CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

STATE 127262 130541Z PAGE 01 ORIGIN P-01

OASY-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 C-01 AID-01 10-16 TEDE-00 INR-00 AF-01 INFO LOG-00 H-01 OIGO-01 HA-09 OMB-01 PA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 EB-01 ss-00 ADS-00 sso-00 L-01 SR-00 SP-00 SNP-00 /041R PRS-01 PMB-00 PM-00 USIE-00 RPE-01 TRSE-00 T-00 STR-01

DRAFTED BY: P:PTARNOFF SPC: JDOBBINS APPROVED BY: IO:DBENNET S/S-O:SEISENBRAUN

IO:DBENNET S/S-O:SEISENBRAUN SPC:JDOBBINS

AF: PBUSHNELL/ARENDER

IO/PHO: JBRIMS IO/UNF: SZELLE USUN/W:DSCHEFFER HA: JKAUFMANN OSD: EWARNER RP: BMCKINLEY

S/P:SBUTCHER NSC:KKENNEY S/S: RWILSON JCS: AMACKE

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:

AF, IO, PM, HA, INR, P , _ ------166E22 130544Z /38

O R 130540Z MAY 94 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE INFO SECDEF WASHDC 0000 CJCS WASHDC 0000

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 127262

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC

SUBJECT: RWANDA: SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

127262 130541Z STATE PAGE 02 REF: A) PRETORIA 6682, B) USUN 2015

- 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. SUMMARY. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED AS GUIDANCE TO USUN DURING DISCUSSIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS WEEK ON THE CONTINUING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN RWANDA. END SUMMARY.
- 3. WE HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE UN'S NON-PAPER ON RWANDA WHICH ASKS FOR AN EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCE OF AT LEAST

SECURITY FOR DISPLACED PERSONS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF RWANDA AND TO ASSIST IN THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN SERVICES TO THEM. VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAS ALREADY EXPLAINED TO BOUTROS-GHALI SOME OF OUR SPECIFIC CONCERNS ABOUT BASING A HUMANITARIAN OPERATION IN KIGALI WHILE A CIVIL WAR AND HEAVY FIGHTING ARE RAGING IN AND AROUND THAT CITY AND ITS AIRPORT (REF A). A KIGALI-BASED OPERATION IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD REQUIRE A CHAPTER VII MANDATE, GIVEN

THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER RENEGADE ARMY UNITS AND EXTREMIST MILITIAS. IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO LOCATE ADEQUATE NUMBERS OF TROOPS WILLING TO SERVE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. MOREOVER, THE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS OF AIRLIFTING IN THE QUANTITY OF TROOPS AND HEAVY EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO MOUNT A KIGALI-BASED OPERATION ARE DAUNTING. THE U.S. IS NOT PREPARED AT THIS POINT TO LIFT HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND TROOPS INTO KIGALI.

4. IN ADDITION TO OUR CONCERNS ABOUT A KIGALI-BASED CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

127262 130541Z STATE PAGE 03 MISSION, WE PERCEIVE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IN THE SECRETARIAT'S PROPOSED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. IN ARTICULAR, WE SEE AN INHERENT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE SECRETARIAT'S ASSUMPTIONS THAT THERE WILL BE NO CEASEFIRE AND THE EXPECTATION THAT THIS WILL NOT BE A PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSION. SIMILARLY, THAT THE MISSION WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO "ENSURE" SAFETY FOR DISPLACED PERSONS BUT, AS GENERAL DALLAIRE OPINED, OPERATE WITH #MINIMUM USE OF FORCE". FINALLY, THE MANDATE DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARIAT AND CONTAINED IN REF B SEEMS OVERLYROAD AND WOULD BE MORE MANAGEABLE IF LIMITED TO CREATING A PROTECTIVE ZONE, PROVIDING SECURITY TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS, LIAISON, AND PROMOTING RESTORATION OF A CEASEFIRE AND RETURN TO THE ARUSHA FEACE PROCESS.

5. AS VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAS INDICATED, WE ARE INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF USING AN EXPANDED FORCE TO CREATE ONE OR MORE SECURE ZONES IN RWANDA ALONG THE BORDER FOR THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN MOST IMMEDIATE DANGER AND FOR THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THEM. SUCH A MISSION COULD NOT ONLY PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SUCH SAFE ZONES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BUT COULD ALSO PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO REFUGEE REPATRIATION

AND COULD SERVE IN A PREVENTIVE CAPACITY TO DETER THE SPREAD OF VIOLENCE TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

6. UNDER THIS OPTION, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE STORED IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND TRANSPORTED INTO THE SECURE ZONES. THE MISSION WOULD PROTECT THE ZONES' PERIMETERS AGAINST INCURSIONS AND, WITHIN THE ZONES, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 127262 130541Z
ENFORCE SECURITY, INCLUDING SECURITY OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE SHIPMENTS AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS. THE
OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES
AND ROBUST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TO ENSURE PROTECTION FOR
THESE ZONES.

