

UNITED NATIONS
TRUSTEESHIP
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

T/1538
3 June 1960

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH-FRENCH

Twenty-sixth session
Agenda item 5 (a)

VISITING MISSION TO TRUST TERRITORIES IN EAST AFRICA, 1960

REPORT ON RUANDA-URUNDI

Table of Contents

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL DATED 2 JUNE 1960 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE VISITING MISSION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL		3
INTRODUCTION		
I. Terms of reference of the Mission	1 - 8	4
II. Account of the Mission's trip	9 - 51	6
III. Glossary	52 - 57	19
CHAPTER I: POLITICAL QUESTIONS		
Introduction	58 - 63	22
I. RUANDA		
A. Political development of Ruanda up to 1956	64 - 109	24
B. Events from 1956 to July 1959	110 - 149	40
C. Events between 25 July 1959 and November 1959	150 - 193	55
D. The disturbances of November 1959	194 - 240	71
E. The plan of reforms and the political events after November 1959	241 - 253	88
F. Situation in Ruanda at the time of the Mission's visit	254 - 313	93

60-13663

195 p.
map.

1...

Table of Contents
 (Cont'd)

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
II. URUNDI		
A. Political development of Urundi up to 1959	314 - 329	112
B. Political events of 1959 and the beginning of 1960	330 - 354	117
C. Situation in Urundi at the time of the Mission's visit	355 - 377	125
III. RUANDA-URUNDI		
A. Organization of Ruanda-Urundi before December 1959	378 - 387	134
B. The reforms of late 1959	388 - 396	137
C. Relations between Ruanda and Urundi	397 - 413	139
D. Relations between Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgian Congo	414 - 423	145
E. Africanization of the Civil Service	424 - 438	148
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS		
A. General	439 - 457	154
B. Future of Ruanda-Urundi	458 - 465	163
C. Sequel to the November disturbances in Ruanda	466 - 473	166
CHAPTER II: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL QUESTIONS		
I. General	474 - 484	169
II. Questions of land tenure	485 - 495	172
III. Public finance	496 - 509	175
IV. Education	510 - 523	182
ANNEXES		
I. Appeal addressed to the people of Ruanda by the Mission on 8 March 1960		
II. Message addressed to the people of Ruanda by the Resident-General on 8 March 1960		
III. Appeal addressed to the people of Ruanda by the Mission on 14 March 1960		
IV. Joint <u>communiqué</u> of the political parties of Ruanda		
Map of Ruanda-Urundi		

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL DATED 2 JUNE 1960
FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE VISITING MISSION
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with Trusteeship Council resolution 2009 (XXV) of 4 February 1960 and with rule 99 of the rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council, the report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, on Ruanda-Urundi.

I should be grateful if you would transmit this report to the members of the Trusteeship Council as soon as possible, and have it generally released on 13 June 1960.

(Signed) Mason SEARS

Chairman, United Nations Visiting Mission
to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960

INTRODUCTION

I. Terms of reference of the Mission

1. The arrangements for the dispatch of a visiting mission to Trust Territories in East Africa were made by the Trusteeship Council during its twenty-fifth session.

2. At its 1048th meeting, on 4 February 1960, the Council decided that the Mission should be composed of the following persons:

Mr. Mason Sears (United States of America), Chairman
Mr. Paul K. Edmonds (New Zealand)
Mr. Miguel Solano Lopez (Paraguay)
Mr. Omar Loutfi (United Arab Republic)

3. At the same meeting, the Council adopted resolution 2009 (XXV) setting forth the terms of reference of the Mission. By that resolution, the Council, having decided that the Mission should visit the Trust Territories of Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika in that order and that the duration of its visit should be approximately two months, directed the Mission:

(a) to investigate and report as fully as possible on the steps taken in the above-mentioned Trust Territories towards the realization of the objectives set forth in Article 76 b of the Charter of the United Nations, taking into account the terms of General Assembly resolution 321 (IV) of 15 November 1949 and other relevant Assembly resolutions, in particular resolutions 1412 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on the preparation and training of indigenous civil cadres in the Trust Territories, 1413 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on the attainment of self-government or independence by Trust Territories and 1419 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 on plans for political reform for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi;

(b) to give attention, as may be appropriate in the light of discussions in the Trusteeship Council and in the General Assembly and of resolutions adopted by them, to issues raised in connexion with the annual reports of the administration of the Trust Territories concerned, in petitions received by the Council relating to these Territories, in the reports of the previous periodic visiting missions to these Territories and in the observations of the Administering Authorities on these reports;

- (c) to make a special investigation of the conditions and causes of the recent disturbances in Ruanda-Urundi;
- (d) to receive petitions and to investigate on the spot, in consultation with the local representative of the Administering Authority concerned, such of the petitions received as, in its opinion, warrant special investigation;
- (e) to submit to the Council, in time for consideration by it at its twenty-sixth session, a report on each of the Territories visited containing its findings, with such observations, conclusions and recommendations as it may wish to make.

4. The Mission visited Ruanda-Urundi from 2 March to 1 April 1960. Before and after the visit it made brief stops at Brussels where it had discussions with representatives of the Belgian Government. A more detailed account of its trip is presented in the following section. During its trip the Mission was accompanied by the following Secretariat members: Mr. Jacques Rapoport (Principal Secretary), Mr. F.T. Liu (Assistant Secretary), Mr. Guy de Warlincourt (Administrative Officer), Miss Monique de Gravelaine (Interpreter) and Miss Denise Wyns (Stenographer).

5. While in the Territory, the Mission received a very warm welcome from the Trusteeship and customary authorities, as well as from the population and its political leaders. Because of lack of space, the Mission cannot name here all the many persons who extended their hospitality to it or who helped it in one way or another to fulfil its task. But it would like to express its special gratitude to Mr. J.P. Harroy, Resident-General of Ruanda-Urundi, Colonel G. Logiest, Special Resident of Ruanda, Mr. I. Reisdorff, Resident of Urundi, Mwami Kigeli V of Ruanda and Mwami Mwambutsa of Urundi for their generous hospitality. It wishes also to acknowledge the valuable assistance furnished by the two liaison officers of the Administration, Mr. Henri Guillaume and Mr. Paul Lannoy, as well as the members of the provisional special council of Ruanda who accompanied the Mission throughout its tour of that State.

6. Lastly, the Mission cannot fail to mention the cordial co-operation which marked its relations with the representatives of the Administering Authority and particularly with Mr. A. De Schrijver, Minister of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Mr. Raymond Scheyven, Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs

of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and Mr. Harroy, the Resident-General. At this critical time in the history of Ruanda-Urundi, the Mission was deeply thankful for having encountered so many persons of goodwill who desired to co-operate with the United Nations in assisting the Territory. If there were differences of opinion on problems affecting the Territory's future, the members of the Mission and the representatives of the Administering Authority always talked them over with the greatest candour and tried to find a satisfactory solution in a spirit of mutual understanding.

7. In view of the special circumstances of the Territory, the Mission considered that it should not only gather information and prepare a report, but also try to bring together the Administration and the representatives of the people and help them, if not to find immediate solutions to the Territory's serious difficulties, at least work out generally acceptable procedures for a constructive discussion of these problems.

8. Before concluding this introduction, the Mission wishes to express one regret. In view of the gravity of the situation in Ruanda-Urundi, of the complexity of the problems faced by the Territory and also of the wealth of documentation which the Mission gathered there, it would have liked to have had more time at its disposal to prepare its report. Unfortunately this was not possible. The Mission was obliged to give rather broad treatment to certain very intricate problems and to spend little time on a number of questions which in other circumstances would have been given a larger place in the report.

II. Account of the Mission's trip

9. On its way to Ruanda-Urundi, the Mission stopped briefly at Brussels on 29 February and 1 March 1960 in order to have a first meeting with the representatives of the Administering Authority. It discussed with Ministers De Schrijver and Scheyven, and their associates, a variety of problems related to the disturbances of November 1959, the future of the Territory and the arrangements for the Mission's forthcoming visit. It also had talks with the three members of the Commission on Inquiry who had shortly before submitted their report on the November disturbances to the Belgian Government, and it spoke with representatives of students from Ruanda-Urundi in Belgium.

10. On 1 March the Mission left for Usumbura, where it arrived on the following day. It was to remain there until 8 March. From its arrival at the Usumbura airfield, the Mission realized that its visit to the Territory was unlikely to proceed in an atmosphere of calm. A military camp with olive-coloured tents for Belgian paratroopers had been erected at the airfield and numbers of Congolese gendarmes stood guard before the hotel where the Mission was to stay. Both at the airfield and in front of the hotel the Mission was met by large and boisterous crowds of demonstrators carrying banners and placards bearing the words "Uhuru" and "Immediate Independence", slogans of the Urundi political parties of UNARU and UPRONA.^{1/} During the Mission's stay at Usumbura, Africans streamed to the hotel to speak to the Mission on behalf of political parties or as individuals, to submit documents or to request a hearing.

11. On 3 March, in honour of the Mission's arrival, the Resident-General delivered to the Mission and a large audience, an important address in which, after enumerating the principal developments introduced in the Territory since the last Visiting Mission in 1957, he surveyed the political situation in the Territory, particularly in Ruanda because of the recent disturbances there, and made some comments on the reforms recently projected for the Territory. He also arranged a working meeting at which senior officials of the Administration informed the Mission about their departments' achievements and problems.

12. The Mission had learned before its arrival in the Territory that, in the face of the heightening tension, the Administration had called in a battalion of paratroopers from the Belgian Congo in order to assist local forces in maintaining order and protecting the Mission. While recognizing that it was part of the Administration's functions to take the necessary measures to ensure order in the Territory, the Mission did not wish to be associated with the military precautions adopted: it did not feel that it needed protection and hoped that, without disregarding the needs for maintaining order, security measures might be reduced to a minimum. The Mission had several talks on this

^{1/} To simplify the account of the trip, political parties will be referred to by their abbreviations in this section. These are explained in paragraph 266 below for Ruanda parties and in paragraph 364 below for Urundi parties.

subject with the Resident-General and the Special Resident of Ruanda; these talks are described elsewhere in the report.^{1/} The arrangements for the Mission's visit were also the subject of interviews with certain political leaders, following which the Mission altered a few particulars of its original programme so as to meet certain of their wishes.

13. While at Usumbura, the Mission spent a large part of its time hearing any person who wished to speak with it. It spoke with, among others, representatives of the UNARU party of Urundi and the UNAR party of Ruanda, and with many persons who had come on their own behalf, including Mr. Albert Maus, a member of the General Council, and Mr. Jamar, attorney for chief Mbanda who had recently been sentenced to death for the part he had played in the November disturbances. Owing to the large number of requests for hearings, the Mission was unable to spend as much time as it would have liked in surveying local economic and social projects. It was able, however, on 5 March, to visit construction sites of the new Usumbura-Bugarama road, as well as two villages and a model farm in the Ruzizi paysannat.

14. On 8 March, after issuing an appeal to the population of Ruanda to remain calm, the Mission left Usumbura by road for Astrida. Before reaching the Ruanda border it made two stops in order to visit the administrative centre of Imbo-Mugamba chiefdom and the Butegana Co-operative of Coffee Planters. The Mission was greeted at the Co-operative by a crowd of some 3,000 persons waving placards and shouting political slogans. Most of the demonstrators were sympathizers of the PDC, which demanded "Democracy before Independence", but there were also some elements of UPRONA, which called for "Immediate Independence". In addition, several groups varying in size from about ten to several hundred persons stood waiting for the Mission along its route in order to demonstrate their support of one or the other of these two parties.

15. The boundary between Urundi and Ruanda in this region is marked by the Akanyaru river, a few kilometres north of Butegana. There, the Mission was stopped by a considerable crowd of some 10,000 people, many of whom carried banners and placards of UNAR reading "Immediate Independence" and "Long live Kigeli V" and who should slogans at the top of their voice. The Mission had

^{1/} See paragraphs 259-261.

some difficulty in persuading the crowd to stand back so that it could continue on its way. Before reaching Astrida, the Mission was stopped a few more times by similar but much smaller groups. Before this journey was over, the Mission had received several hundred leaflets and documents from demonstrators.

16. The security measures taken by the Administration along the Mission's route were very discreet. The approach to Astrida, however, was guarded by a considerable force which permitted only persons with official authorization to pass. The district administrator subsequently explained to the Mission that these measures were intended to prevent mass demonstrations in the vicinity, that anyone wishing to see the Mission could obtain a pass, and that in fact passes had already been issued to nearly 500 people. The large number of requests for hearings, which was to increase as time went on, posed a difficult problem. The Mission wanted to hear everyone, but had too little time to do so. It discussed this matter that same day with the Special Resident and the members of the provisional special council who were to accompany the Mission during its tour of Ruanda. It was possible, thanks to their co-operation, to resolve the problem in a satisfactory manner. Proceeding on the assumption that most of the indigenous inhabitants requesting hearings were members of or sympathizers with the principal political parties, the Mission requested the members of the provisional special council, who are the representatives of these parties, to organize them into groups and to ask each group to designate approximately ten representatives who would express the group's views to the Mission, it being understood that anyone who wished only to submit written documents could do so without any restriction.

17. This system was successfully inaugurated on the following day. In a very orderly fashion, each of the four principal parties designated a group of about ten representatives who presented to the Mission a detailed exposition of their party's views on the problems over which they were concerned. Apart from these representatives, the Mission had the time to hear a great many non-political persons and groups, among them the Anglican Bishop the Right Reverend Percy James Brazier, the Abbé Alexis Kagame, Mr. M. d'Hertefeldt, sociologist of the Institut pour la recherche scientifique en Afrique centrale (IRSAC), Mr. P. Bourdeaux, dean of the faculty of agronomy at the official University of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and several groups of students.

/...

18. At Astrida, the Mission devoted almost all of its time to interviews. Whereas everything was orderly at the IRSAC buildings, which served as the Mission's temporary headquarters, the same was unfortunately not true for other parts of the region. The Mission subsequently learned, in fact, that there had been several incidents in the vicinity of the town during its stay. According to the report which the Mission received from the Administration, several groups of demonstrators had gathered in the course of 8 and 9 March and had made a stone-throwing attack against the unit of police which had been sent to disperse them. The latter threw tear-gas grenades amongst the demonstrators, causing minor wounds to five of them.

19. On 11 March the Mission left for Nyanza. At the request of the APROSCMA and PARMEHUTU leaders, it made a detour to the Savé hill where it was greeted by a crowd of several thousand Hutu. The demonstrators carried AFROSOMA banners and placards calling for democracy, reform of the land system, abolition of feudalism, the founding of a republic and the continuance of Trusteeship. Large number of letters and leaflets were also handed to the Mission.

20. Before reaching Nyanza, the Mission stopped briefly at Rubona to visit the INEAC station in the area. All along the road, large numbers of groups stood waiting for the Mission to demonstrate their political convictions. Some of them were AFROSOMA supporters, but more of them, especially closer to Nyanza, sided with UNAR.

21. At Nyanza, the Mission was received by the Mwami and his retinue at the administrative centre of the State, where an immense throng estimated at nearly 40,000 persons had assembled and stood holding placards and banners reading "Long live Kigeli V", "Immediate Independence", "General Amnesty" and "Deliver us from the Belgians". The Mission attended a performance given by the famous dancers of the King. Later, while it was in private conversation with the Mwami, its secretariat received several hundred communications from demonstrators. A crowd of several tens of thousands of people in a state of political excitement and standing in the sun for hours always constitutes a possible danger, and incidents had therefore been feared, but the demonstrators at Nyanza showed great self-discipline and everything proceeded in a calm atmosphere. The Mwami intervened personally several times to keep the crowd from blocking the way of the Mission's vehicles.

22. The Mission then conducted interviews by the method adopted at Astrida, which it used henceforth. Apart from local representatives of the four major parties, the Mission heard a delegation of independents, two brothers from the Collège du Christ-Roi and a group of ten prisoners brought under escort by the local police. After these interviews, the Mission left Nyanza for Gitarama. It was met on the road by frequent groups of demonstrators, supporting either UNAR or PARMEHUTU.

23. The entire day of 12 March was given over to interviews at Gitarama. The Mission first heard local delegations from the four major parties, following which it received a large number of persons, including the Protestant school group, a delegation of independents, four customary chiefs, two widows of victims of the November disturbances, two Catholic priests and one prisoner. Meanwhile, a crowd of several hundred people had gathered in front of the Mission's headquarters, some belonging to UNAR, the others to PARMEHUTU. The members of the special council, whose assistance to the Mission was very valuable, separated the crowd into two groups according to their political sympathies and placed them on either side of the road.

24. On the morning of the 13th, the Mission went first to Kabgayi where it spoke with the Archbishop of Kabgayi, Mgr. André Perraudin and visited the mission hospital. It then set out for Kigali, the seat of the Ruanda Residency. All the way from Kabgayi to the Marangera chiefdom, a distance of six kilometres, a considerable crowd estimated at nearly 30,000 people had gathered on the roadside and greeted the Mission with PARMEHUTU slogans. Over the remaining distance, other less numerous groups also awaited the Mission, some of them supporting PARMEHUTU and others UNAR. On several occasions, the Mission's convoy was stopped by the groups, which threw letters and leaflets and even placards into the vehicles.

25. On arriving at Kigali the Mission learned that two serious incidents had taken place on the road after it had passed. According to the report which the Mission received from the Administration, the first incident occurred seventeen kilometres from Kigali. A detachment of gendarmes patrolling the road was subjected to a stone-throwing attack by a group of some 300 highly excited people who shouted: "You killed Mwami Mutara; we want to die for the Mwami". The detachment prepared to defend itself and ordered the crowd to disperse, but the

demonstrators continued to advance and to assail the gendarmes with stones. Several tear-gas grenades were thrown into the crowd but produced no effect. After the final order to disperse, the head of the detachment ordered his men to use their weapons: two women were killed and four men wounded among the assailants, while several gendarmes were injured by stones. The second incident took place not far from the first, close to the village of Runda. The district administrator of Gitarama with two members of his staff, on returning to Gitarama after having left the Mission's convoy, was attacked by a group of more than 500 people. To protect themselves, the administrator and his companions were obliged to use their firearms. Eight people were wounded, and one of them later died. Some African political leaders gave different versions of these incidents. The Mission also learned that from 9 to 12 March, in a new outbreak of violence resembling that of November 1959, the Hutu population of some Biumba chiefdoms had set fire to approximately 1,100 Tutsi huts and nearly 700 Tutsi families had been forced to seek protection with the Administration or the religious missions or to take refuge in other regions.

26. The Mission immediately discussed these incidents with the Special Resident and afterwards decided unanimously that everything possible should be done to prevent the further outbreak of incidents. To that end, it decided to make a new appeal to the population forthwith^{1/} and to call an emergency meeting for the following day at which not only all the members of the special council and the leaders of the main political parties of Ruanda would attend, but also the Mwami, the Special Resident and the Resident-General himself. At one o'clock in the morning it held a second interview with the Special Resident, who promised to co-operate in the implementation of the Mission's plan and to notify all the persons concerned without delay.

27. At 2.30 p.m., all the participants, including the Resident-General, assembled at the meeting place. In his opening statement, the chairman of the Mission stated that the Mission had learned of the recent incidents at Gitarama and Biumba with profound regret and it was convinced that order could not be maintained without the complete co-operation of all leaders and all political parties. He proposed that the political leaders immediately issue a joint

^{1/} See Annex III.

communiqué renouncing the use of violence and calling on the people to remain calm and observe the law. The Resident-General and the Mwami spoke in support of the Mission's proposal which, after an animated but cordial discussion, was accepted by all the leaders present. A text was drafted^{1/} and signed by the chairmen of the four political parties and countersigned by the Resident-General, the Special Resident, the Mwami, the members of the special council and the chairman of the Mission. It should be emphasized that this was the first time that a formal agreement of this sort had been reached between the leaders of the political parties, the Mwami and the Administration.

28. On the morning of 14 March the Mission held an interview with Lieutenant-Colonel E. Lamy, presiding judge of the Military Court, who told it of the Court's activity. It then heard a number of persons including two UNAR leaders who were being held in the town prison (Mr. François Rukeba and chief Hormisdas Mbanda), three Protestant missionaries of the Church Missionary Society and two Europeans (Mr. Olbrechts and Mr. Goossens).

29. On the following morning the Mission broke up into two groups. One of them visited Kibungu where it heard, apart from local representatives of the four political parties, a delegation from the Cultivators' Association, another from the Stock-raisers' Association, and Dr. Tenret, Director of the Medical and Scientific Centre of the Free University of Brussels in Central Africa (CEMUBAC) for Ruanda-Urundi. A crowd of nearly a thousand people carrying placards and banners of political parties had gathered in front of the offices which were to be used for the interviewing. Some of them declared their support of the Hutu parties, but the majority were UNAR supporters. In addition, along the road between Kigali and Kibungu, large numbers of groups stood waiting for the Mission to pass. These groups were clearly dominated by UNAR elements in the vicinity of Kibungu, but the followers of PARMEHUTU or APRCSOMA became more and more numerous on nearing Kigali.

30. The second Mission group travelled, in the company of the Mwami, to Nyamata and visited the local refugee reception centre, where more than 5,000 Tutsi refugees from the Ruhengeri region had been established. There it heard representatives of the Tutsi refugees, who expressed their wish to be reintegrated

^{1/} See Annex IV.

in their former regions. The crowd of refugees, several of whom carried placards calling for immediate independence, gave the Mwami a warm welcome. On returning to Kigali, and after visiting the vocational school of the Salesian Brothers, the group resumed the interviews, which the Mission had had to interrupt the day before and heard representatives of the four major parties as well as a UNAR delegation, a delegation of local Swahili, a delegation of women of Ruanda and a number of individuals.

31. On 16 March the Mission left Kigali for Biumba. This visit, which was not originally scheduled, had been included at the last moment because of the recent incidents there. The Mwami had offered to accompany the Mission, but changed his plans on the suggestion of the Special Resident, who feared the occurrence of more incidents. Upon arriving, the Mission held an interview with the district administrator, who told it of the recent disturbances and of the steps taken by the Administration to aid the refugees. It then saw delegations of the PARMEHUTU, RADER and UNAR parties. In front of the temporary headquarters stood a crowd of several hundred people, most of whom were supporters of UNAR.

32. The Mission then set out for Ruhengeri. At Rulindo, it encountered an immense crowd of several thousand demonstrators all of whom belonged to PARMEHUTU and who demanded democracy and the continuance of Trusteeship. It had to make a brief halt there to hear an address by the local chief and to receive hundreds of letters and leaflets. Upon arrival at Ruhengeri, the Mission attended a gathering in front of its hotel of several dozen UNAR supporters who called for immediate independence, followed by another and larger gathering in which several hundred supporters of PARMEHUTU demonstrated in favour of democracy.

33. The next morning, the Mission met the local representatives of RADER and PARMEHUTU, a delegation of local Moslems who favoured the UNAR programme, a group of Hutu chiefs and several individuals including a priest who maintained that the Mwami Mutara had committed suicide. During the interviews, a crowd of over 2,000 persons had gathered in front of the offices of the Mission to demonstrate in support of PARMEHUTU. In the afternoon, the Mission went to Ntaruka where it inspected the hydroelectric plant. There were numerous groups of PARMEHUTU supporters in front of the plant and along the road.

34. On 18 March, the Mission left for Nyundo and Kisenyi. On the road between Ruhengeri and Nyundo, the many demonstrators awaiting the Mission were nearly

all PARMEHUTU sympathizers. But at Nyundo itself, a large crowd of several thousand, including a number of school children accompanied by European and African nuns, were voicing pro-UNAR sentiments and demanding independence, at the same time as other demonstrators were shouting anti-Tutsi slogans. The Mission was met by Mgr. Alois Bigirumwami, the Bishop of Nyundo, with whom it had a long conversation before resuming the journey to Kisenyi. On the road there were a number of groups, mostly PARMEHUTU supporters.

35. To prevent the Kisenyi headquarters from being invaded by demonstrators, the approaches to the hotel where the Mission was staying were guarded by soldiers. During the afternoon of 18 March and the morning of the 19th, the Mission gave a number of interviews at Kisenyi and heard the representatives of PARMEHUTU, RADER and UNAR, as well as a delegation of Protestant ministers from the Church Missionary Society and several prominent Europeans.

36. On 20 March, a party from the Mission went by boat to Kibuye. There, it gave a hearing to two groups of prisoners of opposite political views, as well as to the PARMEHUTU, RADER and UNAR delegations. No crowd was gathered to demonstrate before the Mission. The administrator informed it that a number of persons had come from the interior to demonstrate but that, in order to avoid trouble, the police had prevented them from entering the centre. After the hearings, the Mission returned by boat to Kisenyi.

37. The next morning, the Mission took the plane to Shangugu, the last stopping-place on its tour of Ruanda. The town of Shangugu, which borders on Bukavu, in the Belgian Congo, is somewhat detached from Ruanda politics. This district had remained untouched by the disturbances of last November and, on account of this, the atmosphere was less tense there than elsewhere. Nevertheless, in his interview with the Mission, the district administrator said that the population had recently become far more agitated, that two huts had been set fire to four days earlier, that some twenty persons had stopped his car the day before and thrown stones at him, and that the current investigation had not so far yielded any clues as to the nature of the incidents. The Mission then gave a hearing to the representatives of APROSOMA, UNAR and MUR, to a delegation of the Union des intérêts communs and several individuals. After these hearings, the Mission left Shangugu in the afternoon by air for Kitega, the capital of Urundi.

38. The Mission arrived at Kitega in the afternoon of 21 March and stayed there until the morning of the 26th. On disembarking from the plane, it was met by a large crowd of UFRONA supporters who were shouting and waving placards. Despite their fervour, the demonstrators were disciplined and no incident occurred. However, the Resident later informed the Mission that after the demonstration, several groups of Swahili had tried to break into the administrative centre and had been held back by the police. There had been no casualties. In the evening, the Mission had a meeting with the Resident, the Mwami, the members of the interim committee and the senior officials of the Resident's Office.

39. The next day was devoted almost entirely to hearings. After hearing a statement by the Resident on conditions in the country, the Mission received delegations from the FDC, the PP and UNARU as well as several private persons. Representatives of the five-party congress of UPRONA, UNARU, the VPM, the DNB and the PDJTB also came to announce that the congress was working on a joint draft resolution and asked for a hearing for 25 March, which was granted.

40. On 23 March, the Mission separated into two groups. One group went to Mosso, via Rutana. Just outside Musasa, the group encountered a crowd of several hundred FDC demonstrators headed by chief Kigoma who read a speech advocating democracy. At Musasa, it heard a statement by the director of the INEAC station describing the achievements of the station and visited part of the paysannat. It then proceeded to Mwishanga where it was met by chiefs Raphaël and Léon Ndenzako, who were surrounded by a crowd of several hundred persons, the majority of whom were demonstrating in support of UPRONA and demanding independence. In his address to the Mission, chief Raphaël Ndenzako thanked Belgium for the work it had done in Ruanda-Urundi and requested independence for the country at an early date.

41. The other group went to Ngozi by way of Karuzi. On the way, at Karuzi, it visited an experimental farm for large-scale stock-breeding and a station run by the research mission on water resources and witnessed several demonstrations - one at Bugenyazi, where several hundred persons headed by chief Bakereke were calling for independence, another at Mwimebero, organized by sub-chief Bisharu and very similar to the first, and another at Gisha at which chief Bigayimpunzi, surrounded by several hundred persons, was advocating the institution of a democratic

government prior to independence and announcing his intention of forming a new party (which was to be established some days later as the PDR). On its arrival at Ngozi, the group, which had been joined by Mwami Mwambutsa, found several thousand persons, in two groups of about the same size, assembled outside of the district offices. The UPRONA group was calling for independence and the FDC group was demanding democracy. After having received representatives from UNARU, the protestant mission and several individual petitioners, the Mission called on Mgr. Martin at the Ngozi bishopric, and on the Right Reverend Percy James Brazier, the Anglican bishop, at the mission of the Church Missionary Society.

42. In the morning of 24 March, the Mission held at Kitega an important meeting with the Resident-General who had come by plane from Usumbura to see it. This meeting, which was essential for the drafting of the Mission's conclusions, is described in another section of the report.^{1/} In the afternoon of the 24th, the Mission visited Mgr. A. Grauls, the Archbishop of Kitega, and had a private conversation with him.

43. The next morning, the Mission received three members of the interim committee of Urundi, the representatives of the congress of UPRONA, UNARU, DFM, DNB and PDJTB parties, a delegation of the Association des oeuvres sociales and a number of individuals. In the afternoon, it had a final interview with the Resident of Urundi and attended a reception given by the Mwami Mwambutsa, at which a group of chiefs and sub-chiefs presented it with a joint memorandum.

44. On 26 March, the Mission again divided into two groups. The first group went to Muramvya, where it gave a hearing to a UPRONA delegation and to five agricultural instructors and three farmers who were all sympathizers of that party. At the entrance to the building, a crowd of several hundred persons formed at the sides of the road to express support for the same party's views. After the hearings, the group proceeded to Usumbura.

45. The second group also went to Usumbura, but via Luvironza and Kisozi. At Luvironza, it visited the local zootechnical station and the rural development zones of the region. On the journey from Luvironza to Kisozi, it had to stop twice to witness rival demonstrations: the first in front of the hospital of the Matana protestant mission where a crowd of several hundred people, including a

^{1/} See paragraph 443.

large number of school children, were calling for immediate independence, and the second at the Kitandu chiefdom, where, in the presence of the chief, a crowd of approximately the same size was demanding democracy before independence. At Kisozi, the group was shown round the INEAC station by the director.

46. The Mission arrived at Usumbura on the afternoon of 26 March and was to remain there until 1 April. On 27 March, it had a talk with Minister Scheyven, who was in the Territory at the time, and with the Resident-General, to review the questions raised at the Kitega meeting. As mentioned in another part of the report,^{1/} the Mission had made at those meetings a number of suggestions which the Resident-General had immediately forwarded to the Belgian Government. It was now necessary to await the reply from Brussels.

47. Meanwhile, on the morning of 28 March, the Mission visited the Collège du Saint-Esprit and the Athénée royal at Usumbura, as well as the town prison and the port. On the afternoon of the same day it had a talk with the Resident-General. On 29 March there was still no news from Brussels. The interviews with political parties, which the Mission had provisionally planned for that day, had to be postponed.

48. On the morning of the following day the Resident-General received a reply from Brussels. After noting the contents of the reply and after discussing with the Resident-General the problems which it raised, the Mission met in a series of interviews during the course of the afternoon, the Mwami of Ruanda, the members of the provisional special council of Ruanda and the leaders of political parties of that country, namely, UNAR, APROSOMA, PARMEHUTU, RADER, UMAR and MUR. On the morning of the following day, the Mission consulted, in a second series of interviews, the Mwami of Urundi, the members of the Urundi interim committee and the leaders of Urundian parties, including UPRONA, MPB, PDC, UDP, DNB, PP and PDR. Following these consultations, the Mission drafted a communiqué which was issued the same evening. It also sent a cable concerning the matter to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. This sequence of events is described in greater detail in another part of the report.^{2/}

1/ See paragraphs 449-450.

2/ See paragraphs 452-455.

49. The following day, 1 April 1960, the Mission left the Territory for Dar es Salaam where, on 4 April, it granted an audience to the UNAR leaders who had gone to Tanganyika - Mr. M. Kayihura, Mr. M. Rwagasana, Mr. C. Rebero, Mr. C. Bagitishya, Mr. P. Mungarulire and Mr. C. Rwangombwa - who presented it with several documents.

50. After its visit to Tanganyika, the Mission made a second stay at Brussels from 27 to 29 April 1960. During that stay it had talks with the representatives of the Administering Authority, first with Mr. Van den Abeele, the Administrator-General, and other high officials of the Ministry for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and then with Mr. De Schrijver, Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi and with Mr. Wigny, Minister of Foreign Affairs. These discussions, which are described in another part of the report,^{1/} marked the end of the Mission's journey.

51. After returning to New York, the Mission prepared the present report, which was adopted unanimously on 2 June 1960.

III. Glossary

52. The terms used in any report on Ruanda-Urundi are somewhat complicated for the uninitiated reader. It was therefore considered useful to provide at this point some explanations which are mainly based on the Working Group's report.

53. The languages spoken in Ruanda (Kinyarwanda) and in Urundi (Kirundi), as well as the lingua franca of East Africa (Kiswahili), are Bantu tongues distinguished by the use of prefixes which determine the nature of the word and whether it is singular or plural. For example, the following are formed from the radical Rundi:

Murundi: a man of Urundi
Barundi: men of Urundi
Kirundi: the language of Urundi
Urundi: the country of Urundi

54. This creates problems whenever Bantu words are used in a text in another language. The European written form of these words has not become standardized and is not always logical. In some cases, one of the forms given is used invariably as noun and as adjective: a Barundi, Barundi (plural), a Barundi house. Sometimes, in a European context, the Bantu form is used with the correct prefix,

1/ See paragraphs 456-457.

e.g. the Barundi, a Murundi warrior, Barundi peasants, the Kirundi language.

The practice has been recently introduced of using only the invariable radical, without any prefix: a Rundi house, Rundi warriors, the Rundi language. This is more logical but, since the root is never used without a prefix in the vernacular, this form is somewhat artificial and confusing.

55. Nevertheless, this last method is the one which has been most followed for some years and it has also been adopted in this report, with a few exceptions.

56. Below will be found a list of the words of Bantu origin which occur most frequently in this report:

Ruanda: the European form has been used because it corresponds to the spelling adopted in the Trusteeship Agreement. In the language of Ruanda, the form Rwanda is used and, under the influence of local nationalism, its use is becoming increasingly prevalent throughout the Territory.

Urundi: this Swahilized form has been used (in Swahili U is the prefix used to indicate the country because it corresponds to the spelling used in the Trusteeship Agreement. In the Rundi language, the name of the country is Burundi. Under the influence of local nationalism Burundi has recently been used in preference to Urundi, even in French texts.

Munyaruanda (plural Banyaruanda): native of Ruanda.

Murundi (plural Barundi): native of Urundi.

As far as possible, the noun and adjective forms have been replaced in this report by the invariable radical: Ruanda, Rundi, or by the words Ruandese and Urundian, except in certain direct quotations.

Mututsi (plural Batutsi), of the Tutsi ethnic group.

Muhutu (plural Bahutu), of the Hutu ethnic group.

Mutwa (plural Batwa), of the Twa ethnic group.

As far as possible, these forms, both as noun and as adjective, have been replaced by the radicals: Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, except in certain standard expressions and in some direct quotations (e.g. the Manifesto of the Bahutu).

Kinyaruanda: the language of Ruanda.

Kirundi: the language of Urundi.

Kiswahili: the language of East Africa.

The names of the languages are generally replaced by the following expressions:

the Ruandese language, Ruandese or Ruanda;

the Urundian language, Urundian or Rundi;

the Swahili language or Swahili.

Mwami (plural Bami): king. In this case the word is still used with the singular or plural prefix in order to avoid using the radical Ami.

Muganwa (plural Baganwa): of the family of the princes of the blood of Urundi, descendant of the last four Bami. In this case the radical Ganwa has been used.

57. The following few words have been retained in their vernacular form:

Ubuhake, a customary livestock lease contract between an owner and a client, in Ruanda.

Ubugabire, the same contract in Urundi.

Igikingi (plural Ibikingi): formerly a minor political and land fief in Ruanda; now an individual pastoral land holding.

Ubukonde: forest occupied by clans which cleared the forest in Ruanda.

Mukonde (plural Bakonde): head of family representing the clans of those who had cleared the forest (in Ruanda).

Isambu: farmer's family holding (in Ruanda).

Itongo: farmer's family holding (in Urundi).

CHAPTER I: POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Introduction

58. This report is set out very differently from the reports of earlier Missions. It deals almost entirely with those political problems which are of the primary concern of the people of Ruanda-Urundi and which have pushed their other problems into the background.

59. The Mission's visit to Ruanda-Urundi took place at a period when the Territory was going through a serious crisis. On the one hand, tragic events took place in Ruanda in November 1959 and since then the people have been living in an atmosphere of grave tension overclouded by the fear of renewed violence. On the other hand, political agitation which was for so long unknown in the Territory sprang up in both Ruanda and Urundi. The speedy and unexpected political developments in the Belgian Congo which is to become independent on 30 June 1960, the subject of independence having been mentioned for the first time in a statement on 13 January 1959, have had profound repercussions in Ruanda-Urundi. Certain sections of the population of the Trust Territory which until recently did not even envisage self-government in the near future now demand immediate independence. The political reforms announced by the Belgian Government in November 1959 have already been superseded by events. It has become necessary to work out more radical and accelerated reforms, including some procedure whereby the people of the Territory may be consulted without delay concerning their wishes and especially concerning the process by which they desire to attain independence.

60. The Mission was entrusted with the task of making a special inquiry into the circumstances and causes of the disturbances which have recently occurred in the Territory. The tension in Ruanda was still great at the time of the Mission's visit. During its stay in the Territory, it received thousands of communications, oral or written, dealing almost exclusively with political problems. For these reasons the Mission, despite the fact that it spent four weeks in the Territory, had to devote virtually all its attention to the political situation and neglect economic, social and educational factors save when they most directly influenced the political issue, although it fully realized the fundamental importance of those factors to the future well-being of the country.

61. Another characteristic of this report is worthy of special attention. Until recent years the differences between conditions in Ruanda and Urundi had been minimized and the political situation in the Trust Territory had been presented as a whole. The disturbances of November 1959 in Ruanda drew attention to the differences between Ruanda and Urundi and led the Administering Authority to follow in Ruanda policies which it did not feel obliged to apply in Urundi.

62. The need to make a special inquiry into the tragic events in Ruanda, to seek their causes in the past and explain their after-effects and the fact that the present problems of Ruanda and Urundi now appear in a different light, induced the Mission to present the problems of the two countries in separate sections of its report.

63. This procedure has the disadvantage of making a certain amount of repetition inevitable, but the Mission believes that it will in that way make the report clearer and enable the reader to understand more clearly the problems involved. None the less, the Mission has not lost sight either of the fact that there is a single Trusteeship Agreement for Ruanda-Urundi, or of the many similarities which exist between Ruanda and Urundi and the interests that they have in common, it has therefore provided for a section on the common problems of Ruanda and Urundi and the reciprocal relations between them. In addition, the Mission has preferred to group its conclusions and recommendations in a single section to avoid needless repetition and to facilitate consideration of this report by the Trusteeship Council.

I. RUANDA

A. Political development of Ruanda up to 1956

Ruanda before the German occupation

64. In order to understand the problems of Ruanda as they appear in 1950, it is necessary to know various ethnologic and historic facts which are, as it were, the key to the present complex situation.

65. The African population of Ruanda is not of one single physical type: it includes Tutsi Hamites (or ethiopids), Hutu Bantus (or negroids) and Twa pygmies. The Twa, who no longer represent more than a small minority (0.67 per cent of the population), are related to the pygmies of the Belgian Congo and have probably been in the country from time immemorial. The Hutu came later, but nothing is known of their origin. They now form the great majority of the population (82.74 per cent of the population of Ruanda). Lastly, the Tutsi (16.59 per cent of the population of Ruanda) are related to the Hima, who are the ruling caste in all the kingdoms between the lakes. They probably came originally from Ethiopia. They undoubtedly migrated to Ruanda some time before the fifteenth century. The Tutsi were nomadic cattle-breeders, who gradually occupied the country and subjugated the indigenous inhabitants, establishing various small kingdoms in the east of what is now Ruanda, and extending those kingdoms towards the west.

