

The SC met on 9 April, unusually for a Saturday, to continue its deliberations concerning Rwanda

The UN Secretariat as well as the Rwanda Ambassador (via the UNSC President) informed about latest developments in the country which took a marked turn for the worse in the course of the previous 24 hours; whilst on Friday, the Secretariat informed about the provisional government and hopes for a ceasefire, in the course of the night these flickers of hope were extinguished. Absolute anarchy rules the country, armed members of the gendarmerie, army and the presidential guard (which is least inclined toward a peaceful settlement of the situation) freely move around Kigali. Tutsi military forces have completely abandoned their assembly points where they had been under control of UN soldiers. The RPF composed of Tutsi is (perhaps naturally) suspected of the airport assassination which, however, it vehemently denies. Tutsi units are also on the move from the demilitarized zone in the North of the country. They are evidently heading for Kigali, the capital. The RPF has disavowed the provisional government. (Note: the local press here describes them as “rebels”.)

(We assume that Prague has the basic information and that Rwanda concerns our country only tangentially. If there is interest in more detailed information about the situation in-country, let us know – otherwise we would focus especially on the UN position.)

The French Ambassador informed about the dispatch of his country's troops with the humanitarian objective of evacuating French nationals. Belgium (the former colonial master of Rwanda) has decided similarly and for logistical reasons, the two operations have been linked. FR emphasized that the operation is time-limited. If other countries appropriately request it, the expedition can evacuate their nationals as well. The US Amb. Informed about the steps of that country – so far, marines are in Bujumbura, in neighboring Burundi.

The UNSC now faces three questions:

1. *The FR-Bel expedition:* This concerns the SC only marginally. We listened to the basic information which was not challenged in the course of the following discussion from the point of view of international law. E.g., the Arg Amb (who as several other amb's is an important international lawyer) referred to Art 51 of the UN Charter. All supported the Fr-Bel decision. (CZ did not take part in that discussion.) The Amb of Nigeria pointed out the need to inform the press exactly, in view of the inglorious history of foreign military interventions in Africa; on Friday, for example, he recalled a parallel with the Congo of

the 60s. – This aspect will concern the SC only in terms of coordinating the activities of this expedition with those of UNAMIR.

2. *The situation of UNAMIR* and other UN personnel. Coincidentally, just on the eve of the aircraft catastrophe, the SC approved an extension of its mandate by four months with the proviso that within six weeks a decision will be taken as to whether progress in politically resolving the country's situation will warrant it staying any longer. Today this appears almost as a tragicomic coincidence. The question today is whether UNAMIR doesn't need a broader mandate (so that it can for example assist with evacuations), whether it doesn't need to beef up its current strength (of about 2500 men), or conversely, whether we shouldn't evacuate it completely.  
(The New York representative of the RPF informed the SC President that the RPF would not like to see any changes in the UNAMIR mandate. It is possible that the RPF feels that UNAMIR sides with the Hutus – a small news item appeared in March according to which UNAMIR got involved against demonstrators protesting the late president Habiyarimana.)

We will be discussing these aspects further, as of Monday April 11. We assume that in the SC will base its decision-making on needs on the ground, as forwarded by the SG. But already on 8 April, the SG sent the SC President a letter in which he drew attention to the possible need to review the mandate – or even to expand the force “by two or three battalions”, if UNAMIR were to evacuate itself, other UN personnel and other foreigners. However, the [Fr-Bel] expedition is now taking care of foreigners so the question of expanding UNAMIR is rather an academic one right now.

CZ intends to stay out of this debate, leaving the initiative to the countries that are directly involved.

3. *SC and the future of Rwanda*. Here we'll face the most troublesome discussion. Two types of arguments will be used in favor of continued activity of the SC and the peace-keepers:
  - a) The alleged responsibility that the SC bears for Rwanda (or for its innocent civilians)
  - b) That the domestic situation there jeopardizes international peace and security – certainly in neighboring Burundi (the two countries are to a great extent communicating vessels) but also in Uganda (from where, under the auspices of UNOMUR, another UN operation, units of Tutsi are returning which until recently took part practically as mercenaries in that country's civil war) as well as in Tanzania

– in both of these countries in view of the anticipated hundreds of thousands of refugees.

Arguments against further involvement will make the point that it is an internal affair of the country in which the SC shouldn't interfere any further, if only because forestalling the anarchy was evidently beyond UNAMIR's capability. To get deeply involved in the internal affairs of a country affected by anarchy has not paid off for the UN at least once in the past – in the case of Somalia. Apart from that, in view of the non-existence of any effective and recognized government, any further SC activity would have to be based on Chapter VII of the Charter, whereas so far, UNAMIR has been functioning under Chapter VI.

This discussion will be very complex. Though it will not be said aloud, in the background will be the tacit question of whether the SC doesn't care two hoots about Africa when the going gets tough – compared for example with the former Yugoslavia. On this question, too, CZ will avoid sharp public comments and might follow the views of our friends.

We'd appreciate an OK for the proposed approach, or different instructions.