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FROM: OTTAWA C01921/OTT 20-Jun-1994

TO: WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC Immediate

CC: PARIS LONDON Routine
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P/S MFA
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DEFENCE MOD

Wilberg	W
Porter	
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Rider	
Alger	W
Kaplan	
McGowan	
Foster	
Morley	
Rush	
Tyne	
Dalton	
Watson	

Subject
SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

SUMMARY

Canada declined over the weekend a French request received Friday for troops/logistics support for the French intervention force. Canada privately hopes that the proposal will not be given UN cover as it considers that it is not the right answer to the problem, and would more likely than not backfire on the UN. Canada's objectives in Rwanda are the same as New Zealand's, and it has called for an early deployment of UNAMIR TWO. Dallaire believes the French action has already had negative repercussions on the ground in Kigali. Canada considers that UNOMUR did not have the capacity to effectively police the Ugandan/Rwandan border and accordingly cannot verify accurately just what has happened there.

ACTION

For information: your U52172.

REPORT

3 DFAIT (Lessard, Director, West and Central Africa and Maghreb Relations) said that the French HOM submitted a request Friday (17 June) for Canadian troops/logistics support for its intervention force. Minister Ouellet on Sunday approved Canada's response, to the effect that it was not in a position to support the initiative. Canada would prefer to make its response in context of the existing approved plan to reinforce UNAMIR. Canada recognised the good intentions of the French, and suggested that they

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provide assistance to UNAMIR and aircraft for humanitarian assistance. Having regard to Canada's important relationship with France, Minister Ouellet indicated that Canada should not publicly criticise the proposal.

4 Lessard said that in their view the French proposal was a high risk strategy which was likely to leave a worse mess for the UN to handle once the intervention force departed. Dallaire believed it would make the situation unmanageable, but was unable to comment publicly as the Secretariat had received instructions from the SecGen to be both supportive of the French proposal and the reinforcement of UNAMIR (please protect). The UN Secretariat (DPKO) was also opposed to the proposal.

5 Lessard remarked that the stakes for the UN were very high, as if Rwanda ended up as another debacle like Somalia then the reputation of the UN would be further weakened. The French initiative did not constitute peacekeeping, as it was not possible to impose peace through force. We might note that when we talked with Balloch (ADM, Asia Pacific) earlier in the day on another matter and touched on the Rwandan situation he robustly asserted that the initiative would not work. It was perceived as intervention on one side and even if the French succeeded in suppressing some of the conflict it would simply resurface when they departed in August.

6 Lessard said that the proposal constituted a political trap for other countries as there was pressure from the public to see something done. The public did not perceive that the UN plan (UNAMIR TWO) was in progress, and in any event were unable to properly evaluate what was the best thing to do. France was working at two levels, saying on the one hand that they had to intervene urgently and would act tomorrow, and on the other saying that they had to have UN approval.

7 Lessard noted that the designated prime minister under the Arusha Accords Mr Twagiramungu (a moderate Hutu) would be in Ottawa on Tuesday 21 June (we shall seek a report). Twagiramungu was an influential figure who had a particular legitimacy as the designated PM. According to press reports had spoken out against the French intervention.

8 In response to our query Lessard suggested that the French were largely acting for domestic political reasons. The media had been harshly critical of the French Government over Rwanda, but were now lauding the new initiative. France was not qualified to provide troops to UNAMIR as they were not acceptable to the RPF. That was also a difficulty with their initiative.

9 Concerning other support for the French proposal, Lessard said that at official level Ghana had indicated that consideration of support at the political level would require them to reassess their participation in UNAMIR. The French

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clearly had the clout to get a number of African states on side, and indeed the President of Benin who had been in Paris had announced support. The EU's position was that it would assist with logistics but not troops.

SITUATION ON THE GROUND

10 Lessard said that they had no evidence to suggest that the RPF had changed from its strategy of seeking military victory. The evidence was that the RPF was making slow progress on the ground, but their forces were thin on the ground and supply routes were stretched. They were not in full control behind their own front lines. DFAIT had no specific information, but Lessard suggested that one would be rash to assume that the RPF would prevail any time soon. No one really knew what was going to happen. The RPF could be willing to negotiate once it believed it controlled enough territory to isolate their Hutu enemy (the "hardliners") in one part of the territory. DFAIT had no reason to believe that a ceasefire was possible anytime soon.

11 Lessard advised that he had talked with the Canadian mission in Nigeria earlier in the day (20 June), which had been in touch with General Dallaire. After allowing the departure of the humanitarian flight carrying the UNAMIR casualties (and the fatality) from Friday, the RPF had barricaded Kigali airport so that it was unusable (just, Lessard commented, when the humanitarian need had become even greater). Dallaire believed that this action and the intensified fighting resulted from RPF concern about the prospect of French intervention. The RPF did not of course believe the French claim that they would only intervene in "government" held territory. Following the reported Senegalese support for the proposal, the RPF had informed Dallaire that any Senegalese UNAMIR troops would be treated as enemy. Canada had no knowledge whether there was any connection between the French proposal and the RPF attack on the UNAMIR truck.

12 Lessard indicated that it was difficult to speculate about the secondary effects of the French proposal on the situation on the ground, except that as reported above Dallaire believed that it had had immediate negative effects.

UNOMUR

13 We asked Lessard about the SecGen's report on UNOMUR. Lessard retorted that it was a red herring. With 80 officers based in fixed locations and only travelling from time to time on prior notice in difficult territory it was not possible to prove that military supplies were not crossing the border. It was a fiction to believe otherwise. Lessard said Canada did not have specific information to prove otherwise, but believed that supplies were crossing the border.

14 We have faxed (Wgton and New York only) two press clippings, and the official briefing on the Canadian position

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for use in Parliament.

End Message

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