



KANGURA



KANGURA INTERNATIONAL VERSION No. 71 JUNE 1995 PRINTED IN BELGIUM RUELENSVEST 127, 3001 LEUVEN

✦ THINK ABOUT THIS, ARE KENYANS TO BE THE NEXT REFUGEES LIKE RWANDIANS AND BURUNDIANS ? MUSEVENI WANTS EXACTLY THIS

✦ **WHEN HE SLEEPS LIKE THIS HE KILLS PRESIDENTS AROUND UGANDA**


✦ THE SPREAD OF MUSEVENI VIRUS IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA. WHO IS BEHIND IT AND WHY IS THE REST OF THE WORLD WATCHING

✦ UGANDA- KENYA PROBLEMS !!!


WHEN HASSAN NGEZE MET NYENZI KAGAME AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN ENTEBBE KAMPALA , ITS FUNNY

WHO STARTED THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA, SURPRISED ? THE UNITED NATIONS IS WRONG IN THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE EVENT AT KIBEHO IN APRIL 1995

LE GOUVERNEMENT KAMBANDA PERSISTE ET SIGNE: JERÔME BICAMUMPAKA PARLE DE SA POSITION.



HE USED KAGAME AND RPF TO KILL HABYARIMANA AND PUT RWANDA INTO TRIBAL MASSACRES. NOW HE WANTS TO EMPLOY THE SAME PLAN WITH ODONGO AND FERA TO KILL MOI AND TO PUT KENYA IN THE SAME TURMOIL



invited Belgium, Canada, France, Germany and Netherlands, the United Nations organisation and the Organization of African Unity to participate, together with Rwanda in the work of commission. President Bizimungu set out a number of questions (see below) concerning the Kibeho incident, to which the commission was to answer and which were to serve as Terms of reference (TR).

The commission was formally established in Kigali on the 3rd May 1995 and it held its first working session on the 8th May 1995 with the following members present

-Mr. Mark Bristot-Foucault, Prosecutor (France)

-Mr. Bernard Dussault, Diplomat (Canada).

-Mr. Koen de Feyter, Professor of International Law (Belgium)

-Mr. Karl Flittner, Diplomat (Germany)

-Mr. Ataul Karim, Diplomat (United Nations organizations)

-Dr. Ashraf Khan, Forensic Pathologist (United Kingdom)

-Mr. Maurice Nyberg, lawyer (United States of America)

-Colonel-Major Abdelaziz Skik, military expert (Organization of African Unity).

-Miss Christine Umutoni, lawyer (Rwanda).

-Mr. Ernest Wesselius, Prosecutor (Netherlands)

In its first working meeting the commission appointed by consensus Colonel-Major Skik as its President, Mr. Dussault as its Vice-President and Mr. Wesselius as its Secretary/Rapporteur.

The commission was assisted in its work by:

-Mr. Claude Cozar, Prosecutor (France)

-Mr. Ron Newman, Criminologist (Canada)

-Mr. Jan Wilken, criminologist (the Netherlands).

as well as by representatives of different ministries of the Government of Rwanda in their capacity as expert advisers.

On the basis of numerous interviews with witnesses of the events, held in Kigali, Kibeho and Butare between 10th and 17th May 1995, several visits to the forensic investigation research in the Kibeho area as well as briefings given by UN and Rwandan officials, the commission hereby submits its report to the Republic of Rwanda on May 18th 1995.

a. IN WHICH CONTEXT WAS TAKEN THE DECISION TO CLOSE THE CAMPS, AND ABOUT THIS VERY ONE (KIBEHO)?

b. ESPECIALLY, WHAT INFORMATION ABOUT MILITIA IN THE CAMPS WAS AVAILABLE.

c. BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THE CLOSURE DID THE GOVERNMENT CONSULT VARIOUS PARTNERS INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER?

d. WAS THE CLOSURE OPERATION AIMED TO ELIMINATE A CERTAIN

CATEGORY OF PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY ONE ETHNIC GROUP?

Following the assassination of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in the vicinity of Kigali Airport on the 6th April 1994, a genocide began which would cost the lives of several hundred thousand Rwandans. A civil war started which would lead to the liberation of the country and the establishment of a national coalition government on the 19th July 1994.

During those sad months, Rwanda saw both its material and social infrastructure practically destroyed. Kigali city had no more than some tens of thousands of inhabitants and a large part of the Rwandan people were refugees in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi or were displaced within the country. In addition of hundreds of thousands were dead. Administrative buildings had been pillaged, damaged and sometimes destroyed and services (water, electricity, communications, social) were nonexistent. The Government found itself faced with an enormous and complex task, compounded by the problems of bringing the perpetrators of genocide to justice.

As soon as the government was instituted it could see, as could the international community, that one of the priorities had to be the return of refugees and displaced persons to their home communes. The return of these people was necessary and urgent in order to re-start the Rwandan society and economy, to relieve the destabilizing pressure of the presence of these refugees throughout the region and also for reasons of national security. Indeed it appeared obvious that as long as these refugees and displaced persons were not re-integrated into Rwandan society they would constitute a threat to security of the Rwanda and a permanent social burden.

At that time the international community saw importance of assisting Rwanda to instill a feeling of security in the country so as to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons. Upon the request of the Rwandan government the United Nations assisted Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), with a contingent of more than 5,500 troops, was deployed with this intention already in early September 1994. In the course of the same month international cooperation was mobilised in order to rehabilitated certain infrastructures. Discussions were begun with neighbouring countries the OAU, the UN and particularly with UNHCR in order to organise a conference on refugees and displaced persons. Studies were also begun jointly by Rwandans and international experts with a view to preparing a national plan of action which could be supported by donors. The plan in question was submitted in January 1995 in Geneva and the international community responded by pledging some USD 600 million of the USD 780 million requested.

ALL THESE INITIATIVES MADE

POSSIBLE A STEADY AND SIGNIFICANT RETURN OF REFUGEE AND DISPLACED persons to the communes. Rwanda begun normalizing an over the months, the capital re-established its population and its activities. Many peasants returned to their communes and sizeable population inhabits Rwanda today. It was still important however that all refugees and displaced persons should return home. Unfortunately, a significant number of refugees outside the country and internal by displaced persons (IDPs) in camps located in the former protected zone in southern Rwanda refused to return voluntarily for reasons of security, but also because many of these camps were infiltrated by genocidal criminal elements, groups of militia-men and re-grouped military. There was fear of eventual re-arming; military training was observed to take place. Another factor was that refugees and IDPS gradually became dependent on living conditions provided in the camps.

In December 1994, there still remained within the country 38 IDPs camps and Kibeho camp appeared to be a centre of hostility and a threat to internal security.

