

115/23/37

Your file: 3/88/1

Our file: 522/1/1

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FROM:	WELLINGTON	C23162/WN1	11-May-1994
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Subject

U49301: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Your C04443 and fax 2591 (page 3 unfortunately missing - grateful you repeat).

2 As you note (para 2), concept of operations is broadly consistent with the ideas in the informal draft you circulated last week. Non-paper should form a useful basis to take Council consideration further.

3 We will want to look more closely at the non-paper and may have additional comments tomorrow. Our initial thoughts and queries follow:

- We agree it would be necessary to explore further the feasibility of assigning tasks and functions as proposed in the non-paper without providing Chapter VII cover. We appreciate that the US could find it difficult to accept such a reference. However, given assumption that UNAMIR-A will be operating in the absence of a negotiated ceasefire and is expected to take "self-defensive" actions (para 7c of non-paper), it is at present difficult to see how it could do so without invoking Chapter VII.

- One of the central elements of the non-paper is that Kigali airport can be established as a neutral zone with the "consent of the parties" (para 6 e). We accept that this is a precondition in terms of logistic support for any proposed operation. However, how likely is such consent to be forthcoming, particularly given the RPF's recent heavy

military commitment to taking the airport?

- The proposal that UNAMIR-A "would depend primarily on deterrence to carry out its tasks and would resort to force only in self-defence" (para 7) needs to be investigated very carefully. The events following Belgian attempts to protect the Prime Minister are instructive in this regard. Para 7 implies that the rules of engagement could be interpreted in such a way as to make Chapter VII authority unnecessary. The Council would need to satisfy itself that a very robust alternative existed, and conceivably approve some form of words to this effect.

- Given the kind of operation under discussion is there scope for addressing US concerns about invoking Chapter VII, and reassuring the RPF that UN intentions are limited primarily to humanitarian relief/refugee protection and not full scale intervention and disarmament (a la Somalia)?

- We wonder where the 5,500 plus troops (para 9) for UNAMIR-A would come from. The non-paper provides no clues (aside from the premise that the Ghanaian battalion would be brought to its full strength). Have there been any indications from the discussions conducted by the US and by regional countries and the OAU as to which countries might make forces available?

End Message