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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

10003166

IMMEDIATE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL, MADRID

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 13 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: 1117

SUBJECT: RWANDA

[Handwritten signatures and initials]
de Soto
APR 12 1994

1. Security Council consultations this evening centered on your letter, on which several members voiced disappointment, and draft resolution by NAM. Gambari said on behalf of NAM caucus that workable alternative must be found excluding extremes of withdrawal of UNAMIR or (some rhetoric here) enforcement action. All representatives who spoke (Nigeria, France, US, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Russia, UK, Argentina, China, Djibouti, New Zealand) stressed the importance of retaining a UN presence in Rwanda (Summary at Annex I). The sense was that the practicable approach was to consider options based on UNAMIR's presence on the ground.

2. The NAM draft resolution (Annex II) by Nigeria was viewed as a working document, but many delegations insisted that the Secretariat present specific proposals for the Council's consideration. (Some commented that your letter did not respond to recent requests to this effect by members.) A few said that Belgium had been unfairly blamed as it was withdrawing for very plausible reasons. De Soto clarified that there was no such intention, rather the intent was to stress that the absence of the critical Belgian contingent from UNAMIR made the implementation of its present mandate unfeasible. The outcome was a pointed request to the Secretariat (articulated by Hannay) to present clear alternatives for maintaining a UN presence to play the critical role of intermediary in bringing about a cease-fire and substantive negotiations for the resumption of the peace process. There is virtual unanimity amongst the members as to the need to "not

abandon Rwanda", and for the Secretary-General to present options on the UN role in light of recent developments. (The arrival at this point of SRSG's cable (Annex III) with information that UNAMIR would be arranging talks between the two sides was received as endorsement of this consensus among Council members.)

3. During the day there were frequent contacts with UNAMIR. On the basis of these consultations, we could, if you approve, put the following two outline alternatives to the Council after further consultations (which we are initiating simultaneously with this cable) with SRSG and Force Commander. These alternatives are predicated on the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent from UNAMIR.

4. One approach (resting upon the strong possibility that direct talks between the two sides are due to start tomorrow) would be to inform both sides at the start of the talks that the Secretary-General would consider retaining UNAMIR at a reduced strength (i.e., after the withdrawal of the Belgian battalion, which would leave essential equipment behind, along with trainers for a short period) in Rwanda for three weeks (i.e., until 6 May - which is within the six week period mentioned in resolution 909/1994 - Annex IV) in order to give them an opportunity to resume the Arusha process. This would depend on the following conditions:

- (a) Effective cease-fire in place by both sides during the entire period;
- (b) Each side to accept responsibility for maintaining order and security of civilians in the areas under their control, and discipline of their troops;
- (c) Each side to assure the security of UNAMIR personnel;

- (d) Declaring the airport and its approaches neutral territory under the control of UNAMIR, with only civilian Rwandan personnel to enter for technical duties;
- (e) Concentration of UNAMIR personnel in airport and in selected locations in Kigali;
- (f) Opening of airport for humanitarian purposes (entry of relief supplies, exit of remaining foreign nationals);
- (g) Return to their homes of displaced persons concentrated in such points as stadia and hospitals;
- (h) Freedom of movement for UNAMIR including patrolling wherever decided by UNAMIR.

All talks between the two sides would be held under the auspices of SRSB/FC, who would warn them on 30 April that if complete agreement was not finalized by 6 May, UNAMIR would start withdrawing by 7 May and complete withdrawal by 11 May. Contingency preparations would be made by UNAMIR for such withdrawals, including further regrouping as required between 30 April and 6 May.

Under this approach, the goal would be the establishment of the transitional institutions envisaged under the Arusha agreements, and the formation of a transitional coalition government if both sides were to agree. The goal would be the resumption of the Arusha process, failing which UNAMIR would be withdrawn in toto.

5. The second alternative would be based on the assumption that a return to the Arusha process is an impractical proposition and that negotiations for another approach might be required. This would involve prolonged negotiations making the retention of UNAMIR, even

in a reduced form, unsustainable. The UNAMIR presence, under an amended mandate, then would be essentially political, to act as a mediator between the two sides for negotiations broadly along the lines of the Arusha agreements. This political presence (SRSG and staff with advisers and a small group of UNMOs) would need security support of about one company group (approximately 150 men).

6. In the first alternative, UNOMUR would remain in Uganda, while the UNAMIR battalion in the DMZ would have been redeployed to the Kigali area. In the second alternative, UNOMUR either could be retained to continue monitoring the border or its suspension could be considered.