66. They gradually subjugated the whole population of Ruanda; in some parts this took place at a comparatively recent epoch. As described by Mr. Maquet and Mr. d'Hertefeldt,^{1/} from all this has emerged a society which is integrated and homogenous from certain points of view but varied and complex from others. Thus the Hutu language was adopted by the Tutsi. On the other hand the difference between conqueror and conquered has crystallized in a system which has been called a system of castes. This dichotomy between conquering Tutsi and subject Hutu is a fact that has dominated social relations, and especially economic and political relations. The sharing of political power and economic assets among the castes was very unequal. The Hutu were a body of farmers upon whom lay the

^{1/} J.J. Maquet and M. d'Hertefeldt, Elections en société féodale, Brussels, 1959.

whole burden of agricultural production in the country, yet they had no part in government. The Tutsi had nothing to do with agricultural production but they were the warrior caste and were in command. By a complex political system in which there were three hierarchies - administrative, military and feudal - they managed to gather all the agricultural surplus into their own hands. The feudal system established relations of personal allegiance between Tutsi and Hutu, which both acted as a counterbalance to the inequities of the caste system (the identification of the Hutu servant with his Tutsi lord ensured greater protection for the Hutu) and provided the Tutsi with goods and services without depriving them of the ownership of the cattle and land which they placed at the disposal of their Hutu dependents.

67. The outcome is a very complex but stable civilization, in which the cow plays a predominant role. The Hutu, who are farmers, long to possess cattle. The Tutsi, cattle-breeders, want domestic servants and labour for their crops. In order to obtain cattle, the Hutu mortgage their services and take on for themselves and their descendants a series of commitments relating to cattle, pastures and arable land. The ubuhake, a cattle contract, was a basic factor in the establishment of the new social structures. It enabled the Hutu to obtain the use of the cattle, subject to complete loyalty towards his master. The 1959 Working Group concluded in its report that it was the spirit of the ubuhake, combined with precarious conditions of life, that has for many years made the common man a subject creature, defenceless, with very rare possibilities of initiative, and more often than not waiting for his fate to be decided by others.

68. The Tutsi conquest which had probably begun before the fifteenth century was accompanied by a vast effort of political integration and unification, using very varied methods. Tutsi officials, emissaries of the court, were appointed to exercise various functions in the provinces. The people were obliged to pay tribute to the Mwami, a percentage of which was taken at each administrative level. The levying of this organized and systematized tribute became a real system of taxation for the benefit of the ruling class. The ownership of land was gradually withdrawn from the Hutu tribes and became the supreme right of the Mwami.

69. The King, or Mwami, became the supreme head and absolute master of the country. He was the incarnation of the State, "the eye through which God looks

upon Ruanda". He enjoyed an almost divine prestige: without him cattle would cease to multiply, there would be no more rain and plants would cease to grow. According to a Ruanda saying, the Mwami of Ruanda has no race, and the motto of the country "Imbaga y'injabatatu ijya mbere" (the three united races advance) seeks to unite the three ethnic groups in one movement towards progress.

70. The policy of the Bami of Ruanda was to carry out the fragmentation of the land ad infinitum, in order to prevent any great provinces being formed under over-powerful vassals.

71. A complex political system evolved. Abbé Mulenzi^{1/} noted that below the Mwami stood the Abiru, or Crown Council, guardian of the constitutional principles by virtue of which the dynasty ruled; the King was obliged to submit for its information and approval all important decisions of a general nature. As far as the executive organization was concerned the Mwami was assisted by a council of ministers (Abatware b'intebe) while below them were the governors, one for each province in the country, and the sub-chiefs (Abatware b'ibikingi); contact between these bodies and the population was maintained by the family chiefs (Abakuru b'Imiryango, i.e., heads of families or households), who informed their relatives of the "royal decrees".

72. Economic administration was based on the system of fiefs. Abbé A. Kagame defines the fiefs in Ruanda in terms either of head of cattle, parcels of pasture land or landed property, which the holders either inherited from their forebears, received from the political authorities or acquired by their own industry within the framework of indigenous custom and under the protection of the authorities. The administration of this system was based on the existence of a body of chiefs of pastoral fiefs (Abatware b'Imikenke), who were responsible for both the allotment of pasture land and the supervision and control of the services rendered under the ubuhake contract, and a body of chiefs of landed fiefs (Abatware b'Ubutaka).

73. There were also army chiefs who commanded the warriors and were in charge of mobilization and security. Finally, judicial power was exercised by the Mwami and by courts composed of family chiefs and presided over by the local political authority.

^{1/} Abbé Mulenzi, Etude sur quelques problèmes du Ruanda (A Study of Certain Problems in Ruanda), Brussels, 1958.

74. An account of political and social organization in Ruanda, however brief, should take into account the fact that conditions are not absolutely identical throughout the country. The penetration of the Tutsi varies from one area to another. While it accounts for 16.59 per cent of the population of Ruanda as a whole it varies from 5.62 per cent in the Kisenyi district to 30.71 per cent in the Kibuye district. It is true that the domination of the Tutsi has been solidly established in the central part of Ruanda for centuries but the same cannot be said of the peripheral areas in the vicinity of the Congo-Nile Crest, which in some cases were only nominally subject to the authority of the Mwami until the end of the nineteenth century or later. Tutsi officials penetrated into the area with caution and the inhabitants cherished the memory of the Hutu principalities.

75. Another consideration which should be borne in mind is that the castes were to a certain extent open to each other. Custom allowed a particularly worthy Twa or Hutu to rise to the rank of a Tutsi, while conversely an impoverished Tutsi who had fallen from his former estate could be assimilated in every way to the Hutu. It was this aspect of Ruanda society which was to give rise to controversy concerning the racial, political, social and economic character of the castes.

76. Finally, it should also be noted that while there are some whose physical appearance in every way corresponds to the Hamitic, Bantu or Pygmoid type there are others whose appearance does not identify them at first glance as belonging either to the Tutsi, the Hutu or the Twa.

Ruanda under the German regime

77. After the Berlin Conference of 1885 the German zone of influence included Ruanda-Urundi. Count von Götzen crossed Ruanda from east to west for the first time in 1894 and met the Mwami, Kigeli IV. In 1897 Ruanda was detached from the authority of the Resident at Usumbura and headquarters for Ruanda were established at Kigali.

78. The relations between Mwami Yuhi Musinga and the German authorities were relatively peaceful. The results of the two decades of German administration, however, were negligible. It was at the most a military occupation concerning itself exclusively with measures of pacification and security. No changes were made in the tribal organization. The indigenous political institutions continued to function. Thus an indirect form of administration was established under which

the protecting power administered Ruanda-Urundi through the traditional authorities, in accordance with the laws and customs of the country.

79. Richard Kandt, the first German Resident in Ruanda, wrote: "Our political and colonial interests require that we should support the King and uphold the supremacy of the Tutsi and the corresponding extreme dependence of the great mass of the population. Considering the nature of the country and the character of its people, this arrangement can be reconciled with those humanitarian imperatives which require the elimination of abuses of power and arbitrary rule over subject populations".

Belgian policy in Ruanda from 1916 to 1956

80. As the Resident-General recalled in his address of 3 March 1960, the first Belgian authorities adopted a position identical with that of the Germans in order to tackle the country's major problems, namely, hunger, disease, the absence of roads and a widely scattered population. In setting up the first administrative cadres they turned to the Tutsi aristocracy and with its aid began to carry out the most urgent tasks, such as the establishment of the first colonial administration, the intensification and improvement of agriculture, the introduction of public health services and the opening of the first schools. In accordance with this policy, the influence and authority of Tutsi chiefs were extended over the north-western region of Ruanda during the earlier years of the Belgian administration.

81. This policy is summarized in the explanation of the purposes of the legislative ordinance of 4 October 1943: the Administration found in Ruanda-Urundi socially and politically vigorous ethnic groups which had remained immune to any destructive influences which more advanced peoples might have been expected to have on them; thus the Administration had only to recognize them and modify their internal structure in order to adapt them to the new conditions created by the introduction of European civilization and the policy of indirect administration which it was successfully pursuing in Ruanda-Urundi.

82. Nevertheless, while the Belgian administration respected the customary political organization it did so only to the extent that generally held concepts of public order were not thereby violated. A number of steps were taken to

eliminate any features of the customary organization which might seem objectionable or undesirable. Thus in 1917 the Mwami and the indigenous authorities were deprived of their arbitrary power, and in 1926 domestic slavery was abolished and the triple hierarchy of indigenous authorities (the authorities responsible for farming, pastures and the armed forces respectively) was replaced by a single authority.

83. It is interesting to note that those who have recently assessed the policy pursued during that period, have reached greatly differing conclusions.

84. Some, including, in particular, the Abbé Mulenzi, the traditionalists, the present entourage of the Mwami (according to various communications received by the Mission) and some Europeans, stated that this pseudo-indirect government was in reality only a camouflaged form of direct government. In support of this view they quoted the latitude given the European authorities to dismiss the tribal authorities, their power to alter the customary circonscriptions without prior consultation, the transformations of customary officials into executive agents of the European administration and the superimposition and juxtaposition of a European administration (staffed with Africans and Europeans) on the traditional administration, which has led to the existence of two authorities whose traditions and interests do not necessarily coincide. This criticism is levelled even at the present institutions (and also at the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959) and constituted the basis of the claims of some existing parties.

85. However, others, particularly the leaders of the Hutu movements, expressed a very different view. In a memorandum delivered to the Mission, they declared that this policy, "in theory a happy marriage of traditional feudal institutions and the requirements of democracy, has in fact only consolidated the traditional hegemony of the Tutsi minority, practically ignoring the existence of the Hutu majority". They say that it has "oriented to the benefit of the same privileged persons of the traditional regime the very generous innovations introduced by the Mandatory Power and that intentional or unintentional discrimination reserves the monopoly of all strategic positions of power to the Tutsi oligarchy and the monopoly of poverty, destitution and servile labour to the Hutu common people".

86. The Administration believes that its policy has been reasonable and justified. In a speech made on 3 March 1960, the Resident-General said: "Thus,

for many years, Belgians and the Tutsi of Ruanda have co-operated in a great common task, that of improving the well-being of Ruanda, a task in which, over a long period, no major conflict divided them. The old order did not appear to be threatened. The Belgian authorities, for their part, saw the people making undeniable progress, eating and dressing better, receiving better medical care, becoming gradually but steadily more prosperous and gaining access to education. They hoped that nothing would intervene to hamper that progress because, in due course, the ruling class would come to understand that it was in its own interest to accept a new politico-social order in which the aristocracy could distinguish itself in new fields. Moreover, some indications led to the belief that this would come about. Some Tutsi spokesmen had long advocated the very policy which I have just mentioned. It was therefore not unreasonable to believe that the entire ruling caste might some day support that realistic policy."

87. Towards 1930 a programme of political and economic development was initiated which included regrouping of chiefdoms, improvement of agriculture in order to overcome periodic famines and shortages, introduction of coffee cultivation, improvement of livestock, intensive reafforestation of eroded hills, mineral prospecting and trial mining operations, construction of an adequate road network and reorganization of trade.

88. In 1931, the Belgian administration removed Mwami Yuhi V Musinga (who had reigned since 1896), as it considered that the latter's attitude towards the Belgian authorities and the missions constituted a major impediment to Ruanda's advancement. He was replaced by his son Mutara III Rudahigwa who, as stated by Mr. Maquet and Mr. d'Hertefeldt, "appeared to be well disposed towards the Belgian Administration and the Catholic missions". Mutara, they added, was in fact, from a traditional viewpoint, one of the possible successors of Musinga. However, those who had appointed him, i.e. the European administrative and religious authorities, did not follow the traditional practice in selecting him. At that time, the action of the Belgian authorities consisted more in decisions of that nature than in structural reforms. Late in 1931, a regency council was established in Ruanda. In view of the youth of the new king and the fear of the authorities that he might encounter opposition from certain feudal chiefs and headmen, the Resident decided to establish a council composed of several

notables of noble families, who would have the responsibility of helping and guiding this high dignitary in his task. This council was composed of four members from 1931 to the beginning of 1936, and thereafter of six members.

89. The chiefdoms, which, prior to 1931, had numbered in the hundreds and had frequently consisted of parts and enclaves scattered throughout the State, were grouped according to geographical and practical criteria, without regard for the traditional principles of land tenure.

90. According to the apologists of the traditional regime, the loss of power of the Hutu dates from that reform. They claim that under the system of ibikingi (minor political and land fiefs) many Hutu had actually been appointed chiefs and sub-chiefs. After the regrouping, the proportion of Hutu in positions of command decreased considerably. The same traditionalists pointed out that the increasing monopoly of all positions of control and responsibility by the Tutsi was indirectly due to action by the European authorities, because it was the Belgian Administration which decided, after consulting the Mwami, on the removal of traditional authorities. They added that the policy of making systematic use of the Tutsi was not only adopted by the Belgian Administration, but was also recommended by the Catholic Church.

91. The Church had, in fact, noticed, about 1926, that it received its greatest support from the Tutsi aristocracy. Furthermore, the Church, momentarily concerned at the "vacillation of the colonial administration with regard to the traditional hegemony of the well-born Tutsi",^{1/} vigorously supported the Tutsi cause.

Mgr. Classe, Bishop of Ruanda, sent the following memorandum to the Administration in 1930: "The greatest disservice which the Government could do to itself and to the state would be to eliminate the Tutsi caste. A revolution of that nature would lead the entire state directly into anarchy and to European-hating Communism. Far from furthering progress, it would nullify the Government's action by depriving it of auxiliaries who are, by birth, capable of understanding and following it. This is the view and the firm belief of all superiors of the Ruanda

^{1/} L. de Lacger, Le Ruanda, Vol. II, p. 181.

mission, without exception. Generally speaking, we have no chiefs who are better, more intelligent, more active, more capable of appreciating progress and even more fully accepted by the people than the Tutsi. It is therefore primarily and essentially with their aid that the Government will succeed in developing Ruanda from all points of view."

92. It had also been the Belgian Administration's policy to pay special attention to the Tutsi in the field of education. In the first years of the Belgian occupation an official primary school was established at Nyanza, which was reserved for the sons of Tutsi chiefs and notables.

93. In 1929, a Groupe scolaire was established at Astrida, where the Frères de la Charité of Ghent operated, on the Administration's behalf, a new special school for the best students from the missions' primary schools. One branch of this school was reserved for future chiefs and sub-chiefs and was designed gradually to replace the school at Nyanza. The pupils in this branch were almost all sons of Tutsi chiefs and notables. In the other branches, where the pupils were trained to become secretaries or agricultural, veterinary or medical assistants, the proportion of Tutsi children was also very high.

94. This factor enabled the UMAR to claim that the reason why the Tutsi children had enjoyed a privileged position as far as post-primary education was concerned was that this had been the deliberate policy of the Administration and of the missions and that the Tutsi themselves were not to blame.

95. In the light of recent events, there appears to be more or less general agreement that the policy of indirect government has met with failure in Ruanda. Although its material achievements have been substantial, it has not yet brought about social justice. However, many different interpretations are given of the causes of this failure.

96. As explained earlier, the traditionalists have accused the Administration of having perverted the traditional system through increasingly direct and arbitrary intervention, and of having strengthened or even created a Tutsi monopoly of the ruling class whose prestige was employed as a tool but which was given less and less opportunity or power to contribute to the welfare of the population as a whole. The European Administration had, they say, "taken over all posts of any importance, leaving the indigenous Administration only the

insignificant function of transmitting orders". As for the Tutsi monopoly of the indigenous civil service, it is alleged that it was partly due to the appointment by the Belgian Administration of chiefs and sub-chiefs trained in the first government schools, which had been reserved exclusively for Tutsi children.

97. The Administration defined its policy in its 1938 annual report.^{1/} It declared itself convinced "that the Government should endeavour to maintain and consolidate the traditional cadre composed of the Tutsi ruling class, because of its important qualities, its undeniable intellectual superiority and its ruling potential. However, the mentality of this class must gradually alter. A way must be sought gradually to modify its conception of authority, which must be changed from one of domination exercised solely for the benefit of its holders, to one of a more humane power to be exercised in the interests of the people." Twenty years later, the Administration was to accuse the Tutsi of having shown egotism and lack of appreciation of an inevitable evolution towards democracy, and of having sought only to perpetuate their privileged position to the detriment of the general population.

98. Finally, the Hutu theorists criticized the system of indirect government itself. One of them^{2/} said: "In practice, some measures taken by the Administration to eliminate abuses have provided further opportunity to exert pressure on the weak. This is due to that principle of its native policy, according to which the traditional authority should be considered as the official intermediary between the Trust Administration and the general population. The practice has therefore always been to strengthen the prestige of the traditional authority while turning a blind eye to certain of its acts. How could that authority, strengthened by the moral support of the Administration, have done otherwise than be led to abuse its power?"

1/ Rapport annuel, 1938, p. 72.

2/ G. Cyimana, Plaidoyer pour le menu peuple au Ruanda-Urundi, La Revue Nouvelle, 15 March 1959.

99. It appears that the choice of a native policy in Ruanda was dictated by the Administration's basic desire to ensure, as rapidly as possible, the economic and social progress of which the country was in such great need. The 1954 Visiting Mission stated that "the Administering Authority places greater emphasis on economic progress than on political development, with a view to creating equal opportunities for the people and material equality for all".^{1/} The Belgian representative challenged this statement at the time,^{2/} declaring that it was "in order to promote political development that the Administering Authority was now laying stress on economic, social and cultural progress, which were the essential foundations for political development". "Contrary to the beliefs of certain members of the Visiting Mission," he went on, "our policy inspires confidence in the indigenous inhabitants, both among the best elements of the élite and among the masses of the people. This confidence has made progress possible in the past and is a guarantee of even greater progress in the future."

100. Three important dates should be mentioned in order to complete the picture of the political evolution of Ruanda up to 1956. These are:

- 1945: First political and judicial reorganization
- 1952: Second political and judicial reorganization
- 1954: Abolition of ubuhake.

101. The ordinance of 1943 created nothing new. It recognized that the Administration would continue to operate in the customary manner, subject, however, to certain conditions. It recognized the existence of a hierarchy composed of the King, the chiefs and the sub-chiefs, who administered the State, the chiefdoms and the sub-chiefdoms. The King was elected according to tradition but had to be invested by the Governor. The chiefs and sub-chiefs were appointed by the King, according to tradition, but were invested by the Belgian Administration. The ordinance also recognized the existence of chiefdom councils and of a Council of State but without defining their constitution, organization or powers.

1/ T/1168, paragraph 129.

2/ Ibid., p. 63, statement of 8 March 1955.

102. The Ordinance also established autonomous administrative funds for each chiefdom and for the State, which were administered by their respective authorities. As regards judicial organization, the Ordinance merely gave official sanction to the indigenous courts which functioned already.

103. The Decree of 14 July 1952 went further and the organization which it approved has been described in detail in various documents submitted to the Trusteeship Council in the past.^{1/} The Decree fixed the membership of the sub-chiefdom councils, the chiefdom councils, the district councils and the High Council of State. An attempt at democratization was made in the case of the sub-chiefdom councils; their members were to be selected by an electoral college consisting of notables whose names would be selected from a list prepared by the sub-chiefs taking into account the preferences of the inhabitants. The other councils were to consist partly of sub-chiefs or chiefs, ex officio, members, of notables elected indirectly by an electoral body appointed by members of the lower council, and of co-opted members.^{2/} These councils had advisory powers.

1/ Rapports annuels, 1952 and 1953; Reports of Visiting Missions, 1954 and 1957.

2/ Article 28 of the Decree of 14 July 1952:

"The councils referred to in article 27 shall be constituted as follows:

1. Sub-chiefdom councils.- This council shall be presided over by the sub-chief. It shall comprise:

- (a) the sub-chief;
- (b) not less than five or more than nine members, at the rate of one member for every 500 inhabitants.

These members shall be chosen by an electoral college. The college shall consist of notables whose names shall be selected from a list prepared by the sub-chief taking into account the preferences of the inhabitants. The number of names on the list of notables shall be at least twice that of the members of the council. The list shall be approved by the chief and accepted by the administrator of the territory. After it has been drawn up in this manner, it shall be posted in the chief-town of the chiefdom and, after proclamation, in the chief-town of the sub-chiefdom.

2. Chiefdom councils.- This council shall be presided over by the chief. In addition to the chief, it shall comprise not less than ten or more than eighteen members selected as follows:

- (a) five to nine sub-chiefs elected by their peers;

(footnote continued on following page)

104. The elective and representative system thus instituted was still on a limited scale. The Visiting Missions of 1954 and 1957^{1/} had already reached that conclusion: Mr. Maquet and Mr. d'Hertefeldt^{2/} pointed out that the electoral college of the sub-chiefdoms, on which the entire system was based, was in fact

(footnote continued from preceding page)

(b) notables to the same number as the sub-chiefs. These notables shall be elected as follows:

Each sub-chiefdom council shall designate three of its notables;

Together these notables shall constitute an electoral college which shall elect those of its members who are to be members of the chiefdom council.

3. District council. - This council shall consist of the chiefs of the district, an equal number of sub-chiefs elected by their peers and a number of notables equal to the total number of chiefs and sub-chiefs. These notables shall be elected as follows:

Each chiefdom council shall appoint three notables from among its members;

Together these notables shall constitute an electoral college which shall elect those of its members who are to be members of the district council.

The district council shall choose its chairman and vice-chairman from among the chiefs. They shall remain in office for one year and shall be eligible for re-election.

4. High Council of the State. - This council shall be presided over by the Mwami. In addition to the Mwami, it shall comprise:

- (a) the chairmen of the district councils of the state;
- (b) six chiefs elected by their peers;
- (c) one representative elected by each district council from among the notables in the council;
- (d) four persons chosen for their knowledge of the social, economic, spiritual and cultural problems of the state;
- (e) four indigenous persons who are holders of the civic merit card or are registered, not including chiefs or sub-chiefs who may be holders of that certificate or be registered.

The members listed under (d) and (e) above are co-opted by the other members.

The Governor decides on the procedure for drawing up the list of xxxxxxxx notables in the sub-chiefdom, who may become members by appointment, by election, and by co-option, referred to in this article. He also determines the periods of time within which the formalities are to be completed." (Bulletin officiel du Congo belge, first part, 45th year, No. 8, p. 2007).

1/ T/1168, paragraphs 138-143 and T/1402, paragraphs 47-51.

2/ Op. cit.

appointed by the sub-chief and was accordingly not representative, so that the higher levels which rested on that basis would not be representative either. In fact, they considered that the councils provided for by the Decree of 1952 were not designed to represent the opinions of the mass of the population, but that the Decree was designed to reduce the powers of the Mwami and the chiefs, by compelling those authorities, in certain important matters, to ask for and act on the opinion of persons of lower rank but belonging generally to the Tutsi class.

105. Proceedings with a view to constituting the various councils took place in Ruanda at the end of 1953. The results were as follows:

		<u>Total</u>	<u>Tutsi</u>	<u>Hutu</u>	<u>Twa</u>
sub-chiefdom electoral colleges	electors appointed	13,145	5,442 (41.4%)	7,674 (58.38%)	29 (0.22%)
sub-chiefdom councils	members elected	4,187	2,190 (52.3%)	1,995 (47.65%)	2 (0.05%)
chiefdom councils	members	692	613 (88.6%)	79 (11.4%)	-
district councils	members	204	185 (90.7%)	19 (9.3%)	-
high councils of the state	members	32	29 (90.6%)	3 (9.4%)	-

106. In 1956 when the councils were re-elected, the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi decided to interpret the 1952 legislation in such a way as to permit the introduction of a form of universal male suffrage. Instead of leaving the establishment of sub-chiefdom electoral colleges to the discretion of the sub-chiefs, the notables of the electoral colleges were appointed by secret ballot of the entire adult male population. Participation in the elections was about 75 per cent of registered voters (i.e. over 300,000 voting out of 400,000 registered voters). The results were as follows:

		<u>Total</u>	<u>Tutsi</u>	<u>Hutu</u>	<u>Twa</u>	<u>Swahili and Congolese</u>
sub-chiefdom electoral colleges	electors elected	9,743	3,223 (33.08%)	6,501 (66.72%)	1 (0.01%)	18 (0.19%)
sub-chiefdom councils	members elected	4,160	1,895 (45.56%)	2,261 (54.35%)	1 (0.02%)	3 (0.07%)
chiefdom councils	members	704	597 (84.8%)	107 (15.2%)	-	-
district councils	members	184	163 (88.6%)	21 (11.4%)	-	-
high councils of the state	members	32	31 (96.9%)	1 (3.1%)	-	-

107. This electoral consultation was the subject of a very detailed study by Mr. Maquet and Mr. d'Hertefeldt,^{1/} made on behalf of the Institute for Scientific Research in Central Africa (IRSAC). Some of their conclusions are worth quoting: "Considerations of caste played an important part in the popular consultation of 1956 and in the resulting formation of the councils. This special concern was shown in two ways: on the one hand, some Hutu showed a desire for emancipation from their caste; on the other hand, results show that the Hutu have an attitude of dependency and submission towards the higher caste. Historically, the hold of the pastoral caste over the peasant masses has varied widely according to regions. Following those variations, the traditional attitudes came out more clearly in the voting at the popular consultation. Thus, in the north-west of Ruanda, which was effectively occupied by the Tutsi only towards the end of the last century, the proportion of the ruling caste in the sub-chiefdom electoral categories was reduced by 50 per cent, sometimes by over 70 per cent, in the popular consultation, whereas in the region of Ruanda proper the reduction was only by about 10 per cent or even showed some increase in the power of the Tutsi." Further on, the authors also noted that "the screening of the people's wishes (of the first degree electors) through seven ballots before the High Council was reached resulted in 1956 in a reversal of the trend in the open popular vote".

1/ Elections en société féodale, op. cit.

108. One last important aspect in the development of Ruandese society before 1956 which should be noted here is the suppression of ubuhake in 1954. The role of ubuhake in the society of Ruanda has already been mentioned.^{1/} In 1954, the High Council of Ruanda decided on the gradual suppression of ubuhake. This historic decision happened to be adopted on the same day when the 1954 Visiting Mission, on its way through Nyanza, was attending the meeting of the High Council of the State.^{2/} Orders allowing the distribution of cattle between patrons and clients, and determining procedures for that distribution were made and between 1954 and 1958, over 200,000 head of cattle had been distributed in Ruanda. This measure, encouraged by the Administration and introduced by the High Council of Ruanda on the recommendation of the Mwami was at the time interpreted by the Administration as evidence that the Mwami's entourage was in favour of making concessions in the interests of the people.

109. In recent political documents, the measure has also been mentioned on many occasions by parties supporting the Mwami as proof of his progressive spirit and as evidence that the Hutu were the first to benefit from that progressive spirit. The Hutu politicians, on the other hand, have more than once suggested that the abolition of ubuhake has done the Hutu little good, as its effects on the land tenure system caused problems which the Tutsi ruling class has not tried to settle. In fact, the possession of cattle is of little use if the owner does not also possess the necessary pastures. The pasture, however, continued to be under the feudal control of the Tutsi; some even alleged that this control became tighter.

^{1/} See paragraph 67.

^{2/} See T/1168, paragraphs 69-72.

B. Events from 1956 to July 1959

110. Between the years 1952 and 1956 there had already been certain criticisms in the Press directed against the indigenous authorities, the political institutions, the Tutsi and the operation of the courts. They appeared in particular in the Ruandese-language publication Kinyamateka, published in the bishopric of Kabgayi. Although the criticisms did not at first arouse much interest, they nonetheless were evidence of some unrest.

111. The first time that the problem of the Tutsi and the Hutu received some publicity was when Mr. Maus, a European settler, member of the Council of Vice-Government-General of Ruanda-Urundi, proposed in April 1956, on the occasion of the debate on the question of reorganizing that Council as the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi, that a special list of four members, indigenous and Europeans, should be drawn up to provide separate representation for the Hutu. That proposal met with opposition from Mwami Mutara, who said that there was no ground for distinguishing between the terms "Tutsi" and "Hutu". Mr. Maus' proposal was rejected unanimously except for his own vote. At that point Mr. Maus submitted his resignation to the Council in a letter in which he took Mwami Mutara to task as having "by his statement revealed his anti-democratic spirit; he is in favour of a single party, that of the Tutsi, which will continue to dominate the two other indigenous groups; he is quite well aware that separate representation for the Hutu would be the first crack in the edifice of Tutsi domination, and he means to safeguard that at any price". He concluded that "the conflict of interests between the Tutsi and Hutu communities which is the most pressing social problem and the most poignant human drama in the Territory, will therefore continue to be officially ignored by our institutions and left without any constitutional means of defence".

112. In February 1957, the High Council of Ruanda approved its "statement of views". That document was reproduced verbatim as an annex to the report of the 1957 Visiting Mission^{1/} and was the subject of some comment by that Mission.

1/ T/1402, paragraphs 42-46, Annex II. Summary in paragraph 31.

The purpose of the statement of views was to raise the problem of the accession of Ruanda to self-government through full use of the élite. In that connexion, the High Council requested, inter alia, that education should be directed towards the training of an élite technically capable of participating as soon as possible in the direction of the State's affairs, and to provide some of the élite with an opportunity to have an apprenticeship in managing their own affairs.

113. In the Trusteeship Council, the representative of Belgium stated that the statement of views was not an official document of the High Council of the State. The High Council strongly objected to that interpretation and said that it could only turn the members of the High Council against the Administration.

114. In the following month there appeared the "Manifesto of the Bahutu", a note on the social aspect of the indigenous racial problem in Ruanda", which for the first time gave specific form to the political creed of the Hutu leaders. The manifesto, the text of which is also reproduced verbatim as an annex to the report of the 1957 Visiting Mission,^{1/} contained the following passages: "No solution of the Tutsi-Belgian relations can be durable until the fundamental difficulties between the Tutsi and the Hutu are settled." The Hutu-Tutsi problem is "primarily a question of a political monopoly" of the Tutsi, which is also an economic, social and cultural monopoly, "to the great despair of the Hutu who see themselves condemned forever to the role of subordinate manual workers and this, worse still, after achieving independence which they have unwittingly helped to obtain". The document also warns against "a method which, while tending to eliminate black and white colonialism, would leave a worse Hamitic colonialism over the Hutu", and recommends measures for "the integrated and collective advancement of the Hutu".

115. Those two documents contain the germ of all the ideological elements which inspired the disturbances of November 1959 and led to the Visiting Mission being received in Ruanda in March 1960 with mutually contradictory slogans: "Immediate

^{1/} T/1402, paragraphs 39-42, Annex I. Summary in paragraphs 29-30.

independence. Get rid of the Belgians for us" and "Down with Tutsi feudalism. Long live Belgian Trusteeship".

116. At the July 1957 session of the General Council, the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi pointed out the difficulties raised by the ideas stated in these two documents. When three members of the General Council presented a voeu that the Government would study the Manifesto of the Bahutu thoroughly and state its views at the next session of the Council, he pointed out that the question was delicate and difficult to tackle with equanimity.^{1/}

117. In his discussions with the 1957 Visiting Mission, the Governor described relations between the Tutsi and Hutu as the key problem of the Territory, and gave some indication of the contradictory courses of action between which the Administration was torn in its efforts to satisfy the demands of both parties, i.e., to give extensive powers to the High Councils, which were composed solely of Tutsi, and to emancipate the Hutu.^{2/} The 1957 Visiting Mission recognized the gravity of the problem, but thought that "although there is every likelihood that the Hutu-Tutsi problem will grow worse in the near future, it is nonetheless true that it carries in itself the seed of its solution. Under the influence of secondary and university education and of contact with the outside world, traditional conceptions are giving way and the élite of the old regime are coming up against a new élite". "The statement of views of the High Council of Ruanda would indicate at least as much an awareness of the inevitability of a far-reaching change in the structure of the state as a desire to provoke a race in order to consolidate the tottering prerogatives of a dominant class by premature self-government".^{3/}

118. In 1957, the High Council of Ruanda firmly expressed a wish that the terms "Tutsi" and "Hutu" should henceforth be banished from official documents. On the other hand the Mouvement social hutu, established in June 1957, to promote democratization of institutions and to combat abuses, opposed that proposal on the grounds that there was nothing hurtful about racial descriptions and that the true social advancement of the country could only be revealed by maintaining

1/ T/1402, paragraphs 23, 24, 28.

2/ Ibid., paragraphs 33-39.

3/ T/1402, paragraphs 40-46.

them and thereby indicating the progress made by the under-privileged majority. That was the origin of the accusation that the Hutu parties are racists.

119. At the outset, the Belgian Administration was in favour of abolishing the terms "Tutsi" and "Hutu", or in any case tried to minimize their importance.

Thus the Special Representative of Belgium on the Trusteeship Council stated on 31 January 1958 that the terms Tutsi and Hutu were outworn, and that "the Administration would be quite pleased to see that terminology abolished ... it was afraid that the proud flaunting of the term 'Hutu' could easily be taken as an expression of hostility to the 'Tutsi'". The controversy as to the real character of the Tutsi-Hutu problem: racial, social, economic, etc., also dates from that time.

120. Towards the end of 1957, the Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (AFROSOMA), founded by Mr. Joseph Habyarymana Gitera, entered the political arena and through its newspaper "Ijwi Rya Rubanda Rutusr" (The Voice of the Little People), made increasingly vehement attacks against the social system, the privileges of the Tutsi, the court of the Mwami, and the Kalinga drum, the emblem of royal power. The question of the Kalinga drum became a great preoccupation of Mr. Gitera. He alleged that that instrument was the object of an almost idolatrous cult, and was an affront to the people and to Christians, because the remains, or to be more accurate, the genital organs of chiefs conquered in the past by the present royal house of Ruanda, were hung from those sacred drums. On many occasions he urged that those adornments should be buried with due ceremony and that the drum should be replaced by "a less barbarous national emblem, more worthy of a civilized people, and better calculated to arouse a feeling a pride in all Ruandese, instead of reminding some of them of their past humiliations". He raised the problem in communications to the King of the Belgians, and to the United Nations,^{1/} and tried to get the Roman Catholic Church to take up a position on the matter. Those attacks shocked some elements of the population, and antagonized the defenders of tradition.

^{1/} T/COM.3/L.25.

121. In 1958, consideration of the Hutu-Tutsi problem was once again postponed in the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi. On the other hand, in January 1958, Mr. Gitera presented a request to the Mwami that the High Council of Ruanda should study the problem of relations between the Hutu and Tutsi. The Mwami consented and in April established a special commission on social relations in Ruanda, consisting of Tutsi and Hutu, to study that problem and submit recommendations to the High Council.

122. Before the Council met, the atmosphere became tense again. Several chiefs complained to the Mwami of the attacks made on them by APROSOMA and certain missionary circles. Moreover, a group of elderly Tutsi at the Mwami's court drafted two notes. In the first, which was submitted to the Mwami and the High Council, the authors protested against all possibilities of distributing pasture and arable land, appealing to respect for ancestral custom and asking that the "trouble-makers" should be sought out. In the second, addressed to the members of the commission to study the problem of the social and political relations between the Tutsi, the Hutu and the Twa of Ruanda, appeared the statement, after certain historical and genealogical considerations, that: "the relations between the Tutsi and the Hutu have always hitherto been based on servitude, so that there is no foundation for brotherhood between us ... As our kings conquered the country of the Hutu and killed their petty kings, how can they now claim to be our brothers?"

123. In June 1958 the High Council of Ruanda considered the report of the Hutu-Tutsi Committee in which the Hutu spokesmen put forward the following demands: administrative and judicial public appointments should be open to the Hutu on the same conditions as for the Tutsi, Hutu children should have the same educational opportunities as Tutsi children, and so forth. The High Council came to the conclusion that the problem was of a different nature. Appointments were open to all who satisfied certain requirements of ability and training. With regard to education, it was the fault of the Administration and the missions if Hutu children had up to now been unjustly treated. On the other hand, the Council agreed that there was a need for numerous reforms to bring about more social justice in many fields but said that the Administration had not hitherto carried out the High Council's wishes in that respect. In his closing speech the Mwami stressed that

Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were all Ruandese and that there was not a racial but a social question, and a problem of institutional reform.

124. The traditionalists considered that the High Council and the Mwami had thus shown understanding, breadth of view and realism. On the other hand, the leaders of the Hutu movements interpreted that attitude, and in particular that of the Mwami Mutara, as dismissing the case; they believed that he was not only denying the existence of the problem but was accusing those who continued to raise it of being "dividers of people, enemies of their country and disturbers of public order". The Hutu leaders said later that the disappointment at the reaction of Mutara, in whom they had placed their hopes, had caused some of them from then onwards to "reject the role of the sovereign and the insignia of his dynasty".

125. When the Mwami Mutara returned from a long visit to Belgium in 1958 his relations with the Belgian Administration changed noticeably. Those relations had first been excellent; they became somewhat cool in recent years, and were almost broken off by the end of 1958. It was rumoured that the Mwami had been very displeased with the way he had been treated in Belgium in 1958 which was alleged to be so different from the cordial reception he had been given on previous visits. Whatever the reason, relations with the Administration became very strained. There was a rumour, reported in the press, that he had said shortly after his return: "There will not be a single European in Ruanda at the end of a year".

126. At the opening meeting of the General Council in December 1958 the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi dealt at length with the Hutu-Tutsi question. He stated at the outset that there was a problem. It was perhaps over-simple and dangerous to call it without qualification "the Tutsi-Hutu conflict" but the problem could not be denied. There was a problem of wide-spread pauperism among far too large masses of the population; and there was a conviction among those economically very weak masses, which seemed to grow stronger every year, that they were being politically, socially and economically oppressed by a certain number of representatives of their local authorities. From the figures it appeared that the Tutsi social group were in a very high percentage of official positions whose holders could abuse their authority and that, moreover, the Hutu group composed the great majority of the impoverished masses among whom were the victims of those abuses.

But that did not mean that there was an oppressive Tutsi class which was exploiting the defenceless Hutu masses. There was a peasant class incompletely protected from the arbitrary actions of certain local representatives of authority who, because of circumstances, and not through a recognized political structure, belonged for the most part to the anthropological group of the Tutsi. The Belgian administration had therefore endeavoured to hunt down abuses wherever it could find them but not to attack the Tutsi as a whole.

127. In that connexion the Governor pointed out that it had been necessary to remove 152 sub-chiefs from office between 1955 and 1957. But he added that the Administration was nevertheless convinced that it would hardly have helped matters to have deliberately and systematically replaced Tutsi chiefs, judges and monitors by Hutu everywhere. Such a policy would have been the signal for a violent and legitimate reaction from a large and deserving indigenous group against the Administering Authority; it would have probably merely replaced one injustice by another; it would have started a civil war which was to be avoided because it would have no point; and it would have thereby erroneously established that the problem was racial and not simply a misuse of local authority. Such an attitude would have also come up against the inadequate training of the Hutu among whom the Belgians would have had great difficulty in finding a sufficient number of efficient personnel. The problem was not one of Tutsi and Hutu but one of rich and poor, of capitalists and workers, of rulers and ruled although it was also undeniable that men who were or who called themselves Tutsi formed the great majority of the governing groups of the country and possessed the greatest part of the country's wealth. The Governor concluded by emphasizing the danger of introducing the notion of discrimination by misuse of the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" and stressed the need to improve the position of the Hutu, to reform the political structure and to fight against poverty.

128. However, in his speech before the Mission on 3 March 1960 the Governor said: "For my part I had gradually modified the convictions which were the basis of my statement of 2 December 1958: the Tutsi-Hutu problem certainly had an economic basis but, as I had tried to emphasize, it also had a politico-social basis and the Administration would have to take it into account."

129. During its December 1958 session a member of the General Council, Mr. Habyarimana Gitera, requested discussion of the Hutu-Tutsi problem. The Governor recalled that he had dealt with it in his opening speech and moreover

reminded the Council that certain of its members were drawing up a report on the question and that while awaiting that document "it was not advisable to give free rein momentarily to discussion of a subject which is so difficult to present in an orderly way". The question was therefore not discussed during the session.

