

NYPM File: 3/88/1

NEW ZEALAND MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK

Telephone: (212) 826-1960

Fax: (212) 758-0827

Date: 6 May 1994

TO: WELLINGTON
WGTN UNSC ✓

No.
No.

2591

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

LD: SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB) Page 1 of: 11

looked to UNSC, MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DSP3, Fortum

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our accompanying message refers.

2 Following is SecGen's nonpaper on how an expanded UNAMIR might be constituted.

AIDE-MEMOIRERWANDA

1. The attached non-paper is in response to the letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 6 May 1994 by the President of the Security Council. The paper outlines a possible mandate and force structure for an expanded UNAMIR, capable of providing support for displaced persons and assisting in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need.
2. UNAMIR has broached the possibility of such an operation to both parties, but further elaboration might be required and explicit commitments obtained to pre-empt possible difficulties.
3. The members of the Council should be aware that the fighting in and around Kigali has intensified. UNAMIR HQs and the Airport have been hit, and humanitarian assistance flights have been halted. One UNAMIR soldier has been killed by mortar fire today. The Force Commander again has stressed that UNAMIR cannot continue to cope with the situation indefinitely with its current resources.

9 May 1994

3

9 May 1994

Rwanda

1. UNAMIR's ultimate objective in Rwanda, as provided in its mandate approved by the Security Council under resolution 872 (1993), is to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. This process tragically broke down on 6 April 1994, and all attempts to put it back on track have so far been unsuccessful. The first step in bringing the parties back to the Arusha peace process is to address the humanitarian crisis, and to assist in re-establishing a stable and secure environment in the country. It is hoped that this will ease the tension between the warring factions and possibly lead to a ceasefire.

2. At present, the situation in Rwanda remains extremely serious. Indeed, more than 1.5 million civilians have been displaced or have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Combat between Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) continues. The RGF controls the west and southwestern parts of Rwanda, while the RPF is in control of the northern and eastern parts of the country, as well as areas in the southeast. The capital city is divided between the RGF and RPF. The front line is, however, fluid and changing as military actions continue. Militia and other unruly elements continue to operate, although less frequently than at the beginning of the conflict, killing and terrorizing innocent civilians. Moreover, although both the RGF and RPF have separately expressed their readiness to enter into a ceasefire, the fighting has so far continued unabated.

3. Given the security situation, it has not been possible to access accurately the humanitarian situation. It is estimated that at least 1.2 million people have been internally displaced and are in need of assistance. Rwanda is also suffering from a serious drought with an estimated 1.5 million people in need of

- 2 -

4

food assistance. The current refugee population in neighbouring countries (Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda and Zaire) is estimated at more than 300,000. In addition, approximately 80,000 refugees from Burundi are in Rwanda. DHA in cooperation with UNAMIR and the operational organizations of the United Nations system has established a Rwanda Emergency Office in Nairobi and fielding an Advance Humanitarian Team in Kigali which has also visited other parts of the country. However, humanitarian operations in Rwanda have been severely limited by problems of access and security.

4. It is imperative that a further deterioration of this catastrophic situation is prevented and that the basic humanitarian needs of the huge numbers of Rwandese civilians who have been displaced or otherwise affected by the fighting be addressed. It is also essential that the issue of their safety be addressed on an urgent basis. The Security Council may therefore wish to consider the amendment of UNAMIR's mandate to include support to those in need and assistance in the provision of humanitarian aid. UNAMIR's efforts would be coordinated with those of the humanitarian agencies operating in Rwanda or engaged in assisting Rwandese refugees in neighbouring countries, including UNHCR. (For convenience, the mission as it would function under this amended mandate is referred to as UNAMIR-A.)

Mandate

5. The mandate of UNAMIR-A would be to support displaced persons and other groups in Rwanda who have been affected by the hostilities, and to assist in the provision of assistance by humanitarian agencies.