UNAMIR, in consultation with the government, decided to launch "Operation Hope" in order to disarm Kibeho. While UNAMIR searched for arms within the camp, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) maintained a security cordon on the outside. This operation, which had worried humanitarian organizations, proceeded well, without loss of life. It sent a clear message to those inside Kibeho camp that the Rwandan Government, as well as the international community could not accept subversion at Kibeho camp.

There was still an urgent need to close the IDPs camp. The Rwandan Government announced the final closure of the camps by the end of December 1994. The discussions that followed between the Rwandan Government and UNAMIR led to the launching of Operation Return.

With a view to supporting Operation Return, a working group was established with the assistance of UNAMIR, including Government authorities, United Nations Agencies and the NGO's, for the purpose of defining and developing policies and strategies concerning IDPs with a view to putting forward as soon as possible, a plan of action to make possible the return of these people to their home communes. In order to facilitate the task of the working group and to oversee the implementation of the action plan, the Integrated Operation's Centre (IOC) was established and in March 1995, 21 persons were employed there full time and 38 persons part-time.

The first formal meeting of the IOC working group was held on 6th February 1995. Operation Return was viewed and it was agreed as then to launch Phase II, the initial operation having had some success but beginning to run out of steam.

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large group of IDPs broke through the cordon in the vicinity of the Zambatt positions. According to RPA witnesses there was firing from among the IDPs and the RPA suffered casualties. IDPs continued to run down the side of the hill into the valley. The RPA responded by firing into the crowd. There is agreement that automatic rifles and machine guns were employed. Numerous IDP casualties resulted.

After the incident the cordon was re-established. In the late afternoon the cordon was breached for second time, this time to the west of the camp. Large groups of people ran down the valley. RPA witness as indicated that some IDPs carried rifles and others were armed with traditional weapons such as machetes and stones. RPA witnesses indicated that there was fire from IDPs which caused casualties to some RPA soldiers. There is evidence that firearms were captured.

The RPA again responded by firing into the crowd causing numerous casualties. It is clear that automatic rifles and machine guns were used. Most witnesses from UNAMIR and from one NGO indicated that heavier weapons such as grenades and rocket propelled grenades were used. There is conflicting UNAMIR testimony on the use of a mortar. It is of interest to note that no physical evidence of mortar fire has been found.

There is evidence to indicate that many suffered injuries from machete, stampede and weapons fire, but the exact proportions cannot be determined. There is agreement that machetes were not used by uniformed personnel but rather by civilians.

UNAMIR witness testimony indicates that a number of summary executions of IDPs by RPA soldiers took place.

During the night of 22nd April 1995, there was sporadic fire around the Kibeho camp area including, according to some UNAMIR and RPA sources, sniper fire from the IDP compound over the Zambatt Company Headquarters. UNAMIR soldiers were unable to respond because of inability to distinguish between hostile and non hostile targets. There were also machete attacks among the IDPs.

UNAMIR witnesses indicate that RPA soldiers were burying bodies in pit latrines and shallow graves. Approximately 15 latrines were examined by the commission and in one of them the body of one child was found. RPA witnesses indicate that bodies washed up in rain after the incident and were subsequently reburied.

The scientific evidence corroborated other evidence that bodies related to the Kibeho incident had been buried outside the Kibeho camp. In the bodies identified, the cause of death ranged from machete, firearm injuries and findings consistent with trampling and hunger. Due to logistic and time constraints, it was not possible to

determine the exact number of fatalities but it is apparent that the numbers are more than those formally counted in the Kibeho camp.

111. a WHAT WAS THE ROLE, THE LIMITATIONS AND BEHAVIOUR OF THE RWANDESE ARMY, THE NGOS AND UNAMIR.

The commission finds that the operation of the Government of Rwanda to close IDP camps was well planned but that failures occurred in the implementation and ensuing panic. The reactions of the RPA soldiers to the threat at that stage were disproportionate and therefore, violate of international law. The RPA did not distinguish between hostile and non hostile targets and indiscriminate fire by the RPA soldiers occurred. There are credible indications that individual RPA soldiers committed summary executions.

The following circumstances contributed to the behaviour of the RPA.

1. Deficiencies in communication Systems. Within the RPA, radios exist at best at the level of the company Commander and above. The RPA relies on couriers and word-of-mouth to communicate information up the chain-of-command and orders back down. In a crisis situation that changes quickly, it can be very difficult for commanding officers to remain in control.

2. Deficiencies in Equipment

The RPA has limited means with which to apply force. The RPA uses presence as a form of deterrence and firing in the air as a means of non-lethal force. When these methods are exhausted, there exists an escalation to deadly force. Such methods as tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets and batons and shields as used for crowd control are not available within the RPA.

3. Deficiencies in Training

The RPA is trained as a guerrilla army not in law enforcement and security techniques.

4. Deficiencies in Experience

The RPA has never engaged in similar operation of this kind. Once the operation unfolded, soldiers died on a background of little relevance to the problem of separating hostile from non hostile forces.

5. Foreseeability.

Given the background of genocide, in the camp and surrounding area, the unwillingness of people to leave the camp, and examples of hostility towards the RPA from within the camp, it is suggested that the RPA command failed to appreciate the determination with which hard-core elements would refuse to leave the camp voluntarily.

NGOs

There are credible indications that some NGOs actively contradicted the policies of the Government of Rwanda by encouraging IDPs to remain in Kibeho camp and by pursuing discriminatory hiring practices. Moreover, the decision of a number of

NGOs not to cooperate with the closure operation once it began exacerbated the humanitarian crisis.

UNAMIR

The mandate of UNAMIR requires it to, Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance where feasible of secure humanitarian areas.

UN Security Council Resolution 965 (1994).

This mandate requires UNAMIR to protect displaced persons against risks from whatever source, including from the IDPs themselves. There is strong evidence that hard-core criminal elements existed within UNAMIR protected zones where they engaged in intimidation and acts of violence. UNAMIR did not respond adequately to this situation.

111.b. WHAT WAS THE PART PLAYED BY THE MILITIA/

There was very strong evidence that over the months that preceded the camp closure operation there was a heavy build-up of what is known in Rwanda as hard-core elements. By hard-core elements, the Commission means extremists who most likely were deeply involved in criminal activities. The commission found numerous indications of the widespread use of machetes and other traditional weapons in acts of violence and of a number of firearms within the camp population.

The activities of these hard-core elements ranged from verbal intimidation to physical violence and were instrumental in creating an atmosphere of panic among the IDPs. CULMINATING ON 22ND OF April 1995. THE COMMISSION WAS NOT ABLE TO OBTAIN SPECIFIC information on the organization and structure of these hard-core elements.

