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115/23/37

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20:55 (5017)

700/NYK/00000/00000

\$238.37

FROM:	NEW YORK	C04340/NYK	19-Apr-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON	WGTV UNSC	Immediate
CC:	BEIJING	CANBERRA	Priority
	LONDON	WASHINGTON	Priority
	MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Priority
	PARIS	HARARE	Priority
	BRUSSELS		Priority

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DP1, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- SecGen to make a recommendation to Council on future of UNAMIR tomorrow (Wed);
- General feeling that Council needs to take a decision about this promptly in light of the exhaustion of UNAMIR mandate;
- However basic division between US (for withdrawal) and Nigeria (to beef operation up) is likely to remain;
- Situation has deteriorated in Kigali, some non-essential personnel have been withdrawn but force commander (and UNAMIR) engaged in useful work

Action

For information only

Report

2 Secretariat (Gharekhan) provided a further update on Rwanda where the situation continues to deteriorate. Fighting and killing has increased in Kigali. There has been an exchange of fire and fighting between the RPF (rebels) and the "so called" Rwanda Government Forces (remnants of the army and Presidential Guard).

3 Although neither party is "overtly" hostile to UNAMIR forces, the "government forces" have been responsible for worrying incidents including shelling the stadium where the Bangladesh contingent of UNAMIR is sheltering some 5,000 displaced persons. UNAMIR HQ had a lucky miss with a mortar landing on the roof but luckily not exploding. This ceased

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however when the UNAMIR force commander complained. There was no indication that UNAMIR was specifically targeted.

4 "Government forces" had also sought "co-management" of the airport with UNAMIR, though UNAMIR had rejected this as one-sided, preferring to see the airport remain as "neutral" and under its control. Under these circumstances, Gharekhan said he "would not be surprised if the "government forces" turned hostile to UNAMIR".

5 UNAMIR continues its efforts to broker a cease-fire agreement between the parties but the immediate prospects look "bleak". Although the "government forces" have agreed to one, the RPF had imposed some preconditions relating to the halting of further massacres (of Tutsi by the "government forces") and hostile radio broadcasts, the disbanding of the bandit style Presidential Guard, and the dissolution of the "interim government" now in exile in the south. Effectively this meant no agreement to the cease-fire in the short term.

6 Tomorrow the SecGen will come to the Council with a recommendation for the future of UNAMIR. Gharekhan "hinted" but would not be drawn further, that it was likely not to be a recommendation for a "sudden total withdrawal" and was likely either to be a recommendation for keeping the bulk of the force on or retaining a smaller number (either option 1 or 2 put to the Council last week). It is also conceivable that the recommendation would fall somewhere in between, ie a force which is large enough to hang on to the airport and to do some meaningful humanitarian work but smaller than the current level.

8 UK (supported by Brazil) emphasised the need to take a decision promptly in the next few days. (Our IPT reports on troop contributing meeting we convened today on UNAMIR).

End Message