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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	EUR-01
	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00
	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-00	/025W

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P 141356Z DEC 92  
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2510  
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 05147

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

PARIS FOR PERLOW AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, RW  
SUBJECT: DEMARCHES TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

REFS: (A) KIGALI 5119, (B) KIGALI 5058,  
(C) KIGALI 5027

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1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. INTRODUCTION: ON DECEMBER 10, THE PAPAL NUNCIO AND THE AMBASSADORS OF BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES MET WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA FOR OVER TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS. AS A FOLLOWUP, WE MET WITH THE PRIME MINISTER DECEMBER 11. REFTELS COVER THE ESSENTIAL POINTS FROM THESE MEETINGS; THIS TELEGRAM PROVIDES DETAILS OF THE CONVERSATIONS FOR A SMALL AND SELECT AUDIENCE. END INTRODUCTION.

DEMARCHE TO PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA  
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3. IN OUR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE PAPAL NUNCIO ELABORATED ON THE TALKING POINTS REPORTED REFTEL C, POSING THE BASIC QUESTION WHETHER THE PRESIDENT SAW AN INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND HIS OWN SPEECH OF DECEMBER 1. BOTTOM LINE WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT REFUSED TO BE PINNED DOWN THE SPECIFIC POINT, BUT IN A VARIETY WAYS INSISTED THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED NOW WAS A CONSENSUS ON INTERNAL MATTERS.

4. IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WELCOMED THE ROLE THE WESTERN OBSERVERS HAVE PLAYED IN THE ARUSHA NEGOTIATIONS, HE RECOGNIZED THE ROLE THAT WE HAVE PLAYED IN FORMING THE CURRENT TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND SAID THAT DURING THIS DIFFICULT MOMENT, RWANDA NEEDS THE HELP OF ITS WESTERN FRIENDS. THE PRESIDENT THEN WENT ON TO

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DEFINE THE PROBLEM WHICH IS BLOCKING THE RESOLUTION AS A CONFLICT FOR POWER FROM THE LOWEST LEVEL TO THE TOP. HE SAID THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM IS THE OPPOSITION'S UNWILLINGNESS TO GO TO ELECTIONS FOR BOURGEMESTRES, LEAVING A SENSE OF NEAR ANARCHY IN THE COUNTRY AND A CONTINUING DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION. HE SAID THAT ARUSHA CANNOT SOLVE THIS PROBLEM.

5. ON ARUSHA ITSELF, HE SAID THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION, THAT IS, HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO ALTHOUGH HE SEEMED CAPABLE OF REPRESENTING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY DURING THE FIRST PHASES OF THE ARUSHA PROCESS, SINCE THE SECOND PART OF THE ARUSHA III HE HAS BECOME ONLY A SERVANT OF THE RPF AND THE PARTIES FOR CHANGE. THE PRESIDENT FEELS THESE PARTIES ARE GANGING UP AGAINST HIM, WITH THE ONLY PURPOSE "TO GET RID OF HABYARIMANA" AND THE MRND AS WAS SPELLED OUT IN THE BRUSSELS COMMUNIQUE ON JUNE 3.

6. ASKED AGAIN IF HE ACCEPTED THE PROPOSALS OF THE CLERICS, THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT HIS SPEECH OF DECEMBER 1 WAS QUITE CLEAR. IT CONTAINED: (1)

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AGREEMENT ON AN APPOINTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; (2) AGREEMENT ON A SHORT TRANSITION PERIOD; (3) AGREEMENT ON A LEGALIZING PROCESS FOR THE ARUSHA ACCORDS; UNLIKE THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO BELIEVED THAT A SIGNATURE AT ARUSHA WOULD SUFFICE, HABYARIMANA INSISTS THAT NEITHER THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SIGNATURE NOR THAT OF THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO GIVE  
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LEGAL IMPACT TO AN AGREEMENT. (4) HE ACCEPTED THE OCTOBER 30 PROTOCOL AS IT IS, BUT WILL MAKE IT MORE ACCEPTABLE THROUGH THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION; (5) HE AGREED WITH THE BISHOPS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO CLEAR WINNERS OR CLEAR LOSERS PERMANENTLY. ON THIS POINT, THE PRESIDENT WENT ON AT GREAT LENGTH ABOUT THE PROCESS THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD USED IN COMING UP WITH FIRST THEIR 35 PERCENT FOR THE MRND PROPOSAL AND THEN THEIR FINAL PROPOSAL WHICH DROPPED THE MRND TO THREE SEATS IN THE CABINET. AT THIS STAGE THE PRESIDENT SAYS THAT HIS ANALYSIS IS THAT THE LATEST BISHOPS' PROPOSAL WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF NO PERMANENT WINNERS OR LOSERS.