CONCLUSIONS.

111)c. WHO IS ACTUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATHS IN KIBEHO.

In the opinion of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, the tragedy of Kibeho neither resulted from a planned action by Rwandan authorities to kill a certain group of people nor was it an accident that could not have been prevented.

2. The commission recognizes the legitimate interests of the Rwandan Government and of the international community to have the displaced persons camps closed as quickly as possible, both for reasons of national security and in order to remove an important obstacle to the country's efforts to recover from the devastating effects of last years genocide.

3. The commission recognizes the efforts made by UN special Representative, UNAMIR, the Government of Rwanda and other organizations to keep the situation at Kibeho under control.

4. The commission regrets that the UN

safely out of Kenya. Meaning Colonel Kaula has accomplished his mission here in a bid for the proclaimed arrest of the Colonel could be a cover-up to protect those of his friends still here. It is for fear of being considered traitors, that we write this report so that authorities can reach some of these people like Byaruhanga and find out actually whom they are. Otherwise, those of us who are here and genuinely opposed to Museveni and his system are falling victims of

suspicion. We are prepared for the good of the people who are suffering here in the hands of Museveni's men, ready to lead you to the identity of these people. The UNHCR in Nairobi should at this moment if possible question the government of the Ugandans (new comers). Mark you most of the people coming now are military officers and mostly, from (Aukole) Museveni's home area! the part of Uganda where there has never been opposition to

Museveni

we seek action of the authority here to

These agents find it so easy to come and go, do what they want and later the blame and suspicion is on the innocent Ugandan refugee community, who consider Kenya very dearly.

-to try to stop falling victims as the late Bazira and the like.

Kangura

WHO STARTED GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

DID IT HAPPEN BEFORE IT CAME TO THE REALISATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

These are quite simple question but require careful analysis for one to arrive at what may be correct answer. Seemingly most Rwandese, both the Hutus and the Tutsis believe the issue of Genocide in their country just erupted as a result of the death of President Habyarimana. This issue has further been eroded by the mass media campaign carried out by the Kigali government, a campaign which will prejudice to great extent the international tribunal. Investigation of Genocide in Rwandan as it was reported by the prosecutor general during his visit to Brussels, of the Interference by the Kigali government to his work. As a result, the office shall find itself prosecuting defenseless, Innocent Hutus who do not have the backing of any government but unfortunately got caught up in the arena when events in Rwanda started unfolding. The way things are today, are such that whoever went out of Rwanda committed Genocide and those who entered Rwanda didn't commit any crime. The press in Rwanda and Voice of America have indiscriminately referred to the Rwanda Refugees as actors Genocide. A judgement that has made it easy for the Tutsi lead Government in Kigali to massacre Hutus because they command less sympathy both locally and internationally. The massacre in Kibeho camp in the month of April, an act of Genocide by the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPF) and supported by the United States of America and UNAMIR as mentioned in the report by the Independent commission of inquiry at Kibeho camp. Page six article one on the review is no

surprise because it was designed to happen and whatever the outcome let it be.

The R.P.A./F a brainchild of N.R.A./M had its lessons in committing Genocide way back in 1983 in Luwero triangle in Uganda, when they were waging war against Milton Obote government. In disguise of government troops often the N.R.A. would massacre civilians then turn round to the survivors to seek favour for ground to fight Obote. The campaign however succeeded in Buganda which has always been home of opposition to Obote government since independence. Obote could not easily sell that secret to the Baganda because he was considered an enemy. Even upto the time when N.R.A. was committing Genocide in the North, Eastern Parts of Uganda a lot of propaganda was launched to discredit the victims of Genocide portraying them as responsible for whatever happened.

Soon after N.R.A. got into power it claimed that Obote's army (UNLA) had massacred over 5000000 people. The same officers who made accusation formed the RPA/F and when they captured power in Kigali, they claimed a similar number of people had been massacred by former Rwandan army no numbers have been given on the side they killed on both incidents yet victory was theirs. One wonders why it is that everything is quite the same.

Just before R.P.A./F's Invasion of Rwanda, the Tutsi lead Army in Uganda had committed the worst act of Genocide to be known as "THE MUKURA KUMI WAGON VICTIMS" Brigadier Bunyenyezi one of the leading commanders of N.R.A./R.P.A. had ordered the burning of about 147 people which was reduced by government to 47 another 20 victims were

also burnt in grass thatched houses in Serere, Soroti District.

Issue was first denied by government but later admitted the incidents but with minor recognition that discouraged the inquiry. The actors were later to leave for Rwanda as R.P.A.

When the first bodies were floating from Kagera down to Victoria shores were seen for those of us who survived the Mukura (Kumi) massacre, it was no surprise. We knew the RPA was doing it for they had done it to us as they had left. Kagera was an area they controlled and it was their major supply root, there was therefore no way it could have been the Rwanda army. But now what is surprising us is the way the whole issue has turned to be a one way traffic. Habyarimana's government has been painted red even when they did not control the area of Incidence.

As a Ugandan who lived through the had times of the Tutsi dominated army N.R.A. part of which went to Rwanda to form R.P.A. I feel sympathetic to the Rwandese Refugees and would request the world community especially the office of the prosecutor General to have an open mind and deduce a new approach to the Genocide cases in Rwanda probing also the N.R.A./R.P.A. as responsible organs for the happening. The former N.R.A. is the Architect and later is the player as in the case of Rwanda. Otherwise Former Rwanda Army is not the only responsible body in this case.

BY OUMA OKOL
CORRESPONDENT IN SOROTI
(UGANDA)

THINK ABOUT THIS, ARE KENYANS TO BE THE NEXT REFUGEES LIKE RWANDIANS AND BURUNDIANS? MUSEVENI WANTS EXACTLY THIS.

The NRM/A regime in Uganda is very unpopular due to its consistent policy of harassment and violent repression of the common people through use of vicious Military force and rule by defection. The

strong-arm tactic employed by the NRA is policy commonly characteristic of decaying police-state and military dictatorship, which is dreadful of popular democracy and itself devoid of grassroots mass support to

cause fear and pandemonium amongst the common people to extend its life span. Museveni's support and mainstay is therefore based upon his persistent policy on the use of the murderous army to solve

Over the Inter Community or UN not remember what these people did in Teso land in Uganda? Does the UN or Inter-Community still not realise that in its midst there is a section of sadists who have a programme of depopulation of Africa through such greedy blind guys like Museveni, Kagame and their like. Can the advocates of the anti Rwanda Genocide tell the world why their investigations do not start in Uganda, why start with the effect not the crime? Do these people imagine that the rest of the people in the world do not know exactly what the truth is. For the Hutus whenever they are, we say while there is still time bring to light these deliberate programmes to your extinction or else your enemies are ready to drink your blood to the last droplet.

