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SUBJECT: .. SPECIAL REPORT RWANDA

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UNRES-4125/J2M-2

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Background Paper for U.S. Mission, United Nations (USUN)

SUBJECT: Former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) Capabilities and Intentions (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: To provide USUN with information concerning present/projected ex-FAR capabilities and likely intentions. The data will be retransmitted to UN personnel involved in Rwanda efforts.
2. (U) POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:
 - a. (UN/RES) The former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) has begun an insurgency campaign against the new Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-dominated government in order to regain the political bargaining power which the former Interim Government lost in its recent military defeat.
 - b. (UN/RES) The ex-FAR has already demonstrated that it has the manpower and organization to conduct small-scale insurgency operations.
 - c. (UN/RES) Several limiting factors prevent a large-scale insurgency operation from occurring within the next 90 days: the focus of international attention in the Goma and Bukavu regions of Zaire, and in southwestern Rwanda; the absence of existing links with international arms suppliers and financial backing; and the necessity for the ex-FAR to reorganize from a primarily conventional national army to that of an insurgent force.
 - d. (UN/RES) It is unlikely that the bulk of Hutu refugees in Zaire and Tanzania will return to Rwanda in the immediate future (within a year). This population-in-exile provides a potential political support base for a sustained and large-scale insurgency unless immediate steps are taken by the international community, including repatriating the refugees, ensuring the security of Hutus in Rwanda, and disarming and demobilizing the ex-FAR.
 - e. (UN/RES) Regardless of whether or not the preceding conditions are met, the insurgency by Hutu extremist elements who will not return to a Rwanda with a Tutsi-dominated government will continue. The size and scope of the insurgency, which in all likelihood will be underway within six months, will depend on the outside support available to the ex-FAR.



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3. (U) BACKGROUND:

a. (UN/RES) Rwanda's civil war began in 1990 when the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military arm of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded Rwanda from RPA bases in Uganda. At the time, Kigali's military force, the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR), comprised only about 7,000 soldiers. In response to the civil war, the FAR rapidly expanded to 31,000 troops. The new conscripts received little training before they were committed to battle, which severely reduced the FAR's overall effectiveness, and the force continued to rely on hastily conscripted and poorly trained soldiers throughout the civil war. Thus, despite having a total force of about 31,000 soldiers, the FAR had a core of only about 10,000 seasoned, combat-tested troops.

b. (UN/RES) When the aircraft carrying Rwanda's Hutu president crashed under mysterious circumstances in early April, the RPA renewed and intensified its fight against the FAR. The Kigali Government's combined military and paramilitary forces numbered about 39,000 soldiers. The total strength of government forces arrayed along the northern front was about 18,700 soldiers and gendarmes. Meanwhile, military and paramilitary forces stationed in the capital numbered about 5,200-6,350 men (see Enclosure (1) for Ex-FAR Force Composition and Locations as of April 1994). These troops served as the FAR's strategic reserve. The government forces were better equipped than the RPA (see Enclosure (2)) for Ex-FAR Equipment Summary as of April 1994), and the FAR was judged very competent by regional standards. Nevertheless, the RPA, a much smaller and less-well equipped force, defeated the FAR by mid-July 1994.

4. (U) DISCUSSION:a. (U) THE FLIGHT OF THE EX-FAR AND ITS GENERAL LOCATIONS

(1) (U) On 17 July 1994, the bulk (approximately 20,000) of FAR forces in northwestern Rwanda fled to Goma, Zaire, as intact combat units, bringing with them their heavy weapons (totals and types of equipment unknown). The primary reason given by the FAR for this retreat was a severe shortage of ammunition and heavy weapons which would have enable the FAR to sustain its fight against the RPA.

(2) (UN/RES) As the FAR crossed into Goma, about 50 percent of the troops were disarmed. Although some units retained small arms and caches of ammunition, they possess practically no ammunition for crew-served weapons. Most of the FAR encampments in the Goma area are along the east-west road from Goma to Sake and at several camps north of Goma. Outside the Goma area, elements of the ex-FAR remain hidden in the Birunga National Park between Ruhengeri and Gisanyu in UN Sector 5A. These ex-FAR elements began conducting small-scale insurgency operations against the RPA in the last week of August.

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(3) (UN/RES) Other less organized and less well-equipped ex-FAR troops have fled to Bukavu, Zaire (between 5,000 -7,000 troops) since July. During the course of the war, probably in early May, about 1,000-2,000 additional ex-FAR soldiers sought refuge along the Tanzania frontier in the vicinity of the Akagera National Park and have launched sporadic attacks against the RPA in eastern Rwanda. An additional group of about 3,000 ex-FAR soldiers are in the Benaco region of Tanzania. Finally, as many as 5,000 armed Hutu elements (ex-FAR and militia) are located in UN Sector 4 (the former Humanitarian Protection Zone), primarily in the Nyungwe Forest west of Gikongoro. Recent reports of Hutu militia activity in this area indicate the road between Cyangugu and Gikongoro is particularly dangerous. The total number of ex-FAR in Rwanda, Zaire, and Tanzania is roughly 34,000-37,000, but most of these elements are assessed to be of generally low combat capability. Only about 10,000 are believed to be well-disciplined and well-trained, the majority of whom are in the Goma area. Enclosure (3) provides a summary of Ex-FAR Force Possible Composition and Locations.