7. We are cabling the two above alternatives to UNAMIR for their review and comments, which should reach us by Thursday morning. We shall then be able to discuss them with you and Gharekhan in Madrid till about 7 pm Madrid time. If you then approve these alternatives, amended as necessary, we shall present them informally to the Council, in response to their strong request today. Otherwise, we would inform them that it would be up to the members to decide what mandate to give the Secretary-General in the present situation.

8. Meanwhile, UNAMIR is finalizing withdrawal plans. This cable is addressed to you after a review (following Council consultations) of the situation by Annan, de Soto, Riza, Baril and Omayad (for Goulding)).

Respects and regards.

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Ann. I

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

PS/17

Wednesday, 13 April 1994

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Rwanda

Mr. Riza gave an extensive briefing to members on the recent political and military ~~situation~~^{situa} in Rwanda and answered questions. The Belgian force expected to complete its evacuation tomorrow, there was no effective cease-fire, the RPF had brought troops into the city from the north and south and some units of the government forces were putting up resistance. There was no significant political contact between the two sides, although UNAMIR was trying to transmit messages between the two sides. Instability had been exacerbated by the news of the Belgian decision to withdraw from UNAMIR and rumours that the rest of UNAMIR would depart: this had led to hostility from people who felt they were being abandoned. The Force Commander felt that if the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR left, then the security of the rest of the force could not be guaranteed, nor could the airport remain secure.

UNAMIR was not capable of performing the tasks under its present mandate. However, it was trying to ensure the safety of UN personnel, evacuating people and escort convoys to Burundi and the airport, carrying out some humanitarian functions, protecting civilians where possible, undertaking specific missions to take people to safety, trying to bring about a cease-fire and truce, and facilitating communications between the two sides. Mr. Riza commended the remarkable performance of the Force Commander in such difficult circumstances (a commendation that was reiterated by France).

ONUMUR was carrying out its patrolling duties and had not reported the introduction of arms supplies across the border. It was directly linked to UNAMIR, and if the latter force was withdrawn, there would be little reason for ONUMUR to remain.

After delegations had spoken, Mr. Riza raised the question of protecting civilian nationals in the long term, and referred to the critical situation at the stadium and hospital. The protection of civilians would require more resources, and the

Council should consider whether PKOs should be assigned such tasks.

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Mr. Riza ^{Later} ~~also~~ reported on a cable just received that the RPF and the Rwandan armed forces had agreed to a meeting tomorrow at the request of the latter with the Special Representative and the Force Commander.

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Almost all delegations spoke on the question of UNAMIR's future. Generally speaking, the consensus was that neither of the two "extreme" options were acceptable (referring to a "Somalia-type" peace-enforcement operation and total withdrawal). Delegations were also insistent that the Secretariat should come up by tomorrow with a number of feasible options that came between the two unacceptable options.

Nigeria, on behalf of the NAM Caucus, presented a draft resolution (text attached), encouraging a cease-fire and deciding to increase the strength of UNAMIR and revise its mandate. Nigeria stressed that the concern of the Council should not be limited to the fate of UN personnel and foreigners but should also include the innocent civilians of Rwanda.

Arguments presented against a complete withdrawal of the force, presented by Nigeria, France and others, included: that only the Belgians had so far expressed this intention; that it would be a bad signal to send to the Rwandan parties and people; that the UN's credibility would suffer (in fact, said Djibouti, it had already suffered when the Prime Minister and others were seized from UN property); that the carnage would spread to the rest of the country and also to Burundi.

France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain referred to the Secretary-General's letter of today, and disagreed, with varying degrees of indignation, with the apparent implication that the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent was a cause of further instability and a reason for UNAMIR's ceasing to exist in future. The UK said the letter was not an adequate reply to the questions posed by the Council, nor an adequate

basis for moving forward. It was a "great pity" that the letter seemed to blame the Belgians rather than the Rwandans, and particularly unfortunate when the accusation was levelled at a contingent that had just lost ten of its nationals. "Even more bizarre" was the implication that everything would be fine if the Belgians remained, when this was palpably not the case.

In response, Mr. de Soto said it had certainly not been the intention of the Secretary-General to blame the Belgians; in fact, his remarks in some way represented a compliment to them by stressing their indispensability. The problem for the immediate future lay in "the tenability of UNAMIR's capacity to discharge its present mandate".

France stressed the need to exert pressure on the RPF, in Kigali, New York and (implicitly) through Uganda. The RPF should be informed of the importance attached by the Council to the UN's continued presence in Kigali. The intervention of the OAU and neighbouring countries could be very important. The UK agreed that the OAU should reinforce the UN's political role, but felt Tanzania and Uganda should be invited "more positively" to help these efforts.