Moi feels it, takes it lightly, Bashir hope negotiations could do. But like in all instances Museveni is determined to succeed. He is once quoted to have said it. That he would not be a consumer of ideas but a contributor. Meaning he had a cause to advance. And that his revolution would be a revolution of Africa. Museveni and his masters would have a government of Rwanda and Burundi nature (satellite great) around him. Where he is the centre of consultation. He dreads Kenya for being

a bad example for his dreams for Kenya is constitutional government and obvious contradiction of his thought besides president Moi is among the African leaders who fought to liberate his people from colonial masters. It would be difficult for him to subdue to foreign intentions to masterminding the politics of his country which on the other side Museveni is a willing tool in order to advance his ambition - of an empire. Mobutu, Bashir are contributors of ideas thus not Museveni's food as he would not consume.

In order for the Empire to expand its influence and the revolution to succeed, Museveni would need his brain children in both the Sudan and Zaire.

For those who think Museveni is about to stop his acts because he is going diplomatic issues of conflict, Let them recall Tito Okello, Habyarimana and the local Uganda oppositions Museveni's trick works best when he has heat you to test your fists and calm down to diplomacy, while there negotiating his master plan has always succeeded.

Do the supermen, masters of international Justice not praise Museveni as a blue eyed African boy for a job well done? Do they not heap empty praise on his economic programmes in Uganda which have

succeeded to the living standards in that country? While 60% of the population there is merely destitute. Have Teso and daughter not fallen victims of some kind compulsory labour in plantations after failing to continue with school due to object poverty? Cant our leaders in the region see this same madness being exported to Kenya, Zaire, Burundi and Sudan? Have people to slumber and think this will not mature to affect them like it has to the people of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi? Are our brothers not seeing that Museveni and the Kagame's are agents of some master plan? Do we want to think that it is about to stop while it has succeeded in Uganda Rwanda and Burundi and was founding Kenya, Zaire and Sudan. Oh! friends, brothers the Hutu of Rwanda and Burundi the same shall be all over- This madness seems steady eating into us taking advantage of negligence. Obote took it jokingly, Tito Okello messed, Habyarimana new understood, Ndadaye Ignored it, Mobutu belittles it may be he thinks Kinshasa is far off.

Hassan Ngeze

Kagame met Hassan Ngeze in press conference its funny.

Meanwhile Kagame said that the founders of RPF/RPA would be given decent burials before this year closes

- Kagame told Kangura at Entebbe Airport Wednesday, that what remained is the exact date. "It can be either in July or October, but for sure we are going to give our fallen comrades decent burial," the General said.

The founders of RPF, including its first commander, the late Maj. Gen. Fred Rwigyema, Maj. Peter Baingana and Maj. Chris Buryezi were killed in still unclear circumstances soon after they had led the RPF invasion into Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990.

The press conference burst into laughter when Kagame, responding to a question as to whether RPA would mind

returning the guns they stole from Uganda in 1990, instead asked "how much would Uganda compensate those fighters who fought and helped in the liberation of Uganda?"

"It's a matter we can look at. Some of these people had made contributions for the well-being of this country (Uganda). That can make some people reconsider the question of paying back equivalent to the weapons lost," he said. "If we can compute this, then we shall see what we can do," he added.

But the fun part of the day came from the journalists as the entourage surged towards the waiting Air Rwanda 20 seater plane. The tall and slender Kagame hastened with quick steps as plump VP Kazibwe tried to keep the pace. Kagame

shook hands with all the Uganda officials. But NRA's Chief of Staff Brig. Nanyumba saluted him. It was then the group of journalists watching from the VIP lounge burst out laughing. "Now you see this Nanyumba, instead of arresting the man they say deserted the NRA, he is instead saluting him"

After the Independence celebrations last year where Kagame was one of the dignitaries, CM for Kajara, Yona Kanyomozi tickled the NRC when he joked that Kagame should have been arrested for deserting NRA.

HASSANNGEZE
AT KAMPALA ENTEBBE

NEXT ISSUE KANGURA NO. 72 YOU WILL READ KANGURA COMMENT ABOUT HUMAN RIGHT WATCH ARMS PROJECT

VI. MILITARY CAPACITY OF THE EX-FAR AND MILITIAS

Human Rights Watch has visited many of the ex-FAR and militia bases in Zaire.⁶⁶ At the bases — and even in some of the civilian refugee camps from which they also operate — the ex-FAR has managed to rebuild its formal military structure since its arrival in Zaire. Military ranks are recognized and military discipline is observed. Officers meet regularly with troops to instruct and coordinate activities and issue pay. In an important development, the militias have been brought more fully under the command structure of the ex-FAR since October 1994. The ex-FAR command maintains a direct link with the political establishment through the self-declared government-in-exile's Ministry of Defense. The ex-FAR also has an extensive communications network ranging from walkie-talkies to radio stations. Human Rights Watch was able to see a major communications center inside Lac Vert camp, near Goma.

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in a nutshell, Teso, formerly one of the most prosperous areas of Uganda is now the most impoverished, backward in most spheres of life such as education, culture and development. Teso will continue to have perpetual famine until the area is restocked with cattle because the basic means of production for the Iteso is the OX-PLOUGH. Re-stocking Teso while NRM still holds power and Karimajong still hold guns is a dream no wise man can interpret for the Iteso.

M. OMOKEL ENGATUNY
CORRESPONDENT IN KAMPALA
(UGANDA)

Museveni's regime under attack

A well planned military attack on Museveni's regime was launched by rebels two months ago in Buganda and western regions. They are determined to bring down Museveni's dictatorship by any means. In a telephone interview with UDC Newsletter, the rebels accuse Museveni of many crimes among which are: Being a self-imposed dictator, denying Uganda's their civil and human rights; selling Uganda to foreign exploiters; making Uganda a colony of Tutsis who have turned citizens into foreigners in their own country; resisting the people's demand for multi-party democracy and federal system; concocting a constitution which is intended to legitimize his brand of dictatorship, committing mass murders of innocent people in northern and eastern Uganda, and turning Uganda into terrorist camp where he trains and supports guerrilla forces against neighboring countries. They demand that Museveni step down. An interim government should take over and organize multi-party elections under acceptable supervision. It is unlikely that he could step down voluntarily. Thus, a civil war is inevitable. The rebels have so far raided, over 25 police stations, taking weapons and uniforms. The Police commander of Masaka was murdered in March, setting his vehicle ablaze. Early this month, the Minister of health, Dr J. Makumbi, was kidnapped. Despite intensive manhunt by the junta, Makumbi could not be rescued until the kidnappers released him at the location of his capture. The rebels have carried out many actions which terrified the junta and exposed its vulnerability. Observers concur that Museveni's regime is vulnerable and its days are numbered. He has lost support of the people in Northern, Eastern, Buganda, Kigezi, Bunyoro, parts of Toro and half of Ankole. Most important is that armed opposition to his rule has erupted in Buganda which is the political, economic and security nerve center of Uganda. No regime has ever survived without the support of Buganda.

