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DA

SECTION ONE OF TWO

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO RESIDENT CLERK.

MY TELNO 1284: RWANDA

UNP 062/80	

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARIAT BRIEF COUNCIL MEMBERS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN RWANDA. LATE ON 8 APRIL AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN AGREED AND A PROVISIONAL CEASE-FIRE WAS HOLDING. BUT THE SITUATION IN KIGALI HAD DETERIORATED RAPIDLY THEREAFTER. THE RPF WERE FIGHTING THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND RPF FORCES HAD BEGUN TO MOVE ACROSS THE DMZ TOWARDS KIGALI. PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS AGAINST FOREIGNERS WERE BEING BROADCAST. A NUMBER OF CONVOYS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS HAD LEFT KIGALI BY ROAD. ONE ORGANISED BY UNDP SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN ATTACKED ALTHOUGH NOT SERIOUSLY. THE AIRPORT WAS CONTROLLED BY FRENCH TROOPS.

2. FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE BRIEFS ON FRENCH ACTIONS. SOLE AIM OF DEPLOYMENT OF FRENCH TROOPS IS TO EVACUATE FRENCH CITIZENS AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS. THE OPERATION WHICH IS BEING CARRIED OUT JOINTLY WITH BELGIUM IS ENTIRELY HUMANITARIAN AND TIME LIMITED. THE NATIONAL DECISION TO EVACUATE IN NO WAY IMPLIED THAT UNAMIR SHOULD LEAVE. ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS WHO SPEAK SAY THEY UNDERSTAND FRENCH AND BELGIAN ACTIONS. BUT ALL EXPRESS CONCERN AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SITUATION FOR UNAMIR. AGREEMENT THAT COUNCIL PRESIDENT SHOULD SPEAK TO THE PRESS AND THAT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE HELD AGAIN ON 11 APRIL TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR.

DETAIL

3. THE FRENCH AND RWANDAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES CALLED FOR

INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 9 APRIL. P5 AMBASSADORS MET BEFORE THE CONSULTATIONS, BUT THE GROUND COVERED WAS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THAT COVERED IN THE CONSULTATIONS.

4. THE CONSULTATIONS BEGAN WITH A BRIEFING FROM RIZA (ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL, DPKO) ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. ON 8 APRIL AFTER THE PREVIOUS COUNCIL BRIEFING (TUR REFERS) THE SECRETARIAT HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN AGREED AND A PROVISIONAL CEASE-FIRE HAD ALSO BEEN AGREED, WHICH SEEMED TO BE HOLDING. BUT NOT LONG THEREAFTER THE SITUATION HAD COMPLETELY CHANGED. THERE WAS AGAIN A RAPID DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE STREETS. THERE WERE LARGE NUMBERS OF DISPLACED PERSONS SEEKING REFUGE INCLUDING IN THE STADIUM WHERE PART OF THE BANGLADESHI BATTALION WAS STATIONED. THE RPF WERE NOW ALL OUT OF THEIR BARRACKS AND WERE FIGHTING IN THE STREET WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. RPF TROOPS HAD ALSO BEGUN TO MOVE ACROSS THE DMZ TOWARDS KIGALI. ALTHOUGH THERE HAD NOT YET BEEN ANY CLASHES WITH RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES, IF THE RPF CONTINUED TO MOVE THESE WERE INEVITABLE. THE FORCE COMMANDER WAS STILL TRYING TO WORK WITH THE CRISIS COMMITTEE TO RESTORE SOME KIND OF ORDER BUT THE SITUATION LOOKED BLEAK. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, THE RPF NOW SAID IT DISAVOWED THE NEW INTERIM GOVERNMENT. THE SGSR WAS CONTINUING TO TRY AND KEEP IN CONTACT WITH THIS INTERIM GOVERNMENT BUT THE SITUATION WAS VERY UNCLEAR. ONE OF THE LOCAL RADIO STATIONS WAS BROADCASTING PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS AGAINST FOREIGNERS. THESE HAD INTENSIFIED AFTER THE FRENCH HAD LANDED AT THE AIRPORT.