7. BASED ON KNOWN FLOWS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

AND THE LOCATION OF PERSONS MOST AT RISK, THE ZONE OR ZONES SHOULD BE SET UP AT LEAST INITIALLY ON THE RWADA BORDER WITH BURUNDI AND, IF REQUIRED, POSSIBLY TANZANIA. ESSENTIAL TO THIS CONCEPT WOULD BE THE FULL CONCURRENCE OF THE NEIGHBORING GOVERNMENTS AND THE ASSENT OF THE RWANDAN PARTIES. OTHER AREAS COULD BE CONSIDERED LATER IF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE AND RESOURCES PERMIT.

- 8. THE MANDATE OF THIS EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCE WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH SAFE ZONES ALONG THE RWANDAN BORDER FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS AND TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE BY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES TO THOSE PERSONS AND SECURITY FOR THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF THE ZONES CREATED SHOULD CORRESFOND WITH THE SIZE AND MANDATE OF THE FORCE. DEPLOYMENT COULD BEGIN AS SOON AS THE TROOPS, EQUIPMENT. AND TRANSPORT ARE READY, WHETHER OR NOT A MILITARY CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE.
- 9. IN THE CUMULATIVE, MILITARY ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THIS MISSION MAY REPRESENT A REAL DANGER TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED. EVEN WITH THE TACIT APPROVAL OF THE WARRING PARTIES, ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE ZONE IN SOUTHERN RWANDA CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 127262 130541Z

HAS THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVOKING CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, MILITIAS AND ROVING GANGS. THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAS BEEN UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO CONTROL THESE FORCES. THEREFORE, TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS' FORCES MUST BE EQUIPPED, CAPABLE AND HAVE THE CLEAR AUTHORITY FOR CONDUCTING WHAT COULD LIKELY BE AN ACTIVE PROTECTION OPERATION REQUIRING THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE. MOREOVER, IF THE RPF CARRIES OUT ITS PREVIOUS THREAT TO PUNISH WHAT IT CONSIDERS ROGUE FORCES IN SOUTHERN RWANDA, THOSE FORCES MIGHT ATTEMPT TO ENTER THE DISPLACED PERSON CAMPS IN THE SECURE ZONE, OR TO PASS THROUGH UN LINES. WITH THE RPF PURSUING THESE FORCES, THE UN FORCE WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN A NEUTRAL HUMANITARIAN ROLE. UN SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS ANALYSIS AS IT CONSIDERS THE MANDATE, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, AND WHICH FORCES TO ACCEPT AND HOW THEY ARE EQUIPPED. OUR VIEW, TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WOULD NEED TO COME EQUIPPED AND PREPARED TO COUNTER POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES AND MEET THE CHALLENGES DESCRIBED ABOVE.

- 10. THIS OPTION DOES NOT ADDRESS THE FATE OF THE SEVERAL
- THOUSAND RWANDANS WHO ARE ALREADY UNDER UN PROTECTION IN KIGALI. WE RECOMMEND THAT THESE AD HOC PROTECTIVE EFFORTS SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL A SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT CAN BE ENSURED.
- 11. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR PROPOSAL CONTAINS MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS -- SUCH AS, WHERE WILL THE NEEDED FORCES COME FROM; HOW WILL THEY BE TRANSPORTED TO THE RWANDAN BORDER AREA; WHAT IS THE PRECISE ROLE OF THE UN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 127262 130541Z AND NGO AGENCIES, THEIR REQUIREMENTS, AND THEIR ELATIONSHIP WITH UN FORCES; WHERE PRECISELY SHOULD THESE SAFE ZONES BE CREATED; COULD THESE ZONES BE RELOCATED TO RESPOND TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES; WOULD UN FORCES BE AUTHORIZED TO MOVE OUT OF THE ZONES TO ASSIST AFFECTED POPULATIONS NOT IN THE ZONES; CAN WE OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH THESE ZONES NEAR THEIR BORDER; WILL THE FIGHTING PARTIES IN RWANDA AGREE TO THIS ARRANGMENT; WHAT MECHANISMS WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO COORDINATE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN MILITARY OPERATIONS; WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD NEED TO OTAIN FOR THE OPERATION TO END SUCCESSFULLY? WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOU AND OTHERS TO FIND ANSWERS TO THESE

QUESTIONS.

12. WE WOULD URGE THE UN TO EXPLORE AND REFINE THIS ALTERNATIVE AND PRESENT THE COUNCIL WITH A MENU OF AT LEAST TWO OPTIONS IN A FORMAL REPORT FROM THE SYG ALONG WITH COST ESTIMATES BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES ON CHANGING UNAMIR'S MANDATE. TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN