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AD HOC MEETING ON RWANDA AND BURUNDI

DATE: August 22, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

AGENDA

- I. Follow-up on Taskings from 8/9 Meeting
- II. Proposed Contact Group and Framework for Regional Conference (30 minutes)
- III. Arms Embargo on Burundi (15 minutes)
- IV. Asset Freeze on Burundian Extremists (15 minutes)
- IV. Conclusions, Next Steps (15 minutes)

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- By Friday, August 11, State will provide NSC a report on availability of funds to assist with construction of prisons, prefabricated housing and tents (work w/ICRC). (C)

War Crimes Tribunal:

- By Friday, August 11, AID will work with State on a plan of action to remove obstacles to assist with getting the Tribunal up and running. As part of the plan, AID will work to resolve issues involving UN reimbursements for personnel in Bosnia to free up funds to support DOJ personnel for Rwanda. (C)
- Also, State will send to Justice the plan regarding security for DOJ officials working with the Tribunal. (C)

International Mediation:

- State will report on a plan of forming a Bosnia-style contact group as well as a possible regional conference on Burundi and Rwanda. Indicate plans for regional travel. (C)

IMET Funds:

- State, with DOD assistance, will determine whether and when there might be an additional \$50,000 in IMET funds for Rwanda. (C)

Refugees:

- State/PRM in consultation with the Belgians will push UNHCR to implement a plan to relocate UNHCR camps from Rwandan border. (C)
- State will develop a prospective plan for engaging Mobutu on Rwandan issues. (C)

Burundi:

- All agencies will review the situation in Burundi and whether current efforts are adequate to stem ethnic violence. We will also review possibilities relating to an ICITAP program. (C)

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Following is review of State action items as contained in Sens-Brill memo of August 14:

Prison Conditions:

- Geneva 006265 reports that a key meeting hosted by UN DHA on August 14 called for UN agencies in Kigali and ICRC to develop an urgent plan of action to relieve prison overcrowding. Donors will review the plan and consider contributions. DOD reports that 75 Rubb-Hall tents, enough to hold 8100 persons, and 352 large tents, which would hold a total of 11,600 persons, could be made available. The questions of whether and how to provide aid in the area of prison capacity, and whether to do so in kind or through ICRC, are open. This should be taken up at the August 22 meeting at the NSC. State DRL's paper on prison strategy is attached.

War Crimes Tribunal:

- State DRL's paper is attached. DRL reports that we are in the process of hiring personnel and hope to double the Tribunal's staff in the near term. NSC pressure would be helpful for Treasury to spring their four people; DRL has supplied talking points. Ambassador Albright's staff is meeting with the SYG's staff to press for a support office in the Hague, immediate appointment of the Registrar and administrative support in Kigali and for movement on direct UN hires. If necessary, Ambassador Albright will follow with a meeting with the SYG. Justice needs to give attention to getting our implementing legislation passed so we can turn over indicted persons to the Tribunal. DRL has assured DOJ that they will be reimbursed for their personnel.
- State has sent Justice a thick memorandum regarding security for its personnel in Rwanda.

International Mediation:

- Amb. Bogosian sent the requested document to NSC several days ago.

IMET Funds:

- Two possible pots of money have been identified - \$50,000 fallout which DOD has found, and \$50,000 leftover from Chad. AF is preparing the necessary Section 451 waiver decision memo to get the ball rolling.

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Refugees:

- US Mission Geneva demarched UNHCR on the relocation issue, and UNHCR agreed to move forward. They were to have a meeting with local and national Zairian officials in Bukavu on August 15 to discuss modalities. We have made it clear to UNHCR that lack of money will not be accepted as an obstacle to camp relocation, given the pledge language of our most recent donation. Kinshasa agreed to camp relocation, but later threatened to expel all refugees if the Rwanda arms embargo is lifted, as it was on August 16. Our Mission briefed UNHCR regarding armed Hutu activities in the camp region on August 16. The briefing helped persuade UNHCR of the urgency of moving camps. In South Kivu, Birava camp has already been closed and 9000 refugees transferred to a camp 75 kms to the west.
- AF/C has prepared a paper on Mobutu. This will be finalized after Assistant Secretary Moose returns to the office on August 21.