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SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-01 USIE-00 RPE-00 /025W

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P 141356Z DEC 92  
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
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INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 KIGALI 05147

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

PARIS FOR PERLOW AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, RW

SUBJECT: DEMARCHES TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

7. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CHALLENGED THE PRESIDENT ON THIS POINT, GIVING HIS OPINION THAT THE 35 PERCENT FORMULA WOULD, IN FACT, CREATE A PERMANENT BLOCKING  
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MINORITY, WHEREAS THE BISHOPS' FINAL PROPOSALS WOULD NOT CREATE A PERMANENT MAJORITY AND WOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A BLOCKING THIRD IN THE MINORITY. AMBASSADOR MARTRES SAID THAT THERE IS A BASIC DIFFERENCE; THE FOREIGN MINISTER SEEMED TO BELIEVE THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO RECONCILE THE CLERICS' PROPOSITIONS AND THE LETTER SENT BY THE PRESIDENCY TO THE PRIME MINISTER. IF THE PRESIDENT REJECTS THE POSSIBILITY OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THESE VIEWS, HE SEEMS TO BE REJECTING THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH. IF THAT IS THE CASE, ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR MARTRES, THERE IS NO PLACE TO GO, FOR RWANDA HAS NO OTHER RECOURSE THAN TO LISTEN TO THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH.

8. THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM ARUSHA, PRAISED THE ROLE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN ARUSHA, SAYING THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER BELIEVED THAT HE HAD A LEGAL DECISION, BUT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO RESPECT ALSO THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT EXISTED. ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR

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SWINNEN, THE FOREIGN MINISTER DID A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE JOB IN PRAISING THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND THE LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENCY, AND CONCLUDED THAT A COMPROMISE FORMULA SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN KIGALI.

9. THE PRESIDENT REITERATED HIS STATEMENT THAT THE PROBLEM WAS A FOREIGN MINISTER IN ARUSHA WHO WAS PLAYING HIS PARTY'S GAME. HE SAID TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DIRIA AND OAU SECRETARY GENERAL SALIM SALIM BOTH HAD SUGGESTED TO HABYARIMANA THAT HE EITHER

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REPLACE THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS HEAD OF HIS DELEGATION OR APPOINT AN ASSISTANT OR DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE DELEGATION TO REPRESENT THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS. WE ALSO EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL.

10. THE PRESIDENT THEN SAID THE KEY ISSUE IS WHETHER THE TRANSITION PERIOD SHOULD BE USED FOR A TRANSFER OF POWER TO OTHERS, OR A SHARING OF POWER IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD. HE ASKED THE WESTERN AMBASSADORS IF WE THOUGHT THE TRANSITION SHOULD BE A TIME FOR THE TRANSFER OF POWER FROM THE PRESIDENCY. WE SAID THAT WE AGREED THAT THE TRANSITION WAS NOT DESIGNED TO BE A TRANSFER OF POWER, BUT A PREPARATION FOR A LONG-TERM SOLUTION. I SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THAT COMPROMISES WERE POSSIBLE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CLERGY AND THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. I URGED THE PRESIDENT TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, AND I ADDED THAT I THOUGHT THAT THE POSITION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN ARUSHA WAS AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION, EXPECTED TO REPRESENT TWO DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED VIEWS IN KIGALI. THE BELGIAN AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS SUPPORTED THIS INTERVENTION.

11. THE PRESIDENT THEN SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THEY COULD USE TECHNICIANS AS HAD BEEN USED IN THE PAST TO DEMONSTRATE A RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES FOR A CONSENSUS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO SUCH A METHOD, BUT THAT IT MUST BE QUICK, BECAUSE TIME WAS RUNNING OUT.

