


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MY TELNO 1481 AND YOUR TELNO 605: RWANDA



SUMMARY

1. Secretariat brief on developments. Fighting continues. Airport shelled for the first time: some damage but it remains functional. Some humanitarian supplies distributed to displaced persons in the Anahoru stadium.
2. Council President briefs on his meeting with the Permanent Representatives of Tanzania and Uganda and the Representative of the OAU. All underlined the need to put as much pressure as possible on the parties to bring about a political settlement. Council President's contacts with representatives of regional countries to continue. Reservations about UK initiating a Council Statement on Rwanda at this stage.

DETAIL

3. During informal consultations of the Security Council on 26 April, Gharekhan (the Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser) gave a briefing on developments in Rwanda. Fighting in Kigali continued. There had been heavy exchanges of artillery and mortar fire over the past 24 hours. The airport had for the first time been affected by the fighting. Mortar shells fell on two occasions. However, there had been no significant damage and the airport was still functional. The Force Commander remained very active in seeking to mediate between the two parties. He was also engaged in discussions on the safety of the displaced persons who had been under UNAMIR's protection in the Anahoru stadium, the King Faisal Hospital and two hotels. The DHA advance team he had mentioned at his previous briefing (para 5 of TUR) had been able to provide some food, medical and sanitary supplies to the stadium and the hospital. The strength of UNAMIR remained at 450 all ranks.

Gharekhan also noted that the Secretary-General's Special Representative was on his way back to Kigali from Arusha and the Secretariat expected a briefing from him on his return.

4. Inderfurth (US) asked if the Secretariat had any information on World Food Programme efforts to bring an end to the killings in the south and to bring food in. Gharekhan said he had none but would investigate. Inderfurth underlined the US wish to hear a response on this. They understood that the WFP office in Burundi had approached the Rwandan Government via their Ambassador in Burundi and demanded that the Government bring its soldiers under control and end the killings. The Security Council might want to consider supporting this WFP initiative.

5. Keating (New Zealand, Council President) then briefed on his discussions with representatives from the neighbouring countries. He recalled that the Council had on 25 April agreed that it would be appropriate for him to meet representatives from the OAU and the neighbouring countries to discuss what steps should be taken to help energize the peace process in Rwanda. The Permanent Representatives of Tanzania, Uganda and the Representative of the OAU to the UN, accompanied by Iqbal Riza (ASG, DPKO), had met the Council President on 26 April. Keating had conveyed to them the Council's strong desire for the UN to work in partnership with the OAU and the regional countries concerned. The Ambassadors had begun by expressing their disappointment at the reduction in UNAMIR's strength. Keating briefed them in great detail on the events leading up to the decision. He believed that by the end of the meeting, they were more appreciative of the decision to leave a UN presence in place. Neither the Tanzanian Ambassador nor the OAU Representative had received a briefing on the failed meeting in Arusha. The OAU representative underlined the need for close cooperation between the UN and the OAU: together they should urge neighbouring states to put as much pressure as possible on the parties to bring about a solution. Keating said there had also been some discussion of whether or not neighbouring countries might be prepared to provide forces for a future peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. Both Uganda and Tanzania had noted the budgetary constraints. The only feasible option would be an operation conducted by the UN. The Ambassadors had underlined the need for political efforts to be coordinated by the UN in the field. They felt that the UN

presence could perhaps be at a higher level and more forceful. Keating said that he had agreed to meet again with the Ambassadors before the end of the week, by which time they should have instructions. He would involve Gambari (Nigeria), the incoming Council President for the month of May, in that contact. Gambari welcomed this, but added that contacts between the President of the Security Council and representatives of neighbouring countries could not be a substitute for the efforts of the Secretary-General, which must continue. Gambari also commented on the possibility of a blue-bereted force drawn from neighbouring states.

6. Keating concluded with a number of personal observations. He said that, if developments on the ground were positive, it was unlikely to be possible to simply restore UNAMIR. If a UN force went back it might be under very different circumstances. Perhaps the Secretariat should consider doing some contingency planning on this issue. He also noted that there had been some interest in the need to energize communications with the parties. Perhaps there was a role for a Security Council mission to Rwanda. He also suggested that the Secretariat should perhaps begin preparing a dossier on violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda, as suggested the previous day by Yanez (Spain). This had been done for the Former Yugoslavia and there was no reason why the same should not be done for Rwanda. No-one else spoke. Keating said he left his ideas on the table for members to reflect upon.

COMMENT

7. First TUR may have misled slightly in implying that there was no continuing process of Council action on Rwanda. As you will see from paras 5 and 6 above, Council members agreed with my suggestion on 25 April that Keating consult regional representatives on the way forward. This process has now begun and will continue. In the circumstances, I do not think that this is the right time to divert Council effort into discussion of a Presidential statement. Quite apart from the limited impact such a statement would have on the ground, there could be risks in our adopting a pro-active approach in the Council. There would I believe be resistance to a statement which had no meat - i.e. commitment on the part of the UN - in it. Council members are casting around for a way forward, and several clearly hanker for an expanded role for the UN. Giving them an opening to pursue the point again so soon after the difficult

battle over the resolution might not be wise.

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