

ACTION

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file:

17:43 700/UNS/00000/00000 \$148.09

FROM: WELLINGTON U47317 15 Apr 1994

TO: NEW YORK WGTN UNSC IMMEDIATE

CC: LONDON PARIS PRIORITY
 WASHINGTON MOSCOW PRIORITY
 BEIJING BRUSSELS PRIORITY
 CANBERRA OTTAWA PRIORITY
 HARARE PRIORITY

MFAT (UNC, MEA, DSP1, EUR, EAB)

Willberg	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Forsyth	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ward	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rider	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hughes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Kember	<input type="checkbox"/>
McMaster	<input type="checkbox"/>
Foster	<input type="checkbox"/>
McCormick	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rush	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tyne	<input type="checkbox"/>
Dalton	<input type="checkbox"/>
Wataam	<input type="checkbox"/>

SECURITY COUNCIL : RWANDA

Your C04314.

Summary

We agree first priority is get a ceasefire. We have reservations about the tactics of setting a five-day deadline and threatening UNAMIR's possible withdrawal. Getting a recommitment to the Arusha peace process may take some time and could involve renegotiation of its provisions.

Report

- 2 We think the following considerations are important:
- the first priority is to get a ceasefire. The Council should emphasise that.
 - If UNAMIR can assist in this process, it should be made available to help, even though this has meant moving beyond its present mandate.
 - What UNAMIR can do and how many forces might be dedicated to this immediate, short-term task is best left to the Force Commander and Special Representative jointly to recommend;

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- The Commander is now playing a good offices role - something more commonly undertaken by the Sec-Gen and his staff. If within a short period a ceasefire is unattainable, whether it is appropriate for UNAMIR to continue to play this role will need to be considered.

3 With these considerations in mind and from this distance, the second option put forward by Riza is the most attractive. This would enable the Force Commander to continue the role you have reported he is usefully playing as a channel of communication and in trying to broker a ceasefire, with the blessing of both parties.

4 Given the strong sense in the Council and among troop contributors that UNAMIR should not withdraw and that the UN should stick beside Rwanda in its hour of greatest need, it seems odd to be setting a deadline with the threat that UNAMIR may pull out.

5 A stand-alone resolution aimed at getting a ceasefire seems the best immediate course. Perhaps the first two paras in your Paragraph 9 by themselves would suffice, leaving aside the question of how the Council might respond if a ceasefire is not achieved in five days.

6 It seems to us that if a ceasefire is achieved, the process of getting a re-commitment to the Arusha peace process could take some time. You have noted that the DMZ is unlikely to have future relevance. The protocols on power sharing and on integration of the armed forces may well be subject to renegotiation. We wonder if it is realistic for the Council to call for the parties to return to previous positions and place emphasis now on full implementation of the Arusha agreement, as the NAM draft tends to do.