

115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

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19:56 (5587)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$660.79
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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04621/NYK	15-Jun-1994
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**Subject**

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

**Summary**

- Special Rep for Rwanda met with NP10 today
- Special Rep urged NP10 members to do what they can to produce the necessary logistical resources to get troops to Rwanda as soon as possible
- Reports of cease-fire agreement reached at OAU summit
- Secretariat report that some 60 children were massacred yesterday
- There are reports of decreasing fighting in Kilgali
- It remains uncertain whether ceasefire brokered at OAU Summit will have any force in the field

**Action**

For information

**Report**

The new Special Rep (Khan) called on the NP10 group today in preparation for his mission to Rwanda. He calls on the P5 tomorrow. This was the first time a Special Rep has met with a large group of members of the Council before beginning a

mission and was particularly welcome given the enormous difficulty of the task in Rwanda. As you know from his CV Khan has a good deal of experience as Pakistan's last Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Marker described him as "one of the best".

2 Khan seems to have a determination to roll up his sleeves on the mission indicating he would leave for Rwanda next week after he has had a chance to meet with the ex-Special Rep Booh Booh for a briefing here in NY. Noting that the lack of facilities was "immaterial" he said he was prepared to live in Rwanda and was determined to get to Kigali "somehow". Khan emphasised his neutral credentials and expressed a hope that he would act transparently in order to be most effective.

3 The Special Rep called on the NP10 members to do what they could to bring logistic assistance to get troops to Rwanda more quickly than was the present case. He noted that at the earliest it was 3 weeks before the first Ghanain contingent could be deployed. If troops could be there earlier this would help the people of Rwanda in a concrete way. "Many lives could have been saved" he said as a result of the psychology if the Council had evidenced an earlier commitment to an expanded UNAMIR Khan said.

4 On the question of Arusha, he noted that while the Agreement was very important and would be a base for the future, he did not believe that the solution should be imposed on the people of Rwanda, it was rather a matter for them to determine from within.

5 All NP10 members (including Rwanda) spoke in welcoming his appointment and expressing a desire to cooperate. We noted that no other UN mission had quite the same sense of tragedy about it and we drew attention to the two types of tasks he would face. On the one hand there would be the important peace building role as a go between with the two factions, and on the other, the Council's mandate given to him to protect civilians at risk.

6 It was possible to conceive of a likely tension between these two roles. Given that the need to protect human life was paramount we warned him that he should keep in mind the possible need to use an appropriately robust level of force against those who may wish to continue practices of massacring civilians. We wanted him to know that if that became necessary he would have the backing of the Council to use every bit of force available under the rules of engagement. We also noted that a lesson learnt in recent times was that there was a tendency for the Council to stand back and wait for a mandate review period to come up before considering a clearly deteriorating situation. In this context we urged him to come to the Council early and gave our commitment to respond by taking, if necessary, a more hands on interest in events in the field (if those in the field called for it).

7 This was widely supported by others. Nigeria went on to note that Khan had the opportunity to "wipe the sense of shame that the Council had failed to respond to the problem" and would "remove the frustration felt in dealing with the problem of Rwanda." While recommending that the Special Rep coordinate closely with the OAU Sec Gen and with the leaders of the sub-region, Gambari nonetheless, emphasised the unacceptability of the international community having initially treated Rwanda as "an African problem" and one for them alone to find troops etc for.

8 Djibouti laid emphasis on the need to obtain a cease-fire and indicated that once a cease-fire had been obtained it would be possible to discuss other matters such as genocide.

#### **Cease-fire**

9 Secretariat (Gharekhan) briefed the Council on the situation at informals today. The OAU summit meeting in Tunis had ended on a high note today with the RPF rep announcing that regional talks held in the margins of the meeting had resulted in a cease-fire agreement, including agreement to cease all hostilities and genocide. The Rwanda "government" side, also present in Tunis, had said it would also observe the cease-fire and that the two parties would revisit certain aspects of the Arusha Agreement and would proceed to establish the transitional government after which the "government" side would disappear.

10 News of this cease-fire is encouraging and the Special Rep (at the above meeting) noted that the latest news out of Kigali was that military fire appeared to be decreasing in Kigali. It will however take a day or two to see if it sticks.

11 Gharekhan reported that there had been eyewitness accounts given to UNAMIR of 60 Tutsi children being massacred at St Paul's church in the "government" sector of Kigali. The RPF rep here cautioned that their position at Tunis had been to allow the "government" 3 days in which to bring its forces under control to stop the killing of civilians. The news of the massacre of the children gave some cause for doubt about how well the "government" side might be able to fulfil the bargain.

12 Gharekhan noted that the 7th round of cease-fire talks had been held yesterday and that the next round was scheduled for tomorrow. The airport remains closed and although the transfer of displaced persons had resumed on Monday afternoon (with 550 persons relocated), it had had to be suspended yesterday.

#### **Situation on the Ground**

13 UNAMIR had discussed with the RPF and "government" forces

the removal of clergy from Kabgayi as called for by the Holy See as well as a proposal to build a compound in Kigali for displaced persons. The RPF was expected to reply shortly to these proposals.

14 The delivery of humanitarian assistance has intensified to both the stadium and King Fasal Hospital in Kigali. Medecines Sans Frontieres has reported that the stadium in Cyangugu (where there are a large number of civilians at risk sheltering) appeared to be calmer and the hospital was well equipped.

15 The Human Rights Special Rappatour has returned to Nairobi and had talks with the UNAMIR Force Commander and other UN agencies. He had been unable to visit Kigali however.

#### **Spanish Draft Resolution**

16 There was no discussion of the Spanish proposal today at informals. As you know, the Council is waiting for the NAM to coordinate its position. We understand from Pakistan that as NAM coordinator their objective is to delay its consideration for as long as possible. In an interesting gloss to the Nigerian position, they say their position is "exactly the same as NZ's except on the question of timing". This of course is the crucial point. We also understand from the UKMISS that they have new instructions to be "warmly supportive" of the Spanish initiative. China says its position is to wait for NAM lead.

End Message