The US was troubled by the difficulty of maintaining UNAMIR at its present level in such circumstances, and suggested leaving a "small skeletal" operation to show the will of the international community. Later, the Council might see what could be done about giving an effective mandate. Russia also approvingly spoke of what it called the "Angolan option", although Djibouti was certainly not in favour of this. New Zealand felt there would need to be a serious security detail left behind if the Special Representative was asked to remain.

Brazil said UNAMIR should be given a "very short and precise" mandate, including the protection of civilians and the promotion of a cease-fire and political dialogue. The UK declared there was no evidence, either now or in the foreseeable future, that UNAMIR would be in a position to protect civilians; the Council should not lend itself to a "tragic fiction" whereby it merely declared that something would be done. New Zealand also had reservations about the feasibility of protecting

civilians, given the possibility of revenge attacks by the minority ethnic group. Much depended on how the RPF would behave after its imminent take-over of Kigali.

A number of delegations, including France and China, expressed their satisfaction with the efforts of UNAMIR so far.

Most delegations reiterated that there was an urgent need for a report (oral if necessary) from the Secretariat tomorrow, with concrete recommendations on where UNAMIR could be deployed and what would be the scope of the operation. Mr. Riza assured members that the Secretariat would do its best, while pointing out the problems of communicating both with the UN representatives in the field and with the Secretary-General in Madrid.

Somalia Commission of Enquiry

It was agreed that if no member had any comment to make to the President on the report of the Commission of Enquiry by tomorrow, there would be no discussion of the subject.

Libya and Chad

A draft technical resolution was introduced by the President (text attached), and the UK hoped it would be voted on tomorrow. Russia and China were very doubtful about the reference to Chapter VII, but the UK and the US insisted that it was legally necessary. The Chinese suggestion to use its usual favourite phrase about relevant resolutions would not work since there were no relevant resolutions in this case.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

Thursday, 14 April 1994

4.30 pm Informal consultations on Rwanda and other matters.

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Ann. II

Draft Resolution on the Situation in Rwanda

The Security Council.

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Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflict in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR);

Noting its resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994 with a six-week review provision on the understanding that progress will be made in establishing all the transitional institutions under the Arusha Peace Agreement;

Recalling its statement of 7 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994 (16)) which, inter alia, reaffirmed the centrality of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the peace process in Rwanda;

Expressing deep regret at the failure of the parties to implement fully the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

Welcoming the initiatives of the late Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi to work towards a resolution of the conflict in their countries within the framework of a negotiated political settlement and in collaboration with regional leaders;

Shocked at the tragic incident that resulted in the deaths of

the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on 6 April 1994;

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Appalled at the ensuing large scale violence which has resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children, and the displacement of a significant number of the Rwandese population;

Deeply concerned by continuing looting, banditry and the breakdown of law and order;

Expressing its deep concern also at the safety and security of UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel who are assisting in implementing the peace process and in distributing humanitarian relief;

Determining that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security;

1. Expresses regret at the tragic incident in which the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi lost their lives, and invites the Secretary General to collect all available information with all means at his disposal and report to the Council as soon as possible;

2. Expresses regret also at the ensuing violence which has

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claimed the lives of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Government Officials and thousands of other civilians;

3. Strongly condemns the attacks against UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel leading to the deaths of several UNAMIR personnel and calls upon all concerned to put an end to these acts of violence and to respect fully international humanitarian law;

4. Calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and an end to the mindless violence and carnage which are engulfing Rwanda; and in this connection, demands that the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) agree without delay to an effective ceasefire and that both parties return to the positions held by them before the present hostilities;

5. Decides, in the light of the current security situation in Rwanda, to increase the strength of UNAMIR and to revise its mandate to enable it to contribute to the restoration of law and order and the establishment of the transitional institutions within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

6. Reiterates the crucial importance of the full implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the settlement of the Rwandan conflict and urges the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to extend its cooperation to the United Nations in this

regard:

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7. Urges all countries, in particular those of the region, to refrain from any action that would further exacerbate the situation in Rwanda;

8. Calls upon the parties in Rwanda to accept the futility of a military solution to the political problem and, in this respect, work towards a negotiated political settlement;

9. Calls also upon the parties to cooperate fully in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all Rwandese throughout the country and in this regard, appeals to the international community to provide increased humanitarian assistance commensurate with the scale of the human tragedy in Rwanda;

10. Strongly appeals to both parties, in particular the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to commit themselves to the peace process leading to a comprehensive political settlement in Rwanda on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

11. Affirms its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda;

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12. Invites the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in Rwanda and to report to Council as the situation warrants, at least, not later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1/2 Ann
~~DATE~~

P14/17

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, NEW YORK

CYX124

INFO: KITTANI

FROM: *for* BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

L0003179

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON SITUATION RWANDA

DATE: 13 APRIL 1994

UNAMIR
13 APR 13 15:00:30
2155Z

MIR-754

1. In a communique signed by the acting Chief of Staff of the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF) and the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie, the RGF expressed the wish to meet with the military leadership of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (FPR) in order to examine together ways and means of bringing back law and order in the the country and to open immediately substantive talks on a calendar for the setting up of the broad-based transitional institutions. The RGF paid tribute to UNAMIR's relentless efforts in promoting the peace process in Rwanda and requested its continued mediation for the proposed meeting.