For the past 9 years Museveni has treated Ugandans as if it was his personal property. He is quick to use brutal force, corruption and lies. He sold out to foreign exploiters in exchange for financial and diplomatic support. The welfare of Ugandans is of no concern to him. Upon grabbing power in 1986, Museveni decreed that political party activities were barred in his Uganda. What people thought was a temporary measure became permanent. His regime fostered excessive corruption. With assistance of foreign agents, Uganda is a center of regional terrorism where rebels from neighboring countries are trained, armed and supported. Worst of all, Museveni delivered Uganda to foreign exploiters who are plundering the country viciously. Polarization of political situation in Uganda puts Museveni's regime at a disadvantage similar to that of Obote in 1980. He took power by the gun, defeating a regime which had stolen elections and ignored the people's complaints. Likewise Museveni is turning a deaf ear to the popular demand for a democratically elected government through a multi-party process, a federal system for the country and respect of civic and human rights. Opposition to Museveni's dictatorship is national, not regional as he so claims in order to lure external sympathy. He is hit in Mukono, Hoima, Kasese, Fort Portal, Masaka, Soroti, Kitgum, Mpigi and Mbende. All those places are not Buganda. Museveni is missing the point by branding opposition to his Tutsi-dominated dictatorship as "Baganda tribalists who went to establish a Kingdom". Kingdoms were re-instituted in many parts of Uganda including Buganda, that is not an issue to fight over. He thinks that he can divide the opposition by isolating Baganda from other Ugandans through igniting tribal conflicts. Persuasions of all tribes and political persuasions want to belong to and participate in political parties of their choice. The people demand for a federal system and multi-party elections cannot and will not be silenced by bullets nor by lies. Local sources indicate that Ugandans are determined to meet force with greater force if need be for the sake of their country. It is childish to call Baganda "tribalists" because they are not. Museveni's record is a perfect specimen of the worst tribalists. All commanding officers in his army are Tutsis. Every powerful and strategic position is occupied by either a Tutsi or a Hima. Many government posts from Kabale to Moroto are filled with Tutsis. Museveni's obsession with Tutsi tribalism forced him to wage war against a Hutu led Rwanda. In the end he destroyed the entire country. He is doing the same thing in Burundi.

On the issue of religious bigotry, Museveni's record is gross. On March 29, 1993, Uganda National Council of Law, Apostles (a catholic Organization) wrote a letter to Museveni complaining that Ugandans Catholics (53.5% of the population) are immensely marginalized in appointments to senior positions in public affairs. The letter cited a number of government appointments with Catholics despite their high qualifications, occupying less than 5%. It is well known that Museveni singled out Muslims in Ankole, murdered hundreds of them and destroyed their properties. For a long time, tribalists politicians fostered anti-Baganda sentiments. Those tribalists, Museveni included are driven by envy and greed for power which has plagued the country into political chaos, mismanagement and violence. It is clear that Museveni will have to be forced out of power. Toppling his regime will require the full participation of all Ugandans including Baganda. This time around, Baganda are not going to be used as a stepping stone by political opportunists. The Baganda like all Ugandans want Uganda to be ruled by Ugandans, not refugees. They want a free, united, peaceful and prosperous Uganda but not at the expense of Buganda. All political parties support a federal system and their members are found among Baganda, Northerners, Easterners and Westerners. One has to be a fool not to know that all are not monarchists but sincere nationalists. Ugandans have drawn the line and are responding to Museveni in a language which he understands best. Museveni is in a dilemma. He is fundamentally crooked that any attempt to change his ways is tantamount to dismantling himself. Perhaps he could benefit from reading 'OEDIPUS REX' by Sophocles.

UGANDA RELATIONS WITH SUDAN AND KENYA.

The Ugandan regime accused Sudan of interfering in her internal affairs claiming that Khartoum is giving Uganda rebels of Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). NRM junta protested to Sudan over a number of air attacks on Uganda's territory. Sudan denied the accusations. The U.N and O.A.U. to which to which Uganda and Sudan are members, bar member countries from harboring rebels against each other. According to the Geneva Convention, refugees are prohibited from organizing armed attacks against their country of origin. Uganda has repeatedly violated those covenants by directly and openly assisting Rwandese, Sudanese and Kenyan refugees in mobilizing and attacking their countries of origin from their territory. According to Museveni's flimsy reasoning, it is fine for him to train and arm rebels

snatching power from the elected majority FRODEBU party. Mr. Nduwayo is a Tutsi from Bururi county and a former aide to dictators Bagaza and Buyoya, she said. A Pentagon representative speaking for the military operations sub-group stated that "we shall not go after jamming the pro-Hutu radio stations since one of the NGOs has the technology to do it.

The media sub-group of the cabal focuses on reporters to direct and influence their coverage of the conflict. Could this be the source of media bias?

NGOs are merely interested in getting lucrative contracts from U.S. Government agencies and so play the game in order to win those million dollar contracts.

Representatives of the favored Tutsis are always invited to the meetings. What is absent in their language is a re-affirmation of the declared U.S. policy to promote multi-party democracy and free elections worldwide.

In Burundi, Tutsis are less than 15% of population but form 99% of the army. Over 90% of the soldiers and 80% of the commanding officers are from Bururi county, according to local sources. The past Tutsi dictators (Bagaza & Buyoya) are also from Bururi. Nduwayo is a Bagaza man per excellence. The army killed the first elected President M. Ndayaye on Oct 21, 1993 whose FRODEBU party had won the first democratic elections. The army officers who killed Ndayaye fled to Uganda where they were under protective custody of Museveni. Instead of condemning and punishing the killers, the army and its political friends, including the U.S. State Dept., have complained and intrigued against FRODEBU's democratic view calling it a "zerosome game". The State Dept. favors Buyoya while Museveni and Qhadafi support Bagaza, according to intelligence sources.