130. Five members or alternates of the General Council, among them Mr. Maus and three African Hutu members, prepared a long report which was finished at the end of 1958. It was sent to the King of Belgium, to the Minister, to the Governor-General and to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi. This document, which was subsequently also transmitted to the Working Group, and to the present Visiting Mission, stated that the Hutu problem had two aspects. The first concerned injustices committed by the customary authorities who were in fact all Tutsi. Although the situation had improved during forty years of Belgian rule, under the influence of the Administration, of the religious missions, and of certain Europeans, "the situation of the weak still remains pitifully tragic", particularly as certain steps taken by the Administration designed to improve the position of the peasant (manant) had been turned against him owing to the "malignity" of the customary authorities. The other aspect of the problem was the fact that the Hutu were backward as a result of the Tutsi monopoly in the political, cultural and economic fields and the gap between Tutsi wealth and Hutu poverty, and that Tutsi domination of the Hutu common people had been increased under the influence of the Belgian Administration. The report went on to attack certain arguments such as that the terms "Tutsi" and "Hutu" could not at present be defined whereas their physical, psychological and cultural differences divided them into groups which were perfectly distinct one from the other. The document suggested a number of solutions, such as the abolition of chiefdoms, with the maintenance of sub-chiefdoms, the supervision and inspection of indigenous authorities and of judges, the separation of administrative and judicial powers, the education of the mass of the people in its rights, the introduction of the principle of numerical parity between Tutsi and Hutu in the distribution of social and public positions, fundamental reforms, and so forth. Mr. Maus and his colleagues stated in conclusion: "To avoid revolution, a revolution must be carried out. The Administration must not be placed in this dilemma: either to support the oppressors in the name of public order or to support the revolt in the name of justice".

131. At the beginning of 1959 the controversy became more intense. Mr. Gitera transformed the APROSOMA into a political party. In a letter addressed to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, a copy of which was sent to the United Nations,^{1/} he requested that Ruanda-Urundi should not be granted independence before the introduction of the numerous reforms demanded by the Hutu.

132. Whereas in 1958 the defenders of tradition had found their theoretician in the Abbé Mulenzi, who had published his "Etude sur quelques problèmes du Ruanda" (A study of some problems of Ruanda) in 1959, the Hutu now publicized their point of view. The first publication was "Plaidoyer pour le menu peuple au Ruanda-Urundi" (A plea for the common people of Ruanda-Urundi) by Mr. G. Cyimana, a Ruandese student in Belgium, and later "L'actualité politique au Ruanda" (The political situation in Ruanda) by Aloys Munyangaju, a journalist.

133. Political unrest increased during the period before the arrival of the Working Group in Ruanda. In December 1958 the General Council had expressed the wish that the Belgian Government, which had in August 1958 set up a Working Group to investigate the political problems of the Belgian Congo, should take a similar step for Ruanda-Urundi. Accordingly, a Working Group was formed on 16 April 1959 and arrived in the Trust Territory on the 22nd.^{2/} Meanwhile, the Belgian Government in its statement of 13 January 1959 had outlined its policy for the Belgian Congo, and its intention to grant independence to the Belgian Congo had clearly awakened great interest in Ruanda and Urundi.

134. In order to submit their views to the Working Group the Ruanda indigenous authorities organized themselves under the leadership of the Mwami. The Hutu leaders have described the atmosphere of those proceedings in the following words: "On the arrival of the Working Group the entire feudal system went into action to demand not only freedom for the oppressed people but nominal independence. Chiefs and sub-chiefs, indigenous judicial officials, committees of cercles d'évolués, delegations from existing associations, keepers of dynastic traditions, high court dignitaries, former army and clan chiefs, higher clergy and feudal Tutsi teachers, in short the whole of the Tutsi upper aristocracy assembled at Nyanza to hold council and receive instructions to be spread throughout the country".

^{1/} T/COM.3/L.25.

^{2/} The report was submitted to the Belgian Government on 2 September 1959 and released on 10 November.

135. On 22 April 1959 the indigenous authorities of Ruanda (chiefs, sub-chiefs and judges) expressed the opinion that the contemplated reforms must be based on a democratic system, preferably on a hereditary constitutional monarchy, and recommended internal autonomy in 1960 and the constitution of a Ruandese Government. The following day, those same customary authorities considered that it was appropriate to draw the Belgian Government's attention, by an official statement, to the tense racial relations which were the cause of great uneasiness in Ruanda. In that document they observed that "Evil machinations have recently come to light and seem to us to have their source in the press and in the spreading of malicious statements; this has resulted in the misunderstanding among the ethnic groups of Ruanda". The document recalled that the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi had not carried out the wish expressed by some of its members that it should examine the problems raised in the Manifesto of the Bahutu; that on the other hand, the Mwami had instructed the High Council of Ruanda to examine the question, and that the conclusions of the discussion had been transmitted to the Government which had not taken up a definite position. Meanwhile, it alleged, numerous sections of the Catholic missionary press (Kinyamateka and Temps nouveaux d'Afrique) kept up the quarrel among the racial groups in Ruanda, and insults and malicious statements continued to be expressed in Mr. Gitera's "Ijwi rya rubanda rugufi". Lastly, the document expressed surprise at the Government's silence in the face of these machinations and considered that it should intervene against these incitements to racial hatred.

136. The only Hutu representative at that meeting of the leaders of the indigenous authorities protested. He condemned all forms of racial hatred but observed that the document quoted only writings by Hutu authors while making no mention of the documents by "great servants of the crown",^{1/} which were against any form of fraternization of the Tutsi with the Hutu and in favour of legal domination by the Tutsi and slavery for the Hutu. The fact that the customary authorities had intentionally said nothing about this document was proof of their partiality.

137. On 28 April 1959 the political reform Commission drew up its conclusions which were approved by the High Council and submitted to the Working Group. This document called for internal autonomy in 1960 and for profound reforms based

^{1/} See paragraph 122.

on a healthy democracy, granting the people a wider participation in public affairs through the system of electing their leaders, and separation of powers. In the legislative field it recommended the abolition of sub-chiefdom councils and district councils, but the retention of chiefdom council whose members would be directly elected by universal suffrage among men of Ruandese nationality. The president of the chiefdom council, to be known as a bourgmestre, would be nominated by the Mwami from three candidates elected by the council. The High Council of the State would be composed of a bourgmestre from each district, elected by all the councils, one delegate for each commune, and twenty-five co-opted members (among whom a certain number would be non-indigenous). The Council would be granted power of deliberation in certain matters concerning the State as a whole and would be progressively transformed into an assembly which would become a chamber of deputies.

138. On the executive level the form of government would be a constitutional monarchy. The constitution of the State would be drawn up by a special commission. A number of ministries would be established. The Prime Minister would be appointed by the Mwami from among three candidates submitted by the High Council of the State. Ministers could be Ruandese or Belgians. These ministries would function with administrative staffs composed of Europeans and indigenous inhabitants governed by the same statute and supervised by the Resident who would have the title of Governor. The chiefdom would become a commune with an elected or appointed bourgmestre, and a staff governed by the same statute as for other public servants. Chiefs at present in office who had not been elected at elections for chiefdom councils would be pensioned, integrated into administrative services or given help to set up their own businesses.

139. The district and the sub-chiefdom would be purely administrative and not political units. Sub-chiefs would be commune officials, but in order to satisfy the aspirations of the mass of the people who had indicated their wish to choose sub-chiefs by means of elections, sub-chiefs would be elected by universal male suffrage, and the Mwami would appoint sub-chiefs from among the three candidates with the most votes.

140. The document then set out the judicial reform based on the separation of powers.

141. On the economic and financial level the Commission recommended a policy of budgetary compression and expressed the wish to see a policy of industrialization carried out. In the field of education it recommended the revision of the agreement with the missions and a wider State participation in the organization of education.

142. With regard to relations between the different ethnic groups of Ruanda, the Commission considered that the problem was more a social one but that there was a tendency for it to become racial. This was due to the unfortunate intervention of certain ill-disposed or ill-informed people, who stirred up racial hatred through the press and by subversive statements. The Commission was astounded by the fact that the Government looked on passively at this scene of the destruction of the State and seemed to encourage the division by its attitude.

143. The Commission noted, finally, that there was an atmosphere of mistrust between the High Council of the State and the governmental bodies, and that the main reason for this mistrust was the lack of contact and frank exchanges of views, and the absence of co-operation towards a common objective.

144. The Hutu groups, for their part - APROSOMA and the Hutu Social Movement - made known their views to the Working Group. They attacked the traditional customary system, which they held responsible for abuses and the exploitation of the people. They hoped that the authority of the European administration would be strengthened, and that it would retain control of the country for a long time to come. They were in favour rather of the gradual transfer of powers through the Africanization (or Euro-Africanization) of the Territory's government, which would allow time for the political education of the indigenous inhabitants and their initiation into administrative matters. They called for the advancement of the people through the granting of access to education and public office to all qualified persons, the introduction of universal suffrage, even for the appointment of judges, and they recommended the complete elimination of heads of chiefdoms, whom they considered to be too much attached to the feudal system.

145. When the Working Group had left, leaflets again circulated in the country. One anonymous leaflet distributed in June and signed "The warrior-defenders of Ruanda", denounced the Hutu leaders and announced the defeat of APROSOMA and of

Gitera, "who have sold Ruanda". The leaflet said: "APROSOMA, which is fighting the Kalinga, will be vanquished by the tripartite people;^{1/} APROSOMA, which hates Ruanda and its Mwami, will be vanquished; APROSOMA, which is opposed to independence, will be vanquished", and, "Here are your orders; be ready for battle. The banner behind which we rally is Ruanda; our Government is synonymous with triumph."

146. The traditionalist groups claimed that many people were troubled by the Administration because they were suspected of distributing the leaflet. On the other hand, they claimed, Gitera was never troubled because of his leaflets, which became more and more violent. The anonymous leaflet made a deep impression on people's minds. Mr. Gitera replied to it with a violent article in his newspaper. At that time, too, a number of false rumours were in circulation. According to the rumours, it was the Belgians who had caused the development of certain cattle diseases, the spread of the tse-tse fly in some parts of Ruanda, the introduction of tuberculosis, and so on.

147. The report of the Commission sent in January 1960 to investigate the disturbances in Ruanda states that in July 1959, during the last weeks of the life of the Mwami Mutara III, there was evidence of a reversal in the attitude of the Mwami towards the Belgian Administration. Some people, the report says, interpreted it as a political ruse; others attributed it to a sudden awareness of the dangers to which Ruanda would be exposed by a flatly hostile attitude to the Trusteeship Administration at a time when the population was already in the grip of serious tensions. Perhaps, too, the Mwami Mutara had become convinced that the Trusteeship Administration's purpose, like his own, was the accession of the country to independence, and that he had no reason to enter into conflict with it. In any event, he tried to regain the confidence of the Administration and himself, at meetings, denied certain false rumours which were circulating in Ruanda, such as the one that it was the Europeans who had introduced certain cattle diseases.

148. On 25 July 1959, after attending a showing of the film "The Lords of the Forest" at Usumbura, the Mwami Mutara III went to see his medical practitioner. During the visit he was given an antibiotic injection and he died soon afterwards.

^{1/} i.e., consisting of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa.

149. It may be interesting to quote here a note from Mr. Vansina, an ethnologist and head of the IRSAC Centre at Astrida, on the political situation on the eve of the Mwami's death:

"The political groups active in Ruanda were, on the Tutsi side, a coalition led by the Mwami Mutara, an independent group provisionally called the Christian Democratic Party led by Chief Bwanakweri and Mr. Makuza and Mr. Ndazaro. On the Hutu side, there were the AFROSOMA group, led by Mr. Gitera (Habyarimana), a trade-union movement, the Muhutu Social Movement, led by Mr. Kayibanda and a movement led by Mr. Muryangaju, editor-in-chief of the newspaper Temps Nouveaux.

"The political movements discernible in the population were as follows:

"(a) an amorphous mass which, traditionally, was fairly content with its lot, but was asking for political improvements, generally of very local interest;

"(b) an ultra-conservative fraction of the Tutsi who regretted the times past and wanted to return to them. They were mainly persons who had become impoverished or had not found a place in the ranks of the chiefs and sub-chiefs;

"(c) advanced persons, both Tutsi and Hutu, who demanded a liberalization of the system through the abolition of caste distinctions and the introduction of a democratic system under a constitutional king;

"(d) Hutu movements, consisting usually of non-evolved persons, with anarchic tendencies. By contrast with the other movements which are spread throughout the country, these were localized in the Astrida and Giterama regions and, less clearly, around Ruhengeri;

"(e) the Hutu population of the North of Ruanda (Kisenyi, Ruhengeri, Byumba) who, for cultural and historical reasons, are trying to maintain the privileges they enjoyed before the introduction of an effective Tutsi administration.

"The political groups were linked to the political movements in the following way:

"(a) The Mwami coalition gained its support principally from the amorphous mass. But it encountered many difficulties because it included a Tutsi wing which represented the ultra-conservatives, and one comprising all the ambitious politicians who wanted a constitutional monarchy, but to varying degrees. It was the late Mwami who preserved the coalition.

"(b) The Bwanakweri group found its customers among the more advanced people and, more specifically, among the students, it seems. The abolition of caste distinctions was its prime objective.

"(c) The APROSOMA group had encouraged the anarchistic Hutu movement in the Astrida district, but its main support came from the Hutu in the northern part of Ruanda. This group, like those that follow, was backed by a large part of the African clergy.

"(d) The Kayibanda group wooed the Hutu of Gitarama. It also met with sympathy in the north. Its goal, however, was not primarily political. Contrary to the preceding group, it preached friendship between the castes.

"(e) The Munyangaju movement was aimed at the advanced group, already being canvassed by the Bwanakweri group.

"To sum up, three trends may be detected:

- a moderate conservatism on the part of the Mwami Mutara;
- a moderate progressivism on the part of the Bwanakweri, the Kayibanda and the Munyangaju;
- a reactionary spirit among Gitera's group."

C. Events between 25 July 1959 and November 1959

150. The news of the death of Mutara III was received with stupefaction. The most extraordinary rumours on the subject have been circulating ever since. It was said that Mutara had been poisoned by the Europeans, according to some, at the instigation of the Bishop of Kabgayi. According to others, he had been assassinated by the Hutu leaders and in support of that theory an article was quoted in which his death had been predicted in veiled terms. According to other rumours the Mwami had committed suicide for reasons of custom. In the hope of putting an end to these rumours (which were still current at the time of the visit of the Mission), the Belgian Administration asked for an autopsy to be carried out, but the Queen-mother objected.

151. There are many detailed accounts - more or less objective - and commentaries - more or less subjective - on the period immediately following the death of the Mwami and the choice of his successor.

152. Instead of reconstituting the facts from innumerable documents we shall reproduce below some extracts from the report of the Commission of Inquiry of January 1960:

"After the death of the Mwami there was intense activity among the traditional groups (the Abiru, the guardians of tradition and responsible for the appointment of a new Mwami; the influential chiefs; the High Council of the State; important decisions had to be taken (the interment of the former Mwami, the possible election of his successor, etc.).

"Some considered the setting up of a regency council, and certain Hutu leaders even appear to have favoured the formation of a republic.

"The burial of the Mwami Mutara III took place on 28 July 1959 on Mwima Hill, near Nyanza, in an atmosphere of extreme tension. When the Vice-Governors General, J.P. Harroy and G. La Fontaine and other Belgian authorities reached the scene, the High Council of the State was in session. When the religious ceremony of the lifting of the body was over and it was time for the coffin to be removed from the Ibwami (the home of the Mwami) to the church, the indigenous dignitaries had not yet arrived, for the meeting of the High Council of the State had not ended. The meeting had apparently been held to deal with two questions:

"1. Should an autopsy on the body of the Mwami be requested and the burial therefore stopped?

"2. Should the name of the new Mwami be announced before the burial of the Mwami Mutara and, if so, who should he be?

"The High Council of the State decided in the negative as regards the first question. It is said that its decision on the second question was also in the negative.

"It appears, therefore, that there was a disagreement between the Abiru, traditionally responsible for the appointment of the new Mwami, and the High Council of the State, a body comprising the most influential of the chiefs, which, relying on the evolution of the customs, would have liked to assume the right to settle the question itself.

"However that may be, the meeting of the High Council of the State came to an end and the procession moved to the church and then, after the religious ceremony, to Mwima Hill. A crowd of armed persons had gathered there and they were extremely nervous. After a statement by Chief Kayihura that according to custom the Mwami should not be buried until his successor was known, Mr. Rukeba began speaking and called to the crowd that the name of the new Mwami should be made known immediately. He was applauded by those present, who were probably afraid that the country would remain without a Mwami unless the successor to Mutara was designated at once. The representative of the Biru, Mr. Kayumba, then read out the name of the new Mwami, Jean-Baptiste Ndahindurwa, the son of Musinga and half-brother to Mutara, who was immediately acclaimed by those present.

"According to the information supplied to us it seems that it was only after the declaration of Kayihura that the name of the successor to Mutara was finally sent to the Vice-Governor General and to the Resident. However, during the preceding days, the Belgian Administration had received information (often contradictory or vague) on the questions which were under discussion and in particular on the designation of Mutara's successor; it had been advised that incidents might be expected on the morning of the burial and that there might be objection to the interment until an autopsy had been performed or a new Mwami designated. The name of J.B. Ndahindurwa had been mentioned among the possible successors to Mutara, and the Belgian Administration knew that he had a good chance of being appointed.

"Once the name of the new Mwami was known and after the future Kigeli V had agreed to rule as constitutional Mwami, the Vice-Governor General soon gave his agreement to the choice of the Abiru, a choice which, moreover, the Belgian Administration considered to be a good one.

"There has been talk of the 'Mwima coup d'état'. We do not think that the election of the new Mwami was in the nature of a plot against the Trusteeship Authority. It seems rather that there was some confused discussion, perhaps even a disagreement, between the Abiru (the guardians of custom and responsible for the designation of the Mwami) and the majority of the members of the High Council of the State, who considered that the decision should be made by them. There was also some fear, as has been said, of certain republican tendencies which had shown themselves in certain quarters in Ruanda.

"The decision taken was not bad in itself: among the various possible candidates the choice of J.B. Ndahindurwa commended itself to the Belgian administration also. On the other hand, the way in which the traditionalist groups acted towards the Trusteeship Authority was, to say the least, unusual. The highest authorities who were present at Kigali, and then at Mwima were not even consulted when these decisions were taken.

"Whatever one's view may be as to the circumstances in which the choice of a new Mwami was made, it is certain that the incidents of 28 July 1959 were used against the Trusteeship Authority. The population gained the impression that the authority had been confronted with a fait accompli and had been compelled to yield, a circumstance which was not calculated to increase its prestige. Some people considered that the European authority had suffered a defeat and the rumour naturally circulated."

153. The analysis of these days, made on 31 July by Mr. Vansina, an ethnologist and head of the IRSAC centre at Astrida, is also interesting to note:

"After the death of the Mwami, the political groups had the following solutions to propose: the abolition of the monarchy, the introduction of a monarchy which would be partly hereditary, because rotated among certain Tutsi clans and lines, and partly free since the King would be chosen by means of elections, the introduction of a constitutional hereditary monarchy and the strengthening of absolute monarchy. Munyangaju and Gitará opted for the second solution. Bwanakweri appears to have favoured first the second solution and then the third, the politicians' wing of the old coalition favoured the third, and the fourth was undoubtedly that endorsed by the ultra-conservatives. The attitude of Kayibanda is as yet unknown to us.

"The death of the Mwami was declared over the radio on Saturday evening. The public for the most part learned of it on Sunday 26 July through the announcement made during Sunday morning mass. The reaction in the Astrida region was a defence reflex. Everyone was immediately aware of the extent of the crisis. All stayed at home and there was no one to be seen in the town. When the body was carried past there were very few spectators. There were few spectators either when the funeral cortege reached Nyanza. Those who were there showed neither grief nor anger.

.....

"The observations made in the course of Tuesday have been recorded in a special report. To sum them up, it may be said that there were numerous highway incidents, that the bulk of the population was afraid and stayed at home or went out armed, even at Astrida, that the Hutu leaders were going to ask for a republic, and that a small group of Tutsi would propose Ndahindurwa. This group included the Abiru, the guardians of custom, a priest who claimed to have received the oral testament of the deceased, and the vice-president of the High Council of the State. These made contact with a number of chiefs and members of the High Council, but we do not know

whether those people were simply asked for their agreement to the name of the person chosen by the Abiru or whether some of them were asked to spread propaganda. We do not yet know the names of all of them. Outside this group, it is possible that among other Tutsi chiefs and leaders some support was beginning to form for a given candidate, but this was not clear.

"The group supporting Ndahindurwa was in a very strong position. It met the wishes of the population, it claimed to be the custodian of the last wishes of the deceased; it based itself wholly on custom, it backed a candidate acceptable to all except republicans, it would, by acting rapidly, prevent political anarchy and internecine struggle, and it would relax tension. Objectively speaking, its action was very good for the country. The only thing that may be held against it is that it did not dare to confide in the European Government. These people knew that their candidate would be acceptable, and yet they did not advance him sooner. It would seem that they feared some manoeuvres by the Hutu republicans. To make matters clearer, we wish to point out that the republican leaders were also at Nyanza, and that their activities there were far more noticeable than in the rest of the country.

"In the last analysis, any other solution would have been impossible. It would have necessitated the use of force to stamp out the various foci of incipient insurrection. It would have aroused a hatred against Europeans where none had existed before. It would have led to a political impasse. Any other candidate proposed by the Administration would have been regarded as an usurper. Continued delay would have encouraged the formation of rival factions and in the long run none of the competing candidates would have been able to command unanimity. Lastly, the proposed candidate was certainly very acceptable from the European point of view.

"The high point of the day was the burial of Mwami Mutara at Mwima. It is not yet clear to us whether what happened was premeditated or not. It is our impression that Mr. Kayihura had hesitated but that Mr. Rukeba persuaded him to act. In that particular situation, the only possible line of conduct was not to ratify the choice hic et nunc, while preserving the possibility of doing it later. For, as we have said, the choice was excellent. The decisions taken were precisely the right ones. The result was that the crowd scattered and that Mwami Kigeli V could be proclaimed the same evening without any loss of prestige on the part of the Administration in the eyes of Ruanda chiefs."

154. The political parties of Ruanda were officially formed and began their activities in August and September 1959. One of them was the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR), officially constituted on 3 September 1959. Its chairman was

Mr. François Rukeba,^{1/} a businessman at Kigali, who was neither a chief nor a Tutsi, but who, as described above, has played an outstanding part in the naming of the new Mwami, at Mutara's burial. By a judgement of the Ruanda court-martial of 22 January 1960, Mr. Rukeba was to be sentenced to six years of imprisonment for arbitrary arrest and bodily tortures during the events of November 1959.

155. According to some sources, Mr. Rukeba represented the emotional and "prophetic" element of the party, whereas some of the important Ruanda chiefs constituted its "brain trust"; these included Mr. Michel Kayihura, Chief of Bugoyi, Mr. Pierre Mungalurire, Chief of Bwanacyambwe, Mr. Chrysostome Rwangombwa, Chief of Ndorwa, and Mr. Michel Rwagasana, Secretary of the High Council of the State (all four now self-exiled to Tanganyika).

156. The party's programme was set out in a document entitled "Manifesto of the political party 'Abashyirahame b'Urwanda'" at the party's first meeting held at Kigali on 13 September. This document, which incidentally was communicated to the Trusteeship Council,^{2/} called for "the union of all Ruandese for the purpose of achieving true progress in all spheres in Ruanda". It was addressed to all Ruandese of goodwill, without ethnic, social or religious distinction. The objective was internal self-government in 1960 and the independence of Ruanda in 1962. The proposed form of government was a hereditary constitutional monarchy, with responsible ministers. The legislative organs would be elected by direct universal adult male suffrage. The judicial power would be separated from the executive power. The manifesto also sketched out an economic and social programme and called for a revision of the agreement with the missions concerning education and a broader participation by the country in the organization and administration of education. As regards human relations, the party intended to combat any

^{1/} In the past, Mr. Rukeba had had some difficulties with the Belgian Administration. He had submitted a petition to the first Visiting Mission of the Trusteeship Council in 1948 (text in document T/217, pages 113-115). At that time, the Administering Authority explained that Mr. Rukeba's difficulties with the law in 1944 had arisen because he had been guilty of altering entries in a judgement register and that a transportation order was issued against him in 1947 (T/217, p.119). Later he submitted his views to the 1954 Visiting Mission (T/1168, paragraphs 89-90), expressing some criticism of the Mwami and the chiefs. The 1957 Visiting Mission also received a memorandum from Mr. Rukeba.

^{2/} T/PET.3/100, annex 3.

incitement to racial hatred or racial discrimination between Whites and Blacks or among Ruandese. Thus, the party meant to attain its goal - the emancipation of Ruanda - in peace and order, without resorting to violence and in maintaining full legality and respect for the authorities.

157. The first meeting of UNAR, held at Kigali on 13 September 1959, was, according to the report of the Commission of Inquiry of January 1960, attended by a crowd estimated at 2,000 persons. The Chairman, Mr. Rukeba, spoke first, proclaiming his love for the Mwami and reading out the party's programme. There were nine speakers, including Mr. Michel Rwagasana, Secretary of the High Council of the State, and Chiefs Mungalurire, Rwangombwa and Kayihura. Generally speaking, the speeches lasted about ten minutes each, except those of Mr. Rwagasana, Mr. Rwangombwa and Mr. Kayihura, which were longer. Their main theme was an appeal to all Ruandese to unite. Mr. Rwagasana's speech dealt with future political development and with the effects of self-government and independence; he also drew attention to old abuses which had to be remedied and accused the Whites and the missionaries of having divided the country.

158. Mr. Mungalurire appealed to the Ruandese to unite and stated that he was in favour of political reform. Mr. Rwangombwa devoted particular attention to relations between races (Ruandese and Europeans or Asians) and between peoples (Ruandese and aliens) and denounced any discrimination between Europeans and indigenous inhabitants. Mr. Kayihura, for his part, lauded patriotism, the beauty of the country and its national traditions and advocated the study of the history and institutions of ancient Ruanda and the need for the country to take its youth in hand.

159. After the singing of a song which was called the national hymn, Mr. Rukeba spoke again to stress the love he bore, and everyone should bear, for the Mwami and criticized the party hostile to the Mwami. He brought the meeting to a close by urging everyone to join UNAR.

160. In its report of January 1960, the Commission of Inquiry remarked that it was not easy for persons who were strangers to Ruanda to judge the real implication and the emotional value of the phrases that had been uttered, for the following reasons:

- (a) UNAR and its opponents were in disagreement even on the actual words spoken. There was a hectographed French text of the speeches which had been

made public by UNAR during October and November; the supporters of UNAR maintained that this text corresponded faithfully to what had been said, whereas its opponents failed to find in it some of the excesses they claimed to have heard;

(b) The speeches were made in Ruandese, which it is extremely difficult to translate into French if all shades of meaning are to be rendered;

(c) The Ruandese are fond of hints, and innuendos, so that words which might seem harmless to anyone not familiar with Ruanda assume a very different meaning to anyone who knows local conditions;

(d) A written report cannot convey the atmosphere of a meeting and - whatever may have been said at Kigali - it is common knowledge that at a public meeting speakers are often carried away and say more than they really mean.

161. However that may be, UNAR protested against the account of the meeting published in the newspaper Temps nouveaux d'Afrique and drafted a "correction"^{1/} in which it denied that speakers at the Kigali meeting had expressed any anti-foreign, anti-Belgian or anti-Catholic sentiments and registered formal and unqualified disapproval of recourse to violence and constraint.

162. The Commission of Inquiry, in its comments on the origins of UNAR, said that UNAR trusted in its strength, and that the forthcoming elections would give it an overwhelming majority making it really the "single party", all-powerful in Ruanda. In order to achieve that goal, UNAR had to take an ultra-nationalist attitude and discourage possible opponents. This second reason is the explanation for the violent tone at the meetings, a violence which was unusual in this State where the ruling class (Tutsi) is highly civilized and courteous, and for the intimidation campaign of October 1959.

163. The Commission of Inquiry felt that the Kigali meeting had made a strong impression in Ruanda and that those present had been particularly impressed to see influential representatives of the customary authority attack the Trusteeship Administration or at least provide cover for those who launched the attacks. After the first UNAR meeting, there was certainly a great deal of confusion in people's minds, the Hutu referred to the meeting of 13 September 1959 as the "UNAR declaration of war".

1/ T/PET.3/100, Annex 4.

164. Other UNAR meetings were held, at Astrida on 20 September and at Gitarama on 27 September. A large number of adherents of APROSOMA went to the Astrida meeting, to organize a counter-manifestation against the UNAR leaders. They even attempted to give a display of folk-dancing at the meeting place. That was the first occasion on which the Hutu had publicly opposed an action of Tutsi notables.

165. On 14 September, a new party, the Rassemblement démocratique ruandais (RADER) was officially founded. This party too intended to fight for "the establishment of a social, economic and cultural order based on authentic democracy in harmonious relationship with the various constituent groupings of the Ruandese people". It came out for the election by universal suffrage of chiefs, sub-chiefs and councillors, for land reform, for internal self-government by 1964 and for the independence of Ruanda by 1968. It favoured a constitutional monarchy, affirmed its friendly feelings towards Belgium and gave its full support to the spreading of the Gospel in Ruanda. Its Committee Chairman was Chief Prosper Bwanakwari, who had been transferred in 1954 for having displeased Mwami Mutara over the question of setting up a democratic political party.

166. The fact that several of its members were officials of the trusteeship Administration led to the accusation that RADER was a party created and supported by the Administering Authority. In fact RADER was to play a minor role in the political agitation which preceded the November disorders.

167. On 9 October 1959, a fourth party, the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU), which developed from the Mouvement Social Hutu, published its manifesto. The party's aim was to end the Tutsi hegemony and the feudal regime. Ruanda could not attain independence until it had been democratized. It accepted the constitutional royalty of the Mwami but called for reforms ensuring the separation of powers, the access of the Hutu to education at its various levels, the recognition of individual landed property, and, in general, an end to the malpractices of the ruling classes. The most prominent figure in the party is Mr. Grégoire Kayibanda.

168. In September and October 1959, the Catholic Church of Ruanda, represented by its two bishops, Mgr. Bigirumwami, Apostolic Vicar of Nyundo, and Mgr. Perraudin, Apostolic Vicar of Kabgayi, made their position known by means of two confidential circular letters to all Catholic priests of the State.

169. The first circular, dated 24 September 1959, was a warning against the UNAR party, which, according to the letter, wished to have a monopoly on patriotism and represented a trend closely resembling national socialism. It wanted to remove the schools from mission influence on the pretext that they would be better administered by the State, and it had plans for enrolling young people in some sort of national service, thus removing them from the influence of the family and church. Lastly, the bishops drew attention to alleged pro-communist and pro-Islamic influences in the party.

170. The letter of 11 October circulated by the two bishops was a warning against APROSOMA, whose statements they felt displayed unchristian feelings of race hatred. The two bishops also reproached the party for distorting certain remarks regarding the Kalinga (the Royal Drum of Ruanda). It might be noted that the publication of the circular was followed by a letter of apology and the resignation of Mr. Joseph Habyarimana Gitera as chairman of APROSOMA.

171. It should be observed that Mgr Perraudin, who has since become the Archbishop of Kabgayi, transmitted these texts to the Visiting Mission in order to demonstrate the impartiality and neutrality of the Catholic Church of Ruanda and to refute the accusations levelled against it. The Mission found, nevertheless, that a large part of the population felt that the situation was not quite so simple. Many thought that the Archbishop of Kabgayi was the central figure in the backing given to the Hutu parties, which explains the leaflets attacking him personally. On the other hand, Mgr Bigirumwami of Nyundo, who is a Ruandese and a Tutsi, has the reputation of sympathizing with UNAR.

172. On 9 October, Mwami Kigeli V was sworn in at his investiture at Kigali, a matter which had given rise to certain difficulties.^{1/} When called upon to sign the act of investiture at Kigali on 6 October, in the presence of the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, Kigeli V insisted that the ceremony be conducted in the presence of the members of the High Council of Ruanda and also that the oath of office be altered to include the promise which he had made to reign as a constitutional Mwami. The ceremony was postponed for three days and the Mwami's wishes were finally complied with.

1/ T/PET.3/100, Annex 5.

173. During the month of October, the political tension in Ruanda increased. Aside from the activities of the newly created political parties, there was a series of incidents during the month which assumed the nature of a campaign of intimidation. False rumours of all kinds were in continuous circulation. One rumour, for example, had it that injections and vaccinations produce sterility, and this seriously hampered the anti-tuberculosis programme in Ruanda. Expectation of the Belgian Government's statement on Ruanda-Urundi also served to aggravate the tense situation.

174. On 10 October, the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi issued an order prohibiting political meetings in the hope of restoring a measure of calm and of preventing the general tension from reaching explosive proportions.

175. The chairmen of Hutu parties of Ruanda^{1/} expressed their distress in a letter addressed on 14 October to the Minister of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. They stated their fear that the internal autonomy under consideration for Ruanda would in practice mean the return of exclusive power to the Tutsi clan. "We become enraged at the thought of seeing our people fall once again under the merciless yoke of the Tutsi and their racist ideology". They voiced their apprehension at the formation of political parties like UNAR, which were established and supported by the Tutsi authorities, parties that were nationalist, totalitarian, anti-democratic, anti-western and reactionary but which, in spite of this, gained influence over the ignorant Hutu masses. They expressed their fear that these parties might win elections in many areas "owing to the ignorant or terrorized support of the people" and consequently they implored the Belgian Government "not to terminate its trusteeship until the Hutu people were sufficiently emancipated to be able to defend their rights effectively".

176. At the same time, in a letter of 29 October 1959 addressed to the Trusteeship Council,^{2/} UNAR asserted that the Administration was utilizing the "Hutu-Tutsi question" as a means of delaying the emancipation of Ruanda. They also complained that UNAR was encountering all kinds of difficulties raised by the local administration.

^{1/} Together with some concerned Hutu of Urundi, see paragraph 341.

^{2/} T/PET.3/100, Annex 2.

177. During the entire month of October, while UNAR complained of attacks by the Hutu parties against the Tutsi and against the institution of monarchy and asserted that those parties enjoyed the tacit support of certain officials and missionaries, the Hutu parties and RADER maintained that UNAR was carrying on a veritable campaign of intimidation. A long list of terrorist acts perpetrated by UNAR was drawn to the attention both of the Commission of Inquiry of January 1960 and the Visiting Mission.

178. The acts consisted of publicly uttered threats against people's lives, made mainly by Swahili (Moslems), of violence and assault of individuals (some notables who were not members of UNAR were victimized), of crimes against property (banana plantations were cut down, stores were pillaged or boycotted, cows mutilated, vehicles damaged, etc.).

179. According to the Commission of Inquiry, these were apparently intended to induce those still hesitant to join UNAR and to frighten opponents and moderates. The terrorist campaign was certainly effective, the Commission found. Thus, when the Administration sent a circular letter to all chiefs and sub-chiefs in which it defined the extent to which they might engage in political activities, the customary authorities of several districts refused to acknowledge receipt for fear of reprisals.

180. The campaign of intimidation appears to have at first been directed against the Tutsi notables who did not belong to UNAR, and principally against those who sympathized with RADER. The outcome, according to sources hostile to UNAR, was that in order to defend themselves from the danger, "almost every member and supporter of RADER is going over to the UNAR camp". Subsequently, Hutu leaders, too, were attacked particularly those of APROSOMA.

181. On 25 October 1959, an anonymous leaflet was posted on trees in the Nyanza district. It read: "These are the enemies of Ruanda, of the kingdom and of the Kalinga". It then listed the names of ten RADER and Hutu leaders, saying that their chief was Mgr Perraudin of Kabgayi. The leaflet continued: "People of Ruanda, all these are traitors to Ruanda. It is they who want to keep us in slavery under the Belgians, they who have gathered at Kabgayi under Mgr Perraudin to plot the death of H.M. Kigeli V and the overthrow of the kingdom in Ruanda in order to make us slaves... People of Ruanda, let us unite our forces and, whatever the cost, seek out these enemies of Ruanda and their

offspring and purge Ruanda of this bad seed. Let us march forward and exterminate all these serpents, the enemies of Ruanda."

182. On 27 October, a RADER delegation handed to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi and to the Mwami of Ruanda a note entitled: "Grave Political Situation in Ruanda: Terrorism". The note, after citing various cases of attacks on people and property, concluded as follows: "The gravity of this situation should not escape the notice of the Government. The lack of any effective reaction on the part of the Administration is highly encouraging to the terrorist campaign. We who are threatened in our persons and in our belongings feel bound to notify the Government that in these conditions, the members of the other political parties will be constrained, out of self-defence, to resort to the same methods".

183. In a letter to the Governor, dated 3 November 1959 UNAR protested vigorously against the allegations that it was responsible for the incidents which had occurred in Ruanda. The letter added that such allegations were part of a systematic campaign of slander against the party.

184. Whereas some observers view this period of mutual intimidation and terrorism in October as one of the immediate causes of the November disturbances, mention should also be made of another occurrence which appears to have contributed to the tension in Ruanda. The issue concerned action taken by the Administration against three chiefs who had taken part in the first meeting of UNAR at Kigali on 13 September 1959. The action and the circumstances in which it was taken are described in the report of the Commission of Inquiry.

185. The Administration regarded as inadmissible that chiefs, who were members of the administration, should attack it at a public meeting or should take part in meetings mainly intended for propaganda against the Administering Authority. It accused these chiefs of having, by virtue of their presence condoned what was said at the meetings through their prestige and authority, the more so since it had been established that these chiefs, seated in places of honour, had applauded the passages hostile to the Administering Authority and had thus roused the audience to enthusiastic response.

186. The Administration therefore decided, on 12 October 1959, to transfer the chiefs Michel Kayihura, Pierre Mungalurire and Chrysostome Rwangombwa to other chiefdoms by way of disciplinary action. These chiefs were, however, popular personages who headed important chiefdoms and who moreover expected to hold important positions in Ruanda: Kayihura was vice-president of the High Council of Ruanda, a member of the permanent deputation of the High Council and a member of the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi; Rwangombwa and Mungalurire were members of the High Council of Ruanda; the former was also a member of the permanent deputation of the High Council and the latter was an alternate member of the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi. All three were moreover held in repute and had stood high in the estimation of the Belgian Administration.

187. It was not, however, until October, that is, one month after the Kigali meeting that the Administration published its circular letter relating to the membership and participation of chiefs, sub-chiefs, and the staff of the courts in political parties. The letter said that chiefs and sub-chiefs were not prohibited from joining a political party as private persons, but in the exercise of their functions or in connexion with them, they were not allowed to engage in any action or propaganda on behalf of a political party. It was recalled that chiefs and sub-chiefs were not permitted to associate themselves with actions or speeches designed to provoke resentment or hatred against the Administering Authority, nor were they allowed to collaborate with a party whose programme or habitual propaganda tended to discredit the Administration of the Territory or attack the honour of Belgium.

188. On 15 October, the three chiefs who had been transferred addressed a letter to the Governor in which they protested against the charges made against them. They denounced the local administrative authorities, accusing them of bias and declaring that their own conduct had been irreproachable, that they had been victimized by arbitrary action and that, as a result, they preferred to give up their administrative career rather than abjure their political opinions. They ended their letter by saying: "We now have an advantage over the local trusteeship administration since we now know that it uses force to pervert justice and that

it must therefore be weak. If you do not provide a remedy, this policy may lead to a disastrous breach, resulting in a stinging defeat for Belgian policy in Ruanda."

