

115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

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Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Sec Gens report widely welcomed with some noting its "challenging" content especially his view that the UN system failed in dealing with the crisis in Rwanda
- Working Group convened to prepare draft resolution for possible adoption tomorrow
- US emphasises urgent need for logistic support, especially from Council members

Action

For information

Report

At informals today, US confirmed their willingness to extend UNAMIRs mandate and give the go ahead with expanded deployment. US emphasised the urgent need for logistic support to be given to the troops which are now available, drawing specific attention to "many in the Council having the necessary equipment".

2 Nigeria noted that now that African states had agreed to provide the troops, it hoped that others outside the continent would provide the logistic support needed. "It

must not be conveyed that the problem remains an African one" Nigeria emphasised. If the Council did not act "speedily" it would be "vicariously liable for the tragedy in Rwanda".

3 Secretariat noted that 8 African states had confirmed to the UN that they are ready to send troops to Rwanda (Senegal, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Congo, Namibia and Tanzania). All however had made it a precondition that they be adequately equipped and supported, and that the necessary financial resources be made available.

4 Secretariat also noted that at summit meeting of front line states in Harare South Africa offered a field hospital and 50 APCs. Secretariat also tell us that France will equip the Senegalese troops, that Italy has firmed up its offer for a C130 and that the Dutch will also come in with an aircraft probably an F27.

5 All delegations welcomed the Sec Gen's report as "excellent" (many commenting on its challenging content) and general agreement was expressed on the need for urgent action in the form of adopting a resolution if possible tomorrow. UK supported NZ proposals, circulated informally to delegations, to amend US draft.

6 Working Group is currently working on text which we will fax when available.

Genocide

7 Many delegations spoke of the need to make specific reference to "genocide" including Pakistan, Argentina, Spain and Czech. Intervention by Spain was particularly thoughtful on the question of genocide and the Council's competency under Article 8 of the Genocide Convention to adopt measures to address the genocide taking place (or any of the other acts mentioned in Article 8 of the Convention). In this regard Spain drew attention to paras 8 and 11 of the Sec Gen's report in which the continued broadcasts inciting ethnic killings by Radio Mille Collines in "government" held areas, and the previous inflamatory broadcasts made before the events of April are referred to.

8 Spain noted that it was punishable under the Genocide Convention to either commit genocide, or incite others (as Radio Mille Collines has) to commit it. In the view of Spain, these broadcasts, and those involved in either supporting them or allowing them to continue "constitute direct incitement to commit genocide and are punishable as such under Article 3 of the Genocide Convention".

9 Spain also noted the urgent need to begin the investigation of genocide given that, (as the Sec Gen's report noted) as time goes on it becomes increasingly difficult to locate witnesses and evidence. "At some stage" Spain said it would be appropriate for the Council to address

this issue, for example by considering the establishment of a special investigative body as done in the Yugoslav context in res 780.

Human Rights

10 China indicated it did not have instructions but expressed specific difficulty with the paras in the US draft which related to establishing coordination between UNAMIR and the Special Rapporteur on human rights (op 13 and 14 of US draft) and Human Rights Commissioner. Brazil also indicated this was "breaking new ground" and required "further consideration" on their part. Oman (in its national capacity) seemed finally to have abandoned its earlier position that there should be no Council action before a cease-fire was achieved.

Failing of UN

11 For our part, we recalled that we had had reservations about postponing, at the time res 918 was adopted, the decision to deploy phase II until a further report was received from the Sec Gen. We welcomed the US announcement that they were now ready to endorse deployment of phase II of the expanded UNAMIR and emphasised the need to proceed rapidly with the aim of the work being completed tomorrow.

12 We referred to the fundamental problem identified in the Sec Gen's report that the UN system had failed in dealing with the crisis in Rwanda and noted that the Sec Gens indication that he would conduct a review of the structure was very important for the Council. It was a real shame that it had taken nearly 4 weeks to bridge the relatively minor differences between delegations who had wished to proceed at the time res 918 was adopted (eg NZ) and others which required further information (eg US) and come to this point now of authorising the expanded UNAMIR in whole.

13 (It seems very clear to us that had the Council shown more commitment to an expanded UNAMIR at the time res 918 was adopted some weeks ago the UN would now be a great deal further down the track of actual deployment, especially given the chicken and egg situation which developed and led to a stalemate at certain crucial times that states were not willing to commit to an operation when the Council itself had not committed to one.)

14 President summed up briefly by noting that the logistic and financial assistance to the troops available was very important and that a specific reference to "genocide" was supported.

Situation on the Ground

15 Secretariat (Gharekhan) briefed the Council on the situation on the ground noting that there had been heavy

exchange of fire at "Gaddafi Crossing" in Kigali. This had resulted in no major changes in the relative positions of the two sides. The "government" had launched a counter-offensive to push the RPF off the road they hold to Gitarama and appeared to be readying itself for a major counter-offensive against the RPF. The RPF had however repelled the attack and was pushing into the hills south of Kigali.

16 On 4 June there had been heavy bout of mortar fire at Kigali airport resulting in UNAMIR briefly suspending the Canadian flights to Kigali airport. A strong protest had been lodged with the "government forces". UNAMIR had also requested Ugandan cooperation in allowing it to use Entebbe airport with transportation of supplies going through Kabale in southern Uganda en route for Kigali.

17 UNAMIR had recently evacuated further displaced persons from both the stadium and a church in Kigali. There remained some 4326 displaced persons at the stadium and 936 at the airport.

18 As regards the cease-fire talks, the force commander has had 2 rounds of talks with each side but there was no agreement yet. The next meeting is scheduled for Monday. The Sec Gen's Special Rep has also had discussions with the OAU Sec Gen in Addis and the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights would be leaving Geneva on 10 June to travel to Rwanda and on to Burundi and Tanzania, accompanied by the Special Rapporteur on Torture and others.

End Message