

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file:

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FROM: WELLINGTON	C24728/WN1	20-Jun-1994
TO: NEW YORK	WGTV UNSC	Priority
CC: PARIS	LONDON	Priority
BRUSSELS	MADRID	Priority
ROME	GENEVA	Priority
MOSCOW	WASHINGTON	Priority
BEIJING	SANTIAGO	Priority
CANBERRA	OTTAWA	Priority
HARARE	BONN	Priority
DEFENCE		Routine

MFAT (UNC, MEA, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DSP1, EAB)

P/S MFA
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)
DEFENCE MOD

Subject

U52172: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Thanks your C04641

We remain cautious about France's proposal for an intervention force and hope it will not take precipitate action in the Council.

2 As posts will see from the following we have a number of questions that need clarifying before we would be able to consult Minister about a position to take in the Council.

3 New Zealand's immediate objectives in regard to Rwanda are:

- to see a stop to the fighting and killing;
- to see arrangements in place to protect and look after threatened and displaced populations and provide security for relief operations.

In looking to achieve these objectives, we want so far as possible to avoid prejudicing prospects for a sustainable political settlement, within the broad framework of the Arusha Accords.

4 Regarding the first objective, the talks sponsored by UNAMIR Commander Dallaire have not so far succeeded. An intervention force holds out that prospect.

5 Regarding the second objective, we have supported the early deployment of an expanded UNAMIR. Our concern is that an intervention force might cut across or complicate the task of an expanded UNAMIR. As New York put it in informals (C04641, para 14), how would an intervention force fit in with UNAMIR or impact on UNAMIR's future ability to operate in Rwanda?

6 The RPF attitude is a major consideration. France cannot expect to be perceived as a disinterested party. The signs we have seen to date of the RPF position are not encouraging. If the RPF regards a French-backed intervention force as hostile, the prospect is only more fighting. By all accounts the RPF is a well-armed, disciplined force. The French could face an imbroglio.

7 RPF hostility could also lead it to reject UN involvement, deny access to Kigali airport and refuse to cooperate with an expanded UNAMIR. This would jeopardise the second objective outlined above.

8 France has said it will proceed with an intervention force if;

- there is no ceasefire;
- it has WEU and African support;
- it has UN endorsement.

9 With regard to the first of these conditions, it would be helpful to get an up-to-date assessment of the situation on the ground. What are RPF military objectives and how close are they to achieving them? After the capture of Gitarama it was confidently asserted that the RPF were about to chase the last of the Government forces from Kigali and positions from which they could threaten the airport. Yet latest media reports suggest heavy fighting around the capital still exists, with UNAMIR caught in the middle suffering casualties. How does Dallaire assess the situation and the prospect of the ceasefire talks he has been leading? Will France's initiative put pressure on to reach an agreement? Is this its purpose?

10 It seems France is not finding it easy to line up credible WEU and African support. We have seen reports that Belgium, UK and Italy have all said no to troops, although noises have been made about logistical support. Spain seems cautious. We understand the WEU is to meet again Tuesday 21 June to further consider France's proposal. Except for Senegal and Zaire, the Africans seem cautious. New York reports a negative Nigerian view, but we note a Reuters report that France is to send a special envoy to African capitals, starting with Lagos, to explain its objectives. African views as they develop will bear on our own considerations.

11 As to UN endorsement, the French clearly have Boutros-Ghali's backing. If Sec-Gen is to write to Council urging intervention, we will need to see extent to which he addresses this in relation to UNAMIR and its role. Are the reservations of Council members, including the other permanent members, likely to jell into any disposition to oppose or abstain on the sort of UNITAF-inspired resolution the French have circulated? No-one will want to be seen as opposing a measure aimed at stopping genocide. US and Russia may see useful precedent in humanitarian intervention in terms of their inerests in, eg. Haiti and CIS.

12 France has also said an intervention force is necessary because the expanded UNAMIR will not be properly up and running for another 4-6 weeks. Yet the Secretariat says Ghana's forces are ready to go and the US airlift of APCs is imminent. Is the deployment of substantial part of an expanded UNAMIR in fact imminent? Will France's moves in any way accelerate deployment? And if so, would early deployment scotch the French initiative? Is the notion of using UNOSOM forces (probably Pakistan?) still in play? Our C24677 noted reservations we have about redeployment of UNOSOM.

13 It would be a concern if the French initiative encouraged the interim government and RGF to prolong the fighting, with the calculation that to do so might increase the prospect of French intervention.

14 We should be interested in posts'reporting on the questions we have raised. This will help us determine a position before the next discussion in informals. The US reaction will be significant in determining the Council's response, if it comes to that. Washington's readout, especially following reported Juppe/Christopher telecon would be appreciated.

End Message