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Your file:

Our file: 3/88/1

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FROM: NEW YORK	C04314/NYK	14-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
CC: BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
PARIS	HARARE	Routine
BRUSSELS		Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our C04308

Summary

- Sec Gen proposes either UNAMIR (minus Belge) remain or it be reduced but acknowledges that neither option can really be satisfactorily addressed until prospects for a ceasefire are clearer.
- Council believes priority is to apply pressure on the parties to reach a ceasefire.
- President proposes that decision about future mandate be put off for five days with clear message that unless a ceasefire is agreed UNAMIR may well pull out.
- In consultation with Nigeria and France we have proposed operative paragraphs for a resolution to implement that proposal.

Action

For information

Report

2 Responding to the desire made plain yesterday on the part of Council members to have some options on which to focus consideration of Council action, secretariat (de Soto and Riza) gave following advice at informals this afternoon: Sec Gen had formulated essentially two possible options for future of UNAMIR "both predicated on the assumption that a cease-fire would be agreed" between the parties in the next few days.

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3 The first option outlined by Riza was that UNAMIR stay on minus the Belgians. In these circumstances the total remaining force would be redeployed into Kigali since there would be no point leaving a remnant of it at the demilitarised zone. The political (and military reality) is that the DMZ is unlikely to have any significance in the future given that it no longer represented the actual lines between the parties. This option would assume that some progress based on the Arusha Accords was in play.

4 The second option was that a substantially reduced UNAMIR remain to promote agreement on resumption of a peace process. This would comprise just the Special Rep plus his personal staff and a security detail (estimated by the Force Commander to require up to 150 soldiers), making a total of about 200 UNAMIR personnel. This option would recognise that there may not be any quick resumption of the peace process and that in those circumstances the full UNAMIR would not be sustainable. Nonetheless there would be value in assisting in establishing a channel of communication between the two parties.

5 It was also possible to conceive of a third option, Riza noted, that would be a combination of the two above. That is, option 1 could slide into option 2 say if within 3 weeks there was no clear sign that the peace process would in fact resume, then UNAMIR (minus the Belgians) could scale back to the a small political presence.

6 The Sec Gen's preference (but a marginal one we guess) said Riza emphasised is for the Council to adopt option 1. The only problem with the options, identified by both the UK and US, is that they are based on an assumption about circumstances which do not presently exist, ie a ceasefire.

7 That led Riza to clarify rather more what the Force Commander wished for. This was welcome since it is recommendations from the field which members have been particularly concerned to receive rather than observations from the SC in Madrid or wherever. The Force Commander had stressed that both sides want UNAMIR to remain and that what he badly required was something on which to apply pressure to the parties in order for them to accept a ceasefire.

8 At conclusion, President proposed that the resolution now under consideration would put off making a decision on UNAMIR's future until in practical terms it was determined whether a ceasefire would in fact be agreed. Delegations are reflecting on this overnight and discussions will resume tomorrow (Fri) at noon.

9 We have followed up the proposal by consultations with Nigeria and France and produced the following OPs which could be a stand alone resolution (our preference) or part of the NAM text.

"Demands that the parties agree to an immediate ceasefire throughout Rwanda;

Decides that, if within five days of the adoption of this resolution, there is an effective ceasefire in place, the Security Council will review the mandate and composition of UNAMIR with a view to assisting the parties in a resumption of the peace process in Rwanda on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

Further decides that, if within five days of the adoption of this resolution, there is no effective ceasefire in place, the Council will reconsider the continued presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda."

10 Our accompanying fax contains the NAM draft as amended by a working group which met twice today. The square brackets around the final PP and Op 7 represent the political decision which will hopefully be taken about UNAMIR's future tomorrow. It also contains the results of our discussions tonight with Nigeria and France on some paragraphs which are designed to achieve President's proposal and be dropped into the text at Op7.

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End Message