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-https://francegenocidetutsi. FGT. fr

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New archives

The publication of the report to the French President by the commission chaired by Vincent Duclert (Duclert, 26/03/2021) has been followed by the opening of the archives consulted. The following have been published two inventories of documents cited or consulted (Douat, 26/3/2021), a statement of sources (Duclert, 10/05/2021) and a methodological statement (Duclert, 07/04/2021). Some documents from these archives have been uploaded to FGT.

The Muse report (19/04/2021) in English, commissioned by the Rwandan government, was toned down to allow Emmanuel Macron's visit to Kigali (27/05/2021). However, published shortly after the Duclert report, it criticizes the latter for failing to take a position on the real responsibility of the French state. It asserts that the French government bears significant responsibility for enabling a foreseeable genocide. This report was not accompanied by the publication of archives.

The French judicial investigation into the attack of April 6, 1994, which caused the death of the Rwandan and Burundi presidents ended with a dismissal (Herbaut, 21/12/2018) in favor of the Rwandans incriminated by judge Bruguière (17/11/2006). Documents from this case are available on FGT.

Duclert's report

The Duclert commission produced a voluminous report which concluded on a "set of heavy and damning responsibilities" for France (Duclert, 26/03/2021, p. 973). The Élysée Palace and especially the état-major particulier are suspected. Following this enormous work, continued in a book by Vincent Duclert, La France face au génocide des Tutsi (Duclert, 2024), a number of questions arise. Was there complicity in the genocide? "If that means a willingness to join in the genocidal enterprise," writes the report on page 971, "there is nothing in the archives to demonstrate that". Did the commission have access to all the archives? It was limited to the French archives. In its methodological statement, it acknowledges the limits of its work. It did not have enough time to work on the role of Paul Barril (Duclert, 07/04/2021, p. 36). The Direction générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) listened to Paul Barril's phone communications

in 1993-1994, the reports being archived at Fort de Vincennes. DGSE documentalists would have denied the existence of such archives. On the hiring of mercenaries to carry out an indirect strategy during the genocide (Quesnot, 06/05/1994), Duclert makes up for it in his 2024 book by analyzing the Rwabalinda's report on his visit to General Huchon on May 9, 1994 (Rwabalinda, 16/05/1994). He does not dispute its authenticity (Duclert, 2024, pp. 421-426). One of the most important aspects of Duclert's report was to untie tongues. For example, Colonel Galinié opened his personal archives. Some archives are missing or very incomplete, such as that of the état-major particulier. Some faxes are labelled to be destroyed after reading (Huchon, 10/27/1990). Pierre Joxe tried to put an end to the practice of "orders by voice", which leaves no paper trail (Duclert, 26/03/2021, p. 737). Hubert Védrine would not give this note to the President "for fear to displease" (Joxe, February 1993).

Antoine Anfré

The direct consequences of the Duclert Commission are political : the Emmanuel Macron's visit to Kigali (Macron, 27/5/2021) and the appointment of Antoine Anfré as ambassador. This young diplomat in Kampala and then in Quai d'Orsay as Rwanda editor was a little too lucid. He was dismissed for notes that displeased Paul Dijoud (Duclert, 26/3/2021, pp. 844-850) and the ruling left, not free of colonial and racist clichés. On the guestbook of the Gisozi memorial, Anfré writes : "The Tutsi genocide would not have happened if we had a different policy" (Anfré, 19/07/2021). That says it all. In front of Rwandan television, Anfré goes back over his career troubles (Nsengimana, 17/09/2022). The French press made no mention of it.

Inability to think about genocide?

