This interview gives Dominique de Villepin the opportunity, more than 30 years after the events, to present a particularly favorable account of his role in French policy regarding Rwanda. Alain Juppé's former chief of staff portrays himself essentially as a clear-sighted witness to a tragedy to which France allegedly tried to respond through diplomacy and, subsequently, humanitarian action. The interview concludes with Dominique de Villepin in tears as he speaks of the genocide. However, comparing this account with contemporary archives suggests a significantly less edifying picture. Dominique de Villepin was no mere outside observer of French policy in Rwanda. As early as July 24, 1992, while serving as Deputy Director of African and Malagasy Affairs, he signed a memo titled
Action de la France au Rwanda, in which he noted that France had deployed troops to Rwanda and "
intensified [its] cooperation with the Rwandan army". During the genocide, he served as Alain Juppé's chief of staff, placing him at the heart of the French diplomatic and interministerial chain of command precisely when decisions regarding Rwanda were being made. The events of July 1994 are particularly embarrassing in this regard: at a time when the highest levels of the French government were debating whether to arrest the leaders of the interim government present in the Zone Turquoise, the
Duclert Commission report attributed a specific phrase directly to Dominique de Villepin: "
We need to pass the buck to someone else". Then, on
July 15, 1994, the Armed Forces General Staff sent a fax to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explicitly marked "
for the attention of Mr. de Villepin", informing him of the presence of members of the Interim Government in Cyangugu. The timeline is worth noting: at the very moment when the officials of the government orchestrating the genocide were within reach of French forces, Dominique de Villepin was part of the decision-making core; he advocated leaving their arrest to others and personally received information regarding their whereabouts. One would have liked the interview to confront the former chief of staff with the questions raised by these archives: what action did he take regarding the fax personally addressed to him on July 15, 1994? What did he do with the information conveyed to him? What personal role did he play in the French stance that led to these officials not being arrested? These questions are all the more legitimate given that Dominique de Villepin himself,
in 2003, claimed a role as a key figure during that period ("
I was Alain Juppé's chief of staff") while speaking of the "
terrible genocides that struck Rwanda". The emotion that overcame Dominique de Villepin at the end of the interview may well be sincere; there is no way to judge. Yet it leads to a singularly convenient conclusion: the actor of 1994 fades into the background, overshadowed by the deeply shaken witness of 2026. And yet, the historian has access to archives that would allow for a return to less emotionally charged questions, such as what Dominique de Villepin knew, the positions he advocated, and the information personally conveyed to him. It is therefore regrettable that the interview concluded with Dominique de Villepin in tears rather than with a confrontation involving those documents.