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Your file: 3/88/1

Our file:

115/23/37

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FROM: WELLINGTON	C21870/WN1	13-Apr-1994
TO: NEW YORK	WGTM UNSC	Immediate
CC: LONDON	WASHINGTON	Priority
PARIS	HARARE	Priority
BEIJING	MOSCOW	Priority
CANBERRA	OTTAWA	Priority
GENEVA		Priority

MFAT (UNC, MEA, DSP1, EUR, EAB)

Subject

U47075: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Your C04292.

Guidance

Confirm you can be flexible on future of UNAMIR mandate. You should bear in mind following considerations and take account of views of Special Representative and troop contributing countries.

Report

- 2 As we see it the two key considerations are:
- the safety of UNAMIR personnel;
 - whether UNAMIR's mandate is still relevant and can be carried out.
- on the safety question, the decision on whether to withdraw completely, scale the operation back to a minimum or stay, is essentially an operational one for the Force Commander to take.
 - if the situation remains one of high risk, and if the Force Commander and Special Rep are unable to get convincing assurances from RPF and remnants of Rwandan Govt as to UNAMIR safety, withdrawal should take place immediately
 - we are not attracted by idea of trying to establish a "safe area". In the absence of guarantees, this would still leave troops vulnerable.
 - if, however, the risk to personnel is assessed to have lessened; the necessary assurances are available and Special Rep considers they will be honoured, there may be a case for a (perhaps reduced) UN presence to remain

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to try to help stabilise the situation and restore some sort of governmental authority.

- that may well require UNAMIR's mandate to be re-written.

3 On the issue of UNAMIR's mandate, the context in which the Arusha Peace Agreement was negotiated and was being implemented has changed entirely. We are not sure it is realistic to remind the parties that Arusha is the only durable means for peace. The continuing relevance of its provisions needs to be reassessed.

- if the Council's judgement is that the mandate is still relevant and can be implemented, there may be some advantage in the US proposal to withdraw to a neighbouring country for a (brief, specified) time. This would enable rapid redeployment. On the other hand, any prolonged period in a neighbouring country would soon show a negative cost benefit.
- we do not agree with Spain that complete withdrawal would send a signal of UN failure or the proposition that withdrawal would leave a security vacuum. That would only be the case if UNAMIR had a mandate to enforce security. It does not and should not. The situation has changed because of events totally beyond UNAMIR's control.

4 We welcome the agreement to consult troop contributors. The Council's response will need to take account of their views as well as those conveyed by the Special Rep and Force Commander.

5 We have received an enquiry from a relative of a New Zealander believed to be in Rwanda. Information about this man is vague. His name is Mathew Rakena Raymme. He is said to be working with a UN Communications Workshop - presumably under the auspices of one of the UN humanitarian agencies. It is possible he was joined in Rwanda in January by his wife and two children. If he was with the UN we would assume he has been evacuated and his name would appear on agency lists. Grateful if New York and Geneva could make appropriate enquiries.

End Message