 5 OCT 93. I DEPARTED FOR UGANDA FOR UNOMUR MISSION ON 7 OCT 93. I AM ALSO THE CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER IN UGANDA AS WELL AS THE FORCE COMMANDER IN RWANDA FOR UNAMIR. DEPARTED UGANDA FOR RWANDA ON 21 OCT 93 WITH MILITARY ADVANCE PARTY. MONTH OF NOV WAS SPENT ABSORBING THE NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP OF ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. NMOG CONSISTED OF 51 OBSERVERS AND 60 TUNISIAN TROOPS WITH VIRTUALLY NO EQUIPMENT. VERY FEW WORKING VEHICLES, INCOMPATIBLE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND SOME PISTOLS. NEAR END OF NOV BELGIAN BN ARRIVED GIVING US SOME CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION SOME STAFF OFFICERS AND OBSERVERS COMMENCED ARRIVAL. BANGLADESH PROVIDED ABOUT 200 INFANTRY, 100 LOGISTICS, 100 ENGINEERS AND 25 MEDICAL PERSONNEL BUT TOTALLY WITHOUT ANY EQUIPMENT. UN LOGISTICS SYSTEM VERY SLOW TO REACT TO NOV REQUIREMENTS. MISSION AT THIS STAGE GAVE A WHOLE NEW MEANING TO MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY.
3. DEC SAW GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION AS VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT COMMENCED ARRIVING. OBSERVERS AND STAFF OFFICERS CONTINUED TO ARRIVE AND FORCE HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP HEADQUARTERS AND TWO OF OUR SECTOR HEADQUARTERS WERE ESTABLISHED. WE WERE STILL PLAGUED WITH BUDGET PROBLEMS AS THE BUDGET FOR UNAMIR WAS NOT YET APPROVED. NEVERTHELESS WITH THE FORCES AVAILABLE WE INSTITUTED ALL OF OUR MILITARY OBJECTIVES FOR

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pls coord w D.Pal.
3.2.94

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BE CONDUCTED BILINGUALLY. WHILE THE OFFICIAL IMPOSED WORK LANGUAGE OF THE UN IS ENGLISH, UNAMIR IN FACT MUST CONDUCT MOST OF ITS ACTIVITIES IN FRENCH. THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT AND SPECIFICALLY MY STAFF OFFICERS ARE FLUENT IN FRENCH WITH SOME ABILITY IN ENGLISH, THE BANGLADESH STAFF OFFICERS HAVE SOME ABILITY IN ENGLISH BUT NO ABILITY IN FRENCH. IN ADDITION THERE TROOPS SPEAK NEITHER LANGUAGE. THE GHANA STAFF OFFICERS HAVE SOME ABILITY IN ENGLISH BUT ALSO HAVE NO ABILITY IN FRENCH. AS A RESULT THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS EXTENSIVE LANGUAGE PROBLEMS WHICH DETRACT FROM OUR OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. THERE IS A DESPERATE NEED FOR BILINGUAL CANADIAN OFFICERS AND THERE EXISTS AN OUTSTANDING OPPORTUNITY IN FRONT OF THIS COUNTRY AND THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COMMUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THE ADVANTAGES OF BILINGUALISM AND THE CF ABILITY IN THIS AREA.

9. WHEN STRUCTURING THIS MISSION THE UN OPTED FOR A CIVILIAN COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT VICE A MILITARY SIGNALS COMPONENT. IN SHORT THE SYSTEM DOES NOT WORK WELL AT ALL. STAFF OFFICERS ALONE RUN THE COMMAND POSTS AND SPEND THE MAJORITY OF THEIR TIME ON SIGNALLERS DUTIES INSTEAD OF STAFF OFFICER ACTIVITIES. THERE IS A DESPERATE NEED FOR UP TO TEN (10) (ONE OFFICER, ONE SNR NCO AND 8 SIGNALLERS) BILINGUAL SIGNALLERS IN MY FORCE HQ AS OUR NETS MUST WORK IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH. HOWEVER THE MAJORITY OF OUR STAFF OFFICERS CANNOT FUNCTION IN FRENCH. HERE AGAIN IS AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR BILINGUAL CF SIGNALLERS TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR SKILLS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COMMUNITY.

10. I HAVE FORWARDED THIS FAX DIRECTLY TO YOU TO OUTLINE THE PRESENT SITUATION AND SOME OF OUR URGENT PROBLEMS WHICH IT IS MY OPINION CAN ONLY BE REMEDIED WITH AN IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT OF UP TO FIVE CF STAFF OFFICERS, UP TO 10 SIGNALLERS AND UP TO 15 MILITARY OBSERVERS.

11. IN SPITE OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL IMPASSE HERE IN RWANDA, I AM CONFIDENT THIS TEMPORARY SETBACK WILL BE REMEDIED SHORTLY. THIS MISSION WAS SOLD AT THE UN AS A WINNER MISSION. HOWEVER EVEN WITH A POLITICAL SOLUTION THE PRESENT LINGUISTIC, STAFF, OBSERVER AND SIGNALLER PROBLEMS WILL CONTINUE TO PREVENT THIS MISSION FROM ACHIEVING ITS TRUE POTENTIAL. I AM FULLY CONFIDENT ON THE EVENTUAL SUCCESS OF THIS MISSION. IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE SUCCESSFUL WITH GREATER CANADIAN PARTICIPATION.

