

Pseudonym:

UNAMIRZ-17

Witness Code: UNAMIRZ

# UNAMIR

Code Cable from Dallaire to Annan  
Re: Current Assessment of the Situation in Rwanda and meetings with RGF chief; milita control and map of airport mortar attack

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MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN (ONLY), UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO:

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 25 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR 829

SUBJECT: CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

REFERENCE: A. DPKO CODE CABLE 1233 DATED 21 APRIL 1994  
B. DPKO CODE CABLE 1237 DATED 21 APRIL 1994  
C. UNAMIR CODE CABLE 829 DATED 24 APRIL 1994

APR 27 1994  
15:01

1. FC MET WITH CHIEF OF STAFF (COS) OF THE RGF AND THE PREFECT OF KIGALI. HE ALSO MET SEPARATELY WITH A SENIOR OFFICER WHO IS A LEADER AMONG THE MODERATE ELEMENT OF THE RGF OFFICER CORPS.
2. THE COS DID NOT PROVIDE ANY PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING SIGNS OF MAKING THE REFUGEE TRANSFERS BETWEEN THEIR ZONE AND THE RPF ZONE ANY EASIER IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE. HE STATED HE COULD NOT BRING HIMSELF TO ORDER HIS SOLDIERS TO ASSIST UNAMIR IN ESCORTING REFUGEES WHO WANTED TO GO TO THE RPF SECTOR, THROUGH THE MILITIA\SELF-DEFENCE ROADBLOCKS. HE STATED THAT THE SELF-DEFENCE GROUPS WERE NEEDED FOR THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY, AND ALTHOUGH SOME HAVE GONE OVERBOARD SINCE THE PRESIDENTS DEATH, HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO PACIFY THEM. HE FUTHERMORE STATED THAT UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT GAVE HIM IN WRITING THE RESULTS OF OUR MEETING TWO DAYS AGO WITH THE PM, HE COULD NOT ACTION THESE REFUGEE TRANSFER REQUESTS.
3. IN REFERENCE TO THE SUBJECT OF THE AIRPORT, HE STATED THAT THEIR POSITION WOULD BE MADE CLEAR IN THE ANSWERS WE SHOULD GET TODAY ON OUR PROPOSALS. HE DID NOT COMMENT HIMSELF. FC PRESSED THE SUBJECT OF UNAMIR PRESENCE IN RWANDA AND THE RGF PERSPECTIVE OF ITS USEFULNESS. THE COS REPEATED OFTEN THE ESSENTIALITY OF UNAMIR IN THE CONFLICT BUT REQUESTED THAT WE DO EVERYTHING TO REMAIN NEUTRAL.
4. THE PREFECT WAS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH THE COS EXCEPT THAT HE THOUGHT IT CRITICAL THAT MOVEMENT OF THE REFUGEES BETWEEN ZONES SHOULD BE DONE BOTH WAYS AT THE SAME TIME, OR AS A SWAP. HE ALSO CONFIRMED HIS DESIRE TO REDUCE THE ACTIONS OF

THE MILITIAS\SELF-DEFENCE GROUPS AND THAT HE WAS TAKING STEPS ACCORDINGLY. HOWEVER, OUR CIVIL RADIO MONITORING TEAM REPORTED THAT THE PREFECT'S STATEMENT IN KINYARWANDA YESTERDAY TO THE POLITICAL YOUTHS OF THE MILITIAS TO SHOOT DESERTERS, STEAL CARS FOR MOBILITY, BE EVER VIGILANT ON THE BARRIERS AND HELP SAVE THE COUNTRY. HE DID NOT LEAVE US WITH THE CONFIDENT NOR COMFORTABLE FEELING THAT HE HAD CONTROL NOR THE REAL DESIRE TO POSSIBLY SORT OUT THESE MILITIAS. HE WAS VERY NERVOUS, TENSE, ILL AT EASE AND NOT VERY CONFIDENT ON THE SITUATION. FC BELIEVES THE COS IS ALSO AFRAID OF THE MILITIAS HIMSELF. 10001742