5. A CONVOY ORGANISED BY UNDP WAS TAKING SOME UN CIVILIAN STAFF AND DEPENDENTS OUT OF KIGALI TOWARDS BURUNDI. IT WAS NOW IN GITARAMA WHERE IT WOULD SPEND THE NIGHT. THE CONVOY HAD APPARENTLY BEEN ATTACKED ALTHOUGH THERE DID NOT SEEM TO BE ANYONE SERIOUSLY HURT. SOME OTHER CONVOYS ORGANISED BY EMBASSIES HAD ALSO LEFT KIGALI FOR BURUNDI. THERE WAS NO NEWS OF ATTACKS ON THESE CONVOYS. THE AIRPORT WAS IN THE CONTROL OF FRENCH FORCES. THE FORCE COMMANDER HAD GIVEN GUIDANCE THAT UNAMIR SHOULD COOPERATE WITH THE FRENCH TROOPS AS FAR AS WAS POSSIBLE WITHIN THEIR MANDATE. THE PICTURE AT THE AIRPORT WAS SLIGHTLY CONFUSED. THE RUNWAY HAD BEEN BLOCKED AGAIN BY RWANDESE CIVILIANS BUT IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT, IF MORE AIRCRAFT NEEDED TO LAND, THE RUNWAY COULD BE CLEARED.

6. MERIMEE (FRANCE) THEN INFORMED COUNCIL MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS. IN THE COURSE OF THE NIGHT OF 8 APRIL 1990 FRENCH TROOPS HAD ARRIVED IN KIGALI. MORE TROOPS WOULD ARRIVE DURING 9 APRIL BRINGING THE TOTAL TO 400. THE OPERATION TOOK PLACE

PEACEFULLY. THE RWANDESE ARMY HAD CLEARED THE RUNWAY AND MEMBERS OF THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THE ACTION. THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE INTERVENTION WAS TO EVACUATE FRENCH CIVILIANS AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS WHO WISHED TO LEAVE. THE OPERATION WAS PURELY HUMANITARIAN AND FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME. IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN RWANDA. THE ACTUAL EVACUATION WOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO ESCORT CIVILIANS FROM KIGALI TO THE AIRPORT. THE OPERATION HAD BEEN DECIDED UPON BECAUSE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THE FRENCH COMMUNITY WAS IN SERIOUS DANGER. TWO FRENCH CIVILIANS HAD BEEN KILLED AND OTHERS HAD BEEN THREATENED. THERE WERE REPORTS OF RPF MOVEMENTS. THE RPF WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REACH KIGALI AND EVEN WORSE FIGHTING WAS VERY LIKELY TO BREAK OUT. UNAMIR COULD NOT HELP SINCE ITS MANDATE DID NOT EXTEND TO PROTECTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS. IT WAS THE FIRST DUTY OF ANY GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT ITS NATIONALS AND FRANCE HAD THEREFORE TAKEN ACTION. THIS WAS A PURELY NATIONAL DECISION WHICH NEEDED NO SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORISATION. THE FRENCH DECISION IN NO WAY APPLIED THAT UNAMIR MUST LEAVE. THAT WAS A DECISION FOR THE UN. MERIMEE UNDERLINED THAT THERE WAS COORDINATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH FORCES AND THE UN FORCE COMMANDER ON THE GROUND. HE ADDED THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR NATIONAL DECISION AND THE EVACUATION WOULD BE A JOINT FRANCO-BELGIAN OPERATION. THEY DID NOT KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS THE US HAD MADE BUT FRANCE AND BELGIUM WERE COORDINATING CLOSELY WITH THEM. MERIMEE EMPHASISED THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT EMBARKED LIGHTLY ON THIS COURSE OF ACTION. HOWEVER THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF FRENCH NATIONALS.

7. WALKER (US) SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORTED THE NATIONAL DECISIONS OF THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS. THE US WAS MAINTAINING CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THEM. THIS NATIONAL DECISION WAS QUITE APART FROM ANY DECISION ON PROSPECTS FOR UNAMIR. THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS AS APPROPRIATE. WE WOULD NEED ADVICE FROM THE SECRETARIAT AND THE FORCE COMMANDER OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS AS WELL AS POSSIBLE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR.

8. CARDENAS (ARGENTINA) SAID THAT THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS ABROAD WAS PART OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COULD BE JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THE TRADITIONAL REQUIREMENTS HAD BEEN MET. THERE HAD BEEN THREATS AND ALSO ACTUAL HARM TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO PROTECT THEM. THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE OPERATION WAS TO PROTECT FOREIGN NATIONALS.

