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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	EUR-01
	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	L-01	ADS-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01
	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	RPE-01	PMB-00	/037W				

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O 040932Z MAR 94
 FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
 TO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
 INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6126
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SAAA// PRIORITY
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIGALI 01459

KAMPALA FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
AND AMBASSADOR CARSON

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, RW
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PAGE 02 KIGALI 01459 01 OF 02 040939Z
 SUBJECT: A VISIT WITH HABYARIMANA

REF: KIGALI 01458

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA ASKED ME TO SEE HIM SATURDAY MORNING, 4/2; HE HAD FOUR THINGS ON HIS MIND: THE POLITICAL IMPASSE, PATRIOTIC FRONT'S TERRORISM, THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE UNDER THE ACCORD, AND THE U.S. VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON PEACEKEEPING

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
 DATE/CASE ID: 03 MAY 2005 200103014

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IN RWANDA. I REVIEWED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S POSITION ON INSTALLING INSTITUTIONS, WAS AGNOSTIC ON SOURCES OF INTERNAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND DID NOT COMFORT THE PRESIDENT ON THE U.S. VOTE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE PRESIDENT WONDERED HOW THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) COULD INSIST ON KEEPING THE CDR PARTY OUT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHEN ALL INTERNAL POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THOUGHT THAT THE CDR SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS FROM THE START. THE PROBLEM, IN HIS VIEW, WAS RELATED TO RPF'S ULTIMATE INTENTIONS: THEY WERE A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION SEEKING TO TAKE POWER BY FORCE. INITIALLY THEY TRIED A CLASSIC MILITARY ATTACK, THEN THEY TRIED GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND WHEN THEY FAILED TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE, THEY PULLED OUT THEIR THIRD BATTLE PLAN--NEGOTIATIONS ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL ASSASSINATION TO DESTABILIZE THE INTERNAL POLITICAL ORDER.

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4. REVERSING THE COINAGE, HABYARIMANA THEN RAISED THE WAY IN WHICH THE OPPOSITION AND RPF TRIED TO UNDERMINE THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, WHICH STILL HAD A FUNCTIONAL, STABILIZING ROLE TO PLAY UNDER THE ARUSHA ACCORD. HE MENTIONED RPF COMMUNIQUES WHICH HAD CALLED HIM TRAITOR AND ASSASSIN, BUT OBVIOUSLY ALSO HAD IN MIND RECENT HARSH WORDS WHICH PRIME MINISTER UWILINGIYIMANA HAD DIRECTED TOWARD HIM. THERE HAD TO BE AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL RESPECT AMONGST POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IF THE ARUSHA ACCORD WERE EVER TO WORK.

5. TOWARD THE END OF OUR HOUR-LONG CONVERSATION, THE PRESIDENT UNVEILED THE OBVIOUS REASON FOR CONVOKING ME--HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE U.S. VOTE FOR RENEWAL OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING MANDATE. THE UN PRESENCE WAS ESSENTIAL IF RWANDA WERE EVER TO GET OUT OF ITS CURRENT TROUBLES. HE RECOGNIZED THAT RWANDA HAD GIVEN THE UNITED STATES FEW REASONS TO SUPPORT THEIR CASE, BUT, IN FACT, REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN PLANNING DEMOBILIZATION, IN RESOLVING OUTSTANDING POLITICAL ISSUES REGARDING THE BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND, IN ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE UN PRESENCE ACROSS THE COUNTRY. RWANDA NEEDED A BIT MORE TIME. WOULD I PLEAD WITH ASSISTANT

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SECRETARY MOOSE AND OTHER AUTHORITIES IN WASHINGTON
FOR A POSITIVE VOTE ON EXTENSION?

6. I REMINDED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY'S POSITION ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL
BLOCKAGES HAD THREE ELEMENTS: EQUITY IN THE
TREATMENT OF ALL RECOGNIZED PARTIES (NOT SUPPORT AS
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SUCH FOR ANY PARTICULAR PARTY), FORMATION AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE OF A WATCHDOG NATIONAL COMMISSION TO MAKE
SURE PARTIES KEPT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ACCORD,
AND A CONCLUSION THAT NO INTRAPARTY ISSUE SHOULD,
HENCEFORTH, BE PERMITTED TO STALL INSTALLATION OF THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT. FOR THAT SINGLE
CEREMONY TO SUCCEED, ALL MAJOR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
(PRESIDENCY, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, HIGH COURT) AS
WELL AS MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND RPF HAD TO BE
PRESENT. THE PRESIDENT PROTESTED THAT HE HAD THREE
TIMES TRIED TO SET UP SUCH A CEREMONY AND OTHERS DID
NOT SHOW UP. I POINTED OUT THAT THE LAST TIME HE HAD
SUBMITTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER A LIST OF DEPUTIES