12. DUE TO THE REASONS OUTLINED ABOVE I AM URGENTLY REQUESTING GREATER CANADIAN PARTICIPATION FOR THE GOOD OF THE MISSION AND ALSO FOR THE IMAGE OF OUR NATION WITHIN THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND ESPECIALLY IN RWANDA. UNAMIR OFFERS THE CF AND CANADA THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE OUR OUTSTANDING EXPERTISE AND SKILLS IN PEACEKEEPING IN A WINNER MISSION. THIS OPPORTUNITY SHOULD NOT BE LOST.

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FRONTIER/CHURCH SPEECH

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PHASE ONE WITHIN THE TIME ALLOCATED. KIGALI WEAPONS SECURE AREA ENFORCED BY UN ESTABLISHED ON 24 DEC AND RPF SECURITY BN AND LEADERSHIP WERE MOVED TO KIGALI WITHOUT INCIDENT ON 28 DEC 93.

4. THE BROAD BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (BBTG) WHICH WAS THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF PHASE ONE HAS NOT BEEN INSTALLED DUE TO POLITICAL IMPASSE. PRESIDENT PRESENTED ONE LIST OF DEPUTIES WHICH OPPOSITION PARTIES LED BY RPF DISPUTE. CONTROVERSY HAS STALEMATED INSTALLATION OF BBTG AND LED TO DETERIORATION OF SECURITY SITUATION. EACH POLITICAL PARTY, ESPECIALLY THE PRESIDENTS, HAS AN ARMED MILITIA. SOME DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN MINOR VIOLENCE. THE PRESENT IMPASSE MUST BE SOLVED SHORTLY OR THE RISK OF RENEWED POLITICAL VIOLENCE.

5. TO THE PRESENT MILITARY OBSERVERS CONTINUE TO ARRIVE AS DO VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. GHANA BN WILL COMMENCE ARRIVAL THIS WEEK AND WILL BE COMPLETE BY MID FEB. WHEELED ARMOURD PERSONNEL CARRIERS ARRIVING THIS WEEK FROM MOZAMBIQUE. BALANCE OF INFANTRY, ENGINEERS, LOGISTICS AND MEDICAL FROM BANGLADESH EXPECTED BY END MOS. PLANNING FOR PHASE THREE (DISENGAGEMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO PARTIES) APR-DEC 94 WELL ADVANCED. IN SPITE OF THE WORST LOGISTICS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS I HAVE EXPERIENCED IN MY CAREER THE MISSION IS ADVANCING ON SCHEDULE.

6. AFTER THE RECONNAISSANCE MISSION TO RWANDA IN SEP, WHICH I LED, THE UN REQ CANADA TO PROVIDE ONE WHEELED ARMOURD PERSONNEL CARRIER COMPANY AS A FORCE RESERVE AND UP TO 15 MILITARY OBSERVERS. BOTH THESE REQUESTS WERE DENIED DUE TO OVER-COMMITMENT IN OTHER MISSIONS. TO DATE REQUESTS FOR ANY FORM OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION HAVE BEEN REJECTED. THE ABSENCE OF ANY ADDITIONAL CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THIS MISSION IS NOTED BY ALL. LET ME HIGHLIGHT TO YOU WHY WE DESPERATELY NEED CF PARTICIPATION IN THIS MISSION.

7. RWANDA HAS A LONG HISTORY OF CANADIAN AID AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. CANADIAN, SPECIFICALLY FRENCH CANADIAN, RELIGIOUS ORDERS ARE ACTIVE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND DISAPPOINTED AT THE LACK OF CANADIAN SUPPORT FOR THIS MISSION. CANADIAN AID ORGANIZATIONS ARE ACTIVE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. NEXT TO THE BELGIAN FLAG THE MOST PROMINENT IS CANADIAN. IN ADDITION MANY OF THE NATIONS POLITICAL LEADERS WERE EDUCATED AT CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAS INVESTED MILLIONS OF AID DOLLARS IN RWANDA, AND NOW AT THE MOST CRITICAL PERIOD SINCE INDEPENDENCE, THE CF IS NOTICEABLY ABSENT WITH THE GREATEST AREA OF CANADIAN EXPERTISE, NAMELY PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION. THE EXPERTISE OF CF IN PEACEKEEPING IS PRAISED BY ALL WITH CONSTANT QUESTIONS AS TO WHY WE ARE NOT SUPPORTING A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN A FRANCOPHONIE MEMBER WHERE OUR EXPERIENCE AND BILINGUAL SKILLS ARE SO DESPERATELY NEEDED.

8. THE PRESENT LINGUISTIC SITUATION IN RWANDA AND WITHIN UNAMIR ALSO DESPERATELY REQUIRES CANADIAN EXPERTISE. THE MAJOR LANGUAGE IN RWANDA IS FRENCH. HOWEVER THE RPF SPEAK ENGLISH AS THEY WERE BORN AND RAISED IN UGANDA, TANZANIA ETC. ALL JOINT MEETINGS MUST