Burundi:

- Amb. Bogosian has met with Assistant Secretary Gelbard and INL officers regarding possibilities of an ICITAP program, and has raised the matter with the French Embassy, the French having worked closely with us on a similar program in Haiti. Funding may be an issue.

Prison Reduction Strategy

Goal: To dramatically reduce the prison population in Rwanda and start trials of the most serious offenders in national custody.

Background: Although the GOR has made some noises about reducing the prison capacity and appears willing to form a Presidential Commission on the issue, hardliners within the government have shown little interest in reducing the prison population, making the jails more humane or beginning trials. Indeed, the prison population has surged from 30,000 in May to 50,000 at present. Although the USG has made various demarches to the Rwandan Government, greater political pressure is needed to gain a reduction in the prison population. Pressure is timely given the lifting of the arms embargo. We may wish to underscore the importance we place on the prison issue by a visit to Rwanda from a senior State Department official to lay out our position. We should also seek support from the ROSG. When appropriate, President Clinton could follow with a call or letter to President Bizimungu and Vice President Kagame.

Message:

To pressure the GOR, we should tell them that we must see tangible progress within one month in the areas enumerated below or the USG will have to review its assistance to the GOR. Given the level of concern within the Congress and the USG about prison conditions, we will tell the GOR that it will be extremely difficult for the US to maintain the level of support we have (e.g., aid to government ministries). It will be difficult to authorize new support (e.g., lethal or non-lethal arms equipment) until we see tangible improvements in the prison situation.

To ensure continued USG assistance, the GOR must show progress in the following areas within the next month:

1. Work with international humanitarian organizations to increase the capacity of its prisons and spread out the population. (We have given \$625,000 to the ICRC to expand prison capacity but could give more money or equipment for this purpose).
2. Release the young (over 400 under age 14), the elderly (over 3,200 age 55 and over), the pregnant and the infirm on humanitarian grounds.
3. Dramatically reduce the number of arrests (currently at 500 a week) by only making arrests where there is sufficient evidence of guilt.

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4. Take steps necessary to appoint Rwandan judges and begin trials in Rwanda.

5. Provide for the security of released prisoners and make clear that reprisal killings will not be tolerated.

6. Give high-level support to a Presidential Commission to develop a political strategy for reducing the prison population, triaging prisoners and re-integrating Hutus. (AID will provide \$300,000 out of the \$4 million rule of law assistance to the Commission, as suggested by post).

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G:AJoyce(subs) AF/C:ARender

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War Crimes Tribunal

Background: The Tribunal is currently investigating five targets -- principal masterminders of the genocide -- and believes it can still deliver some indictments before the end of the year. Its team of investigators, although small, is building cases against these suspects in Kigali, as well as transcribing the tapes of the radio broadcasts alleged to have helped incite the genocide. With the assistance of USG demarches to various capitals, the Tribunal has recently obtained permission from some key European States to interview important witnesses in those countries. Additional staff members are slowly beginning to come on board including some of the investigators promised by the Dutch. Nonetheless, the Tribunal still faces logistical and bureaucratic obstacles which we are seeking to overcome. We are taking the following actions:

Expand Tribunal Staff

-- Adequate Tribunal staff is critical to the enterprise. We have identified and provided the Tribunal the resumes of over 50 potential investigators, paralegals and neutral interpreters. The Tribunal has been interviewing prospects and has selected a group of investigators and paralegals, which we plan to hire and deploy in the next few weeks. This will significantly increase the Tribunal's investigative resources.

-- We have provided DOJ/FBI a memorandum and binder answering their security and medical concerns and are awaiting a response as to whether three DOJ prosecutors can be deployed.

-- We have submitted talking points to the NSC for a phone call to Deputy Treasury Secretary Newman about deployment of two investigators and two paralegals at Treasury. We are awaiting the NSC call.

-- Ambassador Albright's staff is meeting with the SYG's staff to press for movement on direct UN hires for the Tribunal. If necessary, Ambassador Albright will follow with a meeting with the SYG.

-- We continue to urge other governments to second staff to

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the Tribunal. We will be in an even stronger position to pressure governments after the next group of USG-provided personnel have been deployed.