Obviously, the conspiracy has worked. FRODEBU party which won elections is no longer in power. The Tutsi-dominated army is in control, slaughtering thousands of defenseless Hutus and pushing the population into exile. The U.S. media coverage of the crisis is disappointing and inadequate. Is the American media silent because they are instructed so? By whom? Washington observers lament that President Clinton is not in control of the State Dept. and Pentagon's treacherous operations in East Africa. Others strongly believe that the President is fed with false information. The U.S. Congress on the other hand is obvious on the situation in East Africa. The technocrats skillfully manipulate the flow of information in order to keep the U.S. political leaders in the dark, lest the President and Congress might see their dirty hands in the blood-soaked East African mud.

UGANDA MERCENARIES IN RWANDA
Uganda soldiers returned from a tour of

duty in Rwanda gave the following account revealing more of Uganda's role in Rwanda. If you thought that RPF army was made up of predominantly Tutsi refugees who used to live in Uganda, you were partially right. All RPF army officers are commissioned in Uganda's army (NRA). Although at one time Museveni called them "deserters", none has ever been charged with desertion nor retired. All commanding officers are Tutsis.

However, between 70% and 80% of the foot soldiers in Rwanda today are genuine Ugandans (i.e. Baganda, Basoga, Acholis, Madi, Banyoro etc.). Uganda nationals were taken to Rwanda through different schemes. A big number serving with the NRA were deployed to Rwanda at a time when Tutsi refugees by themselves were losing the war. NRA mechanized battalion from Masaka was among the first ones to go. Many Acholis detained in concentration camps were taken by force as a continuation of their incarceration. Ex-soldiers who were laid off as a result of IMF-backed military reduction program, were rounded up and re-employed as mercenaries in Rwanda. This category, according to returning soldiers, were each paid 500,000 shillings up front plus big salaries.

Millions of dollars were spent on Uganda mercenaries in Rwanda. An ESO contact suspects most of that money to have come from abroad since Uganda could not afford the cost. Kagame's regime is sustained by Uganda foot soldiers. As long as Museveni is in power, Kagame and his Tutsi warlords in Kigali can breathe and sleep

***THE SSESE SELL-OUT REVISITED**
An American who invested \$200,000 in Pan African Development Corp., a front company for usurping Ssesse Islands, discovered hidden motives and wants to pull out but can't get his money. In a conversation with UDC Newsletter editor, the investor questions the intention and objectives of the scheme.

The Ssesse purchase has all the elements of a plan to colonize strategic islands in Africa's largest inland lake located in the middle of the continent. The plotters used a greedy and corrupt Dr. S. Kisekka, M.D. who was the Prime Minister of Uganda. Dr. Kisekka a member of the Seventh-Day-Adventists church (SDA) was enticed by a group of black American SDA members under the leadership of Dr. Samuel L. DeShay, M.D. Dr. DeShay is a physician, a devoted and influential SDA churchman with vast capabilities.

The group formed Pan African Development Corp. promising Kisekka to advance the influence and powers of SDA church in Uganda. Apparently, that and the financial rewards got to Kisekka's heart while exploiting his position as Prime Minister and later Vice-President. PAIDC

plans to build a church, hospital, college, airport, hotels, housing projects, business, etc. owned by the SDA church. Those objectives attracted investment funds from many wealthy black American SDA professionals and businessmen. Although the investors were told that the project would cost nearly \$880 million (an amount greater than the total AID budget for black Africa), they were assured of U.S. Govt. support. Money was being raised through issuing bonds and grants from the U.S. and Ugandan governments.

The Ssesse sale threatens Uganda's security and sovereignty as this investor informed UDC Newsletter editor. Ssesse Islands would no longer be Uganda's but American property whereby Ugandan citizens, including the President, would require special permits to enter. Most of the natives of the islands would be expelled, leaving a small number needed as laborers. There was to be built an international airport, separate banking system with its own currency controls, a separate police and security force. Generals are among the designers of those plans in addition to other professionals.

Did Kisekka, Museveni and other Ugandan signatories to the Ssesse sale know those details. Mr. Kintu asked? The answer was YES. Again Mr. Kintu asked, did they understand the implications to Uganda's national security? Answer: Kisekka, Museveni and their colleagues could not care less about that because each one was interested in the immediate financial payoff.

Now that Kisekka was thrown out of government, Museveni's days in power are numbered and the other lesser members of the sell-out are in political coma, the conspiracy to colonize Ssesse Islands is in jeopardy. Nevertheless, those traitors should remember the fate of Katikkiro Nsibirwa.

Perhaps we shall never know the reasons why Americans want to usurp Ssesse Islands. A few clues can shed light on possible answers. Among those is the U.S. and British conspiracy in the destruction of Rwanda and Burundi as a first step to devouring mineral-rich Zaire. The U.S. failure to control permanently a seaport in Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya may have triggered a desire to grab an inland air base which is secured by a lake. Another possibility is based on several media revelations implicating some members of CIA and the Pentagon as being heavy drug traffickers via their puppet military regimes in Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti.

There is a similarity between American support for Museveni and that of Noriega

Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (UNHCR) continue à refuser, à ces derniers, le statut de réfugié politique; et sauf pour de rares cas, les réfugiés rwandais qui ne résident pas dans des camps, ne bénéficient pas de l'aide humanitaire internationale requise.

1.2. L'élite politique, intellectuelle et commerçante rwandaise est menacée d'extermination, compte tenu de ces conditions de vie précaires.

1.3. Les Rwandais d'ethnie HUTU restent diabolisés par la "Communauté Internationale".

Les réfugiés rwandais souffrent énormément sur le plan psychologique. Du fait de l'équation "HUTU=Tueur" qu'on a laissé s'installer dans les esprits dans le monde entier, la population HUTU est en plus sous le coup d'une suspicion et d'une culpabilisation qu'elle ne mérite pas.

1.4. La Communauté Internationale reste, d'une manière générale, "complice" des atrocités commises par le FPR aussi bien sur le territoire rwandais que dans les pays voisins (Zaïre, Burundi...).

La Communauté Internationale se compromet toujours en présentant les massacres systématiques commises par le F.P.R., à l'endroit des Rwandais d'ethnie HUTU, jusqu'aujourd'hui, comme des faits de guerre normaux, des bavures commises par des "éléments incontrôlés" de son Armée ou encore comme des actes de "justice immédiate".

C'est le cas notamment du dernier Rapport sur les massacres des camps du Sud-Ouest du Rwanda (Camps de KIBEHO), ou de l'attitude de la Communauté Internationale après l'attaque du Camp de BIRAVA, au Zaïre, par des éléments infiltrés du FPR, attaque qui a occasionné plusieurs dizaines de morts...

1.5. Depuis l'assassinat du Président Juvénal HABYARIMANA, la Communauté Internationale ne soutient pas le dialogue en vue d'une solution politique durable au Rwanda.