189. On 16 October, Mwami Kigeli V addressed a note to the Governor in which he accused the Resident of Ruanda and his deputy of having founded a political party and of agitating against the dynasty and pointed out that any attack on Chief Kayihura was an attack on the Mwami himself. He declared the action taken against the chiefs to be illegal and after remarking that the country was customarily in mourning until the new Mwami was enthroned, he ended his letter as follows:

"I must accordingly warn you that the combination of all these circumstances can only lead to a continuation of this period of mourning, until legality has been restored.

"The enthronement festivities which had been in preparation will not now take place, in view of the state of mind prevailing in the country... I shall be enthroned when people of all opinions in Ruanda are in a position to take part in the rejoicing.

"To guard against misinterpretation, I shall explain my action to public opinion in Ruanda, in order that my people may know the reasons which have led me to continue the period of mourning".

190. These documents were sent to the Governor at Kigali, where he had summoned the chiefs, on 17 October 1959.

191. The report of the Commission of Inquiry describes the vents of 17 October and the following days in these terms:

"Despite a prohibition of assembly, two or three hundred people met before the residency, where the interview between the Governor and the chiefs was to be held. The crowd eulogized Chief Mungalurire and demanded an abrogation of the measure. The Governor agreed to receive a delegation of four. He also informed the chiefs that their resignation had not been accepted and that he would give them eight days to think things over.

"The crowd returned in the afternoon. Some of the demonstrators were very excited; apparently, they had been drinking. After some hesitation, the police were called upon to scatter the demonstrators. They refused to disperse and some stones were thrown; when one of the soldiers was wounded in the head with a billhook, the police used tear-gas grenades and then some explosive grenades. Four people were wounded, and one of them died in the hospital.

"Other mass demonstrations, during which the crowd proclaimed its devotion to its chiefs, also took place at Nyanza (Rwangombwa's chiefdom) and at Bugoyi (Kayihura's chiefdom) but there were no serious incidents.

"Another meeting with the three chiefs was held on 24 October 1959. It took place without any incidents, since security measures (reinforcements of gendarmes) were taken. At this meeting, the decision to reinstate the original chiefdom was maintained, but it was decided between the Governor and the three chiefs to postpone for several weeks the second part of the disciplinary action (taking over their new chiefdoms), pending the results of current negotiations with the Mwami concerning the statement he was to make. Meanwhile the sub-chiefs of the Bugoyi of the Kisenyi territory (Kayihura's chiefdom) submitted a collective resignation.

"While thus partially reversing his decision, the Governor outlined to his administration the attitude it should adopt vis-à-vis the political parties. The Chief Administrative Officer warned his officials against the tendency to ask for too much; they should make greater efforts to hold aloof from the parties and should plan their action less on the basis of party programmes than of the methods used by the parties. He warned them against systematic hostility against UNAR, for it was essential to maintain negotiations, if only to help this party to understand that its present methods were reprehensible. Finally, he recommended extreme vigilance in maintaining order during the forthcoming weeks.

"After the meeting of 24 October, the pressure exercised by the customary authorities on the Trusteeship authority to withdraw the disciplinary measure continued. After 24 October, the Mwami sent another letter to the Governor. (It was then that the note of 16 October was returned without any amendment.) The Governor maintained his decision, but agreed to postpone until after the governmental declaration the appointment of the new candidates to the three chiefdoms deprived of their customary authority. (The "three chiefs" were supposed during that period to stay away from their original chiefdoms,)"

192. UNAR has described the "dramatic events at Kigali on 17 October 1959" in its communication of 11 November to the Trusteeship Council.^{1/} It was repeated in that document that nothing which was said at the Kigali meeting of 13 September 1959 was hostile to Belgium and that UNAR was only concerned with Ruanda's interests. It pointed out that other chiefs and officials had taken an equally active part in other political parties and therefore the measures against the three chiefs were unjust and should be revoked. Others, however, criticized the

Administering Authority for its lack of firmness and considered that once involved in a trial of strength it should have acted more vigorously.

193. It is undeniable that the affair of the three chiefs was a decisive turning point indicating a break between the Administration and UNAR. It led to the voluntary exile of the three chiefs and made it extremely difficult for talks to be resumed.

D. The disturbances of November 1959

Introduction

194. In November 1959 a series of violent incidents occurred in Ruanda which have been compared to an incipient civil war between two sections of the population. The causes and course of these incidents were naturally the subject of many interviews held by the Mission. It was provided with copious and detailed information on the matter. Before the Mission arrived in the Territory, it was presented with the report of the Commission of Inquiry instituted by the Belgian Government last January. On arriving at Usumbura, the Mission received from the Resident-General's offices numerous documents on the course of the incidents, the measures taken by the Administration to restore order and the proceedings of the judicial authority, including judgements given by the Military Court. The Mwami and the chief political parties have given the Mission detailed reports on the causes and course of the incidents which have also been the subject of many petitions.

195. The different documents submitted to the Mission vary in significance. The findings of the Military Court and the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry offer some guarantee of objectivity. But the reports of the political parties are by their very nature partisan documents. Moreover, in spite of the abundance of information supplied there are still many gaps. In this long series of dramatic events many points have not yet been cleared up and may never be, in spite of investigations. The Mission did not wish to devote all its time to the problem since there were questions concerning the future of the Territory which seemed to need the greater part of its attention.

196. In the following sections, the Mission has tried to describe the course of the incidents as concisely as possible. They contain not so much a chronological explanation as an analysis of a tragic and complicated episode in the history of Ruanda. From the bulk of the information received the Mission has only selected those items which it seemed possible to consider as reasonably objective. When opposing groups have advanced divergent views on some important points it has thought fit to mention them.

197. Three major series of actions emerge from a study of the incidents. There were first of all attacks by the Hutu against the Tutsi, then the reaction of the Tutsi against the Hutu and finally the measures taken by the Trusteeship

Authorities to put an end to the disturbances. Those three series of actions were sometimes consecutive and often simultaneous. For the sake of clarity they are described separately.

The Hutu attacks

198. The first serious incident which led to general disorder took place on 3 November. On 1 November at Byimana, in Ndiza (Giterama district), Dominique Mbonyumutwa, one of the few Hutu sub-chiefs at that time and a leader of PARMEHUTU, had been attacked by a band of young Tutsi. The attack on Mbonyumutwa caused great agitation among the local population which is mainly Hutu. The next day groups of Hutu began to demonstrate at Gitarama in front of the quarter of the Swahili who were known to be supporters of UNAR. Other groups attacked the house of chief Haguma, destroying his banana and coffee plantations. The following day, 3 November, when the false rumour went around that Mbonyumutwa had died, a crowd of Hutu gathered in front of the house of chief Gashagaza to protest: an affray ensued during which two Tutsi notables visiting the chief were killed and several others wounded. The same day another band of Hutu pillaged the house of Tutsi sub-chief Biriguza of Ndiza after beating him and several Tutsi who were in his house. The next day another Tutsi sub-chief Ruhinguka was attacked and killed in the neighbouring chiefdom of Marangaza.

199. The various versions of how these first incidents took place more or less tally, but they do not agree as to the immediate cause. UNAR and the Mwami maintained that the Mbonyumutwa affair had been contrived by the Hutu leaders in order to incite attacks against the Tutsi. According to the report of the UNAR regional committee of Astrida, Mbonyumutwa had himself asked close friends to circulate on 2 November a rumour of his death. This version is denied by the Hutu leaders, and particularly by Mbonyumutwa himself, who pointed out that the violent popular Hutu reaction on hearing of the attack on Mbonyumutwa was perfectly natural, as Tutsi leaders had been spreading the rumour since 29 October that the Hutu sub-chiefs would die in the next few days, see the end of the week and that all the Hutu fighters would die with him. They also maintained that the Hutu had attacked the house of chief Gashagaza because one of the Tutsi sub-chiefs at his house had provoked them first.

200. Whatever the truth of the matter may be, this first explosion of violence was the signal for a long series of incidents in which Hutu hordes pillaged and set fire to thousands of huts belonging to the Tutsi. The first fires were observed in Ndiza in the night of 3 to 4 November, and soon spread to neighbouring chiefdoms. After reaching on 4 November Marangaza and Rukoma (Gitarama district) and Bumbogo (Kigali district), the fires spread on the next day to Kingogo, Kanage and Bushivu (Kisenyi district) and Kibali (Ruhengeri district). On 6 November fires were observed in the chiefdoms of Buberuka, Bugarura and Bukonya (Ruhengeri district) and those of Bwishaza and Budana-Nyantango (Kibuye district). The following day the incendiaries were operating in the Bugoyi chiefdom (Kisenyi district) and going on from Ruhengeri were invading the Biumba district. Finally on 8 November the fires spread to Mulera and Rwankeri (Ruhengeri district) in the extreme north of the country.

201. It is impossible to describe the incidents of this phase in orderly sequence - the information collected is too confused and incomplete - but an attempt may be made to point out certain characteristic features. In some areas like Rukoma the incendiaries were soon halted by the Tutsi who when they recovered from the surprise of the attack, had time to organize their defence. Elsewhere, however, in chiefdoms in the north and north-west where the Tutsi were in a minority and their ascendancy only recent, fires went on for days until there was not a Tutsi hut left. Except for certain isolated cases, the last big fires were observed on 13 November.

202. The operations were generally carried out by a fairly similar process. Incendiaries would set off in bands of some tens of persons. Armed with matches and paraffin, which the indigenous inhabitants used in large quantities for their lamps, they pillaged the Tutsi houses they passed on their way and set fire to them. On their way they would enlist other incendiaries to follow in the procession while the first recruits, too exhausted to continue, would give up and return home. Thus day after day fires spread from hill to hill.

203. Generally speaking the incendiaries, who were often unarmed, did not attack the inhabitants of the huts and were content with pillaging and setting fire to them. The most serious incidents involving tragic wounding and death occurred when the Tutsi were determined to fight back, or when there were clashes with the forces

of order. Thus on 6 November in the Ruhengeri district, the sub-chief Nkundiye was killed trying to defend his home. On 8 November at Mabanza a troop of gendarmerie had to use force to disperse a band of incendiaries; two people were wounded and two died. On the same day in the Nyondo region where the Tutsi had organized their defence, skirmishes took place resulting in six deaths and several persons being wounded. The most serious incident was on 7 November at Rubengera, in the Kibuye district. The day before a band of about 200 Bakiga (Hutu dwelling in the mountainous regions of the Congo-Nile crest) launched an attack on the neighbouring chiefdom of Bwishaza, burning and pillaging all the Tutsi huts they found on their way. From Bwishaza the incendiaries, operating in groups of three to six persons, arrived at dawn on 7 November near Rubengera where the local population, Hutu and Tutsi, warned of their approach, had prepared their defence under the orders of the Tutsi chief. Surprised by the attack of the local population and weighed down with booty captured, they could only put up a sporadic resistance. More than fifty-eight incendiaries were therefore massacred.

204. It seems that the incendiaries were in most cases people of simple mentality who committed the worst excesses without realizing what they were doing. They burned and pillaged because they had been told to do so and because the operation did not seem to involve great risk and enabled them to seize loot in the victims' huts. Many of them genuinely believed they were acting in the name of the Mwami who, according to rumours spread, was being kept a prisoner by the Tutsi and had ordered their huts to be burned in order to drive them out of the country. For that reason some of the incendiaries sought him out on his tour of the country after the disturbances and asked to be paid for the work they had done for him. Furthermore when the military reconnaissance plane flew over the scene of the disturbances to track down the incendiaries the latter thought the Mwami was in the plane and that its course indicated the direction in which they were to start more fires. Others of them believed they were acting with the approval of the Belgian authorities. In certain places they went to the administrator of the district to ask him for paraffin. On 7 November at Kingogo, when a military patrol arrested a band of incendiaries and loaded them on its truck they were convinced that it was in order to conduct them further away to start more fires.

205. A great number of cases in connexion with the fires have already been tried by the Military Court. In most cases the Court gave the accused the benefit of extenuating circumstances because it concluded that they were people of simple

and primitive mentality who had unthinkingly executed orders given by certain leaders, and had been influenced by the tension and general excitement prevailing in the country at the time of the disturbances.

206. If it was established that these outbreaks were not largely spontaneous but that the incendiaries acted on orders, the question would arise as to who gave those orders. UNAR accused the Hutu leaders and even certain officials of the Administration of having incited the Hutu population to burn the Tutsi huts. Such an accusation was denied by the persons incriminated and the judicial authorities in their very searching inquiries did not think the charge sustained.

The Tutsi reaction

207. From 6 November onwards, the Tutsi leaders took a series of counter-measures to stop the revolt of the Hutu. The Hutu parties maintain that those measures were part of a plan of attack prepared as far back as October to decapitate the Hutu movements and that operations were directed by the principal leaders of UNAR whose headquarters are in the Ibwami (the Mwami's palace) at Nyanza, and by the Mwami himself. UNAR on the other hand claimed that the Tutsi reaction was an act of legitimate self-defence. It pointed out that at the beginning of the riots the Mwami had asked the Governor to take steps to restore order or failing that to authorize him to do so himself. The Governor's reply, however, was slow to arrive and in the meantime the disturbances were taking a more and more dangerous turn. The population therefore, tired of waiting for action by the Belgian authorities that failed to materialize, decided to take the necessary defence measures and reprisals. This version corresponds for the most part to the views expressed by the Mwami. In this connexion the Resident-General stated in his speech of 3 March 1960 that the UNAR leaders had apparently wished to seize an opportunity of taking some striking action in order to impress the "little" people and to neutralize movements hostile to UNAR policy by attempting to deprive them of their most valuable representatives and spokesmen.

208. From 6 to 10 November, a number of commando parties were organized to arrest or kill certain Hutu leaders. On 6 November, Secyugu, a Hutu trader known to be a supporter of PARMEHUTU, was attacked and killed in his house near Nyanza by an armed band led by the Twa chief Rwevu. During the two succeeding days a number of other Hutu, among them Nsokana, Habarugera, Barekeraho, Tirizibwami, Gatabazi, Zebuzishi, Ntagobwa and Callixte Kabayisa were assassinated in similar circumstances in the Nyanza and Gitarama districts. On 8 November, the riots

spread to the Astrida district, where a councillor of APROSOMA, Innocent Mukwiye Polepole, was attacked and killed, while in the Nyanza district several other Hutu leaders were killed including "monitors" Sindibona and Munyandekwa. On 10 November, the same fate befell Joseph Kanyaruka, secretary and treasurer of APROSOMA, who had fled the day before with his family and livestock to take refuge with a relative, Elias Renhazo, residing in Urundi near the Ruanda boundary. An armed band, raised in the chiefdom on the borders of Ruanda, crossed the boundary and after encircling the house where Kanyaruka had taken refuge, killed him and his relative Renhazo with spears.

209. At the same time, other commando parties were carrying out arrests of Hutu who were taken to the Mwami at Nyanza. Some were immediately released at his orders, other were detained by him for several days. The Hutu parties alleged that the prisoners had been arrested in order to be questioned by the popular tribunal established by UNAR, that they were submitted to inhuman torture there and had been forced to sign forged documents intended to stultify possible judicial inquiries. UNAR, in its turn, affirmed that the prisoners were members of APROSOMA, or of PARMEHUTU, whom the population had spontaneously arrested and brought before the Mwami, that the latter had immediately sent the accused to the district administrator, except for a few whom he had kept at his house to protect them from popular reprisals. It must be added that some arrested persons had themselves asked to be taken to the Mwami to prove that they were not his enemies, and that others went there of their own accord to seek protection.

The culminating point in the Tutsi reaction may be taken to be 10 November, the date of the attack on the Savé hill, in Astrida district, on which the headquarters of APROSOMA and the house of its president, Mr. Joseph Habyarimana Gitera, were situated. That day, some thousands of persons divided in different columns were to carry out a converging attack on the hill in the hope of destroying the nest of APROSOMA. Their leaders had informed them that the attack had been ordered by the Mwami to punish APROSOMA members or even that the latter were keeping the Mwami prisoner at Savé. As the various columns reached the approaches to the hill at different times the district administrator accompanied by a small group of soldiers was able to block the way of each column of attackers and to turn them back, assisted greatly by the use of a megaphone.

Indeed, by speaking to them through the megaphone, he was able to convince the attackers that the Mwami had given no order to attack Savé and that on the contrary he had declared himself to be above political parties. The attackers then retreated without causing any more damage than the burning of a few huts. Unfortunately, after the Belgian authorities withdrew their forces another incident occurred on the hill during which six of the local Tutsi were killed by the Hutu. The attack of Savé was the last important incident of the second phase. After 10 November the repression organized by the Tutsi was quickly checked by the military action undertaken by the Belgian authorities.

211. The Tutsi attacks were fairly clearly a series of organized actions. At the very beginning of the disturbances, the customary authorities had collected armed troops totalling several thousand men around the Ibwami at Nyanza in order to guard and protect the Mwami. Such a measure was justified, according to UNAR, by the failure of the Trusteeship authorities to take action against Hutu violence and the threats of death to the Mwami announced by Hutu leaders. The majority of commando groups which took part in the attacks against the Hutu were formed of those armed troops. Each commando party amounted to some hundreds of persons or more, and included a majority of Hutu, but the leaders were generally Tutsi or Twa. The group would set off on its mission with very definite instructions. In other cases, emissaries were sent out from Nyanza with verbal orders instructing them to bring back or kill certain persons, and permitting them to appeal to local authorities for armed forces to be assembled on the spot to help them in their mission. It seems to be an established fact, moreover, that in many cases a commando group set out with orders only to arrest a person, but in effect killed him, either because he resisted arrest or because some attackers had the instinct to kill.

212. The Mission has already mentioned the different theories concerning the origin and nature of the attacks and the persons who must be considered responsible for them. The Mission was informed that in these incidents, as in those of the Hutu phase, the majority of the attackers thought they were acting in the name of the Mwami. The episode of the Savé hill is revealing. Many assailants arrested stated that they had received orders to attack from the highest customary authorities and in that connexion gave the name of several

/...

UNAR leaders. The Military Court found that the evidence collected was sufficiently serious for it to proceed on that assumption, and in many cases it imposed heavy penalties on UNAR leaders for having provoked attack without necessarily having taken direct part in them. Thus chief Hormisdas Mbanda was sentenced to death for having ordered the assassination of Kanyaruka. In two less serious cases, François Rukeba, president of UNAR, was sentenced to six years of penal servitude in the case concerning Secyugu and chief Michel Kayihura, vice-president of the same party, was sentenced to nine years of penal servitude in the case concerning Sindibona and Munyandekwa.

Measures taken by the Administering Authority

213. In normal times the Ruanda security forces include five police platoons of 51 men each and seven sections of 13 men each. The officers in charge of the platoons are Europeans; the soldiers and non-commissioned officers are of Congolese origin. Three of the platoons are stationed at Kigali, and the two others at Ruhengeri and Astrida respectively; the seven sections are distributed among the chief towns of the other districts. It can be argued that these forces were barely adequate to maintain public order in normal circumstances. Some time before the disturbances, the military authorities drew up a five-stage plan of action, under the title "general disturbances", for use in the event that difficulties occurred. The first stage would make available to the commandant of Ruanda three mobile units; each unit would include a score of men and some jeeps and would be commanded by a European platoon leader. Two of these units were to come from Usumbura and the third from the Belgian Congo. In the second stage, the platoons stationed at Kigali would be deployed and sent to the places where disturbances were reported. In the three later stages, reinforcements were to be transferred from the Belgian Congo and placed at the orders of the military authorities; two platoons and a light aeroplane would be transferred in the third stage, a company reinforced by a reconnaissance unit in the fourth stage and another reinforced company in the fifth.

214. The first stage of the plan was put into force on 24 October. From that date onwards there were circulating on the main roads a platoon was sent from Kigali to Gikarama on 2 November, following the attack against sub-chief Mbonyumutwa.

(On the evening) of 3 November, a District administrator from the Residency of Kigali went to Gitarama to survey the situation. After he had moved about the area all night, he stated that, in view of the darkness and communications difficulties, it was impossible to apprehend the arsonists and the disturbances might become generalized. The following day the Administration put into effect simultaneously the second, third and fourth stages of the military plan. On 5 November it decided to put the fifth and last stage into force. During the night of 6 November the last reinforcements arrived in Ruanda, bringing the strength of the security forces to seventeen platoons.

215. However, in the early days of the disturbances the security forces available proved inadequate to restrain the arsonists. At each alarm administrators went to the disturbed areas with the soldiers they had available. They dispersed the crowds that formed on the hills, erected roadblocks to stop the spread of the disturbances and at the same time sought to quiet the uprising by meeting with the Hutu leaders and by exhorting the people to be calm. But such efforts were often vain: the police roadblocks were easily evaded and, although the crowds dispersed without resistance at the first demand, they reformed immediately after the departure of the security forces to continue setting fires. Thus, the acts of arson spread rapidly from Ndiza to the neighbouring chiefdoms, particularly towards the north and northwest of the country.

216. During this period the Mwami had not been inactive. As reported above, the tribal authorities of Nyanza assembled armed troops around the Ibwami (the Mwami's Palace) at the beginning of the disturbances. On 5 November the Mwami issued a proclamation condemning the riots and affirming that he was the Mwami of all nationals of Ruanda without distinction. On the same day, in an interview with the Governor at Nyana, the Mwami, pointing out that the Administering Authority had hitherto failed to stop the burning of the Tutsi dwellings, demanded permission to have the tribal authorities establish order. This permission was refused.

217. It may be worthwhile to digress here to mention an incident which occurred after the interview and which shows how dangerous the state of tension had become. When the Governor, accompanied by the Resident of Ruanda, reached his car, a large crowd surrounded him and asked him either to guarantee that order

would be restored or to permit the tribal authorities to restore order. When the Governor refused to give the requested permission (some allegations have been made that the Resident made an unfortunate reply), the crowd became threatening and began to ransack the official car. The Mwami had to intervene in order to rescue the Governor and the Resident and to drive them in his own car to Kigali.

218. During the night of 6 November, the last formations provided under the military plan had arrived in position, but the military authority was unable to send the reinforcements provided into the northern areas to check the burnings. As the Tutsi reaction has just been unleashed, a large part of the available forces now had to be used to meet this new danger.

219. On that day the Mwami, in a telegram sent simultaneously to the King, the Belgian Parliament and the Governor, repeated his demand for permission to restore order by his own methods. The Governor again categorically rejected his demand and took additional steps to ensure order in Ruanda. He issued a decree placing the entire country in a state of "military operation" (opération militaire) and put all the civil and military authorities under the command of Colonel Guy Logiest. The proclamation of military operation entailed a ban on all gatherings, restriction on road traffic, application of a curfew between 6 p.m. and 5.30 a.m., pacification of the interior by the security forces, and authorization for these forces to use arms, after warning has been issued, against violators of the above measures. The population was acquainted with this order on 9 November by a joint proclamation of the Governor and the Mwami; at the same time they appealed to the people to cease the fratricidal struggle. Furthermore, the Governor decided to reinforce the units already on the spot by four new companies transferred from the Belgian Congo, including two companies of Belgian para-commandos. Lastly, by an order of 11 November 1959 the Governor declared a state of emergency (état d'exception) in all the district of Ruanda and appointed Colonel Logiest as Military Resident in place of the Resident. The state of emergency gave the Military Resident certain emergency powers, including authority to order day and night searches, to place persons under surveillance, to ban associations, publications and meetings, and to suspend the dispatch and receipt of the post. As a result of these measures, the intensity of the disturbances began to diminish rapidly, and on 14 November it could be said that quiet had been restored in the country.

220. The Administration's attitude during the disturbances was severely criticized by UNAR. This organization charged the district authorities and the security forces with having been present and done nothing during the first Hutu attacks on the Tutsi and asserted that, because of their failure to act, the burnings had been allowed to spread and to reach the numbers they had. The same authorities, on the other hand, had used force to combat the Tutsi crowds when they took counter-measures to defend themselves. In particular, UNAR accused the Belgian authorities of having machine-gunned crowds that were on the defensive, made arbitrary arrests and tortured arrested persons. The Hutu parties, on the other hand, approved the action taken by the Administration to suppress violence. They had been disappointed at the weakness shown by the Administration during October in the face of what they considered as UNAR intimidation and terrorist acts. The forceful measures taken in November had restored their confidence in the Administration.

221. On this question the Commission of Inquiry felt that the military action had been carried out with the greatest possible rapidity, precision, coolness and effectiveness, and that it reflected a firm desire to avoid any bloodshed. The Commission believed that, although the country was very unsuited to military action, mountainous and with few means of communications, and although the lack of co-operation by a part of the population raised obstacles, the Force publique had succeeded within several days in putting an end to the disturbances with a minimum loss of human life. It had the clear impression that everything possible had been done to avoid needless brutality.

222. Lastly the Commission noted that the Force publique had never made arrests on its own authority, save against looters, arsonists, and gang-leaders caught in the commission of crime, that during the pacification period arrests had always been made in the presence of a judge or criminal police officer, and that prisoners had never been examined by the army but had been immediately handed over to the judicial authorities responsible for investigations.

Outcome of the disturbances and of subsequent events

223. During nearly two weeks Ruanda was torn by extremely violent fratricidal struggles, the exact results of which will undoubtedly never be known. According

to the information received, there are about 200 dead. The actual figure is surely much higher, for the people, when they can, prefer to carry off their dead and bury them silently. An official communiqué issued on 23 November stated that at that date the number of persons wounded in the disturbances who were hospitalized or given first aid in hospitals had reached 317, but probably many wounded had left without seeking attention. The account of the damage, which includes, in addition to dwellings burned, plantations sacked, livestock killed and personal goods pillaged, is still being prepared and probably will never be fixed exactly.

224. Many problems inherited from the November crisis relating to prosecutions, refugees, interim tribal authorities and maintenance of order are particularly urgent. They are considered in the following sections.

(a) Prosecutions

225. Under Legislative Order No. 081/225 of 12 November 1959, in areas under martial law all persons are subject to the jurisdiction of the Military Court. With respect to non-military persons, the Military Court applies only the criminal laws enacted for civilians. Its decisions are not subject to appeal, except when the death penalty has been pronounced. The Governor called on professional magistrates, who were also reserve officers, to preside over the Military Court. Thus, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Lamy was appointed chief judge, and Major J. Guffens deputy judge.

226. One thousand one hundred and forty-three persons were arrested during and after the November disturbances. The number of cases brought reached 207. The Military Court declared itself without jurisdiction to deal with 28 of them. By 30 March 1960 135 cases involving 1,013 defendants had been decided. About 85 per cent of these cases involve pillaging and arson, and the remainder are murder cases. Two death sentences have been pronounced.

226. In an interview with the Mission, Lt-Colonel Lamy declared that the Military Court, which had sat continuously for four months, had insisted on examining all the cases in the most meticulous manner. The defendants had been provided with all safeguards. In serious cases they had had the benefit of legal aid. Moreover, care had been taken always to use two interpreters, one

Hutu and one Tutsi, and to have the interpretation supervised by a European. A commission of the League for the Rights of Man had come to investigate and had found the procedure adopted satisfactory.

228. It must be noted that some UNAR leaders fled to Tanganyika and Uganda to avoid prosecution. Several of them have been sentenced in absentia by the Military Court. After the disturbances the Military Resident, using the emergency powers invested in him under the state of emergency, placed a certain number of people under a system of prescribed resident. As of 22 March 1960, forty-two people were under these restrictions.

(b) The refugee problem

229. More than 5,000 dwellings were burned during the disturbances. The inhabitants of these dwellings, almost all of them Tutsi, had to seek refuge in missions and Administration buildings. The number of these refugees rose to more than 7,000, most of whom were in the Ruhengeri district. In some areas they were able to return to their homes once the height of the disturbances had passed, and sometimes the local Hutu even agreed to help them rebuild their dwellings. In other areas, particularly in the Rugengeri district where the Tutsi were only a very small minority of the population and had been established only recently, the Hutu population was, on the contrary, fiercely opposed to their resettlement.

230. In his speech of 3 March 1960, the Resident-General explained the steps which the Administration had taken to meet this problem. He said, in substance, that the Administration was not able by military force to re-establish hundreds of Tutsi in their lands when thousands of peasants, who had expelled them, clearly showed a fierce will to prevent their resettlement. First, the Administration gave the refugees who were temporarily housed in the missions food, blankets and medical care. Then, it decided to establish a reception centre outside the disturbed areas. Thus, at great cost and with much care, a shelter camp was constructed at Nyamata, 20 km. to the south of Kigali, and all the refugees who voluntarily expressed the wish to go there were transported by truck. The Resident-General announced that, as the third stage in the refugee rehabilitation operation, activity had been under way since the beginning of the

year to open two settlement zones in the areas that had been reserved since before the November events in a programme which was to be financed by the European Economic Community. The refugees would receive special assistance in resettling there, while in the chiefdoms they came from steps would be taken to ensure the recovery of their livestock, the transfer under official supervision of the lands and harvests they had abandoned and compensation for the damages they had suffered.

231. Unfortunately, the refugee problem, far from improving continued to deteriorate still more during and after the Mission's visit. During March the Hutu again began to burn the huts of the Tutsi in the Biumba and Kisenyi districts. During the week of 10 to 16 April, following a dispute between the Hutu and the Tutsi, another succession of Tutsi hut burnings was reported in the Astrida district. The number of refugees increased substantially as a result of these fires.

232. At the Mission's request the Belgian Administration gave it a report on the refugee situation as of 19 April 1960. According to this report, there were at that date 22,000 refugees divided in the following manner:

Kigali	+ 5,000 installed in the Nyamata camp
	+ 1,000 at large
Biumba	+ 8,500 distributed throughout the district
Kisenyi	+ 1,500 concentrated at Nyondo
	+ 500 at large
Astrida	+ 3,000 in the process of being assembled at Mugombwa
Gitarama and Nyanza	+ 2,000 at large

233. Steps have been taken by the Administration to place the refugees in reception centres such as the one at Nyamata, or, whenever it has proved feasible, to help them resettle in the area from which they came. Supervisory committees have been set up in the affected areas to facilitate the resettlement of refugees. Unfortunately these steps have not yet brought entirely satisfactory results.

234. The Administration has attributed this lack of success to the hostile attitude of the Tutsi leaders. It has pointed out that the refugee problem had been "made political" everywhere and that this problem had remained acute because the Tutsi leaders had wished it so for political reasons. In the view of the Administration, it was absolutely certain that if the Tutsi leaders and

the Mwami changed their attitude the great majority of refugee cases would be closed without delay by installation at Nyamata or by resettlement in the area from which they came. The district authorities throughout the country were making sustained efforts to find those who would lead the way and would induce others to follow their example. Some initial success had just been reported at Astrida, where in one day the district administration had succeeded, in co-operation with the tribal authorities, in resettling 1,200 of the 3,000 refugees in the area. The Administration stressed that this had been possible because, before negotiations were undertaken, the ringleaders had been separated from the mass of refugees.

(c) The problem of interim authorities

235. During the Hutu revolt many Tutsi chiefs or sub-chiefs, particularly in the north and northwest of the country, had been driven from their posts. During the Tutsi reaction, many other chiefs and sub-chiefs took part directly or indirectly in attacks against the Hutu; those chiefs were killed in encounters with the security forces or arrested by the judicial authorities. Others were removed from office by the Administration; others resigned voluntarily in the face of opposition from the local Hutu population.

236. In filling the vacant posts, the Administration chose Hutu by preference. The following table gives the number of chiefs and sub-chiefs in Ruanda as of 1 November 1959 and as of 1 March 1960:

	<u>1 November 1959</u>	<u>1 March 1960</u>
Total number of chiefdoms	45	45
Vacant chiefdoms	2	1
Tutsi chiefs	43	22
Hutu chiefs	-	22

	<u>1 November 1959</u>	<u>1 March 1960</u>
Total number of sub-chiefdoms	559	531 ^{1/}
Vacant sub-chiefdoms	-	17
Tutsi sub-chiefs	549	217 ^{2/}
Hutu sub-chiefs	10	297

237. In justification of Administration policy regarding the replacement of tribal authorities, the Resident-General stated in his speech of 3 March that, in driving the chiefs and sub-chiefs from office, the population of certain areas had created a practical situation which sprang from the very depths of popular will. Hence the Administration had to regard the abandoned posts as at least temporarily vacant and had to fill these posts provisionally. These were not final appointments but solely interim replacements; the future of the sub-chiefs would be decided in the communal elections and the future of the chiefs in the general reform now under way.

238. In answer to criticisms that the interim appointments were made practically on the basis of racial predominance, the Resident-General explained that the Administration could not do otherwise in the present excited state of public opinion. It considered that an interim Hutu appointee imposed by the district authorities would have been physically unable to exercise his functions in an area under strong Tutsi influence. In a solidly Hutu area, which had just been affected by a jacquerie, the sounding of the preferences of the inhabitants had very naturally led to the choice of Hutu interim appointees. Thus, when public opinion was once more calm, the free play of democratic institutions would have to be relied on to restore the balance best suited to maintain the harmonious interracial policy of Ruanda. The Resident General concluded, however, that while awaiting the next elections the method followed by the Administration had the advantages of allowing some 200 Hutu the chance to show their aptitude for political office, and yet of not making commitments for the future since the elections could always right any unfortunate choices.

1/ Twenty-eight sub-chiefdoms disappeared when they were merged with neighbouring sub-chiefdoms in November.

2/ Two of the 217 sub-chiefs are Swahili.

(d) The maintenance of order

239. Although it could be said on 14 November that order had been restored in Ruanda, an atmosphere of great tension continued to reign throughout the country. During the next few days, the security forces continued to patrol all roads. The judicial authorities actively prosecuted their inquiries to discover the instigators of the disturbances and made a very large number of arrests. Although no serious incident occurred, there were many malicious acts, such as the sabotage of bridges and mutilation of cattle. On 17 November, seeing that tension was mounting, the Military Resident decided to prohibit all meetings, whether public or private.

240. However, towards the end of November, a slight slackening of tension enabled the Administration to relax some of the security measures. Two companies of para-commandos left the Territory on 27 November and three days later the curfew was lifted and freedom of movement was restored. In a special communiqué dated 5 December, the Governor announced the Belgian Government's decision to place Ruanda under a "special resident system" and to appoint Colonel Logiest Special Civilian Resident. In that connexion, the Governor stated that a series of measures had been decided upon in order to end as soon as possible the exceptional Military Resident system, while ensuring the special administrative conditions required by the circumstances for the maintenance of order and the preparations for the elections and the new institutions announced in the Government statement. Belgium's intention to organize immediately a progressive programme for the self-government of Ruanda and Urundi implied immediate and radical changes in the powers of all the members of the Administration. The transformation of the Residents' rôle as a result of these reforms, would be one of the most radical in the whole re-organization plan. The Governor said that the disturbed situation in Ruanda made it undesirable that, when the Military Resident system came to an end, there should merely be a restoration of the status quo. In view of the fact that the present Resident was to go on his regular leave in March 1960, it was deemed advisable in order to facilitate the establishment of the new institutions and the negotiations to be held before the 1960 elections, that a temporary special resident system should be instituted and that the Resident should continue to exercise his extraordinary powers under the emergency régime now in force for as long as was necessary.

E. The plan of reforms and the political events after November 1959

241. On 10 November 1959, just as the disturbances in Ruanda were reaching their peak, the Belgian Government published a statement on its future policy in Ruanda-Urundi. It will be remembered that the Working Group established by the Belgian Government on 16 April 1959 to study the political problems of Ruanda-Urundi had submitted a very detailed report on 2 September 1959 which was published on 10 November. The Working Group concluded that it was necessary to effect radical political and administrative reforms in the Territory and made a certain number of proposals. The Government statement was largely based on the Working Group's report. In fact, all the Working Group's proposals were approved by the Government, with the exception of those relating to a community comprising Ruanda and Urundi.

242. The programme of reforms outlined in the Government statement^{1/} is based on the following ideas. The Belgian Government would first establish, taking into account the separate and distinct characteristics of the two States, a system of government for each State which would be given a progressive measure of autonomy subject to the general control of Belgium, exercised by the Resident-General and Residents. Next, while reiterating its conviction that it was essential to establish a community of the two States, the Belgian Government did not wish to define the terms of that community, but would merely propose to invite the two States to organize it, with Belgian assistance.

243. Having set out these guiding principles, the statement went on to define the political organization within each State as follows:

(a) The enlarged sub-chiefdoms and the extra-tribal centres, which would be reintegrated into the administration of the country, would become communes, the only basic decentralized political entities below the national level. A burgomaster and a communal council would constitute the organs of these communes. A transition period would be necessary before the communes are set up in their final form. In the mean time, the existing sub-chiefdoms

^{1/} The text of this statement is to be found in document T/1502.

extra-tribal centres and urban circonscriptions would become provisional communes which would in all probability elect their councils by universal suffrage during the first half of 1960. The Government was of the opinion that in principle both men and women should have the right to vote, but realized that material circumstances connected with the date at which the first elections would have to be held might oblige it to organize them on the basis of male suffrage only. These councils might elect one of their number as head of the provisional commune;

(b) The present chiefdoms would no longer be political entities and would become administrative circonscriptions. The present chiefs might be integrated into the general administration of the country, thus becoming officials with no political mandate. A transition period would have to be allowed for in this field also;

(c) On the State level, a new State council would be established and would exercise, jointly with the Mwami, the local legislative powers which would be progressively assigned to it. The great majority of the members of the State council would be elected by indirect suffrage, i.e. by an electoral college composed of the councils of the provisional communes. The Government expected the elections to take place early enough for the Council to take office in the second half of 1960. The State councils would function during the transition period, at the end of which other systems better suited to the wishes of the people might be adopted if desirable. Alongside each State legislature, a government would be set up whose head and departmental heads would be appointed or removed from office by the Mwami by agreement with the Resident. The Mwami, the constitutional head of the State, would remain outside the government and above parties. He would not govern and his public enactments would have to be countersigned by the government;

(d) With regard to the judicial power, the Trusteeship authorities would exercise special supervision in this matter to ensure the independence, competence and integrity of the judiciary. Should a community be set up, the administration of justice should be one of its functions;

(e) Government reform at the State level should imply the rapid fusion of the so-called tribal administration and the general administration. The result would be that many responsible offices would be entrusted to indigenous inhabitants; every effort would be made to ensure that this Africanization was effected with an eye to quality.

244. The statement dealt also with the institutions for the Trust Territory as a whole which must continue to function pending the establishment of the future community. This question is considered below.

245. The political organization of Ruanda-Urundi, the reform of which was announced in the Government statement, was the subject of an interim decree dated 25 December 1959.^{1/} This Decree described the organs of the provisional communes, the interim chiefdoms and the States. Lastly, it laid down certain guiding principles for the election of the members of the different councils and defined the Trusteeship to be exercised by Belgium over the administration of the Territory and the States. As indicated by its title, the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 was essentially provisional in character. In a speech to the people of Ruanda-Urundi on 19 January 1960, the Resident-General emphasised that this Decree showed "Belgium's determination to act promptly for reform and in order to bridge the gap between the past and the future work out arrangements which will answer the needs of the present and that its purpose was to start immediately changes, some of which might be lasting if they work out well and others be adjusted, amended or completely replaced, if, after agreement with the elected spokesmen of the people, the Administration deems that desirable".

246. The royal interim order of 25 January 1960 laid down a series of measures of application concerning administrative organization and opened the way for a fusion of the tribal administration and the general administration. It provided that the Residencies of Ruanda and Urundi should be replaced by States of the same name and that except for powers connected with general Trusteeship, the Resident-General should regulate the provisional transfer to the Government of the States of such administrative powers of the Residents and of the Vice-Governor-General as were only of regional interest.

^{1/} The text of the Interim Decree is to be found in document T/1501.