ARGENTINA HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE BELGIANS WHO HAD ASSURED THEM THAT OTHER CIVILIAN FOREIGNERS WHO WISHED TO LEAVE WOULD BE EVACUATED AS WELL. THIS EXCEPTIONAL EMERGENCY ACTION WAS IN THE VIEW OF ARGENTINA JUSTIFIED GIVEN THE GRAVITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. GAMBARI (NIGERIA) SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN RWANDA WAS GRAVE AND DETERIORATING. HE BELIEVED THE COUNCIL SHOULD SHOW UNDERSTANDING FOR THE ACTIONS OF SOME GOVERNMENTS TO EVACUATE THEIR CITIZENS. BUT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT JUST BE CONCERNED WITH THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGNERS. IT SHOULD TAKE A POSITION ON THE RISK TO RWANDAN CITIZENS. THE COUNCIL SHOULD ADDRESS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER ON STRENGTHENING OF UNAMIR AND SHOULD CONSIDER THE RELATIONS BETWEEN UNAMIR AND THE FRANCO-BELGIAN FORCE. THE COUNCIL MUST ALSO ADDRESS THE LARGER POLITICAL ISSUES. HOW COULD PEACE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS BE RESTORED IN RWANDA? WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE OAU?

10. I SAID THAT THE UK FULLY RESPECTED THE RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO TAKE THESE ACTIONS. I ALSO WELCOMED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HELP OTHER NATIONALS. WHILE I AGREED THAT THE FRENCH NATIONAL DECISION TO EVACUATE ITS CITIZENS WAS ENTIRELY SEPARATE FROM ANY DECISION ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR, IN PRACTICE THE FIRST WAS LIKELY TO AFFECT THE SECOND. IN PARTICULAR CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO WHETHER, IF A DECISION WAS TAKEN TO EVACUATE UNAMIR, THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN ASSETS NOW IN PLACE MIGHT BE USED TO HELP CARRY OUT THAT EVACUATION. WE WOULD WELCOME AN ASSESSMENT FROM DPKO AS TO WHETHER UNAMIR COULD FULFIL A USEFUL FUNCTION IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN RWANDA.

11. SIDOROV (RUSSIA) TOOK NOTE OF THE FACT THAT THE FRENCH DECISION WAS CAUSED BY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. HE ALSO NOTED THE STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN NATURE OF THE OPERATION AND THAT IT WOULD BE LIMITED IN TIME. HE WAS WORRIED BY THE FATE OF OTHER NATIONALS, IN PARTICULAR GIVEN REPORTS THAT THERE WERE NOW HOSTILE RADIO BROADCASTS. REQUISITE MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PROTECT NATIONALS OF ALL COUNTRIES. RUSSIA HAD 15 MILITARY OBSERVERS WITH UNAMIR BUT WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SECRETARIAT AND THE FORCE COMMANDER WERE CAREFULLY MONITORING THE SITUATION AND WOULD TAKE NECESSARY DECISIONS AS THE SITUATION EVOLVED.

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FINAL PART OF TWO

12. CHEN (CHINA) SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ACTION TAKEN BY FRANCE AND BELGIUM HAD BEEN TAKEN IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN RWANDA, WHERE THERE WAS NO GOVERNMENT AND CHAOS PREVAILED. HE HAD ALSO NOTED THE STATEMENT THAT IT WAS A PURELY HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND LIMITED IN TIME. IN THIS CONNECTION IT WAS CHINA'S VIEW THAT GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SHOULD NOT BE COMPROMISED, IN PARTICULAR THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED AND FOR ITS DOMESTIC LAW. CHINA WOULD BE FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE FRENCH AND BELGIUM ACTIONS ON UNAMIR. ALL INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS SHOULD FACILITATE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA.

13. PEDAUYE (SPAIN) SAID THERE WERE TWO MATTERS BEFORE THE COUNCIL WHICH ALTHOUGH SEPARATE WERE INTERRELATED. THE FIRST WAS THE FRANCO-BELGIAN OPERATION WITH THE LIMITED OBJECTIVE OF PROTECTING AND WITHDRAWING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SECOND WAS THE PRESENCE IN RWANDA OF A UN FORCE AUTHORISED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN THE LIGHT OF THE SERIOUS EVENTS IN RWANDA THE COUNCIL NEEDED TO LOOK AT WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT UNAMIR. SPAIN HAD NO DOUBTS ABOUT THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE FRANCO-BELGIAN ACTION. THE ARGENTINIAN AMBASSADOR HAD SPELT OUT VERY CLEARLY THE JUSTIFICATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. HE THANKED FRANCE FOR WILLINGNESS TO EVACUATE OTHER NATIONALS WHO REQUESTED IT. HOWEVER, AS THE NIGERIAN AMBASSADOR HAD POINTED OUT, IT WAS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS. ANARCHY AND CHAOS REIGNED IN RWANDA. THERE WAS A REAL PROSPECT OF RENEWED FIGHTING WITH THE RPF WHICH WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE THE SITUATION. SPAIN WOULD APPRECIATE THE SECRETARIAT'S VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR. BUT IN THE MEANTIME IT WAS SPAIN'S VIEW THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL UN FORCES INCLUDING UNAMIR IN AN