Les réfugiés rwandais restent donc des laissés pour compte. Pour la première fois depuis la création de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, tout un peuple est malmené, matraqué par ceux-là mêmes qui sont sensés le protéger, même les mineurs ne sont pas épargnés.

II. L'OBJECTIF POURSUIVI PAR LA COMMUNAUTE DES REFUGIES RWANDAIS EST CELUI DE RETOURNER DANS LEUR PAYS.

Tous les réfugiés rwandais aspirent à retourner dans leur pays le plus rapidement possible. Toutefois, ce retour doit se faire dans des conditions politiques et de sécurité acceptables et garanties par les réfugiés eux-mêmes, sinon par la Communauté Internationale.

Le retour des réfugiés rwandais

dans leur pays doit s'accompagner simultanément du recouvrement de leurs biens (meubles, immeubles et fonciers) encore disponibles au Rwanda. Ledit retour constitue la condition sine qua non de la réconciliation ethnique et nationale des Rwandais.

Toutefois, de mon point de vue, il n'est pas recommandable que les réfugiés rwandais parlent de leur retour au Rwanda, sans procéder à une analyse sans complaisance des conditions préalables qu'ils doivent d'abord remplir, tout comme il est indispensable que les réfugiés rwandais fassent d'abord un examen de conscience et identifient les causes profondes qui ont amené tout un peuple à être chassé de son pays et à connaître la situation tragique actuelle.

III. LES CAUSES DE L'ECHEC POLITIQUE ET DE LA DEFAITE MILITAIRE.

L'échec politique, mais surtout la défaite militaire du Rwanda, face à l'agression perpétrée par le tandem FPR-OUGANDA et leurs alliés, devraient être analysée profondément par les réfugiés rwandais, en vue de se donner les moyens d'élaborer des stratégies cohérentes devant leur permettre d'assurer eux-mêmes leur retour au Rwanda.

L'évaluation de la situation politico-militaire du Rwanda sur la période 1987-1994, nous permet de dégager les principaux facteurs qui sont à l'origine de ce drame. Nous en formulons ci-dessous les principaux:

3.1. L'usure et la forte concentration du pouvoir, au cours des dix dernières années de la Présidence de feu Juvénal HABYARIMANA;

3.2. Le manque d'une politique nationale de défense du pays,

3.3. L'absence d'une politique diplomatique cohérente, particulièrement depuis le début de la guerre;

3.4. La méconnaissance, par les HUTU en général, des véritables enjeux de la guerre au Rwanda, mais aussi des enjeux régionaux et sous-régionaux;

3.5. L'implication de plusieurs puissances étrangères dans la guerre aux côtés du F.P.R.;

3.6. L'existence de divisions internes, au Rwanda, dues aux querelles partisans (régionalisme, élitisme, clientélisme,...);

3.7. L'absence d'une culture politique démocratique dans la Société rwandaise en général; cela se caractérisant principalement par la crise de conception du pouvoir, de mécanismes de son accès et de sa gestion, voire de la conception même de l'unité nationale;

3.8. La présence de traîtres et surtout d'opportunistes, au Rwanda (au sein des différents Gouvernements rwandais qui se sont succédés, de l'Administration Centrale et au sein des F.A.R.);

3.9. La foi naïve en l'application de l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha, lui-même mal négocié par le Gouvernement Rwandais;

3.10. La complicité de la MINUAR en faveur du F.P.R.;

3.11. Le revirement de la France qui s'est retirée du "bourbier rwandais" de manière "inattendue";

3.12. La décapitation du Gouvernement rwandais et des FAR, par

l'assassinat du Président Juvénal HABYARIMANA et du chef d'Etat-Major des F.A.R., le 6 avril 1994; et,

3.13. Les embargos militaire, diplomatique et médiatique contre le Gouvernement Rwandais (c-à-d au profit du F.P.R.).

Autant de facteurs, les uns internes, les autres externes, qui nous ont amenés à l'échec politique et à la défaite militaire de juillet 1994.

En effet, dans mes multiples recherches, j'ai constaté que nombreux étaient ceux qui s'alarmaient de la situation de notre pays, qui s'inquiétaient surtout de l'insuffisance de la "politique militaire" du Rwanda, depuis 1987 particulièrement.

Certains Rwandais contestaient l'ordre "bourgeois", d'autres s'en prenaient au fonctionnement des institutions, d'autres encore à la conception de la politique. La plupart d'entre eux s'alarmaient d'un Rwanda travaillé par ses divisions internes et par le déclin, qui allait hélas se concrétiser par l'effondrement militaire, en juillet 1994.

Alors, si nous voulons, actuellement, sortir de cette situation, nous devrions notamment remplir une série de conditions jugées indispensables à notre retour au Rwanda. Ces conditions partent d'une analyse de la situation socio-politico-militaire du Rwanda, au cours des trente dernières années, et de la situation actuelle des réfugiés rwandais, de leurs comportements et de leurs attentes.

IV. PRINCIPALES CONDITIONS A REMPLIR PAR LES REFUGIES RWANDAIS, EN VUE D'ORGANISER LEUR RETOUR AU RWANDA.

Ces conditions sont les suivantes:

4.1. Il faudrait d'abord que les réfugiés réalisent un examen de conscience collectif, de manière à opérer une remise en cause profonde de leurs comportements et de leurs méthodes de travail, et à développer des solidarités qui leur ont fait particulièrement défaut, au cours des précédentes décennies.

Cet examen de conscience devrait permettre aussi, aux réfugiés rwandais, de partager la compréhension des problèmes et des phénomènes, d'harmoniser les démarches opérationnelles et de mettre en place des mécanismes concertés de coordination de leurs efforts et de leurs actions...

4.2. Réaliser l'unité de la Communauté des réfugiés rwandais.

4.3. Assurer la culture du secret et de la discrétion dans toute démarche politique,

la discrétion du Comité politique
voire militaire.

4.5. Appliquer de manière concertée tous différends, qui découlent du fait que les réfugiés rwandais appartiennent à plusieurs partis politiques et dégager rapidement un compromis politique ad hoc. Un échec en cette matière risque de condamner définitivement à l'exil, les réfugiés, ou du moins une partie d'entre eux.

4.5. Combattre l'appât du gain et du lucre dans l'action socio-politique.

4.6. Assurer aux réfugiés rwandais en général et à leur leadership en particulier, une bonne préparation politique, idéologique, technique et morale.

4.7. Organiser un système de renseignement efficace, aussi bien sur le territoire rwandais qu'à l'extérieur.

4.8. Réaliser une "communauté parfaite" entre la Communauté rwandaise réfugiée et les Rwandais de l'intérieur du pays, notamment quant aux objectifs aux actions.