b. (U) ESTIMATE OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

(1) (UN/RES) COMMAND AND CONTROL. The ex-FAR's senior leadership has probably not yet developed a coherent assessment of the situation in which it now finds itself; some ex-FAR leaders are actively trying to negotiate their return to Rwanda (some succeeded in late August). Several ex-FAR officers have been implicated in the genocide associated with the civil war, and their location is presently unknown. These officers most likely would form the nucleus of a extremist Hutu insurgency, and in all probability, would never return to an RPF-dominated Rwanda. The majority of the influential Hutu military officers are in the Goma area at a Headquarters encampment in the Christian Training Center near Lake Kivu. The ex-FAR relies on couriers and face-to-face coordination to effect command and control. Command and control probably is adequate for limited insurgency operations or small-scale (squad or platoon) conventional operations, but not adequate to control conventional operations in multiple locations.

(2) (UN/RES) INTELLIGENCE. The ex-FAR has a limited institutionalized intelligence apparatus. It can collect via direct observation in the vicinity of the camps. There is no indication that a network of spotters or informers has been formed; there are reports of limited reconnaissance under way, however, near Mutura in Rwanda and in the vicinity of the Birunga National Park by the elite Presidential Guard and ParaCommando elements.

(3) (UN/RES) LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT. Much of the ex-FAR's equipment and munitions was lost in battle to the RPF or discarded/destroyed in place in the final days of the fighting. The ex-FAR did transfer unknown quantities of ammunition into Zaire, some via truck and some carried by individual soldiers.



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The force probably has no current stock of spare parts for weapons, vehicles, or other equipment. The former government fled with the Rwandan treasury, and high level leaders have sufficient personal funds to initially finance an insurgency. Although the force has no known current source for significant new quantities of weapons or ammunition, it is likely seeking to obtain them from various potential suppliers.

(4) (UN/RES) RETRAINING. The only ex-FAR retraining efforts observed have been platoon and squad level activities focused on regaining unit cohesion and maintaining small arms proficiency.

c. (U) NEAR TERM (30 - 90 DAYS) OUTLOOK AND THREAT ASSESSMENT

(1) (UN/RES) The overall combat effectiveness of the ex-FAR units in the region is judged to be low. However, small-scale raids have been conducted by Hutu elements located in the vicinity of the Akagera National Park and Benaco refugee camp in Tanzania, and ex-FAR elements have already begun small-scale insurgency operations from Birunga National Park UN Sector 5A in northwest Rwanda. These forces in all likelihood lack a significant stockpile of weapons and ammunition for a lengthy insurgency, and these units would need resupply within two to three months. The shortage of ammunition and other supplies is the key factor degrading the ex-FAR's near-term capability. Currently, the ex-FAR has insufficient stocks to mount large-scale, sustained combat operations.

(2) (UN/RES) The most capable ex-FAR elements remain in the Goma area of Zaire and are slowly regaining cohesion. They have occasionally been belligerent and aggressive and have the capability to launch small scale attacks into Rwanda against the RPA. While it is estimated that up to 25% of the ex-FAR personnel in the area retain their small arms, they presently possess no heavy weapons, and they also lack the ammunition and other logistics needed to conduct medium-to-large scale operations. The ex-FAR had an unknown quantity of SA-7 family man-portable surface-to-air missiles before it fled to Zaire and could threaten UN air operations in the area if it retained these missiles. There have been recent reports of individual incidents of ex-FAR soldiers confronting NGOs in order to obtain food and other supplies. Random attacks, consisting of a grenade assault or automatic weapons fire, are a distinct possibility.

(3) (UN/RES) The forces in the Bukavu region lack organization and weapons. They pose little threat and are not likely to begin insurgency operations. However, the forces in the Nyungwe Forest area of UN Sector 4 will continue to terrorize the local population, could interfere with UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) troops, and could prompt the RPA to renew military operations in southwest Rwanda. However, UNAMIR began to disarm these elements in early September, which could alleviate the threat posed by these groups. If the RPA resumes its attacks, the local Hutu population undoubtedly would flee to Zaire.

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d. (U) LONGTERM OUTLOOK (90 - 180 DAYS)

(1) (UN/RES) The possibility of a large-scale insurgency will increase over time. That potential would be lessened by disarming the ex-FAR, by having UNAMIR patrol border areas of Zaire and Tanzania, and/or if a significant political reconciliation occurs. If the majority of the Hutu refugee population in Zaire and Tanzania remains outside Rwanda, the likelihood of political reconciliation or prevention of an ex-FAR insurgency against the Kigali regime lessens greatly. Beyond the three month point, as the refugee crisis stabilizes, and world focus shifts to other global "hot spots," financial and arms suppliers will emerge to support the Hutus-in-exile.