EMERGENCY SITUATION. IT WAS FOR HIM TO TAKE ANY MEASURES HE DEEMED APPROPRIATE TO SECURE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR.

14. SARDENBERG (BRAZIL) AGREED THAT ACTION TO EVACUATE FOREIGN NATIONALS WAS JUSTIFIED PROVIDED IT WAS CLEARLY HUMANITARIAN AND TIME LIMITED. THE COUNCIL NEEDED TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR AS WELL AS THE SAFETY AND POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF UNAMIR AND OTHER UN PERSONNEL. HE HAD SYMPATHY WITH NIGERIAN COMMENTS ON THE WIDER POLITICAL ISSUES AND ON THE NEED TO INVOLVE THE OAU. THE COUNCIL SHOULD LOOK AS THIS ISSUE IN MORE DETAIL.

15. MARKER (PAKISTAN) SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN ACTION. AS ARGENTINA AND SPAIN HAD POINTED OUT THIS WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. AS FAR AS PAKISTAN WAS CONCERNED THE KEY PROBLEMS WERE THE CURRENT STATUS OF UNAMIR AND WHAT ACTION THE COUNCIL NEEDED TO TAKE ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR BOTH IN THE SHORT AND THE MEDIUM TERM. HOW THE EVACUATION WENT WOULD BE RELEVANT TO THIS. IT WAS BOUND TO HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. RPF INTENTIONS WERE ALSO RELEVANT. THE COUNCIL HAD A MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNAMIR AND ITS PERSONNEL. THEY WERE IN RWANDA AS A RESULT OF COUNCIL ACTION. THE FACT THAT OTHER NATIONALS WERE BEING EVACUATED DID NOT REMOVE THE COUNCIL'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNAMIR. WE SHOULD BE GUIDED TO A LARGE EXTENT BY SECRETARIAT REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. A LONGER TERM ASPECT WAS SECURITY COUNCIL RESPONSIBILITY FOR RWANDA ITSELF. THE SITUATION THERE MIGHT WELL HAVE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS. HE AGREED WITH THE NIGERIAN SUGGESTION THAT THE COUNCIL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE OAU.

16. ANNAN (UNDER SECRETARY-GENERAL, DPKO) SAID THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT BE RULED OUT. THE SITUATION IN RWANDA WAS VERY GRAVE AS WAS DEMONSTRATED BY THE UNUSUAL ACTION TAKEN BY SOME MEMBER STATES TO EVACUATE THEIR NATIONALS. THE FINAL DECISION WOULD DEPEND ON THE CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORCE AND ITS ABILITY TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE IF IT REMAINED, AS WELL AS THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND INCLUDING THE EFFECTS OF THE FRANCO-BELGIAN ACTION. IT WAS CLEAR THAT IF UNAMIR DID REMAIN THEN IT WAS LIKELY TO NEED A NEW MANDATE AND POSSIBLY A NEW FORCE STRUCTURE. HE UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN FORCES AND THE UN FORCES. COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE WELL AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES WITH COMMAND AND CONTROL EVEN WHEN THERE WAS ONLY ONE FORCE ON THE GROUND. IF TWO FORCES WERE SHARING THE SAME SPACE WITH DIFFERENT MANDATES SUCH PROBLEMS WERE EXACERBATED. HE THEREFORE WELCOMED

FRANCE'S STATED INTENTION TO COORDINATE WITH UNAMIR. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, ANNAN SAID THAT THE IDEA OF REINFORCING UNAMIR TO CARRY OUT AN EVACUATION RAISED IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER THE PREVIOUS DAY WAS OVERTAKEN BY THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN INTERVENTION.