Obtain Adequate Bureaucratic and Administrative Support

-- The Tribunal has suffered from the lack of bureaucratic support. At a meeting in June, the SYG agreed with Goldstone that the Tribunal should have a "godfather" either on his staff or in DPKO to move the Tribunal forward and cut through bureaucratic obstacles. The Tribunal also needs a Registrar and administrative support. Ambassador Albright's staff is pursuing this in NY today and if necessary, Albright may follow with a meeting with the SYG.

Obtain Support Base Outside Kigali

-- The Tribunal is less efficient than it could be because it lacks a support office to process and analyze documents and other sensitive information. The SYG has recently decided that the Tribunal must operate exclusively in Kigali. We intend to urge him to reconsider and permit a small space outside of Kigali. In the meantime, we are working to make the Kigali office more operational and have sent a large shipment of computer supplies and other equipment for this purpose.

Provide Logistical Support in the Field

-- Until the Tribunal receives adequate administrative support, the USG will help provide necessary resources. We plan to redeploy an administrative expert to Kigali, as well as to lease and equip housing for Tribunal staff.

-- We will also continue to equip the Kigali Office. Six DOD vehicles are scheduled to arrive by October 1, with six more to follow.

Raise Publicity and Confidence of Rwandans

-- Physicians for Human Rights plans to conduct an exhumation in Kigali in September. We intend to raise media attention for this event, which will help to create the sense of movement on the ground for the Tribunal.

-- Goldstone is also considering holding another pledging conference in Kigali in the near term, which would also help to build momentum for the Tribunal.

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SUBJECT: Revised Zaire Strategy - Engaging Mobutu in Regional Issues

Summary

The regional nature of the situation in Rwanda and Burundi suggests we reexamine our Zaire strategy to determine whether there is merit and possibility for incorporating means to involve President Mobutu in these issues. Mobutu probably cannot be helpful in regional negotiation given his difficult personal relationship with neighboring leaders and his pro-Hutu inclinations. He might, however, be useful on some issues related to events on his territory in eastern Zaire. Although the balance between invoking his support for efforts in eastern Zaire and keeping him on track for the democratic transition is a delicate one, these need not be mutually exclusive goals. We should guard against naming a specific "reward" for Mobutu's cooperation, as this would hand Mobutu leverage to provoke further rewards by destabilizing the situation in hopes of renewing our pleas for assistance. The effort should be framed as steps Mobutu himself can take to contribute towards a "normalization of relations." King Hassan of Morocco might be usefully engaged to lobby Mobutu on eastern Zaire.

Essential Factors

Involving Mobutu on regional issues does not alter the fundamental thrust of our policy strategy for events internal to Zaire, as articulated in our July 1994 strategy memo. We will continue to encourage support for economic accountability and reform, and realistic preparations for credible and transparent elections in the agreed time-table (by July 10, 1997). We should continue to encourage Mobutu to support/not interfere with these efforts by the Kengo government, and acknowledge in our dialogue with Mobutu his role in allowing advancement on these fronts as they occur. Given our close coordination with "the Troika" on Zaire policy, we will coordinate the concept of approaching Mobutu with the French and Belgians if this strategy is approved.

We see no overall scope for involving Mobutu in any "elder statesman" role to resolve tensions between parties in the region. Mobutu has difficult personal relationships with neighboring presidents (Museveni, Mwinyi, Moi). His pro-Hutu inclinations further undermine any possibility of a role as independent arbiter.

Mobutu probably could, however, induce a better Zairian performance on things that take place exclusively in Zaire. Since the situation in eastern Zaire could suffer either from his meddling or the absence of his blessing, we should explore specific actions (enumerated in "Plan" below) to channel his influence. Only such cooperation consistent with Mobutu's constitutional responsibilities and that does not undercut

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Kengo's authorities will be sought. As Mobutu is the commander in chief of the armed forces, and national defense and diplomatic relations are areas of collaboration between the President and the transitional government, there is probably broad scope for such cooperation. Some issues will obviously be taken up with both the Prime Minister and the President.

