

115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

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FROM: NEW YORK	C04550/NYK	02-Jun-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Immediate
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Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- SecGen has issued further report on Rwanda in light of Riza/Baril visit
- Report confirms that the principal perpetrators of the massacres have been "Government" supporters, and states that the killings amount to genocide
- While direct discussions on a ceasefire and an end to the killings are now underway, their success is not a precondition to the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR, though success at the talks may have an effect on Phases 2 and 3
- While concept of operations for revised UNAMIR requires adjustment, basic approach which was inherent in the NZ draft resolution and the SecGen's report of 13 May remains, namely that the force will seek to provide protection to assemblies of persons at risk and security to humanitarian relief operations. It would operate out of Kigali and elsewhere as necessary
- Americans now appear to accept concept of operations proposed by SecGen and are anxious to be seen to be more positive to UNAMIR
- We and Americans have agreed to collaborate in the

presentation of a resolution to the Council

- SecGen castigates international community for slowness of response to the calamity in Rwanda
- SecGen has now received sufficient offers to get Phases 1 and 2 of expanded force underway, but will not do so until suitable protective equipment (APCs) is available
- The US has agreed to make APCs and other equipment available
- Inexorable pressure will come on next week for a New Zealand contribution, particularly on the light of our high profile on the issue including during the Minister's visit
- Secretariat have already foreshadowed a formal request for NZ assistance and given language SecGen has used. ?

*I dislike this*

*And who invented this?*

#### Action

- Comments on SecGen's report and on resolution on UNAMIR
- A decision if possible when resolution is adopted next week on a New Zealand offer to UNAMIR, (the idea of making an RNZAF Hercules available to supply the force for a defined period remains the most useful, most highly visible and least risky option).

#### Report

We have sent by earlier fax the SecGen's latest report on Rwanda which has been prepared in the light of the visit to Rwanda by ASG Riza and the UN Military Adviser, General Baril. The report makes very interesting reading and contains some powerful observations on what has been happening in Rwanda and on the reaction of the international community. We were given a preliminary readout of the report last night by Riza; the report itself was not available until midday today.

#### The massacres - genocide

2 The report validates the sentence for which we had to fight so hard in securing the Presidential statement of 30 April; namely, that the massacres have been carried out principally in areas controlled by "government" forces or supporters. This fact has been acknowledged by the interim government and chiefs of staff of the government forces and the gendarmerie. Some RPF killings, particularly of suspected members of the militia and the interhamwe (the late President's youth militia), have been reported but these are far from being of the same order as the massacres.

3 In para 11, the SecGen passes on information indicating

the premeditated nature of the killings. In para 36, he states that on the basis of the information that has emerged there can be little doubt that the killings amount to genocide. He notes, however, that the continuing hostilities impede a full investigation and that, in any case, UN procedures "do not lend themselves to immediate action".

#### Ceasefire negotiations

4 The report notes that as a result of Riza's visit, the RPF has agreed to sit down with government military representatives to discuss a ceasefire and that the government side has now accepted the RPF's refusal to negotiate with persons claiming to be the "interim government". The SecGen emphasises that an end to the killings must go hand in hand with a ceasefire (para 39). As he also notes, however, the process of political compromise will take time, and for that reason he proposes that the UNAMIR mandate be extended for six months.

5 It is implicit in the report that the timing of the deployment of Phases 1 and 2 of the expanded force is not dependent on the achievement of a ceasefire or on the formal consent of the parties. The limiting condition on deployment is the availability of protective equipment (see below). On the other hand, progress at the ceasefire talks may have a bearing on the method of deployment of Phase 2 (para 23), and success at the talks may even obviate the need for Phase 3 altogether (para 24). The report also looks to the formalisation of the assurances of cooperation that both parties have given to the expanded mandate (para 18).

#### Concept of operations

6 The SecGen notes that there will need to be adjustments to the concept of operations mapped out in the report of 15 May. The principal changes are the lapsing of the requirement that Kigali airport be a neutral zone and the timing of the deployments of Phases 1 and 2 of the expanded force. On the latter, because of the delays in deployment of Phase 1, the SecGen now proposes that Phases 1 and 2 be synchronised and virtually made simultaneously.