Genocide, i.e. the elimination of the Tutsi, was already announced as early as October 1990 (Martres, 10/15/1990; Galinié 10/24/1990). Blindness in the face of massacres and the declared intention to liquidate the Tutsi proved profitable for France, since Belgium, more concerned about human rights, withdrew its troops. France thus took the place of the former colonial power and became the regime's main support. The text published by the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan governmental army (RGF) defining the Tutsi as the enemy (Nsabimana, 09/21/1992), certainly known to the French military officers as it was written in French, is treated too quickly by the commission (Duclert, 26/03/2021, pp. 911, 950). It is not to be found in French archives! Yet this text, known since the international commission of inquiry in January 1993 (FIDH, 08/03/1993), will lead to the conclusion of the UN Human Rights Commission that genocide had been committed (Degni-Ségui, 06/28/1994). The meaning of this text is emphasized later (Duclert, 2024, pp. 214-215). Long before Alain Juppé publicly acknowledged the genocide of the Tutsi (05/18/1994) and refrained from drawing any consequences, the Amaryllis operation order referred to the elimination of the Tutsi (Germanos, 08/04/1994), the DGSE, the massacre of all Tutsi (DGSE n° 18502/N, 04/11/1994) and the Direction du renseignement militaire (DRM) (military intelligence), the RGF, which indiscriminately attacks the Tutsi part of the population. It's not a question of an inability to think about genocide but a deliberate refusal to talk about genocide. At the UN, Ambassador Mérimée prevents the word from being mentioned in the Security Council presidential statement on April 30. He emphasizes that the responsibility for the massacres is shared by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), but he is unable to provide proof (Kovanda, Pres. Statement., 28-29/04/1994; Quesnot, 02/05/1994). Contempt, indifference to the massacres and racism dominate political thinking. François Mitterrand, for example, confided to his son : "In this type of conflict, don't search for good guys and bad guys, there are only potential killers" (J.-C. Mitterrand, Mémoire meurtrie, p. 154).

Habyarimana feared trial

President Habyarimana hinted that he might renounce the presidency, but would like to be sure that he and his family will not be prosecuted (Martres, 03/30/1993; Bunel, 26/04/1993). He worked hard to break up the parties he considered to be favorable to RPF in order to secure a majority in the National Assembly (Marlaud, 03/01/1994, 04/02/1994).

Aware of a possible coup d'état

The French military knew what would be the consequence of the Arusha agreement to merge the two armies: "This agreement on the army is a severe defeat for the [Rwandan] governmental army. I believe that part of the army (the effective part) will not accept it and we must fear its reactions, which may go as far as an coup attempt" (Delort, 10/06/1993). "The problem of percentages as accepted by the Rwandan delegation in Arusha might not be accepted by the RGF. They may appear to be a real provocation and herald a violent reaction of refusal by the armed forces, or even an internal destabilization by military leaders" (DRM, 25/06/1993).

28 years of false accusations

The French justice has been unable to demonstrate the RPF's involvement in the attack against President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994 (Soulard, 15/02/2022). In view of the judicial order which accused Paul Kagame and those close to him (Bruguière, 17/11/2006), it seemed clear that French justice was used to cover up a French state crime (Kapler, Morel, "Un juge de connivence", 05/03/2008).

The central event

On April 2, 1994, when President Habyarimana asked Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh to inform the UN Secretary-General that he was going to set up the institutions provided for in the Arusha accords, Joseph Nzirorera told him : "We won't let it happen, mister President" (Nshimiyimana, Prélude..., 1996, p. 38). The organizers of the genocide provoked this attack against Habyarimana's plane to block the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement and blame the Tutsi. One would like to put aside this question of the perpetrators of the attack for the good reason that the genocide of the Tutsi had been in the planning stage since 1990 and execution stage since 1992. But the omission of this event impact deeply the analysis of responsibility. The historiography of the genocide remains crippled if it passes over this fact in silence. A body of evidence implicates French leaders.

The DAMI?

Suspicions about members of the Detachement Militaire d'Assistance and Instruction (DAMI) were limited to the questioning of Pascal Estevada (Piwowarczyk, 21/03/2002) and the investigation of Warrant Officer Claude Ray, alias Régis, suspected by Filip Reyntjens (Trois jours..., 02/08/1995) was limited to his service record. Member of the DAMI he returned to Rwanda (Exec. solde, 03/12/1993) He was based at the RGF staff (Tel. directory, 03/01/1994). From April 6 to 12 1994 he looked after Ltc Maurin's family (Tauzin, 04/15/1994). The fact that Tauzin, the commander of the 1st RPIMa (french marines) was awaiting an order for a "probable parachute drop on Kigali" on April 7, suggests a set-up (Tauzin, Je demande justice..., 2011, p. 91).

Barril, Denard, Ollivier?