Several factors may constrain Mobutu's ability to influence the situation in eastern Zaire. Initiatives such as arresting perpetrators of genocide and controlling ex-FAR military activities are resource intensive and could incur Zairian casualties; Mobutu may therefore be reluctant to take on these tasks. Sheer logistic obstacles (collapsing infrastructure and state mechanisms) complicate his ability to assist. (These same arguments can be made to some extent for any of the countries in the region.) At the very least, Mobutu can refrain from being a spoiler on refugee issues (by insisting on rapid repatriation, for example), and could enhance control of arms flows and camp security. Ultimately, the military responds to Mobutu (if paid), and a sufficiently motivated Mobutu can probably get them to accomplish a wide range of activities.

Motivating Mobutu

We should be wary of Mobutu's well-known penchant for horse-trading. It would be imprudent to offer Mobutu a tangible "prize" (e.g., the coveted visa) in exchange for his assistance, because it gives him considerable leverage to extract future concessions and will weaken the internal transition process. If we assume Mobutu can play a role in the pace of the arms flow and ex-FAR activities, it would not escape his notice that he could facilitate renewed destabilization of the region in hopes we would again plead for his intercession. Likewise, providing Mobutu a "laundry list" of tasks he must fulfill as pre-conditions for "rehabilitation" would not preclude Mobutu from simultaneously doing several unhelpful things which counterbalance his positive steps.

The Plan

We will pitch our approach to Mobutu on eastern Zaire as a tool he can employ to improve his abysmal international image and work toward a "normalization of relations." Our approach will contain no specific promises. The sending of an ambassador probably registers with Mobutu as his first short-term "reward," even if we did not intend it that way. Although an unrestricted visa is a possibility we might eventually consider, it is a distant decision dependent on significant results from Mobutu and a careful calculation of domestic U.S. repercussions with the Congress and human rights interests.

Our Ambassador/Charge in Kinshasa will continue to be the focal point for our dialogue with Mobutu. Mobutu has committed himself to participating in this fashion in a conversation with former A/S Cohen. An A/S Moose-Mobutu meeting in New York at the UNGA celebrations would provide another near-term venue for our message.

Our strategy with Mobutu on eastern Zaire is not incompatible with our goal of keeping democratization on track. There is a marginal benefit in diverting Mobutu's attention from the domestic agenda. Furthermore, his involvement de-emphasizes PM Kengo's role in regional issues, thus lessening Mobutu's jealousy of Kengo's international limelight. We will make Mobutu's support for Kengo's reform efforts a condition of our dialogue, and we will recognize Kengo's successes in the economic and governance spheres with kudos to Mobutu for his non-interference.

Mobutu should be asked to assist with the following types of endeavors in eastern Zaire:

- o Abandoning the forced refugee repatriations that were started this weekend in response to the U.N. Security Council action in suspending the arms embargo on Rwanda. Zaire undertook one organized refoulement in the past and then abandoned that approach, so there is hope of convincing Zaire to desist now that it has forcefully demonstrated its anxiety.
- o Ensuring the continued cooperation of the Zairian military in putting its best troops at the disposal of the UNHCR-funded Zairian Camp Security Contingent and in following up quickly and decisively on any instances of ZSCS misdoings.
- o Cooperating with the International Tribunal by seeking to arrest those accused of genocide; Mobutu might be convinced to sacrifice some of the known leaders that he would otherwise be inclined to protect.
- o Tempering international criticism of the arms flow by agreeing to low cost (to Zaire) measures such as airport monitors.
- o Pressuring the Hutu leadership (both Rwandan and Burundi) in eastern Zaire to negotiate rather than carry out armed attacks.
- o Exploring how some land could be made available elsewhere in Zaire for medium-term resettlement of refugees should that become necessary.

As an alternative or parallel track, we could seek to engage King Hassan of Morocco on our concerns in eastern Zaire. Hassan has a personal relationship with Mobutu, a record of assistance on other issues in Africa in the past, and sufficient stature and experience to merit Mobutu's respect.

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7-1707, SER 6788

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AF/C:DHSimpson
AF/RCS:RBogosian
NEA/MAG:ABenesch
P:SSymington
G:AJoyce
DRL/AAA:MSutphen
IO/UNP:BBowie-Whitman
IO/PHO:GStettenbauer
PRM/AAA:MMcKelvey

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NSC AD HOC MEETING
OPTIONS PAPER
ARMS EMBARGO AND ASSETS FREEZE FOR BURUNDI?

