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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AGRE-00	AID-01	A-01	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00
	COME-00	C-01	OASY-00	DOEE-00	ANHR-01	DS-00	EUR-01
	FBO-01	HA-09	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	MFLO-03	MMP-00	M-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-06	OIC-02	OIS-01	OMB-01	OPR-01	PA-01
	PC-01	PER-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SCT-03	SNP-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01
	FMP-00	PMB-00	/061W				

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O 211137Z APR 94
 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3558
 INFO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
 USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
 AMEMBASSY BANGUI
 AMEMBASSY COTONOU
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
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 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 10962

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UN, FR, BY, RW
 SUBJECT: WGRWOL: FRENCH PESSIMISM ON RWANDA

REF: A) STATE 104017 B) STATE 98062 C) STATE 99209
 C) PERLOW-AISTON TELECON, 2-19 D) STATE 105064

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: WE MET WITH THE ELYSEE AFRICA COUNSELOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
 DECLASSIFY AFTER: 21 APR 2016
 DATE/CASE ID: 06 MAY 2011 201005065

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BRUNO DELAYE AND WITH QUAI DESK OFFICER FOR ZAIRE, JEAN-ULRIC CILLARD ON APRIL 20 TO CONVEY THE POINTS IN REFS (B) AND (C) CONCERNING USG POLICY IN RWANDA. THE GOF IS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF THE RPF AND RWANDAN MILITARY LEADERS TO REACH A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT IN THE SHORT TERM. THE GOF AGREES THAT THE ONLY BASIS FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSION IN RWANDA REMAINS THE PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED IN THE ARUSHA ACCORDS AND HAS ENCOURAGED THE TANZANIANS TO PURSUE THEIR EFFORTS. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE VASTLY CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN RWANDA, THE GOF HAS LITTLE FAITH THAT NEW TALKS WILL LEAD TO POSITIVE RESULTS QUICKLY. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING APRIL 20 TALKS ON RWANDA WITH BRUNO DELAYE, AFRICAN AFFAIRS ADVISOR AT THE ELYSEE AND JEAN-ULRIC CILLARD AT THE QUAI AND PRESENTED THE POINTS IN REFS (B) AND (C) ON U.S. POLICY IN RWANDA. ALTHOUGH BOTH INTERLOCUTORS EXPRESSED GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH OUR VIEWS, IT IS EVIDENT THAT GOF AFRICANISTS ARE "CATCHING

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 THEIR BREATH" AFTER THE EVACUATION OF FRENCH NATIONALS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE THEIR FORCES AND DO NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC POLICY PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION OTHER THAN PRESSING BOTH SIDES TO ENTER INTO A NEW SET OF ARUSHA TALKS.
 ARUSHA TALKS

4. THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE TANZANIAN EMBASSY IN PARIS BRIEFED THE QUAI ON APRIL 19 CONCERNING GOT EFFORTS TO OPEN TALKS IN DAR ES SALAAM BETWEEN THE RPF AND GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS. THE QUAI ENCOURAGED THE GOT EFFORT AND ISSUED A PRESS STATEMENT ON APRIL 20 CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND EXPRESSING SUPPORT OF THE TANZANIAN INITIATIVE. THE FRENCH WILL BE REPRESENTED BY THEIR AMBASSADOR OR DCM FROM DAR ES SALAAM. WE INFORMED THE QUAI AND ELYSEE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF LT. COL. MARLEY (REF D).

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

5. DURING A MEETING WITH THE RPF REPRESENTATIVE IN

PARIS ON APRIL 15, THE QUAI URGED AN END TO THE RPF OFFENSIVE AS THE ONLY WAY TO END ETHNIC STRIFE. THE FRENCH ALSO ARGUED THAT THE RPF MIGHT BE ABLE TO SEIZE POWER IN KIGALI, BUT IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GOVERN RWANDA.

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THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY RECENT RPF STATEMENTS ABOUT ON EXCLUDING PARTICIPATION BY HUTU PARTIES OR FACTIONS THAT PARTICIPATED IN OR ENCOURAGED ETHNIC VIOLENCE. WHILE SUCH A RESPONSE IS ENTIRELY UNDERSTANDABLE, CILLARD STATED, THE GOF FEARS THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC AND, IF HELD TO, WILL MAKE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION UNACHIEVABLE.

6. DELAYE ARGUED TO US THAT THE APPARENT RPF STRATEGY OF TAKING THE CAPITAL AND THEN CREATING A COALITION

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GOVERNMENT WITH SOUTHERN HUTUS WILL NEVER WORK. HE
PREDICTED THAT THE EXTREMIST HUTU FACTIONS WILL
ASSASSINATION HUTU POLITICIANS (OR THE FAMILIES) WHO
COOPERATE WITH THE RPF. EVEN IF HUTU EXTREMISTS ARE
NOT ABLE TO CARRY OUT A POLICY OF INTIMIDATION, THEY
WILL CREATE A CLANDESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN THE
COUNTRYSIDE THAT THE RPF WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPRESS,
DELAJE OPINED. UNLESS THE RPF REACHES A NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT, THE LIKELIHOOD IS FOR YEARS OF INSTABILITY
AND ETHNIC BLOODSHED IN RWANDA, DELAJE PREDICTED.

MUSEVENI'S ROLE

7. THE GOF REMAINS IN CONTACT WITH UGANDAN PRESIDENT
MUSEVENI AND IS ATTEMPTING TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO APPLY
PRESSURE ON THE RPF TO HALT ITS OFFENSIVE.

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UNAMIR

8. THE GOF HAS NOT REACHED ANY STRONG CONCLUSIONS ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR, AND DELAYE STATED THAT UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS HE DID NOT SEE MUCH DIFFERENCE WHICH OPTION WAS CHOSEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THAT SAID, THERE IS A PREFERENCE A CONTINUED UNAMIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN KIGALI, PARTICULARLY IN HOPES OF KEEPING THE AIRPORT FROM BEHIND DESTROYED, WHICH WOULD ALLOW A RAPID RESPONSE BY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES ONCE THE FIGHTING STOPS. WHILE THE FIGURE USED BY THE UNAMIR COMMANDER OF 1,000 MEN TO SECURE THE AIRPORT AND PROTECT A UN POLITICAL PRESENCE SEEMS HIGH TO THE GOF, THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT NUMBER IF THAT IS WHAT THE UNAMIR COMMANDER BELIEVES HE NEEDS. DELAYE ALSO NOTED THAT A UNAMIR HEADQUARTERS SITE IN KIGALI COULD EVENTUALLY SERVE AS A SECURE, NEUTRAL MEETING SITE SHOULD AN AGREEMENT BE REACHED.

HARRIMAN

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