Although French officials might have called on mercenaries from the groups Paul Barril, Bob Denard or Patrick Ollivier (Smith, Ces messieurs Afrique, p. 91; DGSE 14/11/1995), vou can't just improvise surface-toair missile shooters, and their presence was surely known to the RGF and their French military advisors, who were listening to all communications (Cohen, Mitterrand et la sortie de la querre froide, Intervention of gen. Quesnot, 02/1998). Rather than being questioned about his presence in Rwanda at the time of the plane attack, it was Paul Barril who de facto led Judge Bruguière's investigation. The exposure of the lies of the former No. 2 in the Élysée Palace's antiterrorist unit did not prompt magistrates to question him further. The Rwandan sponsors of the attack are known from the testimony of Jean Birara (Artiges, 26/05/1994), and the place where the shots were fired, on

the edge of the Kanombe military camp, has also been known since 1994 (DGSE n° 18502/N, 11/04/1994). The 1998 Parliamentary Information Mission (MIP) covered up this document. Judge Trévidic's expert report confirms it (Oosterlinck, 05/01/2012). The French military present in the camp were not aware of the preparation of this attack? The magistrates forgot to ask them.

The black box in Paris?

The MIP learned that the Falcon presidential plane was equipped with two CVR and FDR recorders (Rannou, 06/15/1998) but did not publish it. The commander de Saint-Quentin rushed to the scene of the crash with the Rwandan CRAP a few minutes after the explosion (Fiche Min. Def., 07/07/1998). They searched and found the black box (DGSE, 07/04/1994; Jeune Afrique, 4/21/1994; Smith, 07/29/1994; Mutsinzi report, 04/20/2009, pp. 53-55). The Interim Rwandan Government (GIR) promises that the results of the black box analysis will be included in the investigation (Minafet Kigali, 04/15/1994). The black box of the Falcon would have been sent to Paris for analysis (DGSE, 07/04/1994; Haesendonck, 05/05/1994). A black box found in the Falcon hangar was found at the UN in New York, it was not the Falcon CVR (Nair, OIOS, 2004). It was that of a Concorde plane of Air France (Gautier, 12/15/2004). De Saint-Quentin sent telex which are not in the archives. Likewise a report on the crash of the Falcon was made by the French military but never transmitted to justice (Lefort, 24-31/08/1998).

Missiles

Two surface-to-air missile containers were found by the RGF as early as April 7, 1994 (Fiche Rens.,

10/23/1996) and not on 25 April. A year later, the RGF are unable to say whether it is SA 7 or SA 16 (FAR, Contribution..., 12/1995). The missile identification provided by Colonel Bagosora and taken up by the MIP and the judge Bruguière is therefore probably false. A fact sheet from the French Defense Ministry claims the missiles were SA 16 "according to the missile debris found at the scene of the attack" (Fiche Min. Def., 1998; MIP, Appendices, p. 281). These debris were never presented to justice. British Experts analyzed traces of the missile head on the plane. They did not correspond to an SA 16 (Warden, 27/2/2009).

Mistral?

The experts appointed by Judge Trévidic rule out the Mistral misbecause it is not available sile export in 1994 (Oosterlinck, for 01/05/2012, pp. 137, 172). This is wrong. France has sold Mistrals to South Africa via Congo-Brazzaville (Krop, 03/09/1989). The sale has been discontinued. What happened to these missiles paid for but not delivered? France had even already provided Mistral to the apartheid regime probably for testing in Angola (DOD-SANDF, 07/21/1987). According to the US defense attaché, the Rwandan government army, which probably shot down the plane of the President, had 15 Mistral missiles in April (CIA, 07/13/1994). The information was transmitted to UNA-MIR (Annan, 01/09/1994; Malagardis, 05/31/2012).

Murdered on April 6, 7 or 8?

Inconsistencies concerning the date of the assassination of the gendarmes Didot and Maïer and Didot's wife betray the french authorities of Kigali who had several versions on the cause of their death. They were allegedly killed on April 6 (Thomas, 04/13/1994), on April 7 April (Cussac, 19/4/1994) or April 8 (Thomas, 13/04/1994; Vessière 05-09/07/1994). This Michel Thomas, military doctor in Bangui, declared to the judicial police officer that he is not the author of these certificates (Kaelben, 05/24/2012). These are fakes.

The unspeakable?

