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FROM: PARIS	C01934/PAR	17-Jun-1994
TO: WELLINGTON NEW YORK	WGTM UNSC	Immediate Immediate
CC: BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA HARARE OTTAWA TOKYO DEFENCE	BONN CANBERRA MADRID MOSCOW SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

**Subject**

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C24667.

**Summary**

France is serious about pursuing its initiative. The extent to which it is likely to gain European support should be clearer after the WEU meeting in Brussels this afternoon. For the moment only Senegal has indicated that it will provide troops. Action may move to New York over the weekend where the French will attempt to obtain UNSC blessing. How, and on what basis, is not clear. Somalia could serve as a precedent. France wants international and UN backing but may be prepared to intervene without the agreement and cooperation of the RPF. Any intervention would be temporary and provide protection for civilians until more UNAMIR troops can be deployed.

**Action**

For information.

**Report**

2. We spoke to Cillard (Rwanda, Quai D'orsay) this afternoon. He was not able to add much to de Bellescize's demarche. He confirmed that France wanted international and UN backing for the initiative. There was absolutely no question of France intervening without this. He was not

however clear what the legal basis would be. "This was something for the lawyers." His own view, shared he said by some of his Quai colleagues, was that the US intervention in Somalia provided a precedent of sorts. The intervention force would be transitional - "not even two months" and would remain in place until UNAMIR was strengthened. This could take 4-5 weeks. It was necessary to move very quickly. "Not tomorrow but within a few days."

3. France was waiting on the WEU meeting in Brussels this afternoon to know which, if any, WEU members might be prepared to provide troops for an international intervention force. Italy and Spain were possibilities. Germany might have been willing had its Constitution not stood in the way. According to the British Embassy whom we also spoke to this afternoon, the Elysee had confirmed that only Senegal had so far indicated a firm commitment to provide troops. (Cillard had confirmed that France was in the process of equipping the Senegalese troops.) Our British contact also told us that the UK had not definitely precluded providing some form of assistance. London had received a bit of a shock yesterday morning when French General Lanxade had called his British counterpart to announce that France was going to intervene in Rwanda under WEU auspices through Burundi and to request British support. Since then the British had tried to turn the French towards obtaining UN endorsement of the operation as an element of the UNAMIR effort. Our contact expected a good deal of discussion on this in New York over the weekend. He noted, as have the French press, that since the UNSG had given the proposal his support, the Secretariat could be expected to work hard to ensure that a proper legal UN framework was found.

#### RPF

4. We asked Cillard whether France would be prepared to see the intervention force deployed without the agreement of the RPF. He noted that this would be a very difficult political decision but in his view France would not hold back if this was the only thing standing in the way of deployment of an intervention force. (According to the British, it was not inconceivable that the RPF might decide to cooperate.) Cillard said that discussions were taking place between France and RPF. There had been a good deal of contact. Dialogue with the RPF was not however easy. The RPF claimed that France was partisan but it was not. It had pulled its troops out of Rwanda when it said it would in accordance with the Arusha Accords. The RPF had not expected it to do so. The RPF had requested a high-level visit to Paris and France had agreed. The visit had in the end been cancelled by the RPF. France was always ready to talk to the RPF - indeed any of players in the Rwandan conflict.

#### Political Reconciliation

5. Cillard expanded a little on the references in

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yesterday's article by Juppe to French interest in supporting political moderates in Rwanda. He noted that many of the moderates had been killed but there were still enough on both sides, including in the Rwandan army, to form a government broadly consistent with the Arusha Accords. What was important for France was that no group should be excluded. Cillard confirmed that France had welcomed to Paris the moderate Hutu former Prime Minister designate (name ?) whom it regarded a key potential player in the formation of new Government.

#### **April Attack on Presidential Plane**

6. Juppe has vehemently denied an allegation made today in the Brussels newspaper, Le Soir, that two French soldiers were involved in the attack on President Habyarimana's plane on 6 April, describing it as "a pure and simple fabrication."

#### **Comment**

7. France seems determined to push ahead with this initiative. While it may not make a lot of sense to most people, this initiative has undeniably refocussed international attention on Rwanda and the appalling humanitarian situation there. Maybe France is simply trying to call the international community's bluff. That could be, nobody seems to know what Juppé's real motivation might be. In the event that European support is not forthcoming, the possibility cannot be ruled out that France might still consider going ahead with Francophone African support - provided it continues to receives a nod from the UNSG.

End Message