4.9. Assurer la cohésion et la solidarité internationale, la maîtrise des enjeux.

4.10. S'assurer un appui logistique et financier suffisant.

4.11. S'assurer une base opérationnelle sûre.

Ces conditions sont présentées suivant leur importance hiérarchique. Il faudrait d'abord s'attaquer au mal rwandais pour sa guérison rapide. Tout concours "utile" pouvant venir de l'extérieur, ne serait efficace que si au moins les sept premières conditions seraient réalisées par les réfugiés eux-mêmes, et cela de manière visible.

Le problème principal réside dans le fait que la réalisation de toutes ces conditions ne serait possible que si un cadre large de concertation et de prospective était mis en place rapidement par les réfugiés eux-mêmes, en vue de réfléchir sur la problématique rwandaise et régionale, et de tracer des stratégies appropriées capables de leur permettre la forme de recouvrer leur pays.

Ces conditions sont présentées dans un cadre que le Gouvernement rwandais en Exil (projet d'organiser un Congrès des représentants des réfugiés rwandais). Ce Congrès pourrait constituer ce cadre de concertation et de réflexion. Toutefois, cette action serait la plus efficace pour la cause nationale, si ledit Congrès rassemble des représentants de tous les réfugiés.

Par ailleurs, récemment, quelques réfugiés rwandais ont pris l'initiative (peut-être pour tenter de court-circuiter ce projet du Gouvernement) de mettre en place une association, le R.D.R., qui semble vouloir revendiquer la représentation "exclusive" de tous les réfugiés rwandais.

Il apparaît que la manière dont le

Conseil national rwandais a été conduit au Rwanda.

Après une concertation réalisée, ces dernières semaines, avec des Rwandais qui résident aussi bien dans les camps de réfugiés que dans les pays américains, européens et africains, sur la naissance et la démarche du RDR, a permis de dégager les quelques conclusions ci-après:

a. La mise en place du RDR a été précipitée et ne découle pas de consultations élargies au sein de la famille des réfugiés;

b. Tous les pays qui hébergent les réfugiés rwandais ne sont pas représentés dans son Comité Exécutif;

c. Les réfugiés rwandais contestent sa légitimité dans la mesure où il n'a pas reçu le mandat de représenter les réfugiés et donc de se présenter comme leur porte-parole;

d. Certains membres de son Comité Exécutif auraient un passé peu reluisant et il faudrait évaluer les compétences de ces personnes.

e. Certains membres de ce Comité Exécutif ont été rejetés par ceux-là même qu'ils sont sensés représenter;

f. Certains réfugiés se plaignent aussi qu'il y ait déjà des "factions" qui se seraient déjà rangées derrière certains responsables du RDR, et trouvent que cela risque de fausser l'unité des réfugiés en général;

g. D'autres considèrent le RDR comme le MRND "métamorphosé" et disent que cela ne cadre pas avec le pluralisme vécu déjà quotidiennement par les réfugiés rwandais. Ils se réfèrent notamment pour cela, aussi bien à la composition de son Comité Exécutif qu'à la manière dont ce Comité a été constitué, car en effet il se serait agi d'une auto-proclamation, sans qu'il y ait eu d'Assemblée Générale constitutive.

h. Le RDR n'aurait pas montré jusqu'à présent son programme, son statut, son règlement, d'ordre intérieur, sa structuration, et ses stratégies. Il se contenterait de discuter les fautes du Gouvernement rwandais en Exil, et ferait aussi preuve de démarches "démagogiques" dans le recrutement d'adhérents. Les réfugiés rwandais reconnaissent qu'une telle démarche sert à propager des dissensions, actuellement, inacceptables, dans la Communauté des réfugiés.

i. Enfin, d'après les mêmes personnes, quelques "aventuriers" et autres personnes non recommandables pour diverses raisons, se cacheraient dans cette association.

Ci-avant, je n'ai fait que transcrire fidèlement les quelques conclusions que des compatriotes réfugiés qui résident en des endroits différents m'ont fait parvenir.

Par ailleurs, ce qui est plus grave c'est que la naissance du RDR a suscité d'autres initiatives du même genre. C'est ainsi que, déjà trois projets de création "nouveaux RDR" au sein des réfugiés seraient sur le point d'être soumises à nos compatriotes réfugiés.

Que va-t-il alors advenir de la Communauté des réfugiés rwandais, que trois, cinq ou dix associations vont disputer la représentation des mêmes réfugiés? Comme l'on dit en Economie Marketing, il va s'opérer un "cannibalisme de produits", pour ne pas dire d'associations; cela bien sûr au détriment des mêmes réfugiés.

Compte tenu de ce qui précède, que faire alors pour créer les conditions devant permettre aux réfugiés rwandais d'atteindre leur objectif commun, à savoir celui d'assurer leur retour au pays, dans les meilleures conditions possibles?

V. LA REPONSE A CETTE QUESTION SE TROUVERAIT DANS L'APPROCHE DE SOLUTION C'EST APRES.

L'objectif préliminaire devrait consister à applanir les principaux différends, ainsi que toutes les faiblesses structurelles des réfugiés rwandais en général. Il devrait aussi consister à l'aboutissement à un compromis utile, acceptable, particulièrement par ce que l'on appelle communément, l'élite politique intellectuelle et commerçante.

Si l'on savait que la tenue d'un Congrès des réfugiés rwandais sera difficile à organiser dans les plus brefs délais, ce dialogue pourrait alors regrouper des personnalités politiques et sociales (Gouvernement, Représentants des Partis politiques qui participent au Gouvernement en Exil, FAR, Représentants de diverses associations, Hommes et femmes d'Eglise etc...) sous la forme d'un Séminaire, avec l'obligation de dégager et de présenter un Compromis politique sous forme d'un "Contrat de Progrès", à la Communauté des réfugiés rwandais et à la Communauté Internationale.

Ces personnalités auraient pour tâche d'élaborer une stratégie cohérente et globale sur les plans intérieur (territoire rwandais) et extérieur (Communauté Internationale d'une part et Communauté des réfugiés rwandais d'autre part).

C'est à ces conditions que toute la famille des réfugiés rwandais pourra intégrer l'indispensable RENOUVEAU dans sa démarche de tous les jours, et de ce fait maximiser ses chances de réussite dans l'accomplissement de son projet d'assurer le retour dans la mère-patrie. L'URGENCE OBLIGERAIT.

Fait à Nairobi, le 6 juin 1995.
Jérôme NTARE BICAMUMPAKA.

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