2. As expressed by the RGF, I requested Mr. Kane, my Political Adviser and General Dallaire, the Force Commander to initiate contacts with the political and military leaders of the RPF.

3. While not refusing the principle of an informal meeting with the RGF High Command, the RPF has however made conditions of which the following are the most important to RPF leadership.

1.- To put an end to the chaos and the violence in Kigali and elsewhere in the country, the RGF must endeavour to stop at once inciting to ethnic hatred and violence broadcast on both state and private media particularly in Kigali.

2.-The signatories of the RGF High Command's communique must give assurances that they represent all the officers and the rank and file of the Rwandese Army.

3.- The meeting between the RPF and the RGF would only be informal so as to initiate an appropriate communication channel between the belligerents, and if successful, would lead to the establishment of a more direct working relation between the two parties.

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4. UNAMIR conveyed to the RGF Acting Chief of Staff the above message from the RPF political and military leadership. The RGF have favorably reacted to the RPF's readiness to enter into a meaningful dialogue in order to overcome the mistrust which led to the present crisis.

5. The RGF requested the presence of the Special Representative at the planned meeting, whose advice and guidance are considered very useful in the search for a peaceful solution to the week-old violent events in Rwanda.

6. The RPF and the RGF agreed that the venue of their first scheduled meeting is to be decided by UNAMIR and should be agreeable to both parties.

7. However, despite the apparent goodwill of the two parties, the situation remains very tense in Kigali in particular, with continuing, though intermittent and sporadic gunfire exchanges and, at times, shellings.

8. We are determined to achieve a reasonable success for the planned meeting which is scheduled for Thursday 14 April at 10 hours local time.

9. We will keep you apprised of the situation as it develops.

10. Best regards.



Security Council

L0003181

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/909 (1994)
5 April 1994

RESOLUTION 909 (1994)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3358th meeting,
on 5 April 1994

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), as well as its resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January 1994,

Recalling its resolutions 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993, 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993 and 891 (1993) of 20 December 1993,

Recalling also its statement dated 17 February 1994 (S/PRST/1994/8),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 March 1994 (S/1994/360),

Welcoming the valuable contribution to peace being made in Rwanda by UNAMIR;

Expressing its deep concern at the delay in the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly,

Emphasizing that the Security Council, in resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January 1994, authorized the deployment of a second battalion to the demilitarized zone as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 30 December 1993 (S/26927), and that the international community has thus done its part in ensuring that conditions exist for implementing the Agreement,

Considering that the fact that the transitional institutions have not been established constitutes a major obstacle to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Concerned at the deterioration in security in the country, particularly in Kigali,

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Concerned also at the deterioration of the humanitarian and health situation,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda dated 30 March 1994;
2. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994, on the understanding that the Security Council will, within the next six weeks, review the situation in Rwanda, including the role played in that country by the United Nations, if the Secretary-General informs it in a report that the transitional institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement have not been established and that insufficient progress has been made for the implementation of phase II of the Secretary-General's plan contained in his report of 24 September 1993 (S/26488);
3. Regrets the delay in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, and urges the parties to resolve their latest differences without delay with a view to the immediate establishment of those transitional institutions still required for the continuation of the process, and particularly the implementation of phase II;
4. Welcomes the fact that, despite the difficulties encountered in implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement, the cease-fire has been respected, and commends in this respect the essential contribution made by UNAMIR;
5. Recalls nevertheless that continued support for UNAMIR, including the provision of an additional 45 civilian police monitors as described in paragraph 38 of the Secretary-General's report, will depend upon full and prompt implementation by the parties of the Arusha Peace Agreement;
6. Welcomes the continued efforts by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to help promote and facilitate dialogue between all parties concerned;
7. Commends the efforts of Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, and again urges others to provide such assistance;
8. Commends in particular the efforts of the Organization of African Unity and its agencies, as well as those of the Tanzanian facilitator, in providing diplomatic, political, humanitarian and other support for the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council;
9. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the size and cost of UNAMIR to seek economies;
10. Decides to remain actively seized of the question.