7 The airport's take over by the RPF and the RPF's refusal to the neutral zone concept have precluded the neutral zone option but, to an extent, have also made this less of a requirement given the RPF's undertaking to allow UNAMIR to continue to use the airport and to deploy a strengthened presence there. On the other hand, RPF control would also make the airport and UNAMIR vulnerable to RPF manipulation. For this reason, (and, Riza told us privately, a US phobia of sending their equipment into Kigali) the revised concept of operations also envisages the use of back up airports and deployment of equipment through Uganda and Burundi. (Riza also told us privately that the likelihood was that the operations at the airport would become safer as the RPF

consolidated its control of the surrounding areas.)

8 Despite these adjustments, the basic concept of operations remains as envisaged in our draft resolution proposed last month and articulated in the SecGen's last report. That is, that much of the force would be concentrated around Kigali which is an area of obvious need, is central and offers the best access to other parts of the country. On the other hand, because of the vulnerability of Kigali to possible PRF manipulation and the need to reach people in other parts of the country, particularly the south-west controlled by the government, the revised concept also envisages some of the expanded force and equipment coming in from Uganda and Burundi, (though Riza noted that the extreme sensitivity of the situation in Burundi made the latter option rather precarious.

9 Despite the deployment envisaged from bordering countries, this does not mean that the SecGen has bought onto the US concept of an operation focussed on the border areas. Riza told us last night that UNHCR and other agencies were adamant that the establishment of secure areas was undesirable (would encourage ethnic cleansing) and unlikely to be of help to people in real need. Those really frightened for their lives would be reluctant to risk coming into the open to get to secure areas. But those who were fleeing the RPF, particularly members of the militia and the interhamwe, would seek refuge in such areas. That would put UNAMIR in an intolerable situation.

10 The essential tasks envisaged for the expanded force are unchanged from Resolution 918: to seek to provide protection for persons at risk and to provide security for humanitarian relief operations. The idea of establishing secure areas remains, but this is expressed in terms of providing protection to assemblies of persons (ie in already established concentrations) rather than in setting up new areas.

#### US attitude

11 Both the US Mission and the Secretariat told us that the talks yesterday between the Secretariat and the 14 strong team from Washington went reasonably well. Despite some continuing ambivalence on the part of the Pentagon, the US now seems to understand that it makes no sense in the circumstances of Rwanda to insist on the criteria of PDD 25 or to demand that there be as clearly defined a concept of operations as would normally be desirable. As emphasised in paras 25 and 26 of the SecGen's report, UNAMIR must have sufficient flexibility to respond to a very fluid situation. Riza noted that they seemed finally to have got through to the Americans that UNAMIR could not and was not trying to save all of Rwanda or all Rwandans. Thus, the previous US complaints that a force level of 55,000 was required to do the job proposed by the SecGen had fallen away.

12 We have had extensive consultations with US Mission on this subject over the past 36 hours. It was clear from the Mission's comments that the Administration is sensitive to the negative impressions that its performance generated in the Council and the (foreign) media and that they want to avoid a rerun this time. We pressed on them the importance of restoring unity in the Council and suggested that our two delegations collaborate in putting a text to the Council. The US (Inderfurth) welcomed the idea and proposed we get together tomorrow once Washington has reacted to the Mission's proposals.

13 The US Mission told us they were recommending to Washington support of a resolution to give effect to the latest report. The tone could not have been more different from the US approach of a few weeks ago. If this approach is endorsed by Washington, the atmospherics in the Council will be much improved. US would like to table a draft tomorrow with a view to its adoption early next week.

