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Our file: 197/1/1

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FROM:	PARIS	C01940/PAR	22-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON NEW YORK	WGTN UNSC	Immediate Immediate
CC:	BEIJING BRUSSELS GENEVA LONDON MOSCOW SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	BONN CANBERRA HARARE MADRID OTTAWA TOKYO DEFENCE	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3)  
(DSP1, CEO, EAB)

P/S MFA  
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)  
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

**Subject**

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

W  
/M**Summary**

- Beeby was called into the Quai this morning by the newly-appointed Head of UN (Colin de Verdière).
- France requested New Zealand support for French DR on Rwanda. Beeby was told that France did not understand why New Zealand would wish to delay its adoption in the Council by proposing consultation procedures which were not part of the Council's usual procedure. France wanted the DR adopted today. Any further delay could have serious adverse effects on UNAMIR.
- Beeby informed de Verdière that New Zealand Ministers had not yet taken a decision but were leaning towards abstention.
- He was told that France would not understand how a country like New Zealand could refuse to give its support. "We are counting on our friends".
- RPF statements should not be taken at face value.
- France seems unsure whether China, Nigeria, Pakistan and Brazil might abstain.

**Action**

For information.

### Report

2 Beeby was called to the Quai by De Verdière (the newly appointed Head of UN Section and replacement for Lafon) at short notice this morning to discuss the French DR on Rwanda.

3 Beeby informed de Verdière that he had just spoken to Wellington and been advised that Ministers were considering New Zealand's position on the DR and, while no decision had yet been taken, they were leaning towards an abstention.

4 De Verdière said that France did not understand New Zealand's position (as expressed by the NZPR in New York yesterday) and why we would wish to delay the deployment of the intervention force. France did not accept that another report by the UNAMIR Commander was necessary. New Zealand was trying to change the procedures and customs of the Council by calling for a consultation with troop contributors and the UN Commander. France would not accept any further delay. To do so would be "extremely silly" (in the sense of naive, simple-minded - the French word he used was "benêt" ). France could not understand how New Zealand could wish to delay the deployment of the intervention force when we shared the same concerns about the humanitarian situation in Rwanda and had worked closely together in the Council on this question. He went on. If New Zealand was to abstain this would be of great concern to France. This issue was being managed at "the highest levels" in Paris. "We are counting on our friends."

5 Beeby reiterated that New Zealand's major concern was the possible effect the French intervention force might have on UNAMIR. This was precisely why Keating had called for consultations with troop contributors and a report by the UN Commander. In reply, De Verdière said that the longer the French intervention force was delayed the more serious the effects on UNAMIR were likely to be. The intervention force would facilitate UNAMIR's tasks in the future. It was not France's intention to intervene anyway and anyhow. The situation in Rwanda required an urgent response. France was prepared to assume its responsibilities and accepted the considerable risks involved.

6 Beeby asked about the RPF. De Verdière responded by noting that the declarations of the RPF should not be taken at face value. The RPF understood what was going on, and accepted that France's only motivation was a humanitarian one, even if it did not say so in public. There was no question of France seeking confrontation with the RPF. Ballardur had made this very clear in a statement to members of the National Assembly majority last night (see our separate message).

7 Finally, Beeby asked about the voting intentions of other Council members, in particular China, Nigeria, Pakistan and Brazil. De Verdière began by saying that China would vote in favour and that France was "more or less optimistic" about the others. When Beeby suggested that they all might abstain, de Verdière backtracked slightly, saying "We aren't sure".

8 De Verdière indicated obliquely to us, and his colleague confirmed after the meeting, that France expected the resolution to be passed.

9 De Verdière urged Beeby to convey to the New Zealand Government France's wish that New Zealand not delay a Council decision and not abstain on the resolution. He undertook to do so immediately.

#### **Comment**

10 De Verdière's characterisation of New Zealand's concerns as "procedural" misrepresents the New Zealand position. He seemed to be suggesting that New Zealand was only interested in using the French DR to push its concerns about the need for greater consultations with troop contributors and UN operations commanders.

11 The fact that New Zealand might go as far as to abstain on the resolution probably came as something of a shock, implying as it does, that we have more fundamental concerns about the French proposal - which we do indeed have. De Verdière clearly found it difficult to accept New Zealand's concerns about the adverse effects of the French operation on UNAMIR - despite the fact that Francophone countries are being withdrawn from Kigali.

12 France seems determined as ever to go ahead despite mounting criticism of the intervention force proposal in the media and signs of increasing concern within the Government and, according to some reports, the Elysée. Unless our abstention led to a rejection of these, our assessment is that a New Zealand abstention would not do any lasting damage to the bilateral relationship. It would be unrealistic, however to expect ready French support for any future initiatives New Zealand might wish to take in the Security Council.

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End Message