

1065 – 6 Jan 1994

As we informed in our Nos 1038 and 1039, informal SC consultations took place on 5 and 6 Jan which culminated on 6 Jan by a formal meeting to adopt a resolution.

Though a clear process had been anticipated, with no surprises, certain sudden changes took place. In the course of informal consultations, France pointed out that the Rwanda developments are at the centre of its attention (as are those in Burundi) and consequently we could rely on France's initiative in dealing with these points. This indeed turned out to be the case. Prior to the first round [of informals] France offered a draft resolution and later, subsequently to P-3 consultations, added a draft letter to the SG. The French, however, don't want these drafts to be offered to other members of the SC before the actual consultations start; rather, they want them to "emerge" from the plenum in the course of discussing the SG's report. In our view France was trying to eliminate efforts of the non-aligned to influence things.

The P-3 decided on the need to adopt both documents (the resolution and the letter) for the following reasons:

- a. The letter points out that SC members reviewed the situation in Rwanda, which met the requirement of para 2, res. 872/1993, as an indispensable precondition for further continuation of the UNAMIR mandate. The SC should agree that the parties attained **significant** progress in fulfilling the Arusha peace agreements. On this point, disunity persisted until the last moment of the discussions. This is why the text of the letter to the SG is so "spineless". (We recall for your information that the practice of letters addressed to the UNSG which merely state that conditions for continuing a peace operation have or have not been met was established during discussions concerning Haiti and Liberia.) This practice will continue and the mandate extension or establishing new PKOs will be conditioned by meeting the conditions stated in the resolution.
- b. The resolution was necessary (as demanded by USA, France, Brazil and New Zealand) in order to approve of the deployment of the second unit in the demilitarized zone in the N-W of Rwanda. Some countries also wanted to use the resolution in order to apply additional pressure on both sides of the conflict so as to create soon the provisional government which originally would have served to kick-start the second phase of deploying UNAMIR. Some countries (Argentina, Brazil) interpreted this as insufficient progress.

The first round of informals ended on 5 Jan with members not agreeing on whether the progress attained was significant or not. Comparing the two texts prepared by France was left to the working group. The working group met under the chairmanship of Amb. Kovanda on 6 Jan am and worked out compromise drafts of both documents. In the course of informal consultations, the French representative informed about the intention of his Govt to send military observers to Rwanda. The Amb of Nigeria added that his country planned to join countries participating in UNAMIR.

In the course of informal consultations in the afternoon, both texts were approved without major difficulties, despite initial reticence and reservations of the NAM caucus who felt a resolution to be superfluous and would have been happy with a letter only. Their standpoint was informed by the fear that one day, the SC could backtrack from its original intention to establish or extend a previously agreed-upon operation. NAM assumed that a mandate revision is a mere formality. One has to mention that in the course of previous informals or during the working group's meeting no representative of this group objected openly to a resolution.

[The cable continues with a review of the Czech position and a brief characteristic of the resolution adopted.]