5. THE MEETING WITH THE MODERATE SENIOR OFFICER REVEALED THAT A SEGMENT OF THE OFFICER CORPS IS MOST DISPLEASED AND CONCERNED AT THE TURN OF EVENTS. THIS SENIOR AND VERY RESPECTED OFFICER STATED THAT THE NEW COS WAS NOT IN FULL CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. HE FELT THE GOVERNMENT TO BE MADE UP OF WEAK ELEMENTS OF THE ONE TENDENCY ONLY (THE ONES WHO SURVIVED). HE FELT THE OFFICERS SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD AND ACCEPT THE RPF CEASEFIRE OFFER EVEN THOUGH IT IS VERY DEMANDING AND EVEN DEMEANING. HE FELT THE GOVERNMENT, HAVING FLED, AND PROBABLY WILL DO SO AGAIN, WOULD RUBBER STAMP THE MILITARY DECISION JUST IN ORDER TO SURVIVE. THIS OFFICER SENSED THE EFFECTIVE RPF TACTICAL MOVES AROUND THE CAPITAL AND HE HOPED THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CITY MAY BE AVOIDED WITH A CEASEFIRE.

6. THIS OFFICER, AND A FEW OTHERS KNOWN TO THE FC, ARE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL LEADERS FOR THE POST-CONFLICT PERIOD IF WE EXPECT TO SEE ANY RECONCILIATION. FC BELIEVED IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE WITH RPF, SHOULD THE SITUATION REQUIRE IT, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THEY COULD SURVIVE ANY ONSLAUGHT.

7. FC WILL BE REVIEWING THIS LATTER POINT AND OTHERS (LIKE REFUGEE MOVEMENT) WITH MGEN KAGAME (RPF COMMANDER) TOMORROW. IT IS HOPED THAT A DEAL CAN BE MADE.

8. ON THE HUMANITARIAN SIDE, THE HA TOOK ANOTHER DAY TO ASSESS THE SITUATION WITH TRIPS UP NORTH TO MULINDI. DUE TO THE BUTARE MASSACRE, THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, THE PILLAGING OF RED CROSS REFUGEE SUPPLIES BY THE MILITIAS, THE SECURITY SITUATION AND THE LACK OF GUARANTEES, THE ICRC SHUT DOWN OPERATIONS IN RWANDA TODAY AND ONLY STAYING PUT FOR THE TIME BEING. WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE, EXPERIENCE AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ICRC OUR FUTURE HUMANITARIAN ROLE IS QUESTIONABLE AT BEST. IN ADDITION THE TWO CANADIAN FORCES HERCULES AIRCRAFT IN NAIROBI FLYING IN SUPPORT OF UNAMIR WILL BE WITHDRAWN BY 30 APRIL. WITH OUR CIVILIAN CONTRACT AIRCRAFT REFUSING TO FLY INTO KIGALI DUE TO INSURANCE CANCELLATION, THE AIRLIFTING OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE. THIS IS ALSO A SOURCE OF CONCERN FOR THE FC IF THE POSSIBLE AERIAL EXTRACTION OF UNAMIR IS REQUIRED.

