

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file: 115/23/37

Our file: 3/88/1

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FROM:	NEW YORK	C04649/NYK	20-Jun-1994
TO:	WELLINGTON PARIS CANBERRA	WGTM UNSC OTTAWA	Immediate Immediate Immediate
CC:	BEIJING BRUSSELS MOSCOW LONDON DEFENCE TOKYO	BONN GENEVA HARARE MADRID SANTIAGO WASHINGTON	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine

MFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, ISAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA
 DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)
 DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject
 SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Discussion in Council today suggests French draft resolution lacks sufficient support for adoption
- US, Russia and UK indicate support
- Nigeria and China come out with strong reservations in addition to New Zealand and Brazil
- Sec Gen writes to Council inviting consideration of French proposal
- Boutros-Ghali tells us in a private meeting that in his view intervention by a major power, on whatever basis, is worth the risks and more important than UNAMIR
- RPF continue to oppose French force
- Secretariat decides that French initiative has already significantly increased risk to UNAMIR and Francophone troops are to be pulled out immediately

Action

For information and instructions please

Report

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At Council informals today, French draft resolution which would mandate French led operation in Rwanda was circulated. Only change to the text you have is that new text (op 4) now contains a time period for deployment of the force which would be "limited to the transitional period preceeding the arrival, at the latest around the middle of August, of reinforced UNAMIR."

2 Merimee introduced text of resolution giving 3 reasons why it was necessary for the force to have a Chapter VII mandate. First, the operation would entail a "great deal of risk" and the force needed to have a "free hand", secondly, it was important to maintain a distinction between it and UNAMIR, and lastly Chapter VII would allow them to go in with no agreement of the parties, not as a peacekeeping mission but to "save lives">

3 He emphasised that France did not intend to remain longer than it would be needed until UNAMIR could carry out its mandate. An officer of the General Staff from Paris had been talking to the secretariat over the weekend about coordination and as to how to "get in UNAMIR's way as little as possible". France was continuing its contacts with the RPF in Kigali and wished to emphasise its political neutrality. The objective for France was for the resolution to go into blue tonight for adoption tomorrow.

4 P4, Spain and Czech spoke in support of the initiative. Spain introduced a raft of minor drafting changes to the text but no-one else was ready to discuss the text.

5 US supported the French proposal to bridge the gap till the expanded UNAMIR could arrive. They reiterated that the force must be multilateral, and welcomed Senegal's intention to participate. The US said it was accelerating the deployment of US equipment and announced a willingness to provide logistic support as well. Interestingly they noted that the French force "must not intervene in the fighting or support the government or its forces."

6 As expected UK Mission lost the battle and was instructed for bilateral reasons to support the French proposal but indicated that they had queries relating to the period when there would be 2 Council mandated operations in Rwanda, one acting under Chapter VII and the other under Chapter VI with the forces having different rules of engagement. They essentially wished to consider "at the outset" how this operation would not lead to difficulties for UNAMIR.

7 Russia was also supportive with something of a condition to the effect that the force must have "an extremely clear mandate, be limited in time, and fulfill the other criteria of regular PKOs to the effect that regular reports are received by the Council, and significantly, that the assistance of the parties was a "sine qua non" to the

operation.

8 Czech and Djibouti were very supportive, Djibouti proposing that the text be amended to laud the French proposal (ie add "Noting with keen appreciation" in PP E). Czech did also note that it would be useful to have the agreement of the parties to the conflict.

9 NAM has yet to meet to coordinate its position and would be doing this afternoon. Despite this Nigeria noted that the French proposal involved a "number of difficulties". Nigeria said it would prefer the Sec Gen to put additional pressure on governments which had indicated that they may be in a position to contribute to an expanded UNAMIR. They also had doubts about UNAMIR operating in parallel with another force.

10 Argentina is awaiting instructions but emphasised the need for the Council to double its efforts to enable UNAMIR to deploy as soon as possible in order to carry out the mandate in res 925. Brazil indicated that it was also awaiting instructions and shared some of the fundamental concerns. They referred to their traditional position of being cautious in giving blessing to multinational forces.