247. The organization of communal elections in Ruanda is dealt with in Ordinance No. 22/73 of 10 March 1960. The Interim Decree laid down certain principles regarding the electorate, eligibility and the distribution of seats and stipulated, in particular, that in the communal elections lists of candidates should be elected on the basis of proportionate representation. However, it left the Resident-General free to decide whether to limit suffrage to male voters and to determine the practical rules for the organization and conduct of elections. Under Ordinance No. 221/73, suffrage was restricted to male voters. The elections would be held from any time after 7 June 1960, the precise date at which they would take place in each circonscription being decided by the administrator of the district. The electoral lists were to be closed on 5 May 1960; an appeal against inclusion or non-inclusion on the lists might be made not later than 10 May to the administrator of the district, who should take a decision within ten days of receiving the complaint and at the latest by 20 May.

248. On 26 February, the Belgian Government proposed the inclusion in the provisional agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the Trusteeship Council of an item concerning the possibility of sending a United Nations observers group to supervise the elections to be held in June.

249. Ordinance No. 221/51 of 6 February, made some the provisions of the Interim Decree applicable to Ruanda and stipulated that the High Council of that State and its permanent delegation to the General Council should be dissolved and that until new institutions were established, the powers devolving upon those bodies were to be exercised by a provisional special council composed of six members appointed by the Resident-General. The membership of this provisional special council was later to be increased to eight so as to allow each of the four principal parties to have two representatives on it.

250. A permanent representative of the Mwami participates in the work of the provisional special council without the right of vote. The council has no chairman but its debates are directed by a Belgian official, who is to remain strictly neutral; he also has no right of vote. The inauguration of the provisional special council of Ruanda took place at Kigali on 4 February 1960, in the presence of the Resident-General. The Mwami was not present at the ceremony.

251. The provisional special council proved itself to be extremely active from the outset. In February, it studied and prepared a convention which was later signed between Ruanda and the Government to enable the Belgian Congo National Institute for Agronomic Studies (INEAC) to carry out experiments with pasture land in the Bugesera. The council made a trip to the ten districts of the State in order to examine the proposals prepared by the district administrators and the chiefs for the establishment of communes for the elections and, in collaboration with the local authorities, it worked out the details of the re-organization of the 544 existing sub-chiefdoms into 229 communes. On the same trip, it also discussed with the local authorities some financial problems connected mainly with the ibisigati (grazing estates), the ibikingi (pastoral fiefs) and the ubukonde (the right to clear forests). On its return to Kigali, the council, in collaboration with Mwami Kigeli V, drew up a circular which was published on 28 February in which the Mwami recognized the legality of the four big political parties and appealed for calm.

252. Among the events of the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1960, one should mention that, during the fourteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Fourth Committee granted a hearing on 9 November 1959 to Mr. Michel Rwagasana, representing UNAR^{1/}.

253. At the end of December 1959, the Belgian Government established a Commission of Inquiry composed of three Belgian personalities (Mr. F. Peigneux, Honorary Provincial Governor, Mr. G. Malengreau, Professor of the University of Louvain, and Mr. S. Frédéricq, Advocate of the Court of Appeal in Ghent) and requested it to report on the events of November in Ruanda. This Commission visited Ruanda from 7 to 17 January 1960 and submitted to the Government on 26 February a detailed report which was communicated to the Visiting Mission on its way through Brussels on 29 February. The Mission had the opportunity of meeting the three members of the Commission in Brussels on 1 March.

F. Situation in Ruanda at the time of the
Mission's visit

General

254. When the Visiting Mission arrived in Ruanda, the Belgian Administration had already begun making preparations for the communal elections to be held in June. Instructions had been sent to all those who were responsible for organizing them, an information campaign was being carried on to make the ordinary people familiar with the various electoral processes and the register of voters was being prepared.

255. The atmosphere in the country was still very tense. Memories of the November atrocities were still fresh in people's minds. Widows and orphans were still mourning their dead. Refugees, many of whom were in precarious circumstances, presented a very difficult problem which had to be solved quickly. Many people, arrested after the disturbances, had received heavy sentences, others were awaiting in prison their turn to be tried. A number of political leaders had gone into exile abroad, others were under house arrest.

256. The supporters of UNAR and those of the Hutu parties were still aggressively antagonistic to one another. The Hutu leaders and the Mwami distrusted one another. Moreover, the supporters of UNAR felt that the local Administration was treating them as if they were enemies and would not hesitate to use every possible means to prevent them from participating in the political life of Ruanda. Lastly, while official relations were correct, the Mwami and the Administering Authority were deeply suspicious of each other, which made very difficult that co-operation which was so necessary for the smooth running of the country's public affairs.

257. The Government statement of 10 November 1959 was partially accepted by some of the population and rejected by others, and had not resulted in the hoped-for reduction in tension. Many of the Ruandese felt that they had not been associated with the preparation of the statement and the measures to be taken to implement it even if they had had an opportunity to state their views to the Working Group in the preceding months. Many felt that it was not an acceptable compromise and did not feel in any way bound by it. The statement, moreover, was

open to conflicting interpretations. In failing to bridge the gulf separating the two groups in the population it had in no way succeeded in lessening the atmosphere of tension and mistrust. In order to preserve public order, the Belgian Administration had retained the emergency regulations which it had promulgated in Ruanda during the November disturbances under the title of the Special Residence system.

258. The Belgian Government's decision, taken in January 1960 during the Round Table Conference for the Belgian Congo, to grant independence to that Territory on 30 June 1960 came as a shock to people in Ruanda. By giving some grounds for hope and others cause for deep anxiety it had inevitably caused increased political tension there. Lastly the announcement of the arrival of the Visiting Mission also seemed to have played its part in increasing the general tension. In this country which is so susceptible to false reports; rumours of all kinds were in circulation: it was said that the arrival of the Visiting Mission was a victory for UNAR, because it was coming to hold an inquiry into the incidents which had occurred in November, to pass judgement on the Belgian Administration's action, to bring back the exiled leaders, to resettle the evicted Tutsi or to end the Belgian Trusteeship. Other rumours insisted that the Mission's visit foreshadowed massacres of the Hutu and the expulsion of the Belgians. In contrast, still others expected that it would proclaim the deposition of the Mwami and the establishment of a republic or the division of Ruanda into separate areas for Hutu and Tutsi. While awaiting the arrival of the Mission, the political parties assembled their supporters and prepared to organize mass demonstrations to show their strength. Fearing new outbreaks of violence and since there were no reinforcements of African police available in the Belgian Congo, the Administration brought a battalion of Belgian paratroopers from the Congo to assist the forces on the spot in maintaining order and protecting the Mission.

259. In its conversations with the Minister, Mr. De Schrijver, at Brussels on 29 February 1960 and with the Belgian authorities in the Territory at Usumbura in the first days after its arrival in the Territory, the Mission made a point of making perfectly clear its attitude towards the precautionary measures taken by the Administering Authority. While recognizing that the Administration was

responsible for maintaining peace and public order in the Territory and that it was incumbent on it to take all necessary measures to that end, the Mission did not wish to be associated with the military precautions which had been taken. It did not feel that it needed protection and hoped that, having decided what was required for the maintenance of order, the Administration would reduce security measures to the bare minimum necessary for that purpose.

260. The Special Resident for Ruanda informed the Mission that, according to the information which had reached him, the political parties intended to organize mass demonstrations during the Mission's stay and that these demonstrations might well cause disturbances the more so as UNAR was endeavouring to prove that the Belgian Administration was incapable of maintaining order. He also indicated that certain groups of demonstrators intended to erect barriers across the Mission's route. At the request of the Mission, he agreed to reduce military precautions to a bare minimum and not to have the Mission's convoy escorted by military vehicles. However, he considered it necessary to have the roads on the Mission's itinerary patrolled and to control the movement of people in the urban centres when the Mission was passing through them. In an endeavour to make the maintenance of order easier, the Mission decided to issue an appeal^{1/} to the public requesting it to remain calm and to avoid gathering in crowds. It also stated in the appeal that it wished to grant a hearing to everyone who wanted to meet it but asked people to come in groups of no more than ten persons.

261. Further, the Resident-General gave the Mission a categorical assurance that everyone who wished to see the Mission would be free to do so. When the Mission left Usumbura for Ruanda, he addressed a message^{2/} to the people, reminding them that anyone could freely contact the members of the Mission and that there was absolutely no reason for them to be afraid that they would be harassed because they had done so.

1/ See Annex I.

2/ See Annex II.

262. In point of fact, there were numerous mass demonstrations along the Mission's route. Tens of thousands of persons were massed along the roads which the Mission traversed. The Administration simply asked the supporters of opposing groups not to assemble in the same places or at least to range themselves on opposite sides of the road. It however prohibited the population, with the exception of delegations and individuals in possession of a laissez-passer, from entering certain urban areas where the Mission was staying.

263. The Mission none the less has no reason to believe that any individual or group which wanted to get into touch with it was prevented from doing so. At each place where it stopped the Mission received a very large number (frequently several hundred) requests for a hearing. If it had had to hear all the petitions separately, it certainly would not have been able to do so in the relatively short time at its disposal. But fortunately a satisfactory solution to the problem was found with the co-operation of the members of the provisional special council which accompanied the Mission during its tour of Ruanda. Since most of the petitioners requesting a hearing were members or supporters of the principal political parties, the Mission asked the members of the special council, who are the representatives of these parties, to arrange them in groups according to their parties and to request each group to appoint ten representatives to lay the group's views before the Mission. Further, there were no restrictions preventing anyone who wished to submit written documents to the Mission from doing so. This procedure proved to be perfectly satisfactory. Not only were the representatives of all the political parties able to state their views in detail, but the Mission also had time at each place where it sat to hear representatives of the Churches, members of non-political organizations and many private individuals both European and African. Thus the Mission was able to obtain the views of the most qualified representatives of the population on all the questions which were exercising their minds.

264. The Mission also had long discussions with the Resident-General and officials of his Administration. It likewise had many conversations with the Mwami and the tribal authorities in the localities which it visited. It received from all these sources a great deal of information which was extremely useful in the preparation of its report.

Political parties

265. Before indicating the views of the representatives of the various sections of the population on the problems facing Ruanda something must first be said about the political parties, which, although only recently formed, are now playing an important part in moulding public opinion in Ruanda. All along the route followed by the Mission, large crowds gathered to demonstrate their support for the views of one or other of the political parties and handed the members of the Mission tens of thousands of documents, letters and pamphlets. These demonstrations were obviously inspired by the political leaders.

266. There are now four main political parties in Ruanda which fall into three groups: the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR), the Rassemblement democratique, ruandais (RADER) and two parties, the Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (APROSOMA) and the Parti du mouvement de l'emancipation hutu (PARMEHUTU), whose aim is the advancement of the Hutu. All the indications are that UNAR, on the one hand, and the group of Hutu parties, on the other, have a great hold on the people. As to RADER, it certainly has a remarkably capable and active executive committee but it does not as yet seem to have any great influence on the mass of the people. Lastly, to complete the picture, attention is drawn to the fact that a number of small local political parties have been established very recently, among which are the Union des masses ruandaises (UMAR) at Rutongo, the Mouvement pour l'union ruandaise (MUR) at Shangugu, the Association des Bahutu évoluant pour la suppression des castes (ABESCA) at Rulindo, the Mouvement monarchiste ruandais (MOMOR) at Kisenyi, the Union des Aborozi africains du Ruanda (UAARU) at Gatsibu, the Union des intérêts communaux du Kinyaga (UNINTERCOKI) at Shangugu and the Alliance des Bakiga (ABAKI) at Kisenyi.

267. For greater clarity it is worth recalling briefly the general arguments advanced by the different parties as they were explained to the Mission on countless occasions.

268. The Hutu parties, APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU, stated that, whereas the Hutu constituted approximately 85 per cent of the total population, at the beginning of November there was not a single Hutu among the forty-five chiefs, only ten Hutu sub-chiefs out of a total of 449, and only one Hutu among the thirty-three members of the High Council of the State. In secondary schools less than

30 per cent of the children were Hutu and in higher educational institutes less than 10 per cent. Of the African auxiliary staff in the Administration barely 12 per cent were Hutu. This disproportion was not the result of chance but of actual discrimination, giving the Tutsi oligarchy the monopoly of all the strategic positions providing stepping-stones to power and designed to ensure the continuance of the "Tutsi feudal system" and the enslavement of the Hutu. The Hutu wanted a democratic régime to be established which would do away with all privileges based on class, a genuine democracy which would only be brought about by a revolution - preferably peaceful - of the oppressed peasant classes. In principle the Hutu parties would accept - although on this point their views underwent a change during the Mission's visit - a constitutional monarchy provided the Mwami was not the symbol, the instrument or the prisoner of the reactionary Tutsi oligarchy. Otherwise, the establishment of a republican régime would have to be considered.

269. In the opinion of the Hutu parties, the only chance the Hutu had of achieving their aims lay in the continuation for some time of Belgian-Trusteeship, in which the Hutu parties had confidence despite the fact that in the past the Administration had given their support to the Tutsi. It was only after all the country's institutions had become democratic, after free elections had been held, judicial reforms and radical changes in the land tenure system had been effected, and the economic, social and cultural advancement of the peasant masses had occurred that there could be any question of self-government and thereafter of independence. Thus democracy would have to precede independence. Premature independence would only ensure the permanent supremacy of the Tutsi and their continued exploitation of the Hutu. No confidence could be placed in the promises and statements of the Tutsi, who were past masters in the art of hypocrisy, deceitfulness and intrigue. If it should prove impossible to come to terms with them, the country could, through population transfers, be divided into predominantly Hutu and predominantly Tutsi areas within a federal system. The Hutu parties claimed that they spoke for all the Hutu, in other words for 85 per cent of the population, not only for those who were politically conscious and organized, but also for those who through ignorance, fear, servility and tradition, or because of the high repute in which they held the institution of Mwami, were supporting the old régime either passively or actively.

270. The RADER party felt that the Hutu people, comprising 85 per cent of the population of Ruanda, were justified in their desire for emancipation and that their social claims were understandable. But it opposed the racism on which it considered some other claims are based. It criticized the present attitude of the Hutu parties and the Administration which it alleged had since November 1959 been systematically favouring the Hutu at the expense of the Tutsi - for instance in the nomination of chiefs and sub-chiefs, which had been done without taking into account the merits, training or experience of the candidates. RADER was strongly opposed to the division of Ruanda into Tutsi and Hutu areas. It advocated a constitutional monarchy but had some doubts about the Mwami personally since he appeared to be the prisoner of a political party. It had thought that beginning in 1964 internal self-government could gradually be introduced in Ruanda and that the Trusteeship Administration could probably be terminated in 1968. Later it expressed the view that the country might become independent in 1963. It had confidence in Belgium.

271. UNAR described itself as a traditionalist, monarchist and nationalist movement, which was neither feudal, reactionary, xenophobe, anti-catholic nor anti-Belgian. That the ruling classes in Ruanda were mainly made up of Tutsi, was due not only to historical factors but also to the action of the Administering Authority. It constituted a social, economic and political problem which could be solved through the democratic development of the country. UNAR alleged that the Administration, certain dignitaries of the Catholic Church and certain Europeans had cunningly stirred up the Hutu against the Tutsi and tried to make the problem into a racial problem in order to delay the country's progress towards independence. The great majority of the Hutu were, moreover, loyal to the Mwami and to the traditions of Ruanda. UNAR was in favour of democracy and the constitutional monarchy, on which question it would moreover agree to the holding of a referendum. It stood for universal suffrage and the election of the country's legislative and executive organs. It had called for self-government in Ruanda in 1960 and independence in 1962. Since the incidents in November, however, the party had lost all confidence in the Administration and wanted immediate independence and the termination of Belgian Trusteeship.

272. UNAR also asked for a general amnesty for all political prisoners, the return to the country of its exiled leaders, the lifting of the emergency regulations, the resettlement of the refugees in the areas from which they had been driven out, the presence in Ruanda of a United Nations commission until the proclamation of independence and the formation of a provisional government or an executive council with indigenous and European members.^{1/}

Questions raised by political parties

273. The main questions which now divide the people of Ruanda and their leaders can therefore be divided into two groups - one relating to the disturbances in November 1959 and the other to the future of the country. They are dealt with in greater detail in subsequent sections.

(i) Questions relating to the disturbances in November 1959

274. The questions relating to the disturbances in November 1959 which have been most frequently raised before the Mission concern the causes of the disturbances and the responsibilities of the different groups therefor; the problem of the refugees; the provisional administration and lastly the exercise of political freedoms. For greater clarity the views of the political parties on each of these questions are set out separately.

(a) Causes of the disturbances and responsibilities therefor

275. For the Hutu parties, the underlying cause of the disturbances in November was the Hutu-Tutsi problem, which the Mission has already described, and the immediate cause was provocation and acts of terrorism on the part of UNAR. The Belgian Administration, according to them, is trying to put the existing state of affairs right but is encountering opposition on the part of the Tutsi leaders.

^{1/} After the Mission had left the Territory, UNAR held a congress in Kigali on 17 and 18 April 1960. The resolutions adopted by the congress are contained in document T/PET.3/L.19.

Because of this opposition, the Hutu who are the great majority of the population are still ruled by a Tutsi minority. The Tutsi leaders have established a political party whose aim is to strengthen their traditional supremacy and whose methods are terrorism and the extermination of the Hutu leaders. To prove their point the Hutu parties quoted the words allegedly used by the leaders of UNAR at the meeting organized by the party at Kigali on 13 September 1959, the numerous pamphlets distributed by this party insulting and threatening the Hutu leaders, in particular a black list of ten persons who were to be eliminated as enemies of the Mwami - and lastly the numerous acts of terrorism perpetrated by UNAR during the months of September and October. They stated again that although the Mwami may have said that he was above political parties he had never stopped supporting UNAR and that, in face of this coalition the Administration had shown a disquieting lack of firmness. Because of this weakness the rumours started by UNAR to the effect that the Belgians were soon going to depart and leave the Hutu at the mercy of the Tutsi were making the people more and more uneasy. In the last days of September, a fresh rumour had spread through the hills to the effect that the expected Government statement was going to proclaim the immediate independence of the country. The anxiety of the Hutu was thus at its height. They were convinced that after the Belgians had departed the Tutsi were going to massacre all the Hutu leaders and restore the feudal system. In these circumstances the only solution remaining open to them was to fight like madmen. Such was, the Hutu parties came to the conclusion, the general atmosphere created in Hutu political circles by the policy of UNAR on the eve of the disturbances. The attack on Mbonyumutwa was considered by them as the immediate cause of the incidents.

276. The views of the Hutu parties were shared by RADER. This party also felt that it was the Hutu masses' fear of falling under Tutsi domination again which caused the outbreak of violence against the Tutsi. It considered that this fear was absolutely justified both because of the acts of terrorism committed by UNAR, not only against the members of the Hutu parties but also against the Tutsi in RADER, and because of the lack of firmness displayed by the Administration in the face of these acts of terrorism.

277. UNAR, for its part, regarded the "policy of division" carried out by the Administration as the main cause of the November crisis. It was not a popular uprising. If there was a Hutu-Tutsi problem in Ruanda, and moreover it was a social rather than a racial problem, it was because the Administration had refused to adopt the right solutions at the appropriate time. As soon as the "Statement of views" and the "Manifesto of the Rahutu" appeared it should have arranged for discussions between the two opposing groups so that they could have worked out together such reforms as were needed for the emancipation of the country. That was possible because, in spite of their differences, the two documents had a common aim in view, that of the emancipation of the country. But instead of looking for the common points the Administration had emphasized ~~that~~ their opposing views. To delay the moment of emancipation, it had made the Hutu parties believe that the Tutsi were against the introduction of democratic ideas in the country and that the only way for the Hutu to liberate themselves from their former servitude was to do so under the Belgian Administration. Encouraged and protected by the Administration, the Hutu leaders had set up organizations based on racial hatred and had engaged in violent attacks on the Tutsi in general and the Mwami in particular. This policy had also been supported by some of the Catholic missions whose newspapers, such as Temps nouveaux d'Afrique and Kinyamateka, continuously exhorted the Hutu to resist the Tutsi. When UNAR had been established the Administration had engaged in a systematic persecution of this party. Whereas the other parties were never harassed, it prohibited or sabotaged the meetings organized by UNAR and continuously persecuted its members or supporters, as in the affair of the three chiefs. This attitude encouraged the Hutu leaders to resort to violence to achieve their political aims.

278. The UNAR account agrees with that given by the Mwami to the Mission in several conversations and in the report which he submitted to it on this subject.

279. The Resident-General refrained from expressing an official opinion on the immediate causes of the disturbances but officials in the Belgian Administration with whom the Mission spoke did not hide their sympathy with the opinions expressed by the Hutu parties.

280. As to the Catholic missions, they seem to be divided on the subject. While the official attitude of the Church might appear favourable to the Hutu parties on questions of social reform, several influential Catholic dignitaries were in sympathy with UNAR, as were most of the representatives of the Protestant missions.

(b) The refugee problem

281. The refugee problem, as it appeared on the Mission's arrival in the Territory, has been outlined above. The following are the views of the political parties on this matter.

282. UNAR protested strongly against the transfer of refugees to the Bugesera which it considered an inhuman step. It maintained that these refugees wished to return to their homes where their neighbours were preparing to welcome them and assist their resettlement. The Administration had, however, prevented them from doing so and had forced them to go to an arid region infested with tsetse flies, making them believe that they would be massacred by the Hutu if they stayed behind. UNAR recommended solving the problem by the immediate and general resettlement of the refugees.

283. The Hutu parties considered that there was no need to reintegrate the Tutsi refugees. When the Hutu people had expelled the Tutsi from their homes and occupied their lands it had simply recovered the property which the Tutsi conquerors had taken from them by force in the past. If they now had to accept the return of the Tutsi the Hutu people would be compelled to resort to new acts of violence.

284. RADER, like UNAR, requested the Administration to resettle the refugees on their lands. While admitting that there was a land tenure problem between the Hutu from certain regions and the Tutsi who had settled there during the last few decades, it considered that the Administration had no right to look on passively at acts of injustice even if caused by a political situation which was unfair towards a particular social class. RADER requested that, in addition to the resettlement of the refugees, the persons who had committed acts of pillage and theft should be punished and that property taken from the Tutsi should be restored to its rightful owners.

285. The Mission has set forth above the reasons given by the Resident-General to justify the Administration's policy with regard to the refugee problem arising from the November disturbances. It has also explained how this problem has been aggravated following new outbursts which occurred in the districts of Biumba, Kisenyi, Gitarama and Astrida in March and April.

(c) The problem of the interim authorities

286. As stated above many chiefs and sub-chiefs were killed or driven from their areas at the time of or following the November disturbances. Others have resigned and still others have been removed from office by the Administration. To fill the vacant posts the Administration appointed interim authorities of whom the majority are Hutu.

287. UNAR asserted that the appointment of the interim authorities was a proof of the policy of persecution which the Administration was carrying out against it. It pointed out the removal of chiefs and sub-chiefs had been aimed almost exclusively at members of UNAR and its sympathizers whereas those replacing them were always in favour of the Hutu parties. Moreover, the most highly regarded chiefs and sub-chiefs were among those removed from office. UNAR considered that this inconsistency in its judgements proves that the Administration did not carry out the reorganization in a progressive spirit.

288. RADER was also perturbed by the Administration's policy in the appointment of chiefs and sub-chiefs. It considered that by appointing Tutsi in the predominantly Tutsi areas and Hutu in the predominantly Hutu areas, the Administration was likely to encourage division between the two races and to sow the seeds of future troubles. RADER recommended a progressive policy which would give at least 50 per cent of the appointments to Hutu before the next elections and replace all Tutsi chiefs who are inefficient or too old to adapt themselves to the present development of the country. It also considered that the best chiefs and sub-chiefs who had been deprived of their positions should be reinstated on condition, however, that they would not be subject to legal proceedings.

289. On the other hand, the Hutu parties approved the Administration's policy in the appointment of new chiefs and sub-chiefs. They held that, since the Hutu comprised 85 per cent of the population it was only proper that the same proportion of chiefs and sub-chiefs should be Hutu. They protested against the Mwami's refusal to approve the appointments of the interim authorities and regarded his refusal as indicating a desire to perpetuate Tutsi domination.

(d) The exercise of political rights

290. The political parties put before the Mission a certain number of questions concerning the exercise of political rights. The most important of these questions concern the emergency regime, alleged acts of persecution committed by the Administration against UNAR members, alleged acts of terrorism or intimidation by UNAR, and lastly the question of an amnesty.

291. UNAR accused the Belgian Administration of conducting a policy of persecution against members of the party or its sympathizers. It stated that since November many leaders of the party have been imprisoned or placed under house arrest; others have had to flee abroad in order to escape persecution; lastly, many chiefs or sub-chiefs have been transferred or removed from office because they belong to UNAR. It protested against the continuance of the state of emergency in Ruanda and alleged that the Administration was using the exceptional powers it possessed under the emergency in order to prevent the free exercise of political rights. It requested the immediate cessation of the state of emergency and the proclamation of a general amnesty.

292. At the time when the Mission was about to begin its visit to Ruanda UNAR protested against the security measures taken by the Administration and alleged that the aim of these measures was to prevent the inhabitants and particularly UNAR sympathizers from having contact with the Mission.

293. The Hutu parties were opposed to the cessation of the state of emergency. In their view, UNAR alone was responsible for the state of tension in the country. They accused it of spreading confusion among the population by circulating all kinds of false rumours and committing acts of intimidation and terrorism against those who opposed it. They also complained that the Mwami, though he had several times stated that he was above party politics, gave full support to UNAR. The Hutu parties expressed their conviction that the country would never be able to return to normal conditions if UNAR, with the Mwami's backing, was allowed to continue its evil activity. They therefore requested the dissolution of UNAR and the dethronement of the Mwami.

294. More recently several Hutu leaders suggested that the country should be divided geographically into separate Hutu and Tutsi areas to allow the country to return to normal conditions. While recognizing the disadvantages of a

geographical division of the country, they pointed out that there was no other solution if UNAR was not to be dissolved.

295. RADER also protested against the intimidation policy of UNAR and pointed out that this policy was not only directed against the Hutu but also against the Tutsi members of RADER. RADER was also against the return of the exiled UNAR leaders to Ruanda and suggested that the condemned UNAR leaders should be sent to prison far away from Ruanda.

(ii) Questions concerning the political future of Ruanda

296. During meetings of the Mission with the political parties and other groups in Ruanda, four questions concerning the political future of the country were constantly raised: the question of the communal elections to be held in June, the Belgian Government's plans for reforms, the monarchy and independence. Although these questions are closely connected, the Mission proposes, for greater clarity, to set forth the views of the political parties on each question separately.

(a) The communal elections

297. The Belgian Government's plan of reforms rests on the constitution of provisional communes. The organization of communal elections was laid down by an ordinance of 10 March 1960 of the Resident-General according to which the elections would take place from 7 June. Moreover, the Belgian Government, in its letter of 26 February 1960, requested that the Trusteeship Council consider the supervision of these elections by the United Nations.

298. UNAR stated that it was opposed to the holding of elections in present conditions. It argued that Ruanda was in a state of emergency and that the Administration was taking advantage of the excessive powers granted it under the emergency conditions to carry on its policy of discrimination and persecution against the members of UNAR. It alleged that, on the pretext of organizing elections, the Special Resident was conducting a propaganda campaign against UNAR and gave as an example the Official Statement No. 7 which he had published on 8 February last concerning the elections, in which he had made comments which seemed to attack UNAR and defend PARMEHUTU. UNAR considered that, before holding

elections, it was essential to put a stop to this policy of discrimination and persecution and to take certain steps such as abolishing the state of emergency, proclaiming a general amnesty for political acts and reintegrating refugees. Lastly, it requested that when the elections could be held in satisfactory conditions they should be supervised by the United Nations.

299. RADER considered that in view of the antagonism between the Tutsi and the Hutu the communal elections to be held in June should be postponed because if held in present conditions they would take place in an atmosphere of racial hatred and might provoke new disturbances. It considered that a minimum period of six months would be necessary to prepare these elections and asked for a round-table conference to be called before they took place.

300. The Hutu parties stated that they wanted the communal elections to take place on the date planned. They thought, however, that for these elections to be held in good conditions UNAR should first be dissolved and the Mwami dethroned because they were convinced that UNAR, with the support of the Mwami, would do everything possible to disturb the atmosphere and sabotage the elections, and that the abuse of the Mwami's prestige with the masses and terrorism carried out in his name would distort the results. With regard to United Nations supervision, the Hutu parties did not think that it was really necessary but were not opposed to it.

(b) The plan for reforms

301. The Belgian Government's plan for reforms, announced in the Government's statement of 10 November 1959, was put into effect by the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 and the interim royal order of 25 January 1960. This plan was not discussed in full detail at the time of the Mission's conversations with the political parties, because when it visited the Territory the parties' attention was concentrated on the immediate step in the implementation of the plan, namely the communal elections to be held in June.

302. UNAR's criticisms of the Government statement are set forth in a petition which it addressed to the Trusteeship Council on 11 January 1960.^{1/} UNAR first

^{1/} T/PET.3/111.

of all criticized the statement for its vagueness regarding the independence of the country, for proposing reforms which were too timid and, in general, for being inspired by the desire to maintain Belgian domination over the Territory. Turning to a study of the details of the proposed reforms, it considered in particular that it would have been preferable to choose the chiefdom instead of the sub-chiefdom as the basic political entity because the former constituted a viable budgetary unit; that the principle of direct universal adult suffrage should have been adopted for elections at all levels; that there should have been a clearer separation of executive and legislative powers; and that the powers retained by the Administering Authority, particularly in connexion with the general Trusteeship matters, were excessive. During the Mission's meeting with the leaders of UNAR at Astrida, the latter requested the calling of a round-table conference to adopt or reject the Interim Decree.

303. The Hutu parties expressed their partial satisfaction with the proposed reforms. However, they felt that these reforms gave too much power to the Mwami and in particular they were opposed to the provisions giving him the power to appoint and to remove from office members of the future Government of the State.

(c) The question of the monarchy

304. Some Hutu leaders asked for the abolition of the monarchy and its replacement by a republican régime. However, the majority of those whom the Mission met were in favour of a less radical solution which would consist in keeping the monarchy but with an elected Mwami. They also demanded the dethronement of the present Mwami, Kigeli V, because they maintained that he had supported the Hutu massacres during the recent outbreaks, that Hutu had been tortured in his house and that, despite his declarations of neutrality, he had in fact become the president of UNAR. However, as a compromise, they proposed the following procedure for the election of the new Mwami: a list of four or five candidates would be drawn up, including the present Mwami, and the people would be asked to choose one of these candidates. They made it clear that this election should take place before the communal elections planned for June and under the supervision of an impartial commission.

305. RADER was convinced that the people remained attached to the monarchy. It observed, however, that there was a cleavage between the Administration and the Mwami Kigeli V and as a result the country was cut into two. RADER declared that, for peace to be restored to the country, one of them should withdraw; if Kigeli V had to withdraw, he should be replaced by one of his brothers who was more favourable to national reconciliation and to co-operation with the Administration.

306. UNAR professed unreserved loyalty to the person of the Mwami and to monarchic institutions. It stated that for the immense majority of the population the Mwami remained the only source of legitimate authority and that opposition to him was merely the work of a few political groups without real influence. UNAR accepted without reservation that Ruanda should henceforth develop on the lines of democracy and constitutional monarchy, but considered that it would be dangerous to build the future democracy and allow uncertainty to persist concerning the question of the monarchy. It therefore suggested a referendum based on universal adult suffrage to settle this question once and for all.

307. The Mission was informed that there was some discussion in the provisional special council concerning this question of a referendum, an idea accepted in principle by the Mwami in a memorandum addressed to the Mission. It was understood that no agreement was reached on the timing of such a referendum, if indeed it were agreed that one should be held.

308. The provisional special council of Ruanda had prepared, with reservations from certain of its members on some points, a programme of seven proposals to be submitted to the Mwami: the constitution of a cabinet of four members, with a representative from each party; the regulation of court protocol; the Mwami's residence to be established in Kigali instead of Nyanza; recognition by the Mwami of the interim authorities; prior approval of enactments of the Mwami by the special council; speedy signature by the Mwami of documents approved by the special council; replacement of the Kalinga (drum) by a flag, and the abolition of the Abiru (college of custodians of the esoteric traditions of the dynasty). After the departure of the Visiting Mission these proposals were to be discussed again in the provisional special council in the presence of the Mwami, but he refused to attend the meeting of the council and sent it a note of 23 April

concerning these proposals. Three of the four political parties represented in the special council considered that this reply was tantamount to a refusal to co-operate with the council. They transmitted the following telegram to the King of the Belgians and to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi:

"Mwami Kigeli refuses co-operation with Ruandese people. Relations broken off with Kigeli. Demand appointment of provisional head of State. Ruanda-Urundi round-table refused. Demand ministerial decision. Common front of RADER, PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA".

(d) The question of independence

309. The question of independence is in the background of all recent political events in Ruanda. The UNAR political programme, if extremely compressed, is reduced to "immediate independence", or in brief "independence"; in the same way, the ideas of the Hutu parties can be reduced to the slogan "democracy before independence" or in brief "democracy". Cries of "independence" on one side and "democracy" on the other resounded all along the Mission's journey through Ruanda. The great intensity of these cries was a measure of the antagonism between the two sections of the population.

310. From its formation in September 1959 UNAR raised the question of independence. In the party's manifesto it demanded internal autonomy by 1960 and independence by 1962. Following the November disturbances, UNAR revised its programme and demanded immediate independence. During meetings with the leaders of the party at Astrida the Mission asked them to clarify the meaning of the expression "immediate independence" and they replied that "immediate independence" should not be taken in its literal sense. By "immediate independence" they meant "independence in the very near future" and more precisely they wanted independence immediately after free elections controlled by the United Nations which should be held as soon as possible. In this connexion, they also requested the convocation of a round-table conference consisting of representatives of the four political parties, the Administrative Authority and the United Nations in order to prepare the elections.

311. On its formation in September 1959 RADER drew up a programme providing for internal autonomy in 1964 and independence in 1968. But it too revised its programme and considered in its memorandum of 14 March 1960 that the country might become independent towards the end of 1963.

312. On the other hand, the Hutu parties declared themselves strongly opposed to independence for the time being. After recalling that the Tutsi had kept the Hutu in slavery for centuries they expressed their conviction that UNAR was asking for immediate independence in order to ensure their enslavement. They therefore rejected a fictitious independence which did not guarantee de facto equality between the Tutsi and the Hutu in the exercise of civil rights, the administration of justice, educational opportunity and the free disposal of lands. They wanted independence but they wanted it when this de facto equality was achieved; they wanted it in a democratic system and not under a dictatorship.

313. The Administering Authority's position was explained by the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi in a conversation with the Mission at Brussels. The essence of his statement was that Belgium, which had agreed to give independence to the Belgian Congo on 30 June 1960, had no interest in remaining in Ruanda-Urundi. Its decision to continue to bear responsibility for administering the Territory for a certain time was based on purely humanitarian considerations.

II. URUNDI

A. Political development of Urundi up to 1959

Urundi before the German occupation

314. The ethnic composition of the population of Urundi is similar to that of Ruanda, but the proportion of the Tutsi is lower:^{1/} 1.13 per cent of the population is Twa, 86.48 per cent Hutu, 12.39 per cent Tutsi. Socially and politically, however, a fourth class should be added and these are the Ganwa, belonging to the Tutsi physical type. They are the princes of the blood royal.

315. The Bami of Urundi upon their accession to power received, in the following order, one of the four following dynastic names: Ntare, Mwezi, Mutaga, Mwambutsa. Their descendants bear the following names respectively: Batare, Bezi, Batanga and Bambutsa. They are called (Ba)Ganwa, which means princes of the blood royal, until such time as a new Mwami bearing the same name as his eponymous ancestor accedes to power; thereafter, they are referred to as Bafasoni, a less elevated honorary title. The Ganwa hold practically all the executive posts in Urundi. This is so true that the word Ganwa is also in turn employed to designate the chief of the chiefdom, and the Tutsi who are not Ganwa, while still regarded as aristocrats, have accordingly much less prestige than the Tutsi in Ruanda.

316. In Urundi the King was in theory as absolute as in Ruanda, but often he was regarded as primus inter pares among the Ganwa. Each prince had his court and his own army and could not easily be revoked. The fact that the central government had been unable to control military power as effectively as in Ruanda explains the far less centralized character of the political organization of Urundi. Instead of the policy of splitting up land endlessly which was pursued by the Bami of Ruanda, the Bami of Urundi sought on the contrary from time to time to bring together large tracts of land into a homogeneous area for their children. The sons for their part were in so far as possible sent out to the distant provinces and were the firm supporters of the Mwami, as much against foreign enemies as against possible revolts by princes of older branches.

^{1/} See paragraph 65.

317. The history of Urundi is still little known, mainly because the court maintained no court historians or official scribes and the kingdom was less centralized and less absolutist than Ruanda; the atmosphere was thus not conducive to the development of an abundant and detailed oral tradition. Urundi was for a long time at war with Ruanda. The King was surrounded by a number of counsellors who were not grouped officially into a council. The threefold organization of power at the local level which exists in Ruanda (chief of pastures and shepherds, chief of lands and farmers and chief of the armies) does not seem to have existed in Urundi. The Mwami, although of divine origin, does not represent the State in his person. It is his drum Karyenda which represents royalty and he is subordinate to it religiously.

318. There existed in Urundi a system of cattle holding similar to the ubuhake in Ruanda: this was the ubugabire, but it seems that its provisions were less strict and that it was in fact less binding than its equivalent in Ruanda.

319. As in Ruanda, the number of Tutsi varied in different parts of the country, from 2.63 per cent in the Bubanza district to 28.93 per cent in the Bururi district. The physical characteristics of the Tutsi and the Hutu are, however, less marked than in Ruanda, at least among a large number of their members. This may mean that there has been a greater degree of blood mixture. In Urundi there are more poor Tutsi than in Ruanda and they are reputed to be less arrogant and proud of their race. There is a tradition in Urundi that the early Bami were from the Hutu and not the Tutsi.

Urundi under the German régime

320. In 1892, Dr. Baumann, reached the heart of Urundi and in 1897 the Germans established a military station at Usumbura. The first Catholic missions were founded in Urundi in 1898. In 1912, the seat of the residency of Urundi was transferred from Usumbura to Kitega. On the eve of the First World War, a report by Governor Schnee stated that "the history of Urundi since its occupation by Germany has unfortunately been unsatisfactory and is in contrast with the peaceful and pleasant state of affairs in Ruanda". While relations between the Mwami of Ruanda, Yuhi Musinga and the German authorities were relatively peaceful, the situation was not the same in Urundi where constant struggles and rivalry brought the Bami Mwezi Gisabo (who died in 1908) and Mutaga (1908-1915) into opposition

with their great feudal lords. The residents von Grawert, von Beringe and Langenn among others took sides sometimes with the Mwami and sometimes with the dissidents, pursuing extremely incoherent policies frequently inconsistent with the instructions sent to them by the Governors of German East Africa. When the Belgian troops reached Urundi, they found the country in a state of dissension and the young Mwami Mwambutsa who had just succeeded Mutaga, the butt of court intrigue.

Urundi under the Belgian régime

321. Belgian policies in Urundi were the same as in Ruanda. Readers should therefore refer to the section of this report dealing with that State.^{1/}

322. The Mwami of Urundi, Mwambutsa, who became king when two years old, was until 1930 assisted by a council of regency consisting of three members. A council of the Mwami was re-established in 1938. The 1933 annual report^{2/} states that from the outset it had to be admitted that the indigenous organization of the State in Urundi was less developed than in Ruanda.

323. The annual report for 1939-1944^{3/} states that the European administration, at the instigation of the Mwami himself, was obliged after many years of patience to set aside several chiefs and sub-chiefs who were unable to comprehend ideas of moral or social progress and who by the abuses which they committed stirred up discontent among the people under their authority. The report continues by stating that it might be asked why such individuals were not removed earlier; it explains the situation by saying that the administration had always sought to avoid, for as long a time as possible, removing the notables it had found in power when it had occupied the country, and to cease collaborating with them only when, after constant advice and warnings, it was clear that they absolutely refused to co-operate.

