

CONFIDENTIAL

Your file: 3/88/1

Our file: 115/23/37

18:56 (5782)	700/MEA/00000/00000	\$379.49
FROM: WELLINGTON	C25361/WN1	05-Jul-1994
TO: NEW YORK		Immediate
CC: PARIS		Priority
BEIJING	BONN	Routine
BRUSSELS	CANBERRA	Routine
GENEVA	HARARE	Routine
LONDON	MADRID	Routine
MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
SANTIAGO	TOKYO	Routine
WASHINGTON	DEFENCE	Routine
WGTN UNSC		Routine

MFAT (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

P/S MFA
DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)
DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Subject

U53304: SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA : FRENCH DEMARCHE

Summary

Further demarche by French Ambassador this morning. Aim to inform UNSC members of French initiative to create a secure humanitarian zone in Rwanda and to seek support. Point made that French are proceeding on basis of SCR 925/928 and clear support from Sec-Gen. Not expecting a new UNSC decision or resolution.

Action

2 For information. Grateful your reporting of views exchanged in New York.

Report

3 Reading from his instructions de Bellescize said advances by RPF forces resulting in massive movements of population were behind the French decision to organise a safe humanitarian area in the south-west of Rwanda. Battles in the last few days had extended beyond Kigali to Butare in the south and towards Kibuye in the west. (According to Reuters reports, the RPF have taken Kigali and Butare and the French are moving to defend Gikongoro.) Tens of thousands of inhabitants were fleeing the battle areas adding to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in the south-west of the country where a completely uncontrollable

CONFIDENTIAL

humanitarian situation was about to be created. If nothing were done all this area would lapse into enormous disorder, with the risk of physical elimination of minorities as in April/May, and also of fleeing people trying to seek shelter in neighbouring countries, especially Burundi, making the fragile situation there even more serious.

4 A stop to the fighting offered the only effective means of stabilising the situation and opening the way for talks. In the meantime French and Senegalese forces had no option but to seek, on the basis of the mandate given, to provide the population with shelter in the designated area by resisting any activity which would affect their security. To do this and to ease the provision of humanitarian support, including food/medical aid, the area needed to be single.

5 The Sec-Gen considered the initiative to constitute a safe humanitarian area in conformity with SCR 929 and had supported its creation without ambiguity.

6 France was not asking for Council approval or a new resolution (since the Council had already approved the creation of such areas) but would like all its friends, both within the Council and beyond, to support the initiative, or at least to show a general attitude of support.

7 The Ambassador gave us a transcript of comments by a spokesperson of the Quai D'Orsay on 4 July describing the intention as being to establish a zone in which the French would ensure, within the terms of their mandate and Chapter VII of the Charter, that no activity took place which would jeopardise the security of people finding shelter in that area. "All hostile activity against the population coming from whatever side would result in an action on our part."

8 Ambassador recalled Juppe's comment on 3 July that the French intervention had already saved thousands of lives. The situation continued to deteriorate. The French had concluded that creating a zone was the best action they could take to continue to try to protect the population at risk. Meanwhile they were continuing to encourage commitments by other countries to the strengthened UNAMIR, given that the French intervention was limited in duration. France had taken an initiative in New York to create a contact group among contributing countries. Juppe had said that several thousand troops were ready in principle to rejoin UNAMIR. It was a question of overcoming shortages of equipment, transport and logistical support.

9 In response to the Ambassador's presentation we recalled the reservations New Zealand had expressed about the intervention and the complications for UNAMIR. We said that, while recognising the difficulties of the situation on the ground, we could not help but be cautious about the latest developments. We agreed with de Bellescize's remarks that a ceasefire and resumption of talks in the framework of the

Arusha agreements offered the only real prospect of stabilising the situation.

Conclusion

10 Though France has said it is not looking for any additional Council action, we expect there may be some discussion in Council informals tomorrow. In that event you should draw on the above and our C25306 as you see fit. Now that the French have moved to implement the zone there seems no need for Marker's draft letter. It may be appropriate to reiterate New Zealand's caution. France's latest step has the potential to constitute a new confrontation line between the RPF and RGF forces, and to bring France into direct conflict with the RPF if it defends the declared zone with force. If France stayed, how long would it intend to defend a de facto dividing line within Rwanda? Assuming it wished to leave as soon as possible, as envisaged, would it then seek to have UNAMIR take over policing and monitoring of the zone it left behind?

11 The French are getting themselves into an increasingly difficult situation. They run the risk of prolonging the conflict and their own involvement. Through our questions to de Bellescize we encouraged France to continue contacts with the RPF and regional countries and work for a ceasefire, and to continue to help in getting the expanded UNAMIR operation underway. Hopefully other Council members will reinforce that.

=

End Message