I. CURRENT STRATEGY OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

We have pursued preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to bolster moderate forces and deter extremists from fomenting violence or overturning the current fragile powersharing arrangement. Our initiatives have been carefully calibrated to avoid destabilizing the situation further. Key points of our current policy are:

- o Active support for the efforts of SRSG Abdallah (e.g., our AID mission has used Democracy and Governance (D/G) funds to cover some of the SRSG's cost for confidence-building exercises.)
- o Regular high-level visits (NSA Lake, Deputy Secretary Talbott, Assistant Secretaries Moose and Shattuck, etc.).
- o Regular public statements and appeals (e.g., President Clinton's mid-February radio message).
- o \$300,000 for the activities of the UN Human Rights Center in Burundi
- o Support for the OAU's monitoring force (\$250,000 for initial deployment in FY-94 plus continuing support for OAU conflict resolution capacity)
- o Use of development (D/G) funds (\$4 million) to support peace and democracy, including grants to promote dialogue, reconciliation, and human rights.
- o Planned \$400,000 in FY-95 ESF, supplemented by USAID D/G funds, to strengthen Burundi's judicial system and help end the problem of impunity for past human rights abuses.
- o Active support for recent efforts by NGOs (e.g., Burundi Policy Forum) to promote conflict resolution and peace-promotion activities in Burundi.
- o Unpublicized visa restrictions against extremists.
- o Pursuing a Commission of Inquiry.

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II. PROBLEMS ANTICIPATED

We will continue to pursue these preventive diplomacy efforts, along with our key allies. However, even with this vigorous program, Burundi risks spiralling downward into widespread violence, as occurred in October 1993. The influence of extremists, particularly in the Tutsi opposition, is a disturbing trend. The opposition has extracted a string of concessions from the Hutu-dominated FRODEBU party and its allies, and the National Debate has stalled.

While Tutsi extremists have so far proceeded incrementally through violence and intimidation, they may at some point attempt a direct coup. The military has already attempted three coups since the FRODEBU won the elections in June 1993, and the coup attempt in October 1993 very nearly succeeded. Hutu hardliners, who have become frustrated with the government's continuing concessions to the Tutsi opposition, have launched attacks on Tutsi civilian or military targets. This has led to a swift response by security forces, and could eventually spark a military coup on the pretext of maintaining order. While Hutu militias and the Palipehutu insurgency group could pose some danger to the Tutsis, they are no real match for the Burundi military.

The scenario that played out in October 1993 might repeat itself. A Tutsi coup attempt or Hutu uprising would spark widespread inter-ethnic violence, and we would see large outflows of refugees. (While the death toll could be enormous, the violence would not play out the same way as in Rwanda in 1994 because of the difference in forces. In Rwanda, Hutus controlled the government, the military, and the militias and had effective control over nearly all areas of the country in April 1994; until the RPF drove out the extremists, the Tutsi minority was essentially defenseless. Conversely, in Burundi, the Hutus cannot wipe out the Tutsis because the Tutsis have the military to protect them, and the Tutsis cannot easily seize and hold control of the country because the Hutus have power in their sheer numbers and can inflict serious casualties

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on the Tutsi community, as they did after the October 1993 failed military coup attempt. This counterbalance between Tutsi military power and Hutu numbers could have some self-limiting effect on the scale of the violence.)

III. OPTIONS FOR ARMS EMBARGO/ASSETS FREEZE

On the diplomatic side, we will continue preventive diplomacy efforts. If a coup occurs, our political response should be the same as in October 1993: immediate condemnation of the coup attempt; international isolation of the coup leaders; punitive measures such as suspension of aid; and OAU, UN, or other appropriate missions to facilitate the return to power of the legitimate government.

Participants in the SVTS group have proposed that USUN should introduce a resolution which imposes an arms embargo against Burundi on roughly the same terms as the former embargo against Rwanda, and also calls for arms monitors in regional airports as an aid in enforcing the embargo. Several Burundian (Hutu) Ambassadors, including the one in Washington, have privately called for such an embargo.

Participants in the SVTS group have also proposed that we should introduce a resolution which imposes an assets freeze against certain named Burundian extremists (the list of 40 whom we and European countries deny visas), and bars claims against governments and financial institutions for enforcing such a freeze. There has not been any proposal that we institute a unilateral freeze.