Assumptions

6. This concept of operations for UNAMIR-A is based on the following assumptions:

- 3 -

- a. In accordance with resolution 912 (1994), all mediation efforts would be continued with the objective of reaching a ceasefire agreement and restoring the peace process.
- b. At the time of deployment of UNAMIR-A an agreed ceasefire would not be in place.
- c. The revised mandate of UNAMIR-A would not envisage enforcement actions.
- d. Because of the need to stabilize the security situation in Rwanda as quickly as possible, deployment of UNAMIR-A would have to be rapidly effected.
- e. Kigali airport, which is critical to the deployment and sustainment of the mission, would be established as a "neutral zone" with the consent of the parties. The Security Council should, therefore, call on the parties to declare Kigali airport a "neutral zone" under the exclusive control of the United Nations.
- f. Lines of communication through neighbouring countries would remain open and available to support UNAMIR-A throughout the mandate of the mission.
- g. It is expected that UNAMIR-A would undertake its tasks for a period of four months from the date of initial deployment, on the understanding that UNAMIR's mandate would be reviewed by the Council as necessary and, in particular, following an agreement on a ceasefire.

Concept of Operations

7. The task of UNAMIR-A under an expanded mandate would be to provide support and ensure safety for displaced and other affected persons and for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNAMIR-A would depend primarily on deterrence to carry out its tasks and would resort to force only in self-defence.

6

- 4 -

- a. Humanitarian Assistance: UNAMIR-A would assist humanitarian agencies in their programmes for distribution of relief supplies and other forms of assistance.
- b. Deterrent Measures: Military units would be deployed to areas where displaced and other affected persons are concentrated and where humanitarian relief assistance would be delivered. These areas would be patrolled and monitored by UNAMIR-A, in conjunction with authorized security forces.
- c. UNAMIR-A may be required to enter into self-defensive actions against persons or groups who threaten these areas and the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief supplies and other assistance.

8. In order to execute its mandate, UNAMIR-A must be comprised of a strong, highly mobile force, capable of self-defence. The size of the force would be determined also by the size and terrain of the area of operation which is land-locked, difficult and mountainous with very limited infrastructure. With these criteria, it is estimated that a minimum viable force of approximately 5,500 troops (including five infantry battalions) would be required.

9. The composition of the force would be as follows:

- a. Five battalions (approx. 4000 personnel) two of which are mechanized and three of which are motorized with one mechanized company in each.
- b. A force support battalion (approx. 721 personnel) providing logistic, maintenance, medical service, and including an engineer company capable of undertaking

- 5 -

tasks such as: demining; bomb disposal; road, bridge and other infrastructure repair.

- c. A helicopter squadron (approx. 110 personnel) consisting of:
- (1) a troop/support flight with a minimum 1/2 company lift possibly based on 8 x Bell 212 type helicopters. Medical evacuation, logistic support and night vision capability would be required.
 - (2) Recce/armed flight of up to 8 light helicopters with light armament and night operations capability.
- d. A force headquarters (approx. 219 personnel) which includes a supporting military signals/communication squadron. This would be built around the nucleus of the present headquarters and would continue to operate in Kigali.
- e. A military police force (approx. 50 personnel) of a small company for internal force security.
- f. A military observer group of 320 officers to conduct the humanitarian security monitoring and to provide liaison and escort duties throughout the country and also along the border areas.
- g. A force of 90 UNCIVPOL deployed in a similar fashion to the UNMOs but dedicated to maintaining liaison with the local civilian authorities on matters relating to public security.

10. The deployment of the force would be conducted in three phases. "D-Day" referred to below is the date on which the

8

- 6 -

Security Council resolution is adopted authorizing the expanded mandate of UNAMIR-A.

Phase 1 (D-Day + 7): The Ghanaian battalion would be brought to its full strength of 800 personnel and equipped with APCs. This unit would ensure the protection of Kigali International Airport, the Amahoro complex where 4,000 displaced persons are presently housed and would also act as the Force Reserve.

Phase 2 (D-Day + 14): Deployment of two battalions (one mechanized and one motorized), some advance elements of the support battalion and all of the Force HQ and signal squadron. These troops would be deployed in the Kigali Sector and in Prefectures where the security situation is of greatest concern and where there is the highest concentration of displaced persons.