Since 1994, the French authorities are hiding the report about their investigation on the causes of the fall of President Habyarimana's plane (Lefort, 31/08/1998) as well as parts that were taken from the crash site (plane recorders CVR and FDR, missile debris). As long as they don't put these documents to justice, the French authorities will only cry crocodile tears.

Not accomplice?

Despite the Arusha agreements, Ambassador Marlaud organizes arms deliveries (TD 145-150, 02/15-17/1994). According to him, the French have more to fear from the RPF than from the presidential guard (TD 305, 04/07/1994). He meets the colonel Bagosora instead of the new RGF chief of staff (TD 308, 07/04/1994). Several ministers who lead the genocide take refuge at the French embassy (TD 320, 04/08/1994). The new interim government is, according to the French ambassador, the most possible compliant with the Arusha Accords (TD 326, 04/08/1994). At the height of the massacres perpetrated by the RGF and the militias, he forwards to Paris a request for military support to the RGF (TD 363, 04/11/1994).

Franco-Belgian friendships

The French authorities did everything to ensure that Belgium send no soldiers in Rwanda at the start of the genocide. At the UN, Ambassador Mérimée addresses the representative of Belgium by acting as spokesperson for the representative of Rwanda (Noterdaeme, 04/08/1994). In Kigali, Ambassador Marlaud does the same with his colleague Swinnen (Marlaud, TD 330, 04/09/1994, TD 343, 345, 04/10/1994; Cussac, 04/10/1994). 493 men of the Belgian paras brigade can finally landing in Kigali on April 10, 1994 (Op. Silver Back, 04/15/1994). Around 500 others remain in Nairobi (Marchal, *Rwanda* : the descent..., 2001, p. 249). Durin April 11, the Belgian paratroopers will remain stuck at the airport except for one evacuation convoy to the French school.

On April 14, before taking off, the C-130 of the French special forces (COS) is prevented from doing so by mortar fire on the runway. All testimonies point to the RGF, but French lieutenant-colonel Maurin will accuse the Belgians (Maurin, 04/19/1994; Balch, 08/09/1998).

Intox

FGT transcribes the words of the 1994 television news concerning Rwanda. We see how the confusion was maintained in public opinion by very often reversing the killers and their victims (Givord, 10/12/2023).

Mille Collines Hotel

Thérèse Pujolle's poignant note to Jean-Marc Simon about the attack on the refugee convoy from the Hotel Mille Collines on May 3 1994 provides evidence that the RGF headquarter is in contact with its French correspondents, who appear to be Bruno Delaye at the Élysée and French military officers (Pujolle, 03/05/1994).

Turquoise in Kigali

The aim was to land the special forces in Kigali at three points in one night. (COS, 16/06/1994). Kigali was well in the planning (Lanxade, 06/17/1994; Janvier, 06/20/1994).

Hutuland

The clumsiness betrays the thinking of France's top military brass. Of course, they did not write that the last Tutsi are to be cleared, but that the area of Rwanda where the French vanguard comes is the "Hutuland" (Germanos, 06/22/1994, 06/26/1994). For them Tutsi no longer exist. They have ratified the genocide.

Cynicism

The day Paris pays tribute to the resistance of the Tutsi in Bisesero by inaugurating an Aminadabu Birara square (RFI, 05/13/2022), we learn that the investigation of six complaints from Rwandans against the French army ends with a dismissal of the case (10/18/2023).

Not 3 days, but 4

The French officers sent to stop the massacres but who witnessed the massacre of the last Tutsi at Bisesero for four days are not prosecuted. Four days, because journalist Sam Kiley warned Captain Éric Bucquet on June 26 (Amanpour, 26/06/1994; Saint-Exupéry, 27/06/1994). What did Captain Bucquet do with this information? He was promoted general de corps d'armée, director of the DRSD, former military security, until 2022.

Rosier meets the leaders of the killers

Among the first to disembark, Colonel Rosier, commander of the special forces detachment, met with the main organizers of the genocide. Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, in charge of the "ratissage" of the Tutsi at Bisesero (Rosier, 06/23/1994), the interim Defense minister, Augustin Bizimana, and Foreign Affairs minister, Jérôme Bicamumpaka (Rosier, 06/25/1994), the Prefect of Kibuye, who organized the massacres (Rosier, 06/26/1994).