IO has already drafted and circulated within State proposed Security Council resolutions in each of these two areas, so that the lead time between policy decision and implementation could be fairly short.

On the questions of whether to impose an arms embargo against Burundi and Burundians, and whether to impose an assets freeze against Burundian extremists, options are outlined below. The recent suspension/lifting of the arms embargo against Rwanda makes an arms embargo for Burundi problematical. Accordingly, we recommend that an arms embargo resolution not be introduced at this time, but rather be held in reserve.

AF/C favors the assets freeze. Reluctantly, State E and EB are willing to go along with this Burundi assets freeze proposal, primarily because it is multilateral and not bilateral. State IO favors holding off on a freeze.

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1. Options Regarding an Arms Embargo on Burundi

A. Introduce Embargo Now

Pros

- o Aimed at arms flows to extremist Hutus, who are launching frequent armed attacks in the countryside.
- o Aimed at arms flows to the Tutsi-dominated Army and Tutsi extremists, both of whom are launching reprisals, often against civilian populations.
- o No cost.
- o Sends a signal that the international community is appalled by the continuing violence in Burundi, and wishes to do something about it.

Cons

- o Given the recent suspension/lifting of the embargo against Rwandans, which some persons worried would lead to more arms finding their way to Burundi, the timing is bad.
- o An embargo on Burundi, with none against Rwanda, would not be effective.
- o Difficult to enforce, and even in enforceable would not prevent killings by other means not susceptible to international controls.
- o Over time, likely to affect the Army's ability to fight insurgencies, while not affecting the insurgents or ethnic cleansing operations as much.

B. Holding an Arms Embargo in Reserve

Pros

- o As it represents no outward change in status quo, is less likely to have destabilizing effect or prompt Tutsi hardliner action.

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- o We retain the leverage which a threat to impose an embargo gives us.
- o We avoid the possibility of floating the idea, only to see it go nowhere at the UN, due to possible European opposition.
- o If/when we do call for an embargo, it could be used in a broader context, as part of a concerted series of actions.

Cons

- o The status quo, which is not acceptable as far as the security situation is concerned, continues.
- o We miss, for now, the opportunity to send a strong signal about violence in Burundi.
- o Arms continue to flow to the Army and to extremists of both ethnic groups, fuelling the cycle of extremist attack and reprisal, as well as providing the materiel for any coup attempt.

2. Options Regarding an Assets Freeze Against Burundians

A. Adopt Freeze Resolution

Pros

- o Expresses support of the international community for the moderates. Sends strong signal that we want to isolate extremists and break the cycle of impunity.
- o Cuts off extremists' funds, assuming that they don't move funds as soon as resolution is broached.
- o A UN resolution supporting an assets freeze provides legal cover for otherwise unenthusiastic European governments to take action, an important consideration since the greater proportion of Burundi assets are in Europe, not the U.S.
- o Low cost in resources expended.
- o More surgical than wide-ranging actions---more calculated to affect only extremists.

Cons

- o May provoke panic response by Tutsi extremists.
- o Difficult to enforce due to likelihood that extremists will move their funds before adoption---mainly symbolic.

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- o Because of above considerations, may be difficult to obtain enough votes on the Security Council. Europeans are reluctant to freeze assets. The relevant bank accounts are more likely to be in Europe than in the U.S., so European cooperation is key.
- o The difficulties of implementing a freeze in the circumstances of this case are likely to outweigh the practical benefits, if any.

B. Hold Off on Assets Freeze

Pros

- o As it represents no outward change in status quo, is less likely to prompt extremist reaction.
- o We avoid the possibility of floating the idea, only to see it go nowhere at the UN.

Cons

- o We would cease to commit ourselves to already agreed upon preventive measure.
- o The cycle of impunity continues.
- o We miss, for now, the opportunity to send a strong signal about extremists in Burundi.
- o We miss, for now, the opportunity to send such a message in what would be a symbolic manner for us, there being few such bank accounts here.