(2) (UN/RES) The ex-FAR will probably not totally finish its reorganization and training in the next six months; nevertheless, it could begin larger-scale combat operations involving multiple fronts and company/battalion attacks. The Goma region in all likelihood would be the main front, since Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Prefectures are the areas from which the majority of the Hutu extremists derive, and this area is closest to the ex-FAR logistics resupply point at Goma Airfield. The Bukavu/Nyungwe Forest area would serve as a second front, and a campaign in this area would have two objectives: to prevent RPA forces from reinforcing the northwest, and to drive toward Butare in order to cut off Rwanda from Burundi. The RPA would have difficulty sustaining its troops in the east because of the likelihood that the ex-FAR could have at least minimal success interdicting the flow of arms to the RPA. Ex-FAR troops in the east could also continue to launch small raids and draw RPA assets away from the main threat in the northwest. The ex-FAR will almost certainly launch an insurgency against the new RPF-dominated government in order to regain political bargaining power for the former Interim Government. Although an ex-FAR mounted insurgency seems a virtual certainty within the next six months, the size and scope of the insurgency will depend on the outside support available to the ex-FAR.



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EX-FAR FORCE COMPOSITION AND LOCATIONS AS OF 6 APRIL 94 (U)

<u>MAJOR TACTICAL UNITS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
25 Infantry BNs	13,000 (600-800 Each BN)	Seven Operational sectors
2 Commando BNs	1,000	Ruhengeri/ Gisenyi sectors
Paracommando BN	1,000	Kigali
1 Armored Reconnaissance BN	690	Kigali
Presidential Guard BN	600	Kigali
Headquarters/Support Units	4770	Kigali
Training BN	600	Butare
subtotal	23,460	
10 Gendarme Territorial Groups	5300 (BN)	One Group per Prefecture (10)
1 Gendarme Territorial Co	400	Kigali
2 Gendarme Intervention BNs	920	Kigali
1 Route Security CO	200	Kigali
1 Gendarme Air Assault CO	200	Kigali
1 Gendarme Headquarters	200	Kigali
subtotal	7200	
MAJOR UNIT TOTAL	30,660	
TOTAL FORCES AVAILABLE	approx. 39,000 (includes militia forces)	

Enclosure (1)

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EX-FAR EQUIPMENT SUMMARY AS OF 6 APRIL 1994 (U)

GOVERNMENT	TOTAL
ARMORED CARS	
Panhard AML-60(mm Cannon)	25
AML-90(mm Cannon)	12
AML-245(Machine Guns)	25
ARTILLERY/MORTARS	
122mm Howitzer, D30	6*
105mm Howitzer	6
120mm MRL, BM-21	5
120mm Mortar	24
82mm Mortar, Type 53	75
81mm Mortar	50
60mm Mortar	100+
AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS	
37mm AD Gun, M1939	10
23mm AAA, ZU-23/2	11
14.5mm AAMG, ZPU-4	24
20mm AD Gun	1
does possess SA-7 Family ADA Missiles	unknown
MISTRAL ADA Missiles	15
ANTITANK WEAPONS	
75mm Recoilless Rifle	50
HELICOPTERS	
SA-342 Gazelle, Assault	3
SA-365 Dauphin, Utility	1
SA-318 Alouette II, Utility	2

Reports indicate that some of these helicopters are armed as gunships and are operational

Enclosure (2)

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EX-FAR FORCE POSSIBLE COMPOSITION AND LOCATIONS (U)

<u>MAJOR TACTICAL UNITS</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
12 Infantry BNs	8,400 (600-800 Each BN)	Goma Area
2 Commando BNs	2,000 (1,000 Each)	Goma Area
Paracommando BN	1,000	Goma Area
1 Armored Reconnaissance BN	600	Goma Area
Presidential Guard BN	600	Goma Area
Headquarters/Support Units	4000	Goma Area
1 Gendarme Territorial Co	400	Goma Area
2 Gendarme Intervention BNs	900	Goma Area
1 Route Security CO	200	Goma Area
2 Gendarme Territorial Group	1000	Goma Area
1 Gendarme Headquarters	200	Goma Area
subtotal	15,000 - 20,000	
6 Infantry BNs (less organized)	4200	Bukavu Area
1 Gendarme Air Assault CO	200	Bukavu Area
Support Troops	700	Bukavu Area
subtotal	5,000 - 7,000	
3 Infantry BNs (less organized)	2100	Nyungwe Forest
3 Gendarme Territorial Groups	1500	Nyungwe Forest/Safe Zone
Militia	1400	Nyungwe Forest
subtotal	5000	
1-2 Infantry BNs (less organized)	1400	Akagera Park
2 Infantry Bns (less organized)	1400	Benaco Camp
2 Gendarme Territorial Groups	1000	Benaco Camp
militia	1000	Benaco Camp
subtotal	3000	
TOTAL FORCES AVAILABLE	approx. 34,000 - 37,000	includes militia forces

Enclosure (3)

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