9. TODAY 4 FLIGHTS WERE SCHEDULED WITH DEFENSIVE STORES, WELFARE ITEMS AND HUMANITARIAN AID. THE HUMANITARIAN AID IS

IMPOUNDED IN NAIROBI BY KENYAN CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND WAS NOT FORWARDED, THE WELFARE ITEMS DID NOT ARRIVE FROM SOMALIA, AND THE SECOND AIRCRAFT WAS UNSERVICEABLE. IN TOTAL ONLY ONE FLIGHT ARRIVED WITH DEFENSIVE STORES. IN ADDITION THE AIRPORT WAS DIRECTLY TARGETED AND HIT WITH MORTAR FIRE ON TWO OCCASIONS. THE FIRST ATTACK PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE HERCULES, COINCIDED WITH THE TAKEOFF OF TWO RGF HELICOPTERS AND CONSISTED OF THREE MORTAR BOMBS (TWO HIT THE APRON WHERE THE HERCULES PARKS AND UNLOADS AND ONE HIT THE TERMINAL BUILDING WHERE TROOPS\REFUGEES AWAIT FLIGHTS). LUCKILY THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES. THE SECOND STRIKE OF 6 BOMBS STRUCK THE APRON, THE RUNWAY AND THE TERMINAL BUILDING. BOTH ATTACKS ARE CREDITED TO THE RPF WHO STATED THEY WERE RETALIATING AGAINST RGF ARTILLERY POSITION (WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY 2 KM FROM THE AIRPORT). ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT IS A SKETCH OF THE MORTAR ATTACKS AT THE AIRPORT. THE FC COMMUNICATED WITH BOTH PARTIES AFTER THE FIRST ATTACK ON THE AIRPORT AND BOTH PARTIES STATED THEY WOULD NOT TARGET UNAMIR. HOWEVER, THE SECOND ATTACK OCCURRED COINCIDENTALLY WITH THE LAUNCHING OF RGF HELICOPTERS FROM THE AIRPORT. THIS ONLY REINFORCES THE NECESSITY OF THE RGF AGREEING TO MAKE THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL GROUND UNDER SOLE UNAMIR CONTROL AND SECURITY SO THAT THE AIRPORT WILL NOT BE THE SCENE OF ATTACKS AND RETALIATION. THIS WILL ALLOW IT TO BE USED FOR HUMANITARIAN AID DELIVERIES AND IF NECESSARY THE EXTRACTION OF UNAMIR. IN ADDITION, AT APPROXIMATELY 1900 HOURS 3 MORTAR BOMBS LANDED IN THE VICINITY OF THE FORCE HQ. IT WAS A VERY UNSUCCESSFUL AND DANGEROUS DAY IN KIGALI. FOR THE FIRST TIME, UNAMIR HAS BEEN DIRECTLY TARGETED WITH INDIRECT FIRE. AGREEMENTS ON HUMANITARIAN MATTERS LIKE REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES WERE NOT AGREED TO BY THE RGF AND THE AIRPORT AGREEMENT WAS NOT NOR IS IT LIKELY TO BE FINALIZED IN SHORT ORDER. IN ADDITION, THE HUMANITARIAN AID DID NOT ARRIVE AND THE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK OF THE RED CROSS HAS BEEN CLOSED TO UNAMIR. IT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED THAT THE ATROCITIES OF THE MILITIAS CONTINUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT NOT BEING PERFECTLY CLEAR ON ITS INTENTIONS WITH THIS LARGE, RUTHLESS FORCE IN THEIR REAR ORDERS. THE MILITIAS ARE A VIRUS THAT WAS PLANTED BY CERTAIN EXTREMIST ELEMENTS AND IS NOW MALIGNANT AND OUT OF CONTROL. THEY REPRESENT THE SINGLE GREATEST THREAT TO UNAMIR AND ITS MISSION. THEY ARE MOST CERTAINLY THE REAL ELEMENT THAT MUST BE ERADICATED BY FORCE IF ANY SECURITY IS TO BE REESTABLISHED. A CHANGE OF MANDATE TO HELP BOTH SIDES SORT OUT THIS PROBLEM IS CERTAINLY AN OPTION IN THE FC'S MIND.

10. THE FC VIEWS THE TACTICAL BATTLE CONTINUING FOR SEVERAL MORE DAYS UNLESS THE RPF SUDDENLY RUN OUT OF STEAM OR THE RGF COLLAPSE. THE LAY OF THE LAND PROJECTS A SITUATION THAT COULD RESEMBLE A CYPRUS TYPE OF CEASEFIRE AND SUBSEQUENT PEACE ACCORD. CONVERSATIONS WITH RPF SENIOR LEADERS INDICATE THAT THE CONCEPT OF RECONCILIATION AND INTEGRATION, PRINCIPLE THEMES OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD, MAY NOT SEE THE DAY IN THE NEXT PEACE ACCORD. THERE SEEMS TO BE A MORE DIVISIVE CONCEPT FOR RWANDA LURKING IN THE WINGS. IT WOULD LOOK MORE LIKE AN RPF ZONE AND AN RGF ZONE WITH A GREEN LINE OF MONITORING AND PATROLLING BETWEEN THE TWO. EACH WOULD HAVE ITS FORCES AND






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GOVERNMENT BUT THERE WOULD BE A CENTRAL FEDERAL HIGH COMMAND AND A SIMILAR ARRANGEMENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. FC HAS ORDERED THE PLANS SECTION TO PRODUCE A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND AN OUTLINE PLAN ON THIS THEME AS A POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY.

11. REGARDS.

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⊗ Mortar Bombs