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AF/RCS:RBogosian(subs)
IO/UNP:BBowie-Whitman(info)
PM/ISP:ALangland(info)
P:SSymington(info)
DRL:JRosenblatt(info)
G:AJoyce(info)
L/AF:TBorek(subs)
EB/ESP:JAHolmes(info)

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BACKGROUND: The draft NSC Discussion Paper of August 5 outlined the principal elements of US policy to date as well as several key assumptions, viz.,

Facilitate refugee return and national reconciliation;

Maintain stability and build confidence;

Ensure accountability for the genocide;

Promote respect for human rights;

Enhance security in the refugee camps;

Coordinate and mobilize the international community.

This summary of broad U.S. objectives remains valid. As noted in the NSC paper under its key assumptions section, lasting political reconciliation is unlikely in the short term and may never be possible. The US is not prepared to send troops but is willing to take other actions and to play a leading role diplomatically and as a donor. Any long term solution will require a concerted, multilateral effort over an extended period.

In the State Department package prepared for the meeting originally scheduled for August 17, we provided an initial cut at what a regional conference would entail. More precisely, we outlined the peace process as we saw it in general terms. We have received useful suggestions from IO and PRM, and our ideas require further refinement.

THE REGIONAL CONFERENCE: There is a broad consensus internationally that a regional conference would be timely and useful. The French feel particularly strongly in this regard. We need to engage the key actors, solicit their ideas regarding the conference and provide our own. Prior to that we need to have at least a preliminary sense of where we are heading; that is, we need to have a vision of where the peace process is leading, but we should be flexible enough to make use of good ideas others will have. Inevitably, compromises will be necessary. We also need to have assurances of a USG commitment along the lines noted above, and that assurance should be in the form of the Presidential Decision Memorandum. The initial conference, which will have to be followed by other activities will address regional and Rwanda and Burundi-specific objectives.

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES: We want broad commitments from the parties to support the peace process. AREA GOVERNMENTS should make a commitment to guarantee peace in the region using the authority and facilities of the OAU. DONOR GOVERNMENTS should commit themselves to provide technical, material and diplomatic

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support to the peace process, noting that those who are unwilling to support that process will be ostracized by the donors. The conference should reaffirm the ROLE of the UN SYSTEM including how best to modify UNAMIR. It is of crucial importance that the GOR and GOB endorse the process which will imply their commitment to pursue political reconciliation. The regional conference should establish a framework that will provide for the near and middle-term needs of the REFUGEES pending long-term solutions.

RWANDA: Over the long-term Rwanda will require arrangements that resolve the refugee problem, provide adequate security for the country as a whole and for individuals and tackles basic administrative and economic reconstruction. With the lifting of the arms embargo, the focus will shift to monitoring arms flows and developing a security environment that probably will require demobilization and military reform. The USG will be involved and we need to determine the kind of security relationship we want to have with the GOR. The other broad area of activity for the USG and other donors will be reestablishing judicial and administrative structures in Rwanda and the Rwanda Genocide Tribunal and ongoing issues of human rights performance, notably the urgent prison problem. Beyond that are more traditional assistance programs. Accelerating, delivery and disbursement of assistance already promised and getting the French and Belgians to do more are urgent priorities.

BURUNDI:

The current political environment in Burundi is more sour than in Rwanda. More-over, policy reform is more urgently needed in Burundi. It will be necessary to stress the risk that the donor community will walk away from Burundi (a la Somalia) in the absence of serious efforts at political reconciliation while offering long-term assistance as the pay-off for a genuine commitment to reconciliation. However, reconciliation in Burundi is likely to require military reform, establishment of a real civilian police force, structural adjustment in economic policy and some form of decentralization, local autonomy or regionalism within the country as a means toward power sharing.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS: While democratization remains a long-term objective and perhaps the only means of resolving the problems of Rwanda and Burundi, our more immediate objective should be to develop fairer power sharing mechanisms that protect minority rights and assure greater stability. Thus, the need for judicial, military and other reforms. A regional conference is necessary to focus high level

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attention on the Great Lakes region and to secure the commitments noted above. However, time will be needed to prepare for the conference, and numerous follow-on actions will be necessary. Rwanda and Burundi are linked only up to a point, and we will want to follow Rwanda and Burundi-specific tracks as well as a regional track. It may develop that we will need a Zaire or even a Tanzania track as well.

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