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12. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER DIRIA  
HAD SEEMED CONTENT WHEN HE LEFT, AND ASKED ENOCH  
RUHIGIRA TO GIVE A SUMMARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S  
POSITION. RUHIGIRA REPORTED THAT DIRIA HAD TOLD HIM  
THAT HE HAD RECEIVED WORD FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
THAT THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT ON  
PORTFOLIOS AND THAT DIRIA HAD ALSO SUGGESTED THAT  
THEY MIGHT USE THE JPMC TO DEAL WITH DIFFICULT  
POLITICAL PROBLEMS. HE ADDED THAT THE TANZANIAN  
FOREIGN MINISTER TRIED TO SEPARATE THE INTERNAL  
POLITICAL PROBLEMS FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE  
RPF. DIRIA HAD URGED THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
PRESIDENT TO GET TOGETHER TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

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P 141356Z DEC 92  
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2512  
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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARA 19)

PARIS FOR PERLOW AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, RW

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13. AT THIS POINT THE NONCE REPEATED ONCE AGAIN OUR QUESTION ABOUT THE COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION AND THAT OF THE BISHOPS. THE  
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PRESIDENT AGAIN REPEATED HIS STATEMENT THAT THE OBJECTIVE IS TO ACHIEVE A NATIONAL CONSENSUS. HE EXPRESSED ADMIRATION AND AFFECTION FOR THE CHURCH LEADERS BUT EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE CHURCH SHOULD NOT PRESENT ITS PROPOSAL ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT BASIS, BUT RATHER THAT THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS.

14. IN THE END, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD MEET WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON FRIDAY AND HE WOULD ESTABLISH A GROUP OF EXPERTS TO DEVELOP SENARIOS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, AND HE ENCOURAGED THE PAPAL NUNCIO TO TELL THE BISHOPS THAT THEIR JOB IS NOT COMPLETED AND THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO SEEK A CONSENSUS.

DEMARCHE TO PRIME MINISTER  
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15. IN OUR MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THE PAPAL NUNCIO DESCRIBED THE INTEREST OF THE HOLY SEE AND THE FOUR COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN SEEING A PROCESS TOWARD PEACE, AND EMPHASIZED HIS INTEREST IN SUPPORTING THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CATHOLIC CLERGY. THE NONCE POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD REQUESTED THAT JOINT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER BE SENT TO ARUSHA AND EMPHASIZED THE SHORTNESS OF TIME. THE NONCE SAID WE BELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ACCEPTED THE PROPOSALS OF THE CLERGY AS A POINT OF BEGINNING FOR FINDING A NEW CONSENSUS, AND DID NOT REJECT DIALOGUE WITH THE PRIME

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MINISTER, BUT PREFERRED TO DO IT VIA A SMALL  
COMMITTEE.

16. THE PRIME MINISTER GAVE HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE TASK THE CLERGY HAD BEEN ASKED TO UNDERTAKE, AND NOTED THAT THE CLERGY HAD CONCLUDED THAT ARTICLE 14 OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS WAS MEANT TO BE AN OPENING, AND THAT THE DIVISION OF PORTFOLIOS SHOULD BE EQUITABLE. HE ALSO SAID THAT FRIDAY THE 27TH OF NOVEMBER, WHEN HE AND THE PRESIDENT HAD MET WITH THE CLERGY, THEY HAD ASKED THE CLERGY TO PUT TOGETHER A FINAL PROPOSAL WITH THE PRIMARY REQUEST THAT THEY FORMULATE THE PROPOSAL SO THAT NO ONE BLOC WOULD HAVE EITHER AN AUTOMATIC ONE -THIRD OR AN AUTOMATIC TWO-THIRDS VOTE IN THE CABINET.

17. ACCORDING TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE PRESIDENT SAID NEITHER YES NOR NO TO THE FINAL PROPOSITIONS OF THE CLERGY, BUT WENT TO DAR ES SALAAM SEEKING TO INVOLVE THE TANZANIANS AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN KIGALI. THUS, WHEN FOREIGN MINISTER DIRIA CAME TO KIGALI AND TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER HE SHOULD TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER REJECTED HIS ADVICE AS HE HAD ALREADY MET WITH THE PRESIDENT SO MANY TIMES WITH NO RESULT.

18. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN TOLD US THAT HE REJECTS THE CONCEPT OF A TECHNICAL GROUP ALSO. HE SAID IT WOULD BE A DANGEROUS REPUDIATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CLERGY.

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19. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR INTERRUPTED TO SUGGEST THAT THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE WOULD NOT BE A CHALLENGE TO THE CLERGY OR REPETITION OF THEIR WORK, BUT COULD BE ASKED TO WORK ON FINDING NEUTRAL PARTICIPANTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE CLERGY'S PROPOSAL.