Rosier refuses to rescue the Tutsi

On June 27, Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Rémy Duval, alias Diego, informed by nuns in Kibuye, met Tutsi in Bisesero who were under attack. They asked him for protection. He abandons them but made his report by telephone and fax (Duval, 27/06/1994; Saint-Exupéry, 06/29/1994). In the archives, his fax is dated the 29th. A fax from Turquoise headquarter on the 27th announced that Tutsi were being attacked in the Bisesero region (PCIAT, 06/27/1994). Rosier and Lafourcade claim that Duval did not inform them, although Rosier had sent a transmitter, Sergeant Combette, to follow Duval. We now learn that Duval's fax machine was out of order (Duclert, 2004, p. 298). Rosier declares that his mission is not to disarm the militiamen as they slaughter the Tutsi (Smith, "Dialogue difficile...", 27/06/1994).

Rosier makes people believe that the Tutsi are RPF fighters

On the evening of June 27, Rosier told journalists that 2 000 RPF fighters had arrived on the heights overlooking Lake Kivu (this is Bisesero), which will cut the government zone in two (Amar, France 2, 06/27/1994).

On the 28th, he decided to evacuate the Kibuye Sisters by helicopters rather than the Tutsi from Bisesero, even though the nuns were protected by Duval's detachment. Sergeant Meynier tells Rosier about the previous day's reconnaissance at Bisesero, but Rosier remains impassive (Seriacouty, 28/06/1994).

A special forces intelligence report dated June 28 refers to information received from Lieutenant-Colonel Nsengiyumva. The FAR operation of the previous day was interrupted [by Duval's reconnaissance]. It was postponed until next day, June 29, the day of Minister François Léotard"s visit. While Léotard was inspecting the French troops, gunfire shots were heard in the mountains (Lesnes, 01/07/1994). The massacres continued, in full view of the French.

On June 30, journalist Sam Kiley, accompanied by Michel Peyrard and Benoît Gysembergh from *Paris Match* led captain Olivier Dunant and Thierry Prungnaud to the killing fields of Bisesero, while Gillier, their chief, had passed by in the morning without seeing anything (Kiley, 06/2019).

Sartre spits in the soup

In his July 1st operations order, Colonel Sartre, commander of the Nord Turquoise operation, wrote that elements of the special forces (COS) had encountered Tutsi in the Bisesero region (Sartre 01/07/1994). Lafourcade and Rosier deny this until this day. In 2021, Sartre decides to break his silence (Sartre, 30/03/2021, 12/2021).

Rwandans thrown from helicopters

In a CRQ (daily report) to Romuald (Colonel Rosier), we read : "Following a bad HM [military helicopter] drop, the prisoners left in the NYUNGWE forest have been reported by peasants and in GIKONGORO it is said that the French are throwing the Rwandans from helicopters" (COS, 07/07/1994). The Mucyo report was not fabrication.

RGF disarmament?

Government forces (RGF) withdraw to Zaire with arms and luggage (Quesnot, 18/07/1994). Numerous armed Rwandan forces pass through Goma (Gérard, 07/18/1994). 14 000 FAR soldiers withdrew to Bukavu with a few helicopters, a dozen AMLs, cannons and mortars (DGSE, 28/07/1994). In Goma, an agreement with the Zairian authorities allowed the passage of 20,000 armed RGF soldiers (Reucherain, 08/08/1994).

Mercenaries

As part of the indirect strategy proposed by Gen. Quesnot, French mercenaries were mobilized to rescue the RGF. The accusations against Paul Barril were confirmed by the search ordered by Judge Trévidic (GPB, 06/05/1994). He had signed a contract with the GIR (Barril, 05/28/1994). The identification of Robert Martin with Bob Denard provided proof that the latter had intervened in Rwanda (Crétollier, 02/2018). He made no secret of it (Denard, Corsaire de la République, 1998, p. 422) and judge Bruguière had Jean-Marie Dessales as a witness (Bruguière, 17/11/2006), who accompanied Denard to the Comoros in 1995. The DGSE informed the highest authorities about these French mercenaries ("Les Mercenaires Invisibles", 24/03/2022). Who says Denard says Foccart. Mitterrand's entourage, which included Barril, communicated with the one of Jacques Foccart and Chirac. This agreement imposed by geopolitics should lead us to reconsider the list of the sponsors of these secret actions in Rwanda during the Tutsi genocide.