

115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

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Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- SecGen's non-paper on an expanded UNAMIR has been handed to Presidency but has not yet been made available to all Council members
- Nigerians are preparing draft of resolution to implement the non-paper; they say draft will follow closely the ideas we circulated to Council last week

Action

Preliminary comments, if you wish, on SecGen's non-paper

Report

SecGen sent Nigerian Presidency yesterday the non-paper prepared by the Secretariat in response to the Council's request last week for an indication of how an expanded UNAMIR might look. Nigerians have not sent it on to other Council members, although some have obtained copies informally. Nigerians seem to want to hold on to the paper until Gambari is back from South Africa (tomorrow morning).

2 Nigerians gave us a copy of the non-paper in confidence this afternoon (see accompanying fax). The paper envisages a force of at least 5,500 with an expanded mandate to "support" displaced persons and others affected by the hostilities and

to assist in providing humanitarian assistance. Specific tasks envisaged (para 11) are consistent with those suggested in the informal draft resolution we circulated last week to Council members at the request of the President.

3 The major difference from our draft in terms of concepts is that SecGen does not envisage invocation of Chapter VII powers. As you will be aware, such reference would be difficult for the Americans to accept. It would also be problematic for the RPF who fear that a Chapter VII operation could be the thin end of a wedge by which the Council would purport to takeover Rwanda and require them to give up territory they have seized.

4 However, even though Chapter VII is not invoked, Mission is predicated on the assumption that there is no agreed ceasefire in place. Non-paper also envisages the expanded UNAMIR having to take "self defensive" actions against persons or groups who threaten areas where displaced persons are gathered or who threaten the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. In reality, therefore, the amount of force which it is envisaged UNAMIR might use is virtually identical to that suggested in our draft. One issue we will want to pursue with the Secretariat is whether it is really feasible to assign such powers and functions to the force without invoking Chapter VII.

ROE
Council need
to know perhaps
approx.

5 One encouraging feature of the SecGen's non-paper is that it envisages a fairly rapid deployment of the expanded force: UNAMIR would be brought up to 800 personnel within seven days of a decision by the Council; the force would be expanded by a further two battalions (approx 1600 personnel) within 14 days of the decision; the full force would be deployed within a month of the decision.

6 Nigerians advise that they are preparing a draft resolution to give effect to the non-paper. They have told us that they are relying heavily on the draft ideas we circulated, although without including reference to Chapter VII.

7 Informal consultations are scheduled for tomorrow afternoon. It is conceivable that there will be a first round of discussions on the SecGen's non-paper at that time, although a number of Council members will only have received it in the morning. More thorough discussions of the non-paper and of the draft resolution, which we expect to receive tomorrow, will take place on Thursday, 12 May. The Nigerians would like the resolution to be adopted by the end of the week, though that may be overly optimistic.

End Message