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20. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN ASKED AGAIN IF WE BELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS WILLING TO TAKE THE CLERGY RECOMMENDATIONS AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE. SPEAKING FOR ALL OF US, THE NONCE SAID WE BELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD USE THE RECOMMENDATIONS AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE, ALTHOUGH HE MIGHT ALSO WISH TO

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P 141356Z DEC 92  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 KIGALI 05147

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CHANGE MRN 05147 VICE 05142

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
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SUBJECT: DEMARCHES TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

HAVE A TECHNICAL TEAM APPROACH THE CONSENSUS ISSUE  
FROM OTHER POINTS OF DEPARTURE ALSO.

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21. RECOGNIZING THAT HIS ESSENTIALLY NEGATIVE PRESENTATION TO DATE WAS NOT CONVINCING, THE PRIME CONFIDENTIAL

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MINISTER SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS ON THE BASIS OF THEIR RECOMMENDATION, THE CLERGY COULD SEEK TO FIND INDEPENDENT PERSONS TO FILL THE MINISTRIES LABELED "OTHER". HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REASSURE THE PEOPLE THAT THE PROCESS IS CONTINUING. HE THEN OFFERED TO CONTACT THE CLERGY AGAIN. HE ASKED THE NONCE TO DO THE SAME. BUT, THE PRIME MINISTER WARNED, EVEN IF AN INTERNAL CONSENSUS IS DEVELOPED, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO SELL IT TO THE RPF IN ARUSHA, AND THE RPF WILL NOT ENTER THE GOVERNMENT IF THEY BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A PERMANENT ONE-THIRD BLOCKING VOTE BY THE MRND.

22. THE PRIME MINISTER CONCEDED THAT THE TANZANIAN FACILITATOR WAS AWAITING A CONSENSUS IN RWANDA BEFORE PURSUING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ARUSHA. BUT THE PRIME MINISTER SEEMED TO THINK THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GO AHEAD WITH DISCUSSIONS OF GENERAL MATTERS, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY EVEN WITHOUT THE TYPE OF INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE TANZANIANS AND WE WERE ASKING.

23. ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY PARTICULAR PARTIES WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE IN A FUTURE GOVERNMENT, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE CDR WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM FOR HIM, BUT HE NOTED THAT IT WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE RPF. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THE CDR HAS A REAL FOLLOWING WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND IF ONE IS GOING TO SEEK RECONCILIATION OF ALL RWANDANS IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXCLUDE A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE CDR.

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24. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THEN SUGGESTED THAT ONE MIGHT DISCUSS INDEPENDENT PERSONS INSTEAD OF PARTIES AS THE NEUTRAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY.

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25. COMMENT: THE IDEA OF PERSONS RATHER THAN PARTIES AS THE NEUTRAL MEMBERS IN THE GOVERNMENT WAS RAISED WITH AMBASSADOR MARTRES AND WITH THE PAPAL NUNCIO LATE ON DECEMBER 10. APPARENTLY THE SUGGESTION WAS MADE BY PL LEADER MUGENZI AND WAS REPEATED BY PL MINISTER LANDO TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THE NIGHT OF DECEMBER 10. EARLIER ON DECEMBER 10, MUGENZI HAD PROPOSED TO ME THAT I GET THE PRESIDENCY TO PROPOSE TO THE OTHER PARTIES A COMPROMISE IN WHICH THE NEUTRAL MEMBERS WOULD BE MADE UP FROM SMALL PARTIES, PERHAPS THE PD, THE PDI, AND THE RTD. THIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT MADE TO THE PRESIDENCY AFTER OUR CONVERSATION ABOUT ITS POTENTIAL WITHIN THE WESTERN AMBASSADORS GROUP. BUT IT IS AN IDEA WHICH WE HAVE DISCUSSED FREQUENTLY WITH THE MRND AND THE OTHER PARTIES DURING THE COURSE OF THE PAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS. BOTH IDEAS ARE NOW IN PLAY: INDEPENDENT PARTIES AND NEUTRAL INDIVIDUALS. CHURCH LEADERS HAVE THEIR CHOICE, AND MAY EVEN COMBINE THE TWO APPROACHES TO PUSH THE PROCESS ONE MORE STEP.

26. IN CLOSING THE MEETING, THE PRIME MINISTER COMMITTED HIMSELF TO US TO CONTACT THE PRESIDENCY AND TO CONTACT THE CLERGY TO SEEK A WAY TO PUT TOGETHER CANDIDACYS FOR THE NEUTRAL MINISTRIES ON THE BASIS OF THE CLERGY PROPOSAL. HE COMMITTED HIMSELF TO KEEPING US INFORMED IF THERE WAS PROGRESS. END COMMENT.

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