11 China indicated that the view of the NAM and Africans would be important for them. They referred to their main objectives as being to deploy an expanded UNAMIR as soon as possible and to for the ultimate political solution to depend not on military means but through the Arusha Peace Agreement process. Their preliminary comments were that they believed the lessons of Somalia needed to be taken account of, if action is to be taken a clear mandate and time limit is required, that it is "very necessary" to secure the agreement of the parties, and that China had a traditional position on Chapter VII operations although it might be possible to tailor the reference to Chapter VII in the resolution to tie it to some very specific intentions on the part of France.

12 For our part, we recalled that we were among those in early May who had proposed a Chapter VII mandate for the expanded UNAMIR and had been disappointed that this was not possible at the time. If it were appropriate to use force, we emphasised our preference that this be used by the UN not by states who would be given the protection of Chapter VII when UNAMIR is not. We noted that there was a substantive need to discuss the proposal and consider the risks of going down this track instead of putting the effort into expanding UNAMIR. We said we did not want petrol to be thrown on the fire by mistake.

13 We also pointed to the illogicality of the claim that UNAMIR cannot be deployed immediately. Senegal had indicated both a readiness to participate with France but also with UNAMIR. We noted we had not seen any concept of operations and that in our opinion it would be preferable for the force to be coordinated by the UN, ie for the effort and logistics

to go into an expanded UNAMIR.

Security Situation

14 Secretariat (Anabe) tells us that already the French proposal is creating severe difficulties for UNAMIR. Francophone personnel are being targetted in Kilgali and given the potential risks, the secretariat have decided to withdraw all Francophone personnel from UNAMIR immediately. Privately, Anabe, was in complete agreement with our intervention in the Council.

Next Step

15 The French request for the resolution to be put in blue was put aside by the President in the face of the reservations raised. There will be further consultations tomorrow.

Meeting with Secretary General

16 In a private meeting with Boutros-Ghali (which we had requested several weeks earlier on another issue) he indicated that in his view the French initiative offered the opportunity - which he had been striving for for months - to get a great power actively involved on the ground. That would make the difference and it was worth any risk because in the long run (he implied France would be there for at least a year) France would be able to put an end to the killings and also to stabilise the situation in Burundi.

Comment

17 The SecGen's analysis is quite staggering. Indeed his senior advisers who were present were constantly trying to qualify his remarks. He seemed quite unconcerned by the fact that exactly the same gungho approach on Somalia, including his willingness to accommodate the US at all costs in the early stage, lead the UN into a serious American generated disaster. We can see history repeating itself. And in this case, unlike Somalia where the US intervened with a credibly neutral humanitarian position, in Rwanda France carries heavy political baggage.

18 We find it hard to judge the situation will play itself out in the Council. The French Mission tell us that their public reason for wanting to go it alone is the need for Chapter VII authority for the use of force. But they acknowledge our argument that this could easily be given to UNAMIR. They say the real reason is a political desire in France to act decisively - somewhere - in a military operation under their own flag.

19 Given the political commitment which they have put in to this point we have to assume that France will push very hard and that the other countries with reservations will be

subjected to the same sort of misleading lobbying that Paris has already reported.

20 We have seen nothing that persuades us that the reservations that you have and which New Zealand has expressed are not wellfounded. Indeed they are widely felt. Many like the Canadians and Australians strongly agree.

21 You will appreciate that we are reluctant to suggest proposals relating to the text. That would imply acceptance of the principle. We still think it is a bad initiative and that we should continue to press France to go under the UNAMIR umbrella. But at the end of the day if it becomes clear that France has won support of the Council and you judged the risks of supporting the resolution were less than the risks of continuing to reserve our position we would suggest four areas which might be our minimum requirements for changes in the text:

- a a defined time limit;
- b a requirement for timely reports;
- c a proviso in the operative paragraphs that would ensure that the operation remains neutral and does not become a buffer or interposition force;
- d acceptance that UNAMIR can have no lesser authority than this coalition and should therefore also be under Chapter VII.

22 Text of SecGen's letter and most recent communique from RPF follow by fax.

End Message