Phase 3 (D-Day + 31): Induction of the rest of the force support battalion and two other infantry battalions. The rest of the support battalion would establish logistic and engineer advance bases in the Ruhengeri, Byumba and Butare Prefectures in order to better serve the field force. The two infantry battalions would be deployed principally in the Western and Northern portions of the country in order to provide the necessary support and assistance to people in need in these areas.

Tasks

11. The Tasks of the UNAMIR-A force would be the following :

a. Security

- 7 -

- (1) Assure safe conditions for displaced and others persons in need, including refugees (mostly from Burundi) who have sought asylum in Rwanda
- (2) Provide security to humanitarian assistance activities
- (3) Provide escort to convoys
- (4) Provide security to UN installations
- (5) Assure control of vital geographic features
- (6) Monitor border crossing points as operationally required
- (7) Monitor deployment of the parties in conflict in order to assure effective conduct of UNAMIR-A operations.

b. Humanitarian Assistance

- (1) Assist in the establishment and maintenance of secure areas for the safe support of those in need
- (2) Establish access to those in need
- (3) Provide support for the provision of food, water, medical services, shelter and other relief to those in need
- (4) Provide assistance with demining
- (5) Provide assistance for the rehabilitation of essential facilities and services

c. Liaison

- (1) Strengthen liaison between UNAMIR-A and all parties
- (2) Support liaison arrangements with humanitarian agencies

Logistic Support

12. The deployment and logistic support of a force of 5500 would be an ambitious undertaking. Rwanda is a land-locked country

10

- 8 -

with only one major airport (Kigali). Land movement between seaports (Mombassa, Dar-es-Salaam) and Rwanda requires several days in the best of conditions. It is therefore essential to deploy self-sufficient military contingents capable of operating independently, while logistic support is put in place by the United Nations. The concept of operations calls for the first three units to be moved by air, requiring military and commercial strategic airlift, i.e., up to 10 passenger flights and 40 cargo flights (C5A aircrafts). The remainder of the force and its material would be transported by sea and air as soon as technically possible.

Command and Control

13. UNAMIR-A would be headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who would have overall authority for all the activities of the mission. As regards the military component of the mission, the present UNAMIR Force Headquarters would be expanded as indicated in para 8.d above and would remain located in Kigali. Battalions would be deployed to designated regions or sectors with assigned responsibilities for the tasks described earlier. Battalion commanders would act as Sector Commanders within their assigned regions under the direction of the Force Commander. The military signal unit would establish communications between the Force Headquarters, Battalion Headquarters and other designated sites as necessary.

Conclusion

14. The prospects of success in achieving the aims of UNAMIR-A depend upon the earliest deployment of the proposed force. The longer the delay in the deployment of the force from the time of a Security Council decision, the greater the prospect of the mission not achieving its purpose in operational terms. The most

- 9 -

rapid deployment would be achieved with the deployment of two formed infantry brigades with their integral logistic support.

15. If formed brigades cannot be made available it would be necessary to draw on the recent UN Stand-by arrangements. However, specific contributions for this particular mission must still be negotiated. It is estimated that this process would require one to two months. Simultaneously with Stand-by arrangements, the traditional method of requesting government military forces would be used. Experience shows that it would take at least two to three months to achieve full deployment of forces. If forces are accepted without adequate equipment, experience shows that a further delay of several months would be incurred in providing the necessary equipment for those forces. However, these delays could be significantly decreased if Member States agree to make the necessary arrangements on a bilateral basis to provide the troops, equipment and air lift required for the mission.

16. The UNAMIR Force Commander has had discussions with both the RGF and RPF on the concept of operations and general deployment plan described above and has encountered no strong objections so far. He intends to have further discussions with the parties to avoid possible misunderstanding and difficulties.

16. In considering the elements outlines above, its should be kept in mind that resolution 912 (1994) stressed that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains central to the peace process. Accordingly, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will continue his efforts, in cooperation with the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) and regional leaders, to end the fighting and to conclude an effective cease-fire agreement to be monitored by UNAMIR, in order to build confidence and facilitate progress on other aspects of the peace process in accordance with the Arusha agreements.