324. None the less, as had been pointed out by the Working Group, the problem of abuses perpetrated by the customary authorities had not taken on the social and racial characteristics which it had in Ruanda. Those holding power under the customary system were not all considered as representatives of a dominant race or

^{1/} See paragraphs 80-109.

^{2/} Annual report, 1933, p. 75.

^{3/} Annual report, 1939-1944, pp. 33-34.

class but rather as members of favoured families, and in so far as there were protests of a social nature it was not a question of complaints by the Hutu against the privileges of the Tutsi, but of protests by the Tutsi and the Hutu against the almost exclusive access of the Ganwa to public office. It is difficult to know if the reason for that situation is the existence of more harmonious ethnic relations or a lesser degree of awareness on the part of the mass of the peasantry.

325. The personal influence of the Mwami Mwambutsa, whose popularity amongst the people is very great, has been beneficial. His letters to the chiefs and sub-chiefs have for several years acted as a restraining influence against the abuses of a fraction of the ruling class.

326. Some, however, consider that the feudal and racial problem in Urundi is basically the same as in Ruanda, that the Tutsi-Hutu question is potentially just as explosive, and that the elements for a civil war exist in Urundi also.

327. It is interesting to note that the results of the indirect elections in 1953 and in 1956 for the sub-chiefdom councils were not greatly dissimilar to results in Ruanda and showed similar trends.

<u>1953^{1/}</u>		<u>Total</u>	<u>Tutsi</u>	<u>Hutu</u>	<u>Twa</u>
Electoral colleges in sub-chiefdoms	designated electors	7,285	2,524 (34.65%)	4,761 (65.35%)	-
Sub-chiefdom councils	elected members	3,789	1,504 (39.7%)	2,285 (60.3%)	-
Chiefdom councils	members	372	273 (73.4%)	99 (26.6%)	-
District councils	members	140	140 (80.7%)	27 (19.3%)	-
High Council of State	members	30	26 (86.7%)	4 (13.3%)	-

^{1/} These figures refer to Urundi without Usumbura.

<u>1956</u> ^{1/}		<u>Total</u>	<u>Tutsi</u>	<u>Hutu</u>	<u>Twa</u>	<u>Swahilise and Congolese</u>
Electoral colleges in sub-chiefdoms	elected electors	43,155	9,644 (22.35%)	33,483 (77.59%)	6 (0.01%)	22 (0.05%)
Sub-chiefdom councils	elected members	3,904	1,664 (42.6%)	2,240 (57.4%)	-	-
Chiefdom councils	members	386	301 (78%)	85 (22%)	-	-
District councils	members	140	120 (85.7%)	20 (14.3%)	-	-
High Council of State	members	30	28 (93.3%)	2 (6.7%)	-	-

328. There are two factors which should be noted which have differentiated Urundi from Ruanda in recent years. Firstly, the elimination of the ubugabire which was decided upon in 1957 occurred almost unperceived in Urundi, while the elimination of ubuhake in Ruanda in 1954 had far-reaching repercussions and was applied on a large scale: on 31 December 1958, some 218,000 head of heavy cattle had been subject to property division in Ruanda while in Urundi the equivalent number was only 700.

329. Secondly, the question of the extra-tribal centres had always greatly excited opinion in Urundi. The four extra-tribal centres in Ruanda-Urundi (Usumbura, Kitega, Nyanza-Lac and Rumonge), all situated in Urundi, were endowed with a special régime. That fact was interpreted by the High Council of Urundi and by many Urundians as proof that the Belgian Administration had intended to separate Usumbura from the rest of Urundi and from the authority of the Mwami. In 1952, there had been concern over the nationalization of land which had been made necessary by the development of the town of Usumbura. When in 1957 the question arose of providing Usumbura with a statute similar to that given to towns in the Belgian Congo, there was such opposition that the Administration preferred to withdraw the project. This problem was already noted by the 1957 Visiting Mission^{2/} and has lost none of its acuteness since then.

1/ These figures refer to Urundi without Usumbura.

2/ T/1402, paragraphs 89-96.

B. Political events of 1959 and the beginning of 1960

330. At the end of December 1958, Mr. André Ndabibona, speaking to the Mwami on behalf of the sub-chiefs of Urundi, complained about certain chiefs whom he accused of treating the sub-chiefs as slaves and of committing numerous abuses. He requested that the status of the sub-chiefs be defined, that their remuneration be improved and that they be assured of representation in the High Council of the State.

331. In January 1959, a note signed "Hutu and Tutsi of Kitega" was sent to the Mwami protesting against the monopoly of the Ganwa in nominations to positions of authority in the chiefdoms.

332. But it was mainly the arrival of the Working Group in April 1959 which provoked considerable political activity by the customary authorities and in particular by the High Council of the State. In his speech of 23 April 1959, made on the occasion of the Working Group's visit, Mwami Mwambutsa, introducing the draft constitution for Urundi, began by recalling that the States of Urundi and Ruanda were entirely separate and that each must be allowed to develop according to its own aspirations. He protested against the United Nations recommendation that the Administering Authority must try to merge the two States into a single entity and maintained that such a course was impossible at the present time. Urundi desired internal autonomy but, he added, would still require Belgian assistance for a long time and the Trusteeship System should not be abolished. The Mwami then appealed for the reintegration of the extra-customary centres under his authority. On the same day, Chief Barusasiyeko, on behalf of the High Council of the State, impressed upon the Working Group the importance of the question of extra-customary centres. He pointed out the reasons why that problem was more important than any other. Subsequently, he introduced the draft constitution drawn up by the High Council.

333. The text, based on the Belgian Constitution, comprised 123 articles. It stated that Urundi is a constitutional monarchy, indivisible and democratic. It would establish a Urundi nationality and, in that respect, the High Council considered that, if such a status - so essential for the formation of the nation and State of Urundi - did not yet exist, it was not the fault of Belgium but indeed of the United Nations which, by establishing a Trusteeship System, had

created the concept of persons under the jurisdiction of Ruanda-Urundi (ressortissants du Ruanda-Urundi) without dissociating the inhabitants of Urundi from those of Ruanda from the legal point of view.

334. The draft constitution would establish the principle of the fundamental freedoms, individual freedom, right of ownership, freedom of conscience, of education, of the Press, of assembly, of association, of petition, etc. The principle of the separation of powers would be recognized. The legislative power would be exercised collectively by the Mwami, the High Council of the State and the Legislative Council. These two Councils would be composed, on the one hand, of representatives elected from the chiefdom councils by members of the sub-chiefdom or chiefdom councils, and, on the other hand, of co-opted members. The executive power would be in the hands of the Mwami who would appoint a leader to form a team of ministers. If the ministers raised the question of confidence and did not obtain a majority in one of the two Councils, they would submit their resignations to the Mwami. The government might be composed of Urundi and Belgian ministers. The Urundi ministers would be assisted by Belgian experts and the Belgian ministers would be assisted by Urundi secretaries of State. As the Urundi officials became capable of taking the place of the Belgians, their numbers in the government would gradually increase.

335. The judiciary power would rest with the courts. Judges would be appointed for life by the Mwami, either directly or from lists submitted by the High Council and the courts of appeal. Judges and magistrates might not simultaneously hold other public offices.

336. The sub-chiefdom councils would be elected on the basis of direct universal suffrage and the sub-chief would be appointed by the Mwami from among council members. The chiefdom councils would be elected by direct vote from among members of the sub-chiefdom councils. The chiefs would be appointed and dismissed by the Mwami. The functions of the chiefdom and sub-chiefdom councils would pertain to all matters. It would be laid down that, as long as Belgian Trusteeship is exercised, there would be no distinction to be made between the Belgian officials and magistrates of metropolitan status and Urundi officials. Upon termination of the Trusteeship System, a convention between Urundi and Belgium would regulate the questions of administrative and technical assistance which would enable

Belgian officials, magistrates and experts of metropolitan status to continue to serve Urundi with certain guarantees regarding their future.

337. Pending the results of the Working Group's visit, the relations between the Urundi customary authorities and the Belgian Administration remained excellent, in contrast with the situation in Ruanda. When the Governor returned from leave in Belgium on 30 September 1959, he was welcomed at the airport with remarkable cordiality by the Mwami of Urundi and many chiefs and notables of Urundi, with drums and dances, whereas no notables from Ruanda could be observed. Certain persons interpreted this as a discreet but deliberate gesture by Urundi to dissociate itself from the unrest in Ruanda.

338. In November 1959, the King of the Belgians invited the Bami of Ruanda and Urundi to go to Brussels for an audience on 9 November, the day before the Government statement on Ruanda-Urundi was issued. The Mwami of Urundi accepted the invitation and left Usumbura on 7 November for a month's stay in Belgium. The Mwami of Ruanda, however, felt that, in view of the local situation, it was his duty to stay with his people and to renounce the visit to Belgium.

339. On 13 November, the Resident of Urundi decided to place several chiefdoms in the north of Urundi under "military operation" (opération militaire) to protect Urundi against attacks by armed bands operating from Ruanda in the frontier regions. It may be remembered that on 10 November, a Hutu leader of APROSOMA, who had taken refuge in Urundi, was assassinated there by persons from Ruanda.^{1/}

340. The earliest political parties of Urundi date back to September-October 1959. The first manifesto of the Parti de l'unité et du progrès national du Burundi (UPRONA),^{2/} or Abadasigana d'i Burundi - founded about this time - demanded internal autonomy by January 1960 to pave the way for independence, the establishment of democratic institutions within the framework of a hereditary monarchy, elections on the basis of universal male and female suffrage, the economic development of the country, the promotion of social welfare, the advancement of education with larger State participation in its organization and policy, and the creation of a University of Urundi. The party proposed also to

^{1/} See paragraph 208.

^{2/} Originally known as Union nationale progressiste (UNAP).

campaign vigorously against any form of incitement to racial hatred both among the Urundi population itself or between Whites and Coloured. The party proclaimed a single aim - the well-being of the Urundi nation - and proposed to secure it legally and by peaceful means. It would continue to respect authority but wished to be consulted on any matter affecting the future of Urundi. It felt that the preliminary draft of the Belgian Government's statement on the future of the State should first be submitted to the responsible local political organs. A few weeks later, UPRONA published a second manifesto, deploring the civil war in Ruanda, emphasizing the calm in Urundi as well as the attachment of its people to the Mwami and the dynasty. The manifesto also stressed the importance of recognizing individual land ownership. At the same time the Union nationale du Ruanda-Urundi (UNARU) came into being.

341. Between November and December 1959 a controversy developed in the Press. On 14 October the chairmen of the Hutu parties of Ruanda and some advanced Hutu of Urundi had sent a letter^{1/} to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi expressing their anxiety lest internal autonomy lead to Tutsi absolutism and requesting the extension of the Belgian Trusteeship. A letter published on 13 November in the newspaper Temps nouveaux d'Afrique disputed these views in so far as they concerned Urundi. It was implied that in fact there were no nationals of Urundi among the signatories of the original letter and that since castes did not exist in Urundi the Hutu-Tutsi problem did not arise. On 27 November, the newspaper published a letter from Mr. Maus asserting that the Hutu-Tutsi problem existed in Urundi, just as in Ruanda, and expressed the hope that "the Belgian and Urundi authorities were not awaiting a second civil war to open their eyes and would introduce with good grace in Urundi the drastic reforms which were now being carried out in Ruanda under the threat of blood and fire". On 4 December, Ganwa Louis Rwagasore, the son of the Mwami Mwambutsa and one of the leaders of UPRONA, attacked Mr. Maus in an open letter stating, inter alia: "Your work has borne fruit in Ruanda. Must Urundi go through the same experience before you are fully satisfied?" He continued, "There is a problem, that of the small and weak and they have no race". In his turn, several days later, Mr. Maus, repeated his

^{1/} See paragraph 175.

point of view that "the rich are nearly always the Tutsi and the poor are nearly always the Hutu".

342. In December 1959, a group of Urundi representatives from Usumbura called on the Mwami and made suggestions for the maintenance of peace in the State and for the avoidance of the ill-feeling between the Hutu and the Tutsi, which existed in Ruanda. In particular, it was proposed that an extraordinary national council should be convened to examine the influence in Urundi of the recent disturbances in Ruanda and that the attention of political parties and leaders should be drawn to their duties and responsibilities.

343. On 5 January 1960, in a circular letter addressed to the population of Urundi, Mwami Mwambutsa launched an appeal for unity and stated that it would be incomprehensible if the people of Urundi were to become divided at the very time when the country was choosing its future political path.

344. In January 1960 there came into existence the Parti du peuple de l'Urundi (PP), in February the Parti démocrate chrétien du Burundi (PDC), and other parties to be mentioned later.

345. The reform plan described in the Government statement of 10 November 1959 and the provisions of the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 and of the royal interim orders of 26 January 1960 which have been mentioned above, dealt with Urundi on the same basis as Ruanda. As regards Urundi more particularly, the statement announced that the extra-customary centres would have the same structure as the other communes which had grown out of the sub-chiefdoms. The same régime would apply to Usumbura subject to the police rights which the Administration considered it must be entitled to exercise in the locality of its headquarters.

346. The Government statement at first caused hardly any reaction in Urundi. The High Council of the State set up on 22 December a political committee composed of its own members to examine the statement and this committee, which was also to take note of the Interim Decree after it had been published, drew up a memorandum which was unanimously approved by the Council on 20 January and sent to the Presidents of the Belgian Legislative Chambers with copies for the United Nations, ^{1/} the Resident-General and the Resident of Urundi.

347. The memorandum of the High Council was extremely unfavourable. The Council upbraided the Administering Authority for not having taken into account the wishes which the Council had expressed on behalf of the population for the drawing up of the reform plan. In particular, it criticized the plan on the following points:

- (a) Internal autonomy: The Council stated that, instead of granting a large measure of internal autonomy to the country, Belgium was imposing upon it a form of trusteeship very similar to the colonial system; it described the Interim Decree as "a decree of domination";
- (b) Urundi nationality: The Council reproached the Administering Authority with not having recognized Urundi nationality; it felt that the right to vote and the right of being elected should be granted only to Urundi nationals and those who had obtained Urundi naturalization by an order of the Mwami;
- (c) Democracy: The Council felt that the Interim Decree favoured a truncated democracy; it requested that all political authorities should be elected by the population and be subject to appointment by the Mwami;
- (d) Africanization of the civil service: The Council considered that the form of Africanization envisaged by the Administering Authority in fact meant Europeanization because the most able indigenous civil servants would be automatically withdrawn from the direct indigenous Administration and transferred to the indirect European Administration;
- (e) Chiefdoms: The Council protested against the abolition of the chiefdoms which constituted political entities as ancient as the State itself. It proposed, on the contrary, that the chiefdoms should be enlarged and designated provinces with elected provincial councils and that the heads of provinces should be elected from such councils and nominated for appointment by the Mwami.

The High Council also criticized the provisions of the Decree concerning the General Council.

348. The views of the High Council were opposed by the Parti du peuple in a petition addressed to the United Nations on 23 January 1960.^{1/}

349. On several occasions, the Resident offered to the High Council the assistance of the services of the Administration to explain the statement and the Interim Decree, and the government plans concerning specific projects which would emerge from those texts. He later suggested the establishment of a mixed committee consisting of members of the Council and representatives of the Administration for the purpose of examining the text of the memorandum. The Council nevertheless maintained its position and rejected the Resident's proposal. On 30 January, the Resident-General received the Mwami and the members of the Council's political committee at Usumbura and repeated the Resident's proposal, but his offer was again refused.

350. However, when it became aware of the Belgian Government's decision to grant independence to the Belgian Congo on 30 June 1960, the High Council took an even more decisive position. On 3 February 1960, it adopted a motion demanding independence for Urundi for 21 June 1960 and the holding before that date of a round-table conference grouping the leading representatives of Urundi opinion, as well as the representatives of Belgium and the United Nations, in order to pave the way for independence. In that motion, the Council proposed also a time-table for independence in the following six stages:

- (a) Electoral campaign and detailed arrangements for elections;
- (b) Provincial elections and elections for the constitution of the Lower House;
- (c) Elections for the constitution of the Upper House;
- (d) Formation of the government;
- (e) Meeting of Parliament and proclamation of independence;
- (f) Transfer of public powers.

351. This motion was adopted by 21 votes with 1 abstention - that of Chief Ntidendereza who felt that independence was premature at the present stage.

352. The High Council's three-year term of office expired on 17 February 1960. Meanwhile, the Resident-General decided, by Ordinance No. 221/60 of 27 February, to establish, pending the setting up of the new institutions prescribed in the Interim Decree, a five-member interim committee presided over by the Mwami with the task of exercising the functions of the High Council so far as was necessary for the completion of current business and the examination of urgent problems.

353. To assist the interim committee, the Resident-General also set up by Ordinance No. 221/79 of 17 March, three special committees, namely, an electoral committee, a social and educational committee and a committee dealing with finance, economic development and natural resources. The electoral committee was to include among its members a representative of each of the political parties legally constituted at the date of entry into force of the ordinance.

354. Although, by an ordinance of 10 March 1960, the Resident-General had decided that communal elections would take place in Ruanda from 7 June onward, no decision had yet been taken regarding the timing of the elections in Urundi at the time of the Mission's visit. The Resident stated that the interim committee and the electoral committee were actively examining, in collaboration with the Administration, problems concerning the preparation and organization of those elections and that the Administration had already begun a campaign of information with a view to explaining to the population the various electoral operations.

C. Situation in Urundi at the time of the Mission's visit

355. The situation in Urundi during the Mission's visit presented marked differences from that in Ruanda as well as many points of similarity. Although the atmosphere of excitement and uneasiness which hung over Ruanda was absent from Urundi some tension was nevertheless to be felt there.

356. Ruanda and Urundi are endowed with similar geographic, ethnic, social and economic characteristics and having much the same political organization. What happened in one could not leave the other indifferent. The November disorders which had cast so tragic a pall over Ruanda aroused deep disquiet in the people of Urundi, for they felt that the factors which had caused those disorders also existed in their country. If Urundi had escaped violence it was because the socio-political problem was not yet as acute there as in Ruanda, and because the Mwami Mwambutsa, who had reigned for forty-three years and whose prestige and authority was uncontested, fortunately constituted a stabilizing element.

357. As a result of the position adopted by the High Council with regard to the Government statement, the Council's relations with the Administration had greatly deteriorated and this state of affairs naturally had a very deleterious effect on the course of the State's public affairs. The Resident-General's decision to replace the High Council, at the expiration of its term, by the interim committee was not well received in some quarters. Part of the population sided with the High Council and another part with the Administration.

358. The Belgian Government's decision regarding the independence of the Belgian Congo came as a shock, and, by arousing hope in some and anxiety in others, increased the general tension. Lastly, the announcement of the forthcoming visit of the United Nations Visiting Mission created great excitement among the political leaders and those who aspired to become leaders. The leaders of the existing political parties made preparations to prove to the Mission the rightness of their programmes and the influence their parties exercised over the masses, while other leaders prepared to form new parties.

359. In this political atmosphere, some of the parties accused others of engaging in manoeuvres of intimidation and acts of terrorism, and false rumours similar to those which had circulated in Ruanda soon began to spread, in particular concerning

the Mission's terms of reference and intentions, the Mwami's sympathies for a particular party or the Administration's machinations against that party. In an effort to put an end to some of those rumours, the Mwami on 8 February sent a message to the people in which he said that, since he was the Mwami of all, he intended to remain above political parties and did not authorize any party to claim his endorsement. Three days later, he issued an appeal to the population exhorting them to remain calm and to co-operate with the Belgian Government.

360. This was the atmosphere the Mission found in Urundi when, after having visited Ruanda, it arrived at Kitega on 21 March 1960. An incident, fortunately not very serious, had taken place on that same day. According to the Resident of Urundi, a group of about 500 UNARU agitators, most of whom were detribalized persons from Usumbura, after demonstrating before the Mission, had attempted to invade the Kitega post. The forces of order had shown great coolness, and had succeeded in driving them back without inflicting any casualties.

361. On its arrival at Kitega, the Mission discussed with the Resident, the Mwami and the members of the interim committee questions relating to the maintenance of order and the right of petition. The Resident said that he expected incidents between the political groups and that some of those groups had expressed a fear of being attacked. That was why he had considered it necessary to prohibit the entry of vehicles into the Kitega post during the Mission's stay and to take steps to ensure the security of the Mission's offices. He assured the Mission, however, that every precaution would be taken to enable the population to communicate with it. In that connexion, it should be pointed out that several days earlier, on 15 March, the Resident-General had issued a message to the population of Urundi identical with the one he had already sent the people of Ruanda,^{1/} recalling that everyone had the right to communicate freely with the members of the Mission and that they need naturally have no fear because of such an action.

362. As in Ruanda, the Mission has no reason to believe that everyone who wished to communicate with it was prevented from doing so. The hearing of petitioners was, moreover, not so difficult a problem as in Ruanda, because there were far fewer requests for hearings. The Mission was able to satisfy all the requests

^{1/} See Annex II.

made to it in every locality it visited. Thus it heard representatives of all the State's political parties, of several non-political groups and of a number of individual petitioners, both European and African.

363. The political parties of Urundi are of very recent origin. At the end of 1959, there were only two parties. In the first two months of 1960, six new parties were founded, one of which, APRODEBA, dissolved itself shortly after its foundation because it had only two members. In March, during the Mission's stay in the Territory, three other parties were founded.

364. There were therefore, when the Visiting Mission left the Territory, ten political parties:

- (a) the Union nationale africaine du Ruanda-Urundi (UNARU)
- (b) the Unité et progrès national (UPRONA)
- (c) the Parti du peuple (PP)
- (d) the Parti démocrate chrétien (PDC)
- (e) the Mouvement progressiste du Burundi (MPB)
- (f) the Union démocratique paysanne (UDP)
- (g) the Voix du peuple murundi (VPM)
- (h) the Démocratie nationale du Burundi (DNB)
- (i) the Parti démocratique des jeunes travailleurs du Burundi (PDJTB)
- (j) the Parti démocratique rural (PDR)

365. The situation with respect to Urundi's political parties is still very fluid. It is probable that some of them will disappear for lack of members or funds, as happened in the case of APRODEBA, and that other parties will be founded. It is therefore impossible to determine what influence the present ten parties have over the mass of the population. However, there are many signs that two of these parties have already acquired considerable importance. These are UPRONA and the PDC. UPRONA, which seems to have adopted an attitude of hostility towards the Administration, has called for immediate independence for the State, while the PDC desires the maintenance of Belgian administration and the establishment of democratic institutions before independence is granted. The antagonism between these two parties could stem less from ideological differences than from clan rivalries, between the Bezi, who are members of the present ruling family, and the Batare, who belong to the former ruling family. The latter are supported by the PDC and the former by UPRONA.

366. These two parties were very active during the Mission's stay in Urundi. On the route followed by the Mission and in the places where it held its hearings, large crowds gathered with posters and banners or handed it petitions in order to demonstrate their support of one or the other party. Competing cries for "independence" and "democracy" were heard everywhere here, as in Ruanda, but for different reasons, since this was not a case of antagonism between Tutsi and Hutu, but of a rivalry between political parties supported by two clans.

367. A third party, UNARU, was also active during the Mission's stay. Many members or supporters of this party demonstrated before the Mission at Usumbura and at several posts in the interior of Ruanda. According to the Resident, this party is made up largely of Swahili and Africans from Uganda. Its influence is confined to the town of Usumbura, but on the occasion of the Mission's passage many of its members came by truck to demonstrate before it at Kitega and other places in Urundi. UNARU has adopted the same position as UPRONA on the question of independence; it should also be added that, according to its name and its statute, this party intends to operate in both States, but that so far its activities have been confined to Urundi.

368. The Mission was able to confer with the leaders of the other political parties, who also submitted written documents to it, at Usumbura or Kitega. They confined their activities to these contacts. The oldest of these parties is the PP, which was founded on 10 January 1960. This party seeks the support of the people, that is, the unprivileged, whether they are Tutsi, Hutu or Twa, and has set as its goal their liberation from the Ganwa yoke. The other parties seem to follow less clear-cut lines of action. On the question of independence, some have adopted a position close to that of UPRONA, others to that of the PDC.

369. In giving this first survey of the situation in Urundi as regards political parties, the Mission has not gone into the details of ideologies and programmes, since many of these parties were still feeling their way at the time of the Mission's visit.

370. During the month of March three congresses were held by the political parties of Urundi. A first conference, attended by the seven parties then in existence (MPB, PDC, PP, UDP, UNARU, UPRONA and VPM) took place early in March. It was unable to reach agreed conclusions: UPRONA and UNARU withdrew in its first days.

371. Since then, the various parties have grouped themselves, according to their sympathies, into two congresses:

- one made up of the five parties which continued to take part in the first conference, the MPB, the PDC, the PP, the UDP and the VPM; and
- the other made up of UPRONA, the VPM and two new parties, the DNB and PDJTB.

372. On 19 March 1960 the five-party congress adopted a joint programme, of which the principal points are as follows:

(a) Right to vote and eligibility for election

The congress expressed the wish that only Urundi nationals should enjoy the right to vote and of eligibility for election. On this point the PP expressed a reservation: it considered that non-nationals should also enjoy these rights under certain conditions and stated that in practice it was prepared to accept the conditions provided for in the Interim Decree.

(b) Preparation of elections

The congress noted that the present atmosphere was still saturated with feudal tendencies and that the personal influence of the chiefs and sub-chiefs could not fail to have a decisive influence on the elections. In order to ward off this danger it proposed that the chiefs and sub-chiefs should exchange posts during the electoral period and that control commissions should be established in order to ensure that the transferred chiefs and sub-chiefs did not commit abuses in the circonscriptions to which they had been temporarily transferred and did not return to their own circonscriptions in order to carry out propaganda activities there. The congress also demanded that the Mwami's son, the Ganwa Rwagasore, and his sons-in-law, should be kept out of the disputes of political parties, and decided to lodge a complaint against anyone who, for the purposes of party propaganda, used the name of the Mwami or engaged in any other unfair practice punishable by law. On this point, the VPM pointed out that Rwagasore must be kept out of politics as the Mwami's son, not because he was a member of the Bezi family or a chief.

(c) Independence

The congress expressed the wish that a period of democratization should precede independence and serve as a preparation for it. It considered that it would be unwise, and indeed impossible, to fix a date for accession to independence immediately.

(d) Round-table conference

The congress expressed the wish that a round-table conference should be held immediately after the elections so that all points of view regarding accession to independence might be sifted. The choice of delegates to the round-table should not be based solely on the results of the elections; the delegations should rather include representatives of all tendencies in the State as reflected by the political parties. The conference should send its conclusions to the United Nations, which would thus have all the facts before it when the time came to take a decision concerning the date of independence.

373. The four-party congress set out its conclusions in a letter sent to the Mission. This letter was undated, but was probably signed a few days after the five-party memorandum. The four-party congress's conclusions deal with the same questions as those of the five-party congress. In summary, they are as follows:

(a) Right to vote and eligibility for election

The congress agreed that the right to vote and to be eligible for election should be granted only to indigenous Urundians, but it requested that the Mwami and the interim committee should be empowered to fix the conditions in which aliens might enjoy the political rights of indigenous inhabitants. It also asked that indigenous inhabitants should be given the right to vote at their places of residence on registration, without a minimum residence requirement of six months, and that they should have the right to run for office at the place of their choice, whatever their commune of origin or residence.

(b) Preparation of elections

After stating that accession to independence should be preceded by elections under universal suffrage, the congress requested that those elections should be supervised, beginning with the electoral campaign, by a commission made up of representatives of the political parties and Belgian career magistrates at the provincial level, and by the United Nations at the national level. It also requested suspension of the activities of the territorial and tribal authorities until the end of the elections, in order to ensure that they did not influence the choice of the electorate. It considered that the elections should be preceded by an electoral campaign by the political parties lasting at least two full months. Lastly, it considered it absolutely necessary that a circular from the Mwami explaining the elections should be the only official document guiding the population, and that the Mwami and the Resident should have such a circular distributed widely by a group of independent persons of impartiality and integrity.

(c) Independence

The congress called for independence in the near future. It considered that it was unthinkable that Urundi, which was a Trust Territory, should remain outside the concert of African countries which had attained independence or were on the point of doing so. However, it recognized that it would be impossible to accede to independence without preparation. Among the basic reforms most urgently needed, it listed the pensioning of the old chiefs and sub-chiefs who had deserved well of the country but could no longer keep up with current developments, and their replacement by new chiefs elected by the people and invested by the Mwami. It also requested that public order should be ensured immediately before and after independence by an international force which would remain in the State until the constitution of a police force made up exclusively of Urundian nationals.

(d) Round-table conference

The congress requested that after the elections a round-table conference bringing together representatives of the political parties, qualified spokesmen for public opinion in Urundi and representatives of the

Administering Authority should be held to discuss the date of independence, elections to establish a lower and an upper chamber and new democratic institutions to legislate for the new state.

374. In that connexion, the congress proposed a time-table for independence which it said was based not only on its feelings, which would brook no delay, but also on logic and the reality of the situation. This time-table included the following points:

- (a) if the communal elections took place in June, the preparation and work of the round-table conference might occupy all of July and August;
- (b) the electoral campaign for the elections to the lower and upper chambers would be held throughout September;
- (c) the elections to the two chambers might be held throughout October;
- (d) in November, the government would be formed and preparations made for the State's accession to independence;
- (e) the date of accession to independence should be made coincident with the traditional holiday of Umuganure on 27 December 1960.

Lastly, the congress suggested that the political round-table conference should be followed, in September, by an economic and financial round-table conference.

375. UNARU took part in the four-party congress but refused to support its conclusions regarding the voting rights of aliens. It should also be pointed out that the VPM endorsed the conclusions of both congresses. The two conferences were held on dates which, though close to each other, were separate, which explains why this party was able to take part in both.

376. Lastly, the PDR, which had been founded at the end of March, was unable to participate in either of the congresses. Before the Mission's departure from the Territory, this party submitted to it a memorandum setting out its programme. It considered that the right to vote and to be eligible for elections should be reserved for Urundians alone, and that the country should accede to independence at a not too distant date. It advocated a conference of representatives of Urundi, Belgium and the United Nations, after the formation of the future government of the State, to determine the means and timing of the State's accession to independence. This conference should, in its opinion, be held before the end of 1960. However, if the establishment of democratic institutions was delayed for unavoidable reasons, the conference might take place, at the latest, in the middle of 1961.

377. After it had left the Territory, the Mission was informed that the Mwami had visited all the districts of Urundi, accompanied by the Resident and the interim commission. He was welcomed enthusiastically by the population to whom he stated that he was above political parties; that he recognized them all on an equal basis and that no one party was authorized to claim to be the "party of the Mwami". The Mwami also emphasized that each national of Urundi was free to join the party of his choice or to refrain from joining any party if he so chose. During the mass meetings which took place, the Resident mentioned to the population the communiqué published by the Mission on 31 March 1960.

III. RUANDA-URUNDI

A. Organization of Ruanda-Urundi before December 1959

378. It should not be forgotten that, despite the differences in situation apparent from the foregoing chapters, Ruanda and Urundi constitute a single Territory, the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi.

379. The organization of this Territory up to the end of 1959 has already been described to the Trusteeship Council on many occasions. The highest legislator for Ruanda-Urundi was the Belgian legislative power. Every year it passed the budget of the Territory and it could intervene in all matters, but in fact such intervention was exceptional. The laws (in the strictest sense of the word, this means the laws enacted by the Belgian Parliament) of the Belgian Congo were ex officio applicable in Ruanda-Urundi. The King of the Belgians, assisted by the Colonial Council, was normally the legislator for the Territory, and issued decrees counter-signed by the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. The Governor-General of the Belgian Congo and the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi (who used also to be the Vice-Governor-General of the Belgian Congo) had emergency legislative powers.

380. Decrees and legislative ordinances of the Belgian Congo applied to Ruanda-Urundi only when that was expressly stated in the text, or when they had been rendered enforceable by an ordinance of the Government of the Territory.

381. The executive power was vested in the King of the Belgians. It was delegated to the Governor-General of the Belgian Congo and to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, who exercised it by means of ordinances.

382. The General Council, which in 1957 had replaced the former Council of the Vice-Government-General, was an advisory body which examined proposals concerning the budget, discussed matters submitted to it by the Governor and motions introduced by not less than three members. It could also express wishes to the Government.

383. It consisted of forty-five members with deliberative powers, distributed as follows:

- nine ex officio members: the Governor, who acted as president, the procureur du Roi, the two Provincial Commissioners, the Provincial Secretary, the two Residents and the two Bami;

- four representatives of rural communities, two for Ruanda and two for Urundi, chosen by the High Councils of the States from amongst their own members;
- six representatives of industrial and commercial companies, appointed by the Governor on the nomination of industrial associations and chambers of commerce representing industrial and commercial companies;
- six representatives of the independent middle-classes, appointed by the Governor on the nomination of middle class representative groups, including the chamber of commerce representing individual undertakings;
- six representatives of labour, five appointed by the Governor on the nomination of occupational associations of workers and employees in the public and private sectors, and one on the nomination of the workers' members of the Commissions on Labour and Indigenous Social Progress;
- six notables chosen by the Governor on the basis of their ability and independence of mind;
- four representatives of extra-rural communities, chosen by the Governor;
- four persons belonging to neither the general nor the indigenous administrations, chosen by the Governor.

384. The General Council met at least once a year. In fact it used to have two regular sessions (the ordinary session and the budgetary session) and extraordinary meetings.

385. The General Council has not been convened since the budgetary session in June 1959. Some of the European members, not in the public service, have expressed their disapproval of the fact that the Council had not been convened since, when normally it should have met in December. This omission was criticized all the more because serious incidents occurred in Ruanda during the second six months of 1959, and the entire future of the Territory was at stake. The Governor, on the other hand, thought that, in view of the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959, the constitution of a new General Council should be awaited.

386. Ruanda-Urundi is in administrative union with the Belgian Congo. There is also a customs union between the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. The Governor of Ruanda-Urundi was the Vice-Governor-General of the Belgian Congo and of Ruanda-Urundi. He had under his orders officials (who may be Europeans or Africans since the introduction of the single set of regulations from 1 January 1959) who dealt either with the general services (chiefs of services, etc.), or the local services, divided into two Residencies (Ruanda and Urundi) which were in their turn divided into nineteen districts.

387. The two Residencies (Ruanda and Urundi) were the counterpart of the two customary States (Ruanda and Urundi) each ruled by a customary Mwami and divided into chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms. Accordingly there were two administrations existing side by side, one customary and the other general, a survival of the indirect administration to which the Mission has already referred.

B. The reforms of late 1959

388. The statement of the Belgian Government of 10 November 1959^{1/} lays down the principle that the way should be prepared for definitive decisions by preliminary discussions. It declares that Belgium, which brought this region out of its isolation, may look forward confidently to leading the two States, Ruanda and Urundi, along the road to self-government and ultimately to self-determination and the choice of the type of independence they prefer, possibly involving an association that would not exclude any links which either of the countries may wish to forge with Belgium.

389. The proposed reforms and the measures taken to insure decentralization of the Territory to the State level, and consequently progressive self-government for Ruanda and Urundi in all regional matters and the merging at one level of the general administration and indigenous administration, have already been explained.^{2/}

390. The statement of the Belgian Government provides that the King of the Belgians will continue to exercise ordinary legislative powers by means of decrees, enacted after consultation with a Legislative Council and the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi. This Legislative Council will replace the present Colonial Council as soon as a law can be passed to that effect and representatives of the Trust Territory will be called upon to sit on this Council.

391. The General Council, instituted by the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959^{3/} will consist of forty to fifty elected members, an equal number for each State, elected by indirect suffrage. The heads of the provisional communes and the members of the councils of the provisional communes are to be electors. There will also be five representatives of industrial and commercial companies, five representatives of the independent middle classes, five representatives of labour and five notables appointed by the Resident-General.

392. The new General Council has obviously not yet been constituted, because the elections for the provisional communes have not yet taken place. It may

1/ T/1502.

2/ See paragraphs 241-250.

3/ T/1501.

never be constituted as the entire structure set up by the Interim Decree is supposed to be considered at the Conference envisaged by the Belgian Government.

393. The Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 provides that Belgian Trusteeship shall be exercised by the Resident-General over the administration of the Territory, over the States and over the subordinate authorities.

394. The interim royal order of 25 January 1960 prescribes that the Vice-Governor-General administering Ruanda-Urundi shall take the title of Resident-General and exercise executive power in the Territory, together with all functions conferred on the Governor-General of the Belgian Congo by royal decrees and orders, and that he shall correspond direct with the Belgian Government to which he is required, inter alia, to submit the budget of the Territory and the annual report on its administration.

395. The services of the former Vice-Government-General are divided into two groups. The first group comprises the general Trusteeship services, i.e. the functions which the Belgian Administration thinks that it should reserve to itself in order to discharge its duties, in particular (a) internal and external security of the Territory, (b) political, administrative and financial control over the administration and public autonomous bodies, (c) political development, and the preparation and execution of reforms, (d) the administration of justice, (e) protection of individuals and minorities, human rights and fundamental freedoms, (f) external affairs in so far as they do not come directly under the Belgian Government; these services are gathered together under the authority of a Commissioner-General.

396. In the second group, under the authority of a secretary-general, are the general administration services for which the government of the community of Ruanda-Urundi, as soon as that may be established, would be responsible (secretariat, economic development plan, judicial affairs, administration and religious affairs, social affairs, information, labour, finance, economic affairs, land and mines, agricultural and stock-breeding, veterinary service, public works, communications, medical service, education).

C. Relations between Ruanda and Urundi

397. As the Working Group established in April 1959 by the Belgian Government pointed out, the trend of Belgian policy (which did not, however, wish to impose anything by force), and the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council have always looked towards the constitution of Ruanda-Urundi into a single State.

398. Despite the resemblance between the populations, their language and their social, economic and political structures, efforts at unification by the Belgian Administration have met with obstacles based on historical and emotional considerations and have not succeeded in wearing down the opposition of the two countries and the particularism of their populations. Ruanda and Urundi in fact have for many years been independent entities endowed with a very strong political organization and system of land tenure, and directed by different dynasties. They have frequently been at war with each other in the past and have maintained a very strong national feeling, a sense of their own separate personality, some rivalry and a natural propensity to oppose each other.

399. According to the Working Group, the feeling of the populations concerned is strongly and definitely opposed to political development within the framework and the ways of a single State. The sense of "nationhood" is wide-spread amongst the inhabitants of both Ruanda and Urundi, and the people of each of the States have a feeling of belonging to separate units. Their national consciousness has recently been manifested in the use of the spelling Rwanda and Burundi (in conformity with usage in their own language) rather than Ruanda (Europeanized spelling) and Urundi (a Swahili form). These are facts whose importance cannot be ignored. Accordingly, an appropriate institutional organization of the States should enable each one to express its own character, the development of which is indispensable if the community of interests binding them together is to prosper. Thus the Working Group recommended the organization of a "community" of Ruanda-Urundi, with a Resident-General at the head, representing the Administering Authority, and acting as chief of the administration of the community, a General Council elected for the most part at the second degree by an electoral body appointed by universal suffrage, and a smaller council of the community, consisting of appointed and co-opted members, which would also represent the regions. The community would have the task of laying down rules applicable to

the Territory as a whole, improving and co-ordinating their application in the States and itself putting them into execution in connexion with all action proposed solely at its level or within its competence.