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DIFFERENT THAN HERS ON THE EVE OF THE CEREMONY, AND THAT AFTER HE HAD ASSURED A PROMINENT AMERICAN VISITOR (DASD IRVIN) THAT THE CEREMONIES WOULD GO FORWARD. OPERATIONALLY, POLITICAL ACTORS MUST AGREE ON A SINGLE LIST OF DEPUTIES AND MINISTERS BEFORE THE CEREMONY BEGINS, OR IT WILL NEVER GET OFF THE GROUND. I ENCOURAGED HIM TO ENGAGE DIRECTLY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, PRIME MINISTER-DESIGNATE AND RPF TO SECURE SUCH A LIST. IN THE VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE CDR ISSUE WAS THE LAST POSSIBLE POINT OF CONTENTION; ALL OTHER ISSUES COULD BE DEALT WITH AFTER THE INSTITUTIONS WERE IN PLACE.

7. AS REGARDS TERRORISM, I HAD HEARD BOTH RPF AND CDR, WITHIN THE LAST WEEK, ACCUSE EACH OTHER OF BEING THE SOURCE OF ALL VIOLENCE IN THIS COUNTRY. THE CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM CIVIL WAR WERE FAIRLY EASY TO DETERMINE. BUT ABSENT INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE, I WAS NOT IN POSITION TO SAY WHO MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE

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FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE; VIRTUALLY EVERY POLITICAL FORCE IN RWANDA HAD LOST A PROMINENT PERSONALITY TO SUCH VIOLENCE; MY ONLY CONCLUSION WAS THAT SOME GROUP DOES NOT WANT THE ARUSHA ACCORD TO SUCCEED AND SABOTAGES IT AT CRITICAL MOMENTS. THE ANSWER TO SUCH SABOTAGE WAS TO PUT THE INSTITUTIONS IN PLACE AND LET THE UNITED NATIONS WORK WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES TO FIND OUT WHO PERPETRATED THESE ACTS AND STOP THEM. I RECALLED THAT TARGETED, PERSONALIZED POLITICAL KILLINGS IN THE LATE 80'S HAD

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BROUGHT ABOUT POLITICAL REVOLT AND STATE DISINTEGRATION IN LIBERIA. POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE UNDERMINED THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE NATION. I ENDED WITH A PLEA THAT THE PRESIDENT DO EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO KEEP KIGALI CALM IN THIS TENUOUS TIME AS WE ALL TRIED TO HURDLE THE LAST OBSTACLE TO SETTING UP GOVERNMENT.

8. ON THE QUESTION OF UN MANDATE, I REMINDED THE PRESIDENT THAT DAS BUSHNELL HAD MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO RWANDAN AUTHORITIES ON HER RECENT VISIT THE DEGREE OF SKEPTICISM IN WASHINGTON REGARDING SUCCESS OF THE UN MISSION. SHE HAD ASKED FOR ACTIONS, NOT WORDS, TO JUSTIFY U.S. SUPPORT. THOSE ACTIONS HAD NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING. THE PRESIDENT HAD, NO DOUBT, SEEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT CALLING FOR A SIX-MONTH EXTENSION BUT WITH REVIEW IN TWO MONTHS. I HAD DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT DESK ON FRIDAY NIGHT AND WASHINGTON WAS STILL DEBATING WHAT ITS POSITION WOULD BE ON 4/5. I WOULD OBVIOUSLY COMMUNICATE HIS PLEA TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, WHO WAS TO BE IN KAMPALA 4/3-5, AND TO OTHERS AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

9. COMMENT: OTHER THAN REAFFIRMING OUR SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENCY AS AN INSTITUTION WITHIN THE ARUSHA ACCORD, I CHOSE NOT TO BELABOR HABYARIMANA'S CONCERN ABOUT "MUTUAL RESPECT." POLITICAL EMOTIONS ARE TOO TAUNT AT THE MOMENT TO INDUCE CONFIDENCE BUILDING BY ANY INITIATIVE OTHER THAN AN EARNEST, HONEST EFFORT ON ALL SIDES TO PUT THE INSTITUTIONS IN PLACE. NOR

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DID I TRY TO COMFORT THE PRESIDENT OVER OUR POSITION
ON THE UN VOTE. IT WILL NOT HURT TO LET HIM WORRY;
HE MUST NOT SEE U.S. SUPPORT AS A GIVEN. I CREDIT
HABYARIMANA'S ASSURANCE THAT HE WILL NOT PUT FORWARD
ANY PRECONDITION FOR SWEARING IN THE INSTITUTIONS
OTHER THAN THAT THE CDR HAVE ITS PLACE IN THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. BUT WE CAN USE THE LEVERAGE OF
OUR HESITANT SUPPORT TO KEEP HIM TO HIS WORD. END
COMMENT. RAWSON

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