#### Content of the resolution

14 In formal terms, the only action required by the Council to give effect to the report is to approve the deployment of Phases 2 and 3 and to extend the mandate period for a further six months. It seems to us that it is not necessary or desirable to rewrite the mandate itself which, as set out in Op3 of Res 918, is sufficiently flexible to cover the adjusted concept of operations. However, there are also a number of important political and operational matters in the SecGen's report which could usefully be picked up in the resolution as well:

- genocide: since the SecGen has now gone on the record, it would be invidious for the Council to continue to duck the issue; the least it should do is take note of the SecGen's comments in para 36;
- ceasefire talks: the Council could welcome the initiation of talks but should demand nonetheless that the fighting stop;
- killings: the Council should also demand an immediate end to killings;
- cooperation of the parties: the draft should repeat Op 10 of Res 918 demanding that the parties cooperate with UNAMIR;
- provision of troops and equipment for UNAMIR: the SecGen has now received sufficient offers of troops for Phases 1 and 2 to get underway immediately, but desperately needs equipment (see below); the draft should welcome the offers of troops but emphasise the need for logistic support if the expanded force is to get off the ground;

- provision of humanitarian relief: the draft should welcome the international relief efforts already being made but stress the urgent need for more help; it could also encourage contributions to the trust fund to be established by the SecGen (para 42);
- political process: we should continue to urge the OAU and regional governments to foster a resumption of the peace process;
- interim report: it is probably appropriate to have an interim review, but we should ask the SecGen to provide reports as appropriate and at least before mid-late August (September is out; unless kicked off the Council by then, Rwanda's representative will be President).

#### SecGen's criticisms of international community

15 A feature of the report which need not be taken up directly in the resolution is the trenchant criticism levelled at the international community by the SecGen for the failure to respond adequately to the Rwandan calamity. His language is inclusive; he seems to recognise that the Secretariat is a part of the problem. His undertaking to conduct a review of the system for responding to crises of mixed conflict and humanitarian dimensions is welcome. It may provide a further platform for advancing some of New Zealand's ideas for systemic reform of the management of peacekeeping and related operations. Meanwhile, his comments serve to underscore the need for rapid responses to the appeal for support for UNAMIR.

#### Troops and equipment for expanded UNAMIR

16 Riza told us that they now have firm offers of troops from Ghana, Ethiopia, Senegal and Zimbabwe. Together, these total 3,200 troops. When Nigeria, whose confirmation of readiness to participate is imminent, is added, the total comes to 4,000. This is more than enough for Phases 1 and 2, and depending on the ceasefire talks, may be all that is needed by way of combat personnel. Support and logistics are now the problem.

17 As noted in paras 21 and 40 of the SecGen's report, not even the troops envisaged for Phase 1 will be deployed until there is adequate equipment to protect the troops. The most pressing need is for armoured personnel carriers (APCs), particularly tracked ones. The US is offering 50 APCs, but as reported earlier, these will take some time to get to Rwanda. The South Africans may help, though their APCs are wheeled, which makes them less usable outside Kigali.

#### New Zealand

18 The SecGen's comments about the need for logistic support

equipment, which realistically will only come from developed countries, make it inevitable that New Zealand will be asked for assistance. We consider that it is imperative that we be able to respond positively if at all possible.

19 The situation in Rwanda is not just another peacekeeping operation to be weighed alongside our contributions to UNAVEM, ONUMOZ, or even UNOSOM or UNPROFOR. As the SecGen has been at pains to point out, this is the most horrible situation to have confronted the international community since the holocaust during World War II. Only the killings in Cambodia rival what has taken place in Rwanda over the past two months. Our credibility as a country committed to the UN and as a member of the Security Council will be on the line. In part this is because of the high profile and (from the African and Secretariat perspectives) highly valuable role we have played on the issue but realistically given what the SecGen's report says only Canada, Ghana and Tunisia can claim any kudos at this time.

20 We know from comments made to us yesterday by Riza that an offer of an aircraft to fly the Nairobi-Kigali supply route even if only for a few months would be enormously helpful to the UN if it could be done quickly. It would do wonders for our image with African countries, and the third world generally. We urge that urgent and positive consideration be given to the suggestion we made to you on this question two weeks ago.

End Message