400. The statement of the Belgian Government of 10 November 1959^{1/} did not take up those proposals in detail. While reiterating its conviction that the two States would be condemning themselves to a most unpromising future if they did not unite in pursuit of higher aims, the Belgian Government did not actually wish to define the terms of that community which it regarded as essential. It merely recalled that above the two States stood the de facto community constituted by the present Government of the Territory, and that Belgium had set as its goal the building of the future community by means of judicious consultations and with the co-operation of the reorganized States. Meanwhile, the present institutions must continue to function. A Resident-General would continue in charge of the Territory. A General Council set up in accordance with the same principles as those governing the State Councils would assist the legislative authority in an advisory capacity until an agreement was reached on other arrangements, such as the organization of a legislative and an executive for the community, as proposed by the Working Group.

401. In his broadcast speech of 11 November 1959, commenting on the statement of the Belgian Government, the Governor pointed out that the future union of Ruanda and Urundi in one community would be left to the free choice of the representatives of those States, both as regards its existence and its final form.

402. In his speech of 3 March 1960, the Resident-General stated that, at the level of the Territory as a whole, Belgium agreed with the Trusteeship Council in urgently recommending a union of the two States. Being, however, aware of the considerable reservations felt by the population on that subject, Belgium had abstained from imposing any measure even on a provisional basis, and even from proposing specific formulae.

403. In the past, the United Nations had considered that the future of Ruanda-Urundi should be envisaged as that of a single State. But the 1957 Visiting Mission had thought that the common future of those two States might well be conceived in terms of a federation, or some other form of decentralization under which each region would be able to retain as many of its own institutions as possible.

404. The populations of Ruanda and Urundi have in fact always considered themselves as foreign to each other; in the past they were enemies and hostile to each other, now they are generally indifferent or distrustful. Since the European occupation, they have accepted certain common institutions on condition that these did not go too far and were not imposed from outside. Thus the High Council of Ruanda stated in its conclusions, prepared in April 1959, for the Working Group: "The future relations of Ruanda and Urundi will be enduring only in so far as they are based on free and deliberate acceptance by the parties themselves. Hence the need for negotiation concerning this important problem between acceptable representatives of both States. The Political Commission of Ruanda for its part recommends a confederation of the two States, following on the internal autonomy desired by each. The prospect of this autonomy will make it possible to institute forthwith the possible differentiation of the structures and institutions postulated by the legitimate wishes of both peoples. The admission of that principle will eliminate the concern always to introduce all kinds of reforms simultaneously, as has been done hitherto, when they may be needed here and premature elsewhere and vice-versa". The Commission concluded by requesting the decentralization of certain services from Usumbura to Kitega and Kigali, so that only the services strictly necessary to the association would be maintained in the federal capital.

405. As far as Urundi is concerned, the desire to resist the imposition of too close an association with Ruanda is even more marked. Some say that this is due in part to the fact Urundi has always had an inferiority complex vis-à-vis Ruanda. The question of the special status of the extra-customary centres and the status of the town of Usumbura, mentioned above, continues to be one of the major concerns of Urundi particularism, which is not willing to let any part of the soil of Urundi be detached from the authority of the Mwami and placed under a special régime, even a federal one. The High Council of Urundi has also insisted on the establishment of a distinct Urundi nationality in order to "banish the spectre of the establishment of a single State of Ruanda-Urundi, which would disregard both history and existing facts... With a view to preparing for the future, the Urundians request Belgium to recognize Urundi's right, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, to form a country distinct from that

/...

of Ruanda. Urundi will, if the circumstances warrant, study the possibility of federating either with Ruanda or with other neighbouring countries". Thus it was that the High Council of Urundi expressed dissatisfaction with the proposals set forth in the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 with a view to the establishment of a Ruanda-Urundi community, tentative and provisional though they were. In its memorandum of 20 January 1960 addressed to the Belgian legislature, the High Council of Urundi, referring to articles 63 and 64 of the Interim Decree establishing the joint General Council for Ruanda-Urundi, stated that "Urundi has always protested against the imposition of unification with Ruanda. While Urundi realizes that it cannot live in isolation it nevertheless considers that it has the right freely to choose the country with which it is to be associated... The General Council (provided for in the Interim Decree) is, after all, a council of the community. The establishment of this Council is contrary to the internal self-government desired because it obliges the nationals of one of the States to express their views on a question concerning the other. This can only widen the breach between the two countries and stand in the way of the establishment of the proposed community".

406. Not all the views expressed, however, were thus categorically opposed to close relations between Ruanda and Urundi. In their letter of 14 October 1959 addressed to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, the chairmen of the Hutu political parties of Ruanda and certain Hutu évolués of Urundi expressed the fear that internal self-government granted prematurely to Ruanda and Urundi respectively would perpetuate the traditional domination of the Tutsi in each country and affirmed "that they are convinced that the unitary character of Ruanda-Urundi is the best guarantee that the tutelary function of the Belgian Administration will continue to be exercised efficiently in all fields; ... why not postpone the separation of Ruanda and Urundi until such time as the population as a whole is sufficiently emancipated to express its views on this point?".

407. In Ruanda, UNAR, which in its manifesto of September 1959 proposed a confederation freely agreed to, under a supra-national authority, stated in a declaration of 31 March 1960 addressed to the Visiting Mission at Dar es Salaam by the "exiled" leaders that there could be no question of weakening, still less of breaking, the bonds existing between Ruanda and Urundi, which should, on the contrary, be consolidated, and that it was for this reason that UNAR was in favour

of the independence of Ruanda-Urundi as a unitary State with a single legislature and a single executive.

408. On the other hand, an influential and évolué Ruandese notable told the Mission: "At present, our two States are being governed by similar laws, but the people themselves have never been under pressure to start any form of union. The Union is an artificial one, symbolized by the Resident-General, whereas, in reality, the two States are absolutely separate. Since the past history of the two kingdoms rules out the idea of a federation, the qualified representatives of the two sides should be asked to draw up the principles of a confederation. Thus, Ruanda and Urundi should remain quite separate internally, each with its own government and its head of State, while, for purposes of foreign relations, the two kingdoms will constitute a single entity".

409. UPRONA, in Urundi, proposes that consideration be given to a free confederation for Urundi and Ruanda with a supra-national authority, the composition of which shall be determined by the councils of the two States. The Parti du peuple favours the establishment of a Ruanda-Urundi community to the extent compatible with the particularism and dignity of Urundi. The Parti démocrate chrétien of Urundi advocates a policy of federation with Ruanda, the means and extent of which would be settled by negotiations between the two States. The Mouvement progressiste of Urundi advocates the administrative separation of Urundi and Ruanda, but hopes consideration will be given in future to alliances freely entered into.

410. The Mwami of Urundi, in a letter to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, stated as early as January 1959: "Urundi and Ruanda should develop separately within the framework of Belgian Trusteeship. The policy of the Belgian Government should not be to seek to make a unified State of the two States, but to set in motion the means which would eventually enable them, if they so desired, to enter into association within a federation which would ultimately include other neighbouring States".

411. The Visiting Mission cannot but note that there is a strong feeling in the Territory that the separate personalities of Ruanda and Urundi should be respected. The disturbances in Ruanda in November, which raised concrete problems in that State such as the aggravation of the Hutu-Tutsi problem, changes in Ruanda and not in Urundi in the policy of the Administering Authority concerning indigenous

affairs and, what is more, the emergence of nationalist movements and demands for immediate self-government and independence, have strengthened that particularism. These feelings sometimes go very far. For example, recently, when the question of establishing a separate currency for Ruanda-Urundi, distinct from that of the Belgian Congo, came up, there was a demand in some quarters for separate currencies for Ruanda and Urundi.

412. However, there are very clear indications that the majority of Africans of the two territories, especially among the educated classes and leaders of political parties, want to maintain more or less close relations between Ruanda and Urundi, provided that they feel that those relations are freely entered into and not imposed from outside.

413. The sensitivities of the people cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Visiting Mission therefore feels that it would be a mistake for the United Nations to attempt to impose unification of the two States prematurely. In that respect, it shares the view of the Administering Authority that the problem of relations between the two States should be settled by the representatives of Ruanda and Urundi without outside pressure. Even if round-table conferences were held separately for Ruanda and Urundi to settle the problems connected with the communal elections, any comprehensive round-table conference should discuss the mutual relations between the two States. The Mission is confident that the Ruandese and Urundian leaders will be able to find an area of agreement concerning future co-operation and association between them. Accordingly, the Visiting Mission, in its communiqué of 31 March 1960,^{1/} has expressed the hope that the meeting planned for August would examine the possibility of establishing a Ruanda-Urundi community. While it might be tactless for the United Nations to make more specific recommendations in this field, there is little doubt that in the long run the interest of Ruanda and Urundi would be better served by any arrangement which would avoid splitting up the Trust Territory into smaller units.

^{1/} See paragraph 454.

D. Relations between Ruanda-Urundi and
the Belgian Congo

414. Much has been written in the past about matters relating to the administrative union between the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and they have been studied at length by the Committee on Administrative Unions of the Trusteeship Council.

415. These questions have now to be considered from a different angle. The Belgian Government stated^{1/} on 10 November 1959 that it was considering abolishing the arrangement by which Ruanda-Urundi is subordinate to the Governor-General of the Belgian Congo and restricting the administrative union of these two Territories purely to affairs of customs and finance and to certain technical matters. It seems logical, therefore, that the law of 21 August 1925, establishing the administrative union with the Belgian Congo should be repealed. Meanwhile, the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 and the interim royal order of 25 January 1960 have in fact already to a large extent divorced the Administration of Ruanda-Urundi from that of the Belgian Congo. The senior official who is responsible for the Trust Territory now bears the title of Resident-General and exercises in the Territory not only the powers formerly bestowed upon the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi but also those conferred upon the Governor-General (of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi) through decrees and royal orders.

416. It would be possible to examine in detail the measures enacted under texts (such as the law of 21 August 1925) which it is intended to annul. But the fact that the Belgian Congo is to become independent on 30 June 1960 has changed the situation radically. There is no doubt that, as a result of this, all the documents establishing an administrative union between Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgian Congo will become obsolete. The Administering Authority may wish for time to revise all Ruanda-Urundi's legal texts so as to reflect in legislation this new factual situation. There are, however, certain immediate practical problems which require solution, if only provisionally, before 30 June 1960:

^{1/} See paragraphs 433-436.

- (a) Since law and order is maintained in Ruanda-Urundi by the police force (Force publique) of the Belgian Congo, what arrangements are to be made for the maintenance of law and order in Ruanda-Urundi after the Belgian Congo has become independent and until such time as Ruanda-Urundi has trained its own security force?^{1/}
- (b) What provisions are to be made with regard to money and banking since Ruanda-Urundi used the currency of the Belgian Congo and the Central Bank of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi served both countries?^{2/}
- (c) Is the Belgian Congo/Ruanda-Urundi customs union to be simply dissolved or is it to be maintained in some form or another?^{2/}
- (d) Will any elements of the administrative union with the Belgian Congo be retained, for instance with respect to postal, telegraph and telephone services, public works, research institutions such as INEAC, and so on?

417. The Mission put these questions to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and for Ruanda-Urundi when it was in Brussels on 28 April 1960. No reply had been received by the date on which this report was adopted.

418. The only comments on relations between Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgian Congo which the Mission heard were those made by the Resident-General in his statement of 3 March 1960:

"It may be useful, at a time when the administrative union - which some have at times unjustifiably condemned - is about to come to an end, to offer a defence of it for a moment and even to draw attention to the dangers entailed in cutting the mooring ropes too fast and too thoroughly.

"At innumerable technical levels Ruanda-Urundi has derived inestimable benefit through being able to make use of the extensive central services at Leopoldville and of the help of para-State institutions set up for the Belgian Congo.

"Wherever the new administration of the Congo makes it possible, it seems to me that it would be wise to avoid persuading our Territory to give up such assistance needlessly.

"The monetary union, like the economic and customs union, should undoubtedly be maintained, but we shall take advantage of the negotiations which will follow the dissolution of the administrative union as a whole to try to secure an improvement in certain respects, particularly in the matter of the distribution of revenue, one with which the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi has frequently been concerned.

1/ See paragraphs 433-436

2/ See paragraphs 507-509.

"One question of very great importance in connexion with the discolution of the administrative union is that of a security force.

"All the necessary arrangements have been made with the Belgian and Congolese authorities to ensure that Ruanda-Urundi has at all times enough security troops.

"At the same time there will be an intensified and accelerated recruitment and military training of inhabitants of the Territory."

419. The majority of the political parties and organs have expressed no very clear views about the future relations of Ruanda-Urundi with the Belgian Congo for they believe that this is a matter which cannot properly be settled until after the Congo, on the one hand, and Ruanda and Urundi, or Ruanda-Urundi, on the other, have attained their independence.

420. In its proclamation of September 1959, UNAR proposed that the economic union with the Belgian Congo should be maintained but that the administrative union should be dissolved. PARMEHUTU considered that there was nothing against the conclusion of commercial treaties with the Belgian Congo. UPRONA adopted a position similar to that of UNAR.

421. On the other hand, certain groups of students from Ruanda and Urundi in Belgium expressed the view that the question of the federation of Ruanda-Urundi with an independent Congo should be studied as soon as possible. Some of the leaders of Ruanda advocated the same solution, provided that the Congo itself assumes a federal or confederal form. A confederation of Ruanda-Urundi, they explained, could not be united at the political level with a centralized Congo because the latter country is too large and Ruanda-Urundi would in the end be absorbed. At the economic level, however, they suggested that the two kingdoms of Ruanda and Urundi should remain united with the Congo and with the European Economic Community.

422. It is also interesting to note that most of those who expressed their views were agreed that Ruanda and Urundi, or the community of Ruanda-Urundi, should forge close links, primarily economic, with other African countries besides Congo, especially Tanganyika and Uganda, and participate in a broad federation or community of African States.

423. With regard to any future relationship with Belgium after independence, it is generally felt by the political parties that this could not be defined until after Ruanda-Urundi has become independent.

E. Africanization of the Civil Service

424. The problem of the Africanization of the administration is common to Ruanda and Urundi, whatever the form of their association. It is a problem the importance of which is recognized by the Administering Authority as it is by all the African authorities and political parties.

425. In his statement of 3 March 1960, the Resident-General said that the human problem of the Africanization of the administration could be resolved without difficulty if everyone approached it from the right angle psychologically, and with good will. The essence of the matter was, he thought, to find an ever-increasing number of inhabitants of Ruanda and Urundi capable of holding public office under the new organization, and resolutely to entrust to them greater and greater responsibilities. Such persons should, he believed, be given official opportunities to complete or fill out their education. Training periods should be arranged for them during which they worked side by side with Europeans still provisionally in office and responsible for performing the duties which they would subsequently undertake; they should also be given, temporarily, in the early stages, a European adviser. These transitional phases, the Resident-General added, would demand of the novices great efforts at adaptation and application, untiring good will, and great patience.

426. According to a note by the Administration, the term "Africanization" covers:

- (a) the transfer of the entire administration of Ruanda-Urundi to the care of an African Government, hence to African control;
- (b) the replacement, gradually but as quickly as possible, of European civil servants by inhabitants of Ruanda and Urundi in all administrative posts.

427. The first would be achieved by the political and administrative reform of which the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 and the royal order of 25 January 1960 are the first indications. The significance of these instruments, administratively can be outlined as follows:

- (a) The administration of Ruanda-Urundi is divided into three parts:
 - (i) the first part will continue to be a general administration covering the entire Territory with its services located at Usumbura;
 - (ii) the second and third parts will become the administrations of Ruanda and Urundi respectively, and responsible to the Governments of those

countries; the officials of those administrations, both European and African, will therefore be placed at the disposal of the two countries by the Government of the Territory;

(b) The services of the general administration located at Usumbura, which will still be responsible to the Resident-General, are themselves divided into two main categories:

- (i) the Trusteeship services which will continue until the termination of the Belgian Trusteeship over the Territory;
- (ii) the administration services, which will either be gradually decentralized towards the capitals of the two countries and incorporated in their administrations, or if there is a federation or confederation of Ruanda and Urundi will become its services.

428. The second matter - the appointment of Africans to all administrative posts in place of European officials - is the object of a programme which is being carried out principally among the staff of the territorial, agricultural, veterinary and medical services. In these four services there are at present nearly 290 officials of the fourth category of the public service and one of the third category who were born either in Ruanda or in Urundi. Belgian personnel in these four services on 31 December 1959 included 215 officials of the fourth category and 212 of the third category. Between now and the end of 1960, fifty further persons from Ruanda and Urundi will enter the fourth category.

429. Various measures are in preparation to speed up and intensify the process of filling the higher ranks of the administration with persons drawn from Ruanda and Urundi. These measures will enable the best qualified persons from lower categories to secure appointment to higher posts. Selective tests have already been conducted to discover the persons most suited for periods of theoretical and practical training, at the end of which there is a selective examination. Success in that examination allows immediate entry into the category for which these persons were prepared. This method will allow a large number of persons from Ruanda and Urundi to reach higher posts and even to enter the third category without going through the usual process of advancement.

430. The Resident-General's staff are at present contemplating a measure which would enable members of the customary authorities and the best qualified Ruanda

and Urundi officials of the administration to take a training course which will allow them to fill posts of responsibility and authority. These courses would be in two parts: first there would be a period of instruction on the general organization of the administration, and then there would be a period of practical training in the appropriate sphere of activity. One trainee (a chief in Kibuye district) is at present undergoing a period of instruction. At the end of this pilot phase it will be possible to determine the principles which should govern the organization of subsequent courses.

431. In addition, a number of indigenous officials are at present engaging in courses of practical training (on the job); they are, that is, becoming acquainted with the day-to-day work of a civil servant of the fourth category of the single set of regulations now applicable to all civil servants.

432. Apart from these purely practical measures to speed up the process of Africanization of the administration, mention should also be made of the filling of the higher ranks with Ruanda and Urundi personnel which will come about upon the completion of various study courses now under way.

(a) University studies: 156 indigenous inhabitants are at present taking courses in Belgian and Congolese Universities. When they have completed their studies they will enter the third category.

(b) School of administration of Astrida: the purpose of this school, which opened last September, is to prepare young persons who have completed the entire course of secondary school studies under the metropolitan system, for career in the administration. After nine months' training, and if they are successful in the terminal examinations, these young persons are appointed to posts in the fourth category. Thirty students are at present taking the course.

(c) Special sections of the Astrida Groupe scolaire: these train medical assistants, veterinary assistants, assistant agronomists and administrative assistants. Completion of these studies permits entry to the fourth category.

(d) Secondary schools, collèges, athénées and lycées: the Usumbura secondary schools (the collège and the athénée) have full ancient and modern humanities sections, leading either to university studies or to

entry to the fourth category of officials of the administration. Classics students will be leaving the Nyanza collège in 1961 and from the Kigali and Kitega collèges in 1962 and 1965. The Kitega athénée will open next September. In three years classics students will be leaving the Usumbura lycée for girls, but the girls' lycée at Kisenyi can as yet provide only the lower level of secondary school studies. In addition to these establishments, which have metropolitan curricula, mention should be made of the six small seminaries which give secondary education according to an African syllabus. To complete the picture a reference should be made to such special schools as the schools for men and women teachers (moniteurs and monitrices), the schools for men and women nurses and midwives, occupational and handicraft schools, social schools, and so on.

(e) Other projects: as a result of the termination of the administrative union with the Belgian Congo it has become necessary to make provision for the opening of schools for telecommunications technicians, works foremen, topographers, and so on. These projects are under study and decisions will be reached in the coming months.

(f) Training of administrative accountants: a training course for administrative accountants is shortly to be begun and it will be open to persons in the lower categories. After periods of theoretical and practical training, they will enter the higher ranks of the public accountancy service.

433. Lastly, the Africanization of the higher ranks of the army and the police is also contemplated. With regard to the training and recruitment of officers, arrangements have been made to send six candidates (three from Ruanda, three from Urundi) to the Royal Military School at Brussels, at the beginning of April 1960. Their training will take three years and they are expected to return to Ruanda-Urundi in November 1963. The headquarters staff of the Belgian Congo's Force publique is similarly engaged in recruiting ten candidates, in principle five from Ruanda and five from Urundi, to attend courses at the Luluabourg Officers School (Belgian Congo) in September. Their training will take two years and they are expected to return to Ruanda-Urundi in August 1962.

434. With regard to the recruitment of non-commissioned officers, candidates are selected from among the new recruits. They are sent to the NCO School at Luluabourg (Belgian Congo) and their training takes from two and a half to three years. It is expected that the first non-commissioned officers trained in this way will be back in Ruanda-Urundi in August 1962. The ranks of non-commissioned officers may be completely Africanized by the end of 1964.

435. As regards the recruitment of other ranks, it may be recalled that the Force publique formerly consisted entirely of Congolese soldiers and that there were no recruits from Ruanda or Urundi. This situation has now changed. In 1959 there were seventy recruits (35 from Ruanda and 35 from Urundi). It is expected that in 1960 there will be 140 recruits (70 from Ruanda and 70 from Urundi) and that in 1961 and subsequent years there will be 280 recruits. For the time being they are trained in the Belgian Congo instruction centres. There is in addition a plan to train 150 recruits every six months in Ruanda-Urundi at the Usumbura, Kigali and Kitega camps, together with 150 members of the police force who have had the same basic training.

436. If recruitment to the two forces proceeds at the same pace, their Congolese members may be completely replaced by the end of 1963. The Administration considers that the goal for Ruanda-Urundi should be the formation of two battalions, i.e. a total strength of 64 officers and 1,200 non-commissioned officers and men.

437. While it is clear that the Administration is taking steps to Africanize the Public Service, the Mission considers that this process should be accelerated, especially in view of the increasing demand for self-government and independence for the Territory. This would seem to call for a more intensive and comprehensive programme aimed at both training local civil servants for higher positions and expanding facilities for secondary, vocational and higher education. It is important during this period of transition for the Administering Authority to do what it can to ensure that the efficiency of the Administration is maintained.

438. The question of establishing a Force publique of Ruanda-Urundi completely staffed by local inhabitants is of particular urgency. As has been mentioned above, the Mission has not been informed of what steps are being taken with regard to the maintenance of peace and good order in the Territory between the time when Congo becomes independent and the time when it will be possible to recruit the entire Force publique locally.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. General

439. Certain preliminary observations are called for. With reference to the essential problems of Ruanda's future, the observer must surely be surprised by the contrast between the declared policies of the various political parties and the tension which reigns throughout the country. Ruanda is, in fact, currently dominated by suspicion and fear, as a result of the events which took place during the last months of 1959. Yet, on many principles the parties appear to agree, or at least their differences in policy do not appear to be fundamental.
440. For example, there appears to be a general desire to see the country progress towards democracy based on universal suffrage with equal opportunity for all. There does not appear to be any fundamental opposition to a constitutional monarchy. There are differences mainly with regard to the timing of self-government and independence. In all quarters there is agreement on the need for technical and economic aid from abroad. On the other hand, the opposing sides have a great distrust of the good faith of their adversary. For example, the Hutu and RADER parties assert that anything said or promised by UNAR and the Mwami is constantly contradicted by their deeds. UNAR is convinced that the Administration, while preaching impartiality, systematically persecutes them and supports the Hutu parties. It asserts, moreover, that contrary to their statements, the Hutu parties are racists and incite to violence and destruction. Meanwhile it seems that the general population, often misled by false rumours and with little idea of the real situation, is easily excited to violence.
441. The local Administration is considered by UNAR to be totally biased against it, and by the Hutu parties as being a reliable but belated ally. While their formal relations remain correct, there is little real co-operation between the Mwami and the Administration. All political leaders save those of UNAR appear to regard the Mwami with considerable suspicion. Many Europeans support one or other of the parties and do not conceal the fact. Members of various religious missions are also regarded as having marked preferences. While all this raises difficulties which hinder successful discussion, mediation or compromise, it is clearly necessary to take steps towards general reconciliation.

442. During its stay in Ruanda, the Mission found responsible leaders who were eager to work out some constructive solution if possible. The events of November had impressed many Ruandese with the immediate danger of a real civil war. The Mission considers that, although the task presents many difficulties, national reconciliation is both essential and possible. Its achievement would seem to depend largely on creating an atmosphere wherein people would be willing to discuss their problems and agree on compromise solutions. It appears more likely to the Mission that the political leaders and the Administration might find it possible to have frank discussions if they were brought face to face in some neutral and favourable climate outside Ruanda. The idea of a round-table conference in Brussels, similar to the one held in January 1960 for the Belgian Congo, had already been put forward by several political parties and individuals. The Mission discussed the idea with other parties which, although at first rather reserved, came to endorse the suggestion.

443. The meeting of 14 March at Kigali, mentioned in the Mission's itinerary,^{1/} encouraged the Mission to believe that a round-table conference could be successful, given the necessary preparations. It may suffice to recall here that, at the Mission's request, the leaders of the four political parties of Ruanda met in the presence of the Resident-General, the Special Resident, the Mwami and the members of the Mission to discuss the incidents which had recently taken place in Ruanda, and that, following this meeting, all the leaders agreed to issue a joint communiqué asking the population to remain calm and to assist in maintaining order. It was the first time that a formal agreement had been reached between the leaders of the political parties, the Mwami and the Administration, following a full and friendly discussion. The Mission thought that a round-table conference was most likely to be successful if it were convened as a matter of urgency so that advantage could be taken of the atmosphere created by the Mission's visit and as little opportunity as possible given for fresh outbreaks of violence which would cause a worsening in the relationship of the parties concerned.

^{1/} See paragraphs 26-27.

444. Although it is primarily the situation in Ruanda that has led the Mission to believe that a round-table conference was desirable, it is felt that such a conference should deal with the whole Territory. It is in fact difficult to see how Urundi should be excluded from any such extraordinary attempt at negotiation. In spite of its peaceful past history and the absence of recent disturbances there, Urundi is also the scene of increasing political agitation. Its traditional authorities reacted very strongly to the plans for Congolese independence, the High Council demanding the independence of Urundi by 30 June. Relations between the traditional authorities and the Administration have deteriorated. In spite of the fluidity in the political parties of Urundi and in their platforms, opinions have hardened into two main viewpoints which may be based less on ideological differences than on rivalry between two princely families. Although there has been no open conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu, some people are forecasting that, from that point of view, the situation in Urundi is potentially just as explosive as that in Ruanda. There is therefore some cause for concern regarding Urundi as well. Moreover the political parties of Urundi have also advocated a round-table conference.

445. Finally, all these questions to be discussed at the round-table conference, whether they relate to Ruanda, Urundi, or the community of these two areas, are related to the problem of establishing democratic institutions, attaining self-government, and agreeing on a programme for achieving independence for the whole Trust Territory. A meeting of the type envisaged would concentrate on the best methods of ascertaining the wishes of the people on these matters in an atmosphere of harmony and co-operation.

446. The reforms proposed in the Government statement of 10 November 1959 and introduced by the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 are obviously an attempt towards solutions of these problems. As explained earlier, these reforms consist in the granting of a certain degree of autonomy to Ruanda and to Urundi, the maintenance of the de facto community of Ruanda-Urundi and over-all Belgian Trusteeship. Following the establishment of the new interim institutions, the Belgian Government planned to hold talks with competent spokesmen designated as a result of direct and indirect elections, in order to decide on the ultimate future of the Territory.

447. In other circumstances, such a procedure might have been deemed wise and prudent. However, the Mission, in the light of the tragic events which had occurred in Ruanda, the disturbances which were still occurring there and the rising tension in Urundi, considered that discussions could not longer be delayed which might lead not only to long-term solutions and political programmes, but also to solutions of more immediate and delicate problems. Ruanda-Urundi is no longer an isolated island in an Africa in ferment, and with the Congo attaining its independence on 30 June 1960, it would be unrealistic to imagine that the Administering Authority still has many years in which to bring Ruanda-Urundi to the stage where it can decide its own future. A round-table conference, if held soon enough, would also calm the prevailing passions, besides providing evidence of the Administering Authority's willingness to initiate frank discussions on the future of the Territory.

448. The Mission came to realize that all sections of the population of Ruanda and Urundi expected from it, before its departure, if not comprehensive and immediate solutions to their difficulties, at least constructive suggestions which would make their ultimate solution possible. It was generally agreed that, if they were disappointed, the existing tension might be aggravated and might explode once more in violence. In order to do everything it could to prevent further bloodshed, the Mission considered it essential to publish, before leaving Ruanda-Urundi, a communiqué indicating the suggestions which it intended to make concerning the future of the Territory. While it realized that previous visiting missions had not made their recommendations public at the moment of leaving a territory, the Mission considered that such an action was fully justified by the grave situation in Ruanda-Urundi.

449. With a view to preparing the proposed communiqué, the Mission had a meeting with the Resident-General on 24 March at Kitega. It informed the Resident-General that it was concerned at the state of tension which existed in Ruanda and which was beginning to become felt in Urundi and that it wished to do everything possible to contribute to the establishment of a better climate. It felt that the provisions of the Interim Decree should not be implemented without first arranging a high level meeting between the Administering Authority and the political leaders. It also considered that it might be dangerous to proceed with the communal elections

in the current tense atmosphere. For these reasons, it wished to ascertain the views of the Belgian Government on the idea that it should convene, in Belgium, as soon as possible and prior to holding any communal elections, a round-table conference with representatives of all sections of the population. The Mission informed the Resident-General that if the Belgian Government agreed to convene a round-table conference, it would recommend that United Nations observers should be invited to attend that conference, as the attendance of such observers had been suggested by various African groups. It also informed the Resident-General of its intention to recommend that elections by universal direct suffrage should be held early in 1961 for the purpose of forming national assemblies for Ruanda and for Urundi and that a United Nations mission should be sent to Ruanda-Urundi as soon as possible in order to assist in the Territory's development.

450. The Resident-General expressed certain reservations regarding the proposed timing of a round-table conference. In particular he drew the Mission's attention to the difficulty of finding representative spokesmen for the conference if the latter was to take place before the communal elections. This applied particularly in the case of Urundi where the process of organizing political opinions into political parties had only just commenced. Some sections of the population moreover would certainly be disappointed if the elections promised for the summer were delayed. However, he promised to transmit the Mission's proposals to his Government immediately.

451. Three days later, the Mission took advantage of the presence at Usumbura of Mr. Raymond Scheyven, Minister of Economic Affairs for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, to discuss its proposals further with him and with the Resident-General.

452. The Belgian Government's reply reached the Mission on 30 March. It accepted the formula proposed by the Mission and decided to convene a "meeting" on Ruanda and Urundi, in which popular representatives of the people would take part but which, for organizational reasons, could not take place before the month of August and could perhaps not be held at Brussels. Finally, the communal elections planned for June and July would be postponed to a date as soon as possible after the proposed meeting.

453. The Mission immediately summoned the representatives of the political parties of Ruanda and Urundi in order to discuss with them the Belgian Government's programme and the recommendations which the Mission intended to make in its report concerning the proposed meeting, the holding of general elections early in 1961 under United Nations supervision and the dispatch of a United Nations mission to assist in the Territory's development. All the parties noted with satisfaction the decision to convene a meeting of representatives of the inhabitants of the Territory, but they felt that the meeting should be held much sooner than August. Some of them regretted the postponement of the communal elections to a later date, while some stressed that there was considerable tension throughout the country and that the longer the meeting was delayed the greater would be the risk of further disturbances, particularly if certain urgent problems remained unsolved in the interim. This view was shared by the Mission.

454. Next day, on 31 March, on the eve of its departure from the Territory, the Mission issued a communiqué, the text of which is reproduced hereunder:

"Under the Charter of the United Nations, one of the basic objectives of the International Trusteeship System is '... to promote the progressive development of the inhabitants towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned'.

"For a Trust Territory to attain independence, a certain procedure must be followed that requires approval by the United Nations General Assembly, which normally meets only late in each year.

"The Trusteeship Council sends periodic visiting missions to the Trust Territories to make an on-the-spot study of political, economic, social and educational conditions. The Mission has also been invited to make a special inquiry into the circumstances and causes of the disturbances which took place in Ruanda in November 1959. It has also to take into account a resolution adopted in 1959 by the General Assembly, which requests Belgium to propose, after consultation with the representatives of the inhabitants, time-tables and targets for the attainment of independence by Ruanda-Urundi in the near future.

"The Visiting Mission has heard the views of representatives of political parties in Ruanda and Urundi and of many personalities and individuals. It has also had consultations with representatives of the local administration.

"The Visiting Mission has been gratified to learn that the Belgian Government has decided to convene, probably in Belgium, a meeting on Ruanda and Urundi, in which representatives of the inhabitants will participate. The Visiting Mission hopes that this meeting will enable the representatives of Ruanda and of Urundi to undertake, with the representatives of the Belgian Government, a comprehensive review of all questions relating to the future of Ruanda and of Urundi, and to propose solutions to problems concerning the future of these territories. It believes that this meeting should examine also the questions which will arise for Ruanda-Urundi as a result of the independence of the Congo.

"The Visiting Mission endorses this initiative and sincerely hopes that the proposed meeting will dispel the atmosphere of agitation, fear and tension which has prevailed in the last months in Ruanda and that it will pave the way for national reconciliation. It also hopes that this meeting will relieve the present tensions in Urundi.

"The Visiting Mission has learned that the Belgian Government intends to convene this meeting in August. However, it hopes that the Belgian Government will reconsider this decision and will be able to advance the date of the proposed meeting, as it believes it most important that the meeting should be held as soon as possible.

"The Visiting Mission has been informed that preparations for the organization of this meeting, the composition of the delegations and the agenda will be discussed shortly in consultation with the representatives of the political parties and the leaders and eminent personalities of the States.

"The Visiting Mission will recommend to Belgium and to the United Nations that United Nations observers should attend this meeting.

"The Visiting Mission notes that the communal elections which were to take place in June and July will be postponed until as soon as possible after the proposed meeting.

"The Visiting Mission will recommend to Belgium and to the United Nations General Assembly that elections by direct universal suffrage to national assemblies for Ruanda and for Urundi should be held early in 1961 and be supervised by the United Nations. It hopes that the meeting proposed for August will take this recommendation into account and will also study the possibility of establishing a Community of Ruanda-Urundi.

"The Visiting Mission hopes that the assemblies resulting from these elections may draw up a constitution establishing democratic institutions.

"The Visiting Mission hopes that Belgium will be in a position to ask the United Nations General Assembly to discuss, at its 1961 session, the question of the independence of Ruanda-Urundi.

"The Visiting Mission will recommend to Belgium and to the United Nations that a United Nations mission be sent as rapidly as possible to Ruanda-Urundi to assist the Administration in the development of the Territory.

"The Visiting Mission appeals to all the inhabitants of Ruanda and Urundi and to their leaders to maintain peace, calm and order throughout the Territory and to co-operate with the Belgian authorities to that end. It will be difficult for Ruanda-Urundi to plan a successful future for the Territory without calm, restraint and hard work on the part of its inhabitants.

"The Visiting Mission is convinced that, under the aegis of Belgium and of the United Nations, Ruanda and Urundi will be able to ensure themselves a common, peaceful and progressive future in which all elements of the population without distinction may freely contribute to the welfare of their country. It also hopes that in the near future Ruanda-Urundi will take its place among the free nations of Africa.

"In concluding, the Visiting Mission pays tribute to the Belgian Administration for its contribution to the development of the Trust Territory. Much remains to be done to ensure a happy and prosperous future for Ruanda-Urundi, but the Visiting Mission has confidence in the will and ability of the Banyaruada and Barundi, their Bami and their political leaders, as well as the other sections of the population, to work together to overcome all their difficulties."

455. At the same time, the Mission sent a cable to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi requesting him to consider the possibility of advancing the date of the proposed meeting. In that connexion, it expressed its fear that the delay in holding the meeting might lead to further disturbances in Ruanda and increase the tension in Urundi.

456. After its visit to Tanganyika and before returning to New York, the Mission held a final series of talks with the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi and his associates at Brussels on 27 and 28 April. During these talks, the Mission was informed that, according to information received from the local administration, the Hutu parties of Ruanda and the population in general had been deeply disappointed by the Belgian Government's decision to postpone communal elections and that if this decision was maintained new disturbances might break out in the country. Furthermore, the Minister realized that the Mission had requested him to examine the possibility of advancing the date of the projected

meeting because it feared that the country might become the scene of further outbreaks of violence. However, in view of the economic conference for the Belgian Congo which was being held at Brussels and of the numerous measures that had to be taken to prepare that Territory for assuming the responsibilities of independence on 30 June 1960, the Belgian Government found it materially impossible to devote so much of its time in the near future to the problems of Ruanda-Urundi. In order to meet that difficulty and at the same time give satisfaction to the Mission and the local population, the Minister proposed to modify the previous decisions as follows:

- (a) The Government would convene a small-scale meeting for Ruanda towards the end of May. The aims of such a meeting would be national reconciliation, the preparation and organization of communal elections, the study of possible changes in the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 and the preparation of more general discussions to be held later. A maximum of a dozen representatives would take part in the meeting whose duration would be limited to about a week;
- (b) Shortly after the Ruanda meeting the Government would convene a similar meeting for Urundi;
- (c) After the two meetings the Government would hold communal elections, if possible as early as June;
- (d) A larger meeting would be convened after the communal elections, perhaps in October, to discuss all questions concerning the political future of Ruanda and Urundi and to prepare the 1961 legislative elections.

457. The Minister also stated that his Government had no objection to the Mission's proposal for the holding of general elections in Ruanda and Urundi at the beginning of 1961 with direct universal suffrage and under United Nations supervision, nor to the proposal for the dispatch of a United Nations Technical Assistance mission to the Territory. In reply to a question by the Mission, the Minister also stated that his Government did not insist on supervision of communal elections by the United Nations and that it would take steps to have those elections controlled by Belgian magistrates and officials who did not belong to the local administration.

B. Future of Ruanda-Urundi

458. The Mission hopes that the new plan of action which has been drawn up by the Belgian Government, and which to a certain extent takes into account the Mission's suggestions, will pave the way for a national reconciliation in Ruanda and a relaxation of tension in Urundi. It would have preferred a broader representation and a less restricted duration for the two pre-electoral meetings. The Mission hopes that all precautions will be taken to ensure that the most highly qualified political leaders are invited to these meetings and, in particular, that the representation of UNAR may not give rise to any difficulties. It also hopes that the enforced curtailment of these meetings will not prevent delegates from examining all the possibilities of bringing about a relaxation of tension in Ruanda and Urundi and that, if need be, the meetings may be extended. These views were explained by the Mission to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi in Brussels.

459. The Mission notes the reasons which have induced the Belgian Government to hold communal elections in Ruanda as soon as possible. But while it is important not to disappoint the people by delaying the promised elections, it is even more important, in the Mission's opinion, that these elections should take place in an atmosphere of calm, freedom and confidence so that the results may not be contested. The Mission considers it desirable that the work of national reconciliation should be well advanced before the elections are held. It hopes that the pre-electoral meeting of national political leaders will herald the first signs of a relaxation of tensions and that all parties will agree on the timing of the elections and the conditions under which they are to be held.

460. As regards the electoral system, the Mission has noted that the communal elections organized by the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 are based on a general list with proportional representation. This is a complex system, one of the characteristics of which is that, in a country where most electors are illiterate, each of them must write the name of five candidates on his ballot paper with or without the help of a scribe. The counting of votes and the calculation of seat distribution are far from simple.

461. It may be too late to consider changing the electoral system for the communal elections. Nevertheless, the Mission hopes that, before deciding upon the electoral system for the 1961 legislative elections, the Administering Authority will pay close attention to the experience acquired during the communal elections as well as possibly to the experience acquired during the elections organized in recent years in the Belgian Congo. It also hopes that the Administering Authority will not hesitate to reorganize the system if it proves necessary and even perhaps to ascertain through the United Nations Technical Assistance authorities the practices adopted and the results obtained in other countries where the same difficulties had to be overcome.