17. THERE WAS THEN A BRIEF DISCUSSION AS TO WHAT ACTION, IF ANY, THE COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE. GAMBARI PROPOSED THAT THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT BRIEF THE MEDIA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE COUNCIL HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE ACTION OF SOME GOVERNMENTS TO EVACUATE NATIONALS, EMPHASISING THAT THE RATIONALE BEHIND THIS ACTION WAS PURELY HUMANITARIAN AND THAT IT WAS TIME-LIMITED. HE SHOULD ALSO STATE THE COUNCIL'S INTENTION TO AUTHORISE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL. A FURTHER MEETING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR AND THE POSSIBLE NEED TO CHANGE ITS MANDATE, AS WELL AS THE UN'S ROLE IN RE-ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY IN RWANDA AND REBUILDING ITS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN COOPERATION WITH THE OAU.

18. MERIMEE SAID HE WAS CONTENT WITH A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BUT IT SHOULD BE SHORTER AND MORE GENERAL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. MERIMEE HAD TOLD THE COUNCIL CLEARLY THAT THE OPERATION HAD A HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVE. THIS SHOULD BE PUT ACROSS TO THE PRESS. MERIMEE REPLIED THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT RESERVED THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE TO PROTECT FRENCH NATIONALS. THERE COULD BE NO CONDITIONS OR LIMITATIONS TO THIS RIGHT.

19. WE, THE US, PAKISTAN AND ARGENTINA SUPPORTED MERIMEE'S LINE. NIGERIA, CHINA AND BRAZIL WERE IN FAVOUR OF A FULLER STATEMENT. IT WAS EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT KEATING WOULD TELL THE PRESS THAT COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY THE SECRETARIAT ON DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND AND BY THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON THE OPERATION HIS GOVERNMENT WAS UNDERTAKING. HE WOULD ALSO SAY THAT COUNCIL MEMBERS HAD DISCUSSED THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR AND BEGUN TO DISCUSS WHAT ROLE THE UN MIGHT HAVE IN COOPERATION WITH THE OAU IN RE-ESTABLISHING A POLITICAL PROCESS IN RWANDA.

20. KEATING CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT FURTHER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON RWANDA WERE SCHEDULED FOR 111500Z, AT WHICH THE QUESTION OF UNAMIR'S FUTURE WOULD BE TAKEN UP. A MEETING WOULD

ONLY BE CALLED ON 10 APRIL IF ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

CONTACTS WITH BELGIAN, US AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS

21. FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS WE HAD HEARD EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT THE BELGIANS MIGHT BE THINKING OF BRINGING THEIR UNAMIR CONTINGENT OUT OF RWANDA WITH THEIR NATIONALS, WE EXPRESSED PRIVATELY OUR CONCERN TO THE BELGIAN MISSION THAT SUCH ACTION COULD LEAD TO SEVERE CRITICISM OF THE EUROPEANS. BROUHNS (DPR) ASSURED US THAT HE HAD MADE THE SAME POINT AND THAT BRUSSELS HAD CONFIRMED THAT THEIR UNAMIR CONTINGENT WOULD REMAIN IN UNAMIR PENDING ANY DECISIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE FORCE AS A WHOLE. I ALSO SAID PRIVATELY TO THE FRENCH AND US DELEGATIONS THAT WHILE WE AGREED ON THE NECESSITY AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THEIR SPECIFIC HUMANITARIAN OPERATION, POLITICALLY WE COULD NOT CONTEMPLATE AN EVACUATION WHICH CONCLUDED WITH SIZEABLE NUMBERS OF UNAMIR OR OTHER UN/FOREIGN PERSONNEL LEFT UNPROTECTED. THERE WOULD NEED TO BE VERY CLOSE DE FACTO COORDINATION BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND THE SECRETARIAT ON THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL AND UN OPERATIONS UPON EACH OTHER. WALKER (US) AGREED. WALKER ALSO REFERRED TO US - ORGANISED LAND CONVOYS TO TAKE SOME FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM KIGALI TO BURUNDI, IN WHICH THE US ENVISAGED UNAMIR ASSISTING (IN THE INFORMALS WALKER PREVENTED KEATING SUMMING UP THAT UNAMIR WOULD HAVE NO ROLE IN THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS NOW THAT THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS HAD ARRIVED FOR THAT PURPOSE.)

22. THE FRENCH TOLD US LATER IN THE DAY THAT DELIBERATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT ACADEMIC. THE GHANAIAN BATTALION (ONE THIRD OF THE FORCE) WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ALREADY FLED FROM THE DMZ WHERE THEY WERE STATIONED ACROSS THE BORDER INTO UGANDA.

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