462. The meeting to be convened after the communal elections will assume considerable importance for it will probably be called upon to examine all questions concerning the future of Ruanda-Urundi. With regard to the composition of delegations to this meeting, the Mission would like once again to stress the need for inviting the most representative political leaders of the two countries without any exception. It also feels that it would be advantageous if other persons besides representatives of political parties, for example, leading individuals in private life were to take part in the work. Finally, it would emphasize that the idea has several times been put forward in the Territory that any meeting of this kind would have a greater chance of success if United Nations observers attended it. It hopes that this consideration will not be lost sight of.

463. As part of the reform plan which will certainly be discussed at the meeting, the Mission recommends that elections with direct universal suffrage for the purpose of constituting national assemblies for Ruanda and for Urundi should take place at the beginning of 1961 and should be supervised by the United Nations. The Belgian Government has already indicated that it accepted this recommendation. The Mission suggests that the projected meeting should take this recommendation into consideration and should also study the possibilities of establishing satisfactory links between Ruanda and Urundi.

464. Still as part of the reform plan for the Territory, the Mission hopes that the national assemblies set up as a result of these elections may draw up constitutions establishing democratic institutions. It hopes that, as a result of the progress made in 1960 and 1961, the Administering Authority will be able to request the United Nations General Assembly at its 1961 session to discuss the question of the independence of Ruanda-Urundi.

465. The Mission also recommends to the appropriate authorities that a United Nations mission should be sent as early as possible to Ruanda-Urundi to help the Administration in the development of the Territory. Such a mission would be in harmony with the wish often expressed in the Territory that the United Nations should show its continuing interest in Ruanda-Urundi by some tangible assistance in the Territory. In the Mission's last talk with the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs attended, both stated that the Belgian Government had no objection in principle to the dispatch of a technical assistance mission and, at the time of adopting its report, the Mission learned with satisfaction that negotiations had begun concerning such a mission.

C. Sequel to the November disturbances
in Ruanda

466. Finally, the Mission believes it will be useful to review briefly a number of the problems arising from the November disturbances, the solution of which, whether by means of a round-table conference or other forms of negotiation or decision, is essential for the country's future peaceful development.

467. One of these problems is that of refugees. The Mission notes with grave anxiety that this problem has become considerably worse since last November as a result of the new outbreaks in March and April 1960. It hopes that the Administration will take all the necessary measures to prevent a recurrence of such incidents. As regards the fate of the refugees, the Mission notes the reasons which have led the Administration to settle some refugees in new development areas. However, it feels that in spite of the precautions taken to ensure the welfare of displaced persons, the proposed solution can only be second best and that efforts should be made, as far as possible, to reintegrate refugees in their region of origin. The Mission fully realized that the success of such an undertaking depends essentially on the co-operation of the local Hutu populations and of the Tutsi refugees themselves. It hopes that the leaders of all the political parties will co-operate fully with the territorial authorities in order to facilitate the reintegration of refugees.

468. It is also urgent to solve the problem of provisional authorities. While noting the reasons given by the Administration for its policy in this matter, the Mission observed that the replacement of Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs by Hutu had caused bitterness among the Tutsi and consequently had not helped to diminish antagonism between the two races. Furthermore, the Mission was informed that often the new chiefs and sub-chiefs did not possess the competence of those they were called upon to replace. During one of the Mission's final talks with the Resident-General, the latter, having explained the reasons for his policy, gave the Mission the assurance that the Administration would act extremely prudently in that field and would not proceed with new replacements except when absolutely necessary. The Mission takes note of this assurance and hopes that, with the introduction of the elective principle, the problem of provisional authorities will disappear.

469. Another problem arises from the existence in Ruanda of a régime under which extraordinary powers are held by a Special Resident. According to the explanations given by the Resident-General and set forth above, the Special Resident must retain these extraordinary powers as long as the situation requires. The Mission takes note of the reasons given by the Resident-General but believes that any unnecessary continuation of the Special Resident's power to suspend or restrict certain fundamental rights will in the long run not be conducive to reducing the political tension now reigning in the country. Furthermore, the existence of this régime cannot fail to provoke criticism concerning the validity of the proposed communal elections. For these reasons, the Mission sincerely hopes that the Administration will examine the possibility of ending the emergency régime as rapidly as possible.

470. There is also the problem of national reconciliation, including an amnesty. The Mission notes that, following the November disturbances, a large number of people were arrested and sentenced while others went into exile in neighbouring countries in order to avoid legal proceedings. The Mission feels that it is politically highly desirable to adopt as soon as possible amnesty measures with regard to the events of November since it is convinced that without them national reconciliation will be difficult.

471. The Mission understands that the Administration is not opposed to the idea of amnesty measures if they could lead to the national reconciliation which is essential for the execution of the reforms that are envisaged. But the Administration stressed that such a reconciliation must be real and based on facts. It was also pointed out that certain conditions were prerequisites to the taking of amnesty measures. If the amnesty or the return of exiled leaders were interpreted as a victory for UNAR, this might provoke new and even more violent incidents.

472. In this respect, the Mission recalls that one of the essential conditions for the success of a round-table conference or any other attempt at conciliation is the assurance that the participants in such negotiations should indeed be the true representatives of the political parties, even if they happen to be refugees abroad or involved in legal sentences or proceedings connected with recent

disturbances in Ruanda. The UNAR leaders whom the Mission met at Dar es Salaam stated that they could not go back to Ruanda where they were wanted by the judicial authorities, but they requested that some of them should be members of the UNAR delegation to the round-table conference in Belgium.^{1/} The Mission wishes to emphasize the desirability of reintegrating the UNAR leaders into the normal political life of the country, especially as UNAR is accepted by many as the nationalist party of Ruanda.^{2/}

473. There are other important problems such as the problem of the Ruanda monarchy, the form of the future democratic institutions and the welfare of the peasant masses, upon which the Mission has not commented in detail. It feels that what is the most important is not so much the ideal solutions to these problems as the need to reach agreement on certain basic measures which will be in accordance with the wishes of the majority, which will be as far as possible acceptable to the whole population, and which will be directed towards the establishment of institutions through which the people can peacefully and constitutionally pursue their political, economic and social objectives. The Mission is confident that, once these institutions have been established, the people of Ruanda-Urundi will prove themselves competent to solve their own problems in their own way.

^{1/} See also T/COM.3/L.35.

^{2/} As the Mission was completing its report, it was informed that the Belgian Government had invited the members of the Provisional Special Council of Ruanda to attend a meeting in Brussels from 30 May to 4 June 1960. The Mission also learned that UNAR had instructed its representatives on the Provisional Special Council to withdraw from the Council and not to participate in the proposed meeting in Brussels.

CHAPTER II: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL QUESTIONS

I. General

474. It has already been explained above that the serious political crisis through which Ruanda-Urundi is passing and the number of people and groups of people who wished to have conversations with the Mission about the situation, obliged the Mission to devote almost all its time to political questions.

475. The Mission is none the less fully aware of the importance of economic and social problems in Ruanda-Urundi and regrets that it was unable to study them more thoroughly despite the fact that it received interesting information and documentation from the Administration on the subject. It is in the economic and social field that the Administering Authority considers that it has made the most remarkable achievements and those most likely to ensure a better future for the people of Ruanda-Urundi. The Mission would have liked to devote more time to those subjects on the spot and to give them more ample consideration in its report, as previous Missions have done. It hopes that the amount of time and space devoted to political questions in relation to that reserved for other questions will not be interpreted as meaning that it has failed to understand some of the fundamental problems of the Territory.

476. As has often been emphasized, Ruanda-Urundi is a poor and overpopulated country (more than 4.6 million inhabitants with a density of 86 persons per square kilometer for Ruanda-Urundi as a whole). The annual rate of increase of 2.8 per cent, which would double the population in 30 years, poses serious problems for which no solution can be seen for the moment.

477. Ruanda-Urundi has in the past experienced fearful famines, caused mainly by irregular rainfall. These famines, the last of which occurred in 1943-1944, have resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. Government officials who remember these tragic periods are not entirely free of concern about the subject now. In their view, if political disorders were to continue and unfavourable climatic conditions were to occur at the same time, famines more terrible than ever before might occur. Indeed, events during the disturbed period in 1959 and the abolition in 1958 of compulsory food crops have resulted in a dangerous decrease in food reserves. The Resident-General pointed out that in 1956 each inhabitant could, if necessary, find an extra ration of 81 kilograms of cassava meal; by 1961 that extra amount would have fallen to 10 kilograms.

478. These observations should not, however, obscure the fact that some impressive progress has been made in the Territory: the introduction of new food crops less susceptible to drought, the extension and improvement of traditional food crops, the cultivation of marsh land, the protection of land from erosion, re-afforestation, the creation of peasant settlements (paysannats), the research in agricultural stations, the building up of food stocks, etc. A great part of the Administering Authority's efforts has of necessity been directed toward raising the level of the subsistence economy of the population.

479. Cash crops have also been successfully introduced in the Territory thanks to the combined efforts of the Administration and farmers. Coffee exports increased from some 150 tons in 1933 to 36,000 tons in 1959. This coffee is of excellent quality and in 1959 nearly 1,000 million Belgian francs (\$20,000,000) were paid directly to the African planters. Unfortunately, Ruanda-Urundi is highly vulnerable to the risks of the single crop system. The Administration has encouraged the diversification of export crops wherever conditions permitted: cotton, castor-oil plants, pyrethrum, tobacco, palm oil and tea are being produced but the importance of these crops is still only secondary.

480. The problems associated with stock raising are well known and have been described on many occasions. The ownership of a cow in Ruanda-Urundi has a meaning of greater social than economic significance, and the Administration has for many years energetically attempted to convince stock-raisers that it would be to their advantage to transform their overabundant, unproductive and poor quality cattle into a source of wealth. The Administration has, however, succeeded in reducing animal and cattle diseases and has undertaken a long-term programme to improve cattle by crossing with better strains and improving stock-raising techniques.

481. Ruanda-Urundi has been provided with a basic road system of remarkable density for Africa. Impressive road works are under way in the country whose mountainous and tortuous landscape make road building both costly and difficult. The port of Usumbura has been enlarged and modernized and the Territory has recently been provided with a new aerodrome. The Territory's mineral resources, consisting of some gold, tin, wolfram, and columbo-tantalite, are somewhat meagre and seem hardly suitable for large-scale development. Industrial activity is still at a low level.

482. Economic planning in the Territory is covered by a ten-year economic and social development plan for Ruanda-Urundi, which is financed by the Administering Authority; it was put into operation in 1952.

483. In the social field, note should be taken of the good results achieved in both curative and preventive medicine and public health. The Territory is served by a network of hospitals, dispensaries and health units. Tuberculosis is, however, still a major problem.

484. The Mission will confine itself to dealing with three subjects to which it gave particular attention in the economic and social fields: land tenure, public finance and education.

II. Questions of land tenure

485. Problems connected with the land tenure system in Ruanda-Urundi are two-fold. Firstly, the country is overpopulated and overstocked; the resulting lack of cultivable land and pasture land is all the more serious for the fact that most of the land is of poor quality. Secondly, the customary land tenure system is very complex and is the basis on which the social and political organization of the country rests; changes in it affect and are affected by the social and political development of the people. Many of the political problems referred to in the early part of this report would be incomprehensible without reference to the system of land tenure. The political development and economic future of Ruanda-Urundi therefore depend very much on a solution being found to land tenure problems. With this in mind the Working Group devoted many pages of its report to the subject.

486. The origin and development of land tenure problems are better known in Ruanda than Urundi but they are of much the same nature in the two States.

487. Before the arrival of the Tutsi, the land tenure system was essentially clannish and patriarchal. The Hutu clans had taken possession of the land which they had cleared in the forest. With the increase in population, the forest disappeared and gave way to crops, fallow land and pasture. The power and prestige of the chiefs of the clan who had in theory remained the owners of the land progressively declined. At the same time, the Tutsi pastoralists gradually imposed their political authority on the country, mainly through the ubuhake system, and land slipped little by little out of the hands of the clan to become the domain of the Mwami. "The Mwami has eaten the land" became an adage. The occupants enjoyed the fruits of the land only on a precarious basis, and to cultivate his land the peasant was obliged to fulfil in any duties including forced work and the provision of food contributions.

488. The evolution of land tenure from a clan system to a feudal system is at different stages in different parts of Ruanda. Large remnants of the former forest estates (ubukonde) subsist in Ruanda, mainly in the western chiefdoms on the Congo-Nile crest and in Bugoyi. The ubukonde raises problems by reason of the high rents which the principal bakonde (chiefs of families representing the old clans of settlers) demand from their tenants. In these regions, Tutsi chiefs and notables have in the past taken land for their own use or the use of the families of their clients and servants from central Ruanda. These families, some of which settled

there two or three generations ago, recognize no obligation towards the bakonde, because they hold their lands with the approval of the Mwami. The bakonde, in turn, contest their right of occupation and seek to recover the land, which was one of the factors which brought the expulsion of the Tutsi from certain regions of Ruanda in November 1959.

489. An even more complex land tenure problem exists in central Ruanda, where cattle are extremely plentiful and land scarce. In the past, this region had been divided up by the Mwami into fiefs, for the benefit of the great vassals; some of these fiefs (igikingi, plural ibikingi) entailed political rights, while others seem to have been mere grazing concessions. After the 1931 reforms, the holders of the ibikingi lost their political authority over the indigenous inhabitants residing on their domains but retained their land tenure rights. Even today, a farmer settled on a igikingi owes certain customary services. These services are prejudicial to progress and the modernization of agriculture, and render even more acute the problem of the division of land between agriculture, which is mainly Hutu, and stock-breeding, which is mainly Tutsi.

490. At the same time, and for the same reasons of over-population and the shrinkage of vacant lands, the system of family agricultural holdings is gaining strength and developing towards quasi-ownership. Such a family holding, characterized by a hut, a kraal, a banana plantation and seasonal crops, is known in Ruanda as isambu and in Urundi as itongo. The Administration has encouraged this evolution towards greater respect for the right to land by opposing the once frequent depredations and by obliging the indigenous authorities to bring land disputes before their courts. In 1956, it was decided in Ruanda to vest the sub-chiefdom councils with the power to allocate holdings of an area not exceeding two hectares.

491. During recent years, the High Councils of Ruanda and Urundi have undertaken studies with a view to giving formal endorsement to the revision of the customary notions of land tenure and establishing new rules, through orders of the Bami, especially regarding the elimination or redemption of outdated feudal services.

492. The recognition of the system of individual land ownership is regarded by some as an essential basis for the solution of the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The Hutu in Ruanda are also demanding the abolition of the privileges enjoyed by the ibikingi, without redemption. They have contended that the High

Council of Ruanda is neither objective nor competent in land matters; being composed almost exclusively of Tutsi, it is, in their view, a party to the delicate issues of which it is also a judge.

493. The conclusions of the Working Group were that the laws governing land tenure, which are the very basis of the life of every person in Ruanda and in Urundi, have been severely shaken by the development which those communities have undergone. Custom has become unsettled and erratic; faith in judgments has been deeply affected and the fact that a large majority of the judges belong to the dominant race (Tutsi) has only aggravated the situation. The High Councils of the States have been considering reforms but, despite their efforts, have not succeeded in reaching conclusions. It is therefore necessary, in the Working Group's opinion, to establish without further delay a preparatory committee composed of African judicial officers, assisted by Belgian jurists, whose task would be to prepare draft land legislation consistent with the demands of progress.

494. Since the November disturbances, the question of the necessary changes in the land tenure system has become even more urgent; the present position represents an obstacle to lasting peace in the country and impedes the rational utilization of land, without which agriculture and stock-breeding cannot properly develop.

495. The provisional special council of Ruanda has recently resumed the study of certain land questions, including the problems of the ubukonde.

III. Public Finance

496. During the Mission's visit to Brussels on 29 February 1960, the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi reminded the Mission that the administration of Ruanda-Urundi by Belgium required a constantly growing financial outlay by Belgium, and that the situation raised a serious problem which deserved to be brought to the attention of international bodies.

497. The ordinary budgets of Ruanda-Urundi had for many years been balanced or shown a surplus. Since 1954, however, and particularly since 1956, the ordinary budget has shown a deficit, and these deficits have been covered either by drawing on the surpluses accumulated in the preceding years or by advances from Belgium or the Belgian Congo.

498. The figures of the ordinary budget in the last several years has been as follows (in millions of Congolese francs):^{1/}

	<u>Revenue</u>	<u>Expenditure</u>	<u>Deficit</u>	<u>Sums advanced by Belgium</u>
1954	663	685	22	-
1955	681	694	13	-
1956	695	773	78	-
1957	810	956	146	-
1958	903	984	81	125
1959	1,010	1,217	207	270
1960 (estimates)	992	1,400	408	400

499. Among the factors making for increased expenditure should be especially noted the rise in educational expenditure (115 million in 1955, 349 million in 1960) resulting from the increase in the number of primary school classes, the establishment and expansion of secondary, technical and agricultural education, the establishment of a Department of Agriculture at the University of Astrida, the increasing share assumed by the Government in the expenses of the subsidized private schools, and the increase in ordinary and overseas scholarships. There has also been an increase, although on a smaller scale, in the expenditure for other social services and in the public debt. Finally, public expenditure in

^{1/} 1 Congolese franc = 1 Belgian franc; 50 francs = \$1.

Ruanda-Urundi has recently been affected in a marked way by the introduction of a single status in the civil service (elimination of previously existing measures of discrimination between indigenous personnel and expatriate officers) and the reclassification in a higher category of a number of indigenous officers. Political development is also regarded by the Administration as a factor in the increase in ordinary expenditure (decentralization of administrative services, expansion of the security forces, etc.).

500. Revenue has failed to maintain the same rate of increase as expenditure, particularly since 1956, and the Administration thinks that there is little hope of substantially improving the state of public finances by modifying the tax system. Revenue increases are sharply curtailed by the predominance of a subsistence economy among the indigenous inhabitants and the limited number of taxpayers - for the most part Europeans and Asians - who could be taxed on the basis of their actual individual capacity to pay taxes. The possibility of obtaining revenue from export duties was limited by the precarious state of the coffee market and the equally difficult situation with regard to the marketing of non-ferrous metals. Excise taxes on alcoholic beverages (mainly beer) and tobacco were already fairly high in relation to the value of the products concerned and the purchasing power of indigenous consumers.

501. The extraordinary budget of Ruanda-Urundi primarily covers the financing of the capital work and expenditure provided for under the Ten-Year Plan. This expenditure has been in the region of 400 million francs a year: 466 million in 1958, 442 million in 1959 and 480 million francs in 1960. This budget is mainly financed from interest-free advances formally reimbursable, made by Belgium at the rate of 400 million francs a year since 1952. In 1958 and 1959 this advance was increased to 600 million francs and in 1960, to 750 million francs, but during the last three years, a proportion of these advances has had to be used to cover deficits in the ordinary budget. At the end of 1959, the public debt of Ruanda-Urundi stood at the figure of 4,630 million francs, of which 3,900 million francs were derived from interest-free loans made by Belgium. The state of the public finances of Ruanda-Urundi is, therefore, grave and many problems will have to be faced in future if the Territory's economic and social development is not to be gravely handicapped.

502. The Visiting Mission is not in a position to make recommendations in this field, but it hopes that the United Nations mission, whose despatch to Ruanda-Urundi is recommended, will find it possible, either as a result of its own efforts or through the despatch of subsequent missions, to draw up not only a programme of economic development for the Territory, but a long-term projection of the public finances of the Territory, having regard to the contributions which Belgium is prepared to make and of other possible sources of financing.

503. At the request of the Belgian Government the Association européenne des sociétés d'études pour le développement has recently agreed to undertake an over-all survey with a view to the preparation of an economic and social programme for the development of Ruanda-Urundi. This study will be financed by the Development Fund of the overseas countries and territories of the European Economic Community. The Association, which was recently established, is composed of private and para-university organizations of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

504. It should also be noted that Ruanda-Urundi will receive 500 million francs, in five annual instalments, from the Development Fund of the European Economic Community. The allocation is intended to promote investments of an economic or social character, and one of the proposed projects concerns the development of the Bugesera-Mayaga area. The Administering Authority reports that no political conditions are attached to this assistance and that the economic stipulations connected with it are strictly confined to expenditures undertaken in utilization of the sums supplied to the Territory by the Development Fund.

505. The General Council of Ruanda-Urundi had previously considered the influence of the administrative and customs union between Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgian Congo on the budget and economy of Ruanda-Urundi, and some doubt had been expressed that this system benefited Ruanda-Urundi's public finances.^{1/}

506. At the June 1959 session of the General Council (which is the last session the General Council held), the following statement was adopted:

"In 1960 Ruanda-Urundi will unfortunately be obliged to depend on Belgian subventions for nearly half its ordinary and extraordinary public expenditures.

^{1/} See particularly Report of the Visiting Mission, 1957, T/1402, paragraphs 133-134.

"Yet ordinary expenditures will not exceed 325 francs per capita (compared with 1,170 francs in the Belgian Congo), whereas receipts will amount to approximately 15 per cent of the national product (compared with 24 per cent in the Belgian Congo).

"If, instead of being merely connected by an administrative and customs union, Ruanda-Urundi was an integral part of the Belgian Congo, its direct and indirect allocations for ordinary expenditures would, in consideration of the size of its population and area, be increased in 1960 to 3,000 millions.

"The money income of the Ruanda-Urundi population may be estimated at 2,000 millions a year; the public Treasuries (Government and indigenous circumscriptions) deduct at least 600 millions through direct taxation. For the rural population the figures come to 900 millions in money income and a minimum of 400 millions in taxes.

"In such serious circumstances, the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi must take vigorous steps to mobilize all the country's resources and to base Ruanda-Urundi's economic, financial, wage and social policies on priorities in the country's interests and resources.

"During the past two years the General Council has often expressed its belief that subordination of the principles determining such policies to those prevailing in the Belgian Congo is making the situation more difficult.

"Now it is obliged to note with deep concern that, although the appeals hitherto issued have led to some financial concessions, the response has not been very sympathetic, has been limited to denials without adequate explanation and has not succeeded in changing the basic situation.

"There must be no delay in frankly examining these problems, for the situation is growing worse from year to year and progress in these fields has become practically impossible.

"Accordingly, the General Council appeals solemnly to Belgium to grant the responsible authorities of this country, under the auspices of the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, the freedom to take decisions separate from those taken in the Belgian Congo in matters of economic policy; transport, supply, wage and social policy, and to seek agreements with the Belgian Congo concerning a reasonable division of receipts from customs and exise duties and a sharing of the burden of defence policy.

"The General Council affirms its conviction that, in exercising this freedom, Ruanda-Urundi will not forget the duties which it owes to Belgian generosity or the legitimate influence which the economy and institutions of the Belgian Congo, with which it is connected by a customs union, should exercise on its future actions".

507. With the Belgian Congo's attainment of independence on 30 June 1960, any future relations between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi will be changed fundamentally. Ruanda-Urundi has been represented at the Economic, Financial and Social Conference on the Belgian Congo, held at Brussels from 27 April to 16 May 1960, by a delegation of seven observers, composed of two Urundians, two Ruandese and three Europeans, namely, the president of the Usumbura Chamber of Commerce and two officials.

508. At the conclusion of the Conference, a joint commission, which included the delegates of Ruanda-Urundi, was set up to investigate legal measures for ensuring administrative continuity in the economic, customs and taxation fields and to consider the general problem of relations between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. The text of the resolution No. 4 adopted on the relations between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi by this conference is as follows:

"The Conference:

- apprised of the wish expressed by delegations from both the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi to ensure the maintenance of a customs, economic and monetary association between the two countries;

- having regard to the fact that problems arising out of such association can be definitely settled only after the accession to independence of Ruanda-Urundi, pending which all solutions should be of a conservative and temporary nature;

- having regard also to the fact that the existing de facto union becomes automatically null and void by virtue of the Congo's accession to independence;

- considering that the absence of any legal basis for the relationship between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi would be extremely prejudicial to the economy of these countries by removing all legal support from certain essential administrative departments;

- having regard to the need to ensure the continuity of the monetary system pending a new agreement between the Belgian and Congolese authorities;

- having regard also to the fact that problems connected with economic co-operation arising out of State-controlled organizations which exercise their activities in the territories both of the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and of joint utilities and installations, are of lesser urgency seeing that the Congo Fundamental Law provides for the maintenance of the status quo until new arrangements have been made by the Congolese Government;

"Recommends:

- that a Joint Committee to include delegates from Ruanda and Urundi, acting under the legal responsibility of Belgium, be set up immediately following the conclusion of this Conference;

- that this Committee shall seek for the necessary legal basis to ensure essential administrative continuity in the field of joint taxation, customs and excise, and other branches of trade policy, and that it shall submit to the proper authorities, for immediate implementation urgent solutions which shall take into consideration the interest of both parties;

- that these solutions shall remain in force until the Government of the Congo or the future Government of Ruanda-Urundi expresses the wish to see them replaced by another agreement;

- that the Committee shall also examine the overall problem of relations between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi so as to be able to apprise the Congolese Government, as soon as possible, of the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative systems proposed;

- that the Ruanda-Urundi delegates shall participate in the work of the Committee entrusted with the study of forms of Monetary co-operation and the new status of the Central Bank."

509. The delegation of observers from Ruanda-Urundi issued the following statement as a summary of its views concerning the immediate future:

"I. General considerations

"The joint commission will undoubtedly discuss a preliminary version of certain conventions on co-operation. A legislative measure based on this commission's recommendations will put into effect an extension of the status quo with the changes that have been recommended. This legislative measure will go into force provisionally, to be replaced later by a convention between the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi represented by Belgium. Should that convention not be in effect when the legislative measure expires, there will be no legal basis for the continuation of co-operation. The joint commission will undoubtedly make a proposal concerning the length of time the provisional legislation should remain in force. If contrary to all hopes and expectations, the discussions of the joint commission do not provide the basis for and outlines of a general agreement, Belgium as the Administering Authority will have to take the necessary measures before 30 June to assure the normal and lawful operation of Ruanda-Urundi's economy in the absence of specific technical ties with the Congo.

"II. Special considerations

"(a) Co-operation in customs and taxation

"It is very much to be hoped that the terms and conditions discussed will take into account Ruanda-Urundi's desire to rectify the situation with regard to division of receipts. Indeed, while Belgium has heretofore assumed sole responsibility in this field, particularly with regard to supplying the deficiency in the budgetary receipts in Ruanda-Urundi, such a state of affairs was not very suitable in relations between two countries not linked by a common administration; as a matter of principle as well as for practical reasons, and particularly in preparation for the attainment of independence by Ruanda and Urundi, the first steps should be taken towards a negotiated division.

"(b) Economic co-operation

"The Congolese delegates were particularly reserved in their opinions in this field because of the broad level of discussion on economic policy that follows on such co-operation. It is difficult to see how economic co-operation can be achieved without this broad level of discussion.

"Accordingly the delegation of Ruanda-Urundi would favour the postponement of these negotiations, to eliminate from the discussions a factor which is temporarily the subject of reservations on the part of our neighbours.

"However, it might be difficult to consider practical measures on a single point of economic co-operation like import policy, while the general principle of economic co-operation is not established.

"(c) Monetary co-operation

"The Working Paper dealing with this subject indicates that the decision concerning Ruanda-Urundi will depend on which monetary plan the Congo chooses.

"If the second alternative (National Institute for Issuance of Currency) is put into effect, preparations should be made to issue currency for Ruanda-Urundi alone.

"If, on the contrary, the third alternative (continuance of the present Central Bank acting in collaboration with the Belgian National Bank, with some amendments in their charters) is adopted, the joint commission will undoubtedly draw up a draft monetary convention safeguarding the interests of both Territories; this draft should provide the basis for a temporary legislative measure, which would prevent a break in continuity while ratification of the draft by the Governments concerned was awaited."

IV. Education

510. Despite the efforts made by the Administration and the missions and the progress achieved in this field since the beginning of Trusteeship, in 1957 the educational needs of the Territory were still very far from being met; as the Visiting Mission stated in 1957, an enormous task remained to be done.^{1/} The number of pupils attending primary schools was less than 245,000, or less than half the school-age children. In addition, the wastage in school enrolment from each class to the one above was extremely heavy, as UNESCO had reported.^{2/} The number of pupils engaged in secondary and technical education has not yet reached 5,000, that is to say, 1 per cent of the young people of post-primary school-age. There was no university in the Territory.

511. At this time, in the light of new considerations, the Administration took the following measures:

- (a) it slowed down the development of primary education in order to bring the main effort to bear on secondary education, as well as technical and higher education;
- (b) it strengthened the curriculum in the majority of grades;
- (c) it set up a central examining board empowered to confer lower and higher course certificates in intermediate education based on metropolitan syllabus;
- (d) it established scholarships, fellowships for graduate study and travel grants in Ruanda-Urundi, the Belgian Congo and abroad;
- (e) a survey of school conditions was conducted by three professors from the University of Liège, constituting the Mission of the University of Liège Foundation for Scientific Research in Central Africa (FULREAC).

512. This new policy has hastened the development of technical education and particularly of secondary education during the past three years, and led to the opening in 1958 of the first university establishment in the Territory, the Faculty of Agronomy and Zootechny at Astrida. However, the expansion of primary education came to a halt; 244,689 pupils attended primary schools in 1957 and 247,133 in 1959.

^{1/} T/1402, paragraph 292.

^{2/} T/1495, paragraphs 16-18.

513. It appears that budgetary considerations necessitated the decision to slow down the development of primary education. From 1947 to 1957 the share of the ordinary budget absorbed by education continued to expand; in 1957 it reached 20.8 per cent, or 199 million francs, and in the budget estimates for 1958 21.7 per cent or 221 million francs. In the 1960 budget estimates the outlay for education will come to 25 per cent, or 349 million francs.

514. The education budget was the subject of an interesting debate in the June 1959 budgetary session of the General Council. During this debate the president of the Council pointed out that the Government and the Council had taken a serious risk in recommending that the status quo be maintained in primary education, for such a measure could not fail to arouse popular dissatisfaction. He added that in view of the serious budgetary situation, there were only two solutions: the restraint on the development of education could be relaxed with the result that the budget would soon be swamped, the financing of other public services prevented, and the country reduced to anarchy; the other alternative was to run the risk of creating tension by a temporary limitation on expenditures, but at the same time to establish favourable conditions for the comprehensive solution of the education problem.

515. One of the Council members, Mr. Barusasiyeko, had said that the decision to delay the development of primary education would provoke a "violent hatred" of the Administration among those who would be deprived of the benefits of this education and might even subject the country to "blood and fire"; and he proposed that the indigenous inhabitant himself determine the education budget through his representatives. He was convinced that the indigenous inhabitant had so strong a desire to have his children go to school that he would accept sacrifices if the decision was for him to make.

516. Mr. Barusasiyeko's proposal, which seemed to be supported by several members of the General Council, raised in turn the question of the convention^{1/} regulating expenditures for education in Ruanda-Urundi, which the Administering Authority had concluded with the religious missions in 1948. It was suggested that the expenditures which were governed by the 1948 convention might very profitably be

^{1/} See Rapport annuel, 1948, page 173 and A/1306, page 24.

divided and separately regulated by a series of more limited conventions between the missions and the local authorities. It was pointed out, however, that the authorities in Brussels and Léopoldville, not the authorities in Ruanda-Urundi, were responsible for revising the 1948 convention. It should be noted that the idea of revising the 1948 convention had already been proposed by the High Council of Ruanda.

517. Lastly, in the text adopted by the General Council it was considered imperative not to provide for any new extension of education so long as such basic questions as the convention problem and the salaries of assistant teachers were not settled. The Council believed that the need to find a solution to these questions was extremely urgent in view of the tension and concern over them in the Territory, and that only an authorization to the competent local authorities to take all the necessary decisions at the local level would provide a basis for settlement.

518. The FULREAC mission, mentioned above, visited the Territory in March and April 1958 and submitted its conclusions in a detailed report. On the basis of a study of the psychology of the African child, the development of education in Ruanda-Urundi and the existing problems in this area, it put forward many detailed suggestions for a progressive teaching theory adapted to African conditions. While it would take too much space to reproduce all these suggestions here, it may be noted that, in its final conclusions, the FULREAC mission observed that there was still a large proportion of illiterates in Ruanda-Urundi, and that despite the enormous share of the budget allocated to education, the number of schools was very inadequate in comparison with the school-age population. The report also stated that those who attended school received only limited benefits from their attendance, either because their social, family and biological conditions substantially limited their learning ability and capacity to advance, or because inadequate teaching methods prevented pupils from making the progress of which they were capable, or because the school programme and organizations imposed on them were based too much on European models and did not take African conditions sufficiently into account.

519. Referring to the work of the Education Commission of the General Council and of the FULREAC mission, the Resident-General declared in his speech of

3 March 1960 that the general problem of the organization of education had been thoroughly studied to determine if structural reforms might not permit a better adaptation of education to the special needs and modest resources of the Territory. He announced that a week's seminar would be convened shortly to draw up a general draft which would be submitted for consideration to the State Councils as soon as they were organized. The reorganization would cover such varied sectors as the financing of primary classes at the commune level, the eventual remodelling of the curriculum, the salary scale for teachers and the greater strengthening of secondary and higher education, necessarily at the temporary expense of primary education.

520. As has been indicated several times already, the Mission was not able to devote much time to consideration of education in the Territory. However, it visited two interracial secondary schools at Usumbura, the Collège du Saint-Esprit and the Athénée royal. The buildings of the Collège du Saint-Esprit are splendid, but the Mission was struck by the large sums which were spent on them in spite of the fact that the country's budgetary condition is so critical. The Mission was informed that they cost 185 million francs, 148 millions of which were subsidized by the Government. The buildings of the Athénée royal, which are adequate, cost only 63 millions.

521. There is no need to stress the importance of the development of all levels of education for Ruanda-Urundi at a time when the Territory is moving rapidly towards independence. The difficulties arising from the need to hasten educational progress, on the one hand, and the need to balance the budget, on the other, are even more serious for Ruanda-Urundi than for many other countries, because of the limited resources of the Territory and the rapid growth of its population. The Mission was glad to observe that the Administration and the local authorities are aware of the problem and are trying to find ways to resolve the difficulties. In this connexion, the Mission recalls that the 1957 Visiting Mission had suggested the establishment of a special educational fund for Ruanda-Urundi.^{1/} As it seems difficult for Ruanda-Urundi to meet the full cost of the intensive educational development which the Territory requires, it may be

^{1/} T/1402, paragraphs 293-295.

expected to look to the Administering Authority and, possibly, to the international organizations for increased financial and technical assistance in this field.

522. During its visit, the Mission was informed of a suggestion that, in order to make it easier to retain or engage expatriate personnel after the independence of Ruanda-Urundi, an international school should be established at Urumbura; this school would be subsidized by the various countries from which the teachers came, with the assistance or supervision of UNESCO or the United Nations.

523. After its departure from the Territory, the Mission learned that a meeting of experts and of representatives of Ruanda and Urundi would be held at Usumbura from 23 to 28 May 1960 to consider the draft basic education act which had just been prepared for the Belgian Congo and to decide whether its general lines and its detailed provisions were acceptable, mutatis mutandis, for Ruanda-Urundi.

ANNEX I

APPEAL ADDRESSED TO THE PEOPLE OF RUANDA BY THE MISSION
ON 8 MARCH 1960

Banyarwanda,

This appeal is addressed to you by the United Nations Visiting Mission.

We have come here in order to help the Mwami, the Belgian Administration and the political parties to come to an understanding, restore calm in the hearts of all the Banyarwanda and ensure happiness and peace in Ruanda.

We urgently request you to remain perfectly calm. Do not believe false rumours. Do not assemble in crowds.

The Mission is anxious to hear all those who desire a hearing, wherever they may be. But do not come in excessively large groups. Send us representatives whom you trust in groups of ten or so. We will listen to them with the closest attention.

Help the Mission. Remain calm. Avoid incidents.

The members of the Mission:

Mason SEARS (United States of America), Chairman

Paul EDMONDS (New Zealand)

Miguel SOLANO-LOPEZ (Paraguay)

Omar LOUTFI (United Arab Republic)

ANNEX II

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO THE PEOPLE OF RUANDA BY THE
RESIDENT-GENERAL ON 8 MARCH 1960 1/

BANYARWANDA,

After once more expressing the great pleasure he takes in welcoming the United Nations Visiting Mission to Ruanda-Urundi and his hope that it will help to bring about a calming of minds and the reconciliation which are essential to the advancement of the Territory, the Resident-General takes the occasion of the Mission's departure for the interior of the country to remind you that any person may freely communicate with its members and that, of course, such person need have no fear that he will suffer in any way as a result of having done so.

Usumbura, 8 March 1960

(Signed) Jean-Paul HARROY

1/ An identical message was addressed to the people of Urundi on 15 March 1960.

ANNEX III

APPEAL ADDRESSED TO THE PEOPLE OF RUANDA BY THE MISSION
ON 14 MARCH 1960

BANYARWANDA,

The Mission has learned with deep regret that incidents have occurred in recent days in the Gitarama and Biumba areas.

The Mission repeats that it is here to help you find a solution to your present difficulties. It cannot succeed unless peace, and law and order, prevail in the Territory.

Banyarwanda, remain calm, avoid provocations, help to maintain law and order. The Mission requests this of you.

The members of the Mission:

Mason SEARS (United States of America), Chairman

P.K. EDMONDS (New Zealand)

Miguel SOLANO-LOPEZ (Paraguay)

Omar LOUFFI (United Arab Republic)

ANNEX IV

JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF RUANDA

We, the leaders of the political parties of Ruanda, being met at the request of the United Nations Visiting Mission and in the presence of the Resident-General, the Special Resident for Ruanda, the Mwami, the members of the Special Council for Ruanda and the members of the Visiting Mission, have agreed to issue the following joint communiqué:

Taking note of the statement by the Visiting Mission that: (a) its task is to obtain information, not to make decisions; (b) it has come to Ruanda to study the situation in the country, to ascertain the freely expressed desires of the people, and to report to the United Nations; (c) the question of the Territory's future will be considered by the United Nations General Assembly, which will begin its work next September; (d) the Mission cannot carry out its task unless peace, and law and order, prevail in this country,

Considering the overriding interest of our country,

1. We solemnly condemn all use of provocation, intimidation and violence as political instruments;
2. We urgently request all our followers and sympathizers not to heed any incitement to threaten, molest or kill persons or to destroy houses and property;
3. We further request all our followers and sympathizers not to rebel against lawful authority and not to start or disseminate false rumours;
4. We request the competent authorities to deal severely, in accordance with the law, with any act endangering the maintenance of peace and of law and order;
5. We urge the people to co-operate with all organs of authority in this regard;

6. We request all Banyarwanda to be guided by the agreement which the leaders of the political parties have reached on the terms of this communiqué so that an atmosphere of mutual trust may be created which will make possible the free expression of all views.

Done at Kigali, 14 March 1960

AFROSOMA: J. Gitera Habyarimana

PARMEHUTU: G. Kayibanda

RADER: P. Bwanakweri

UNAR: J. Rutsindintwarane

SEEN AND APPROVED BY:

J.P. Harroy, Resident-General

Colonel BEM (Breveté d'Etat-major) G. Logiest, Special Resident

Kigali V, Mwami of Ruanda

The members of the Special Council: I. Nseyimana (AFROSOMA)

A. Ndayambaje (AFROSOMA)

A. Makuza (PARMEHUTU)

D. Mbonyumutwa (PARMEHUTU)


L. Ndazaro (RADER)

E. Rwighemera (RADER)

E. Karema (UNAR)

X. Ndogozabahizi (UNAR)

M. Sears, Chairman of the Visiting Mission



TRUST TERRITORY OF RUANDA-URUNDI
ITINERARY OF UNITED NATIONS VISITING MISSION TO TRUST TERRITORIES IN EAST AFRICA, 1960

----- Motorable roads
 _____ Country boundary

By road By boat
 _____ Itinerary

By air

0 10 20 30 40
 MILES

0 10 20 30 40
 KILOMETRES