

Cassette 79 JK
Side A.

K0156591

MD: We are now starting tape 79.

PD: That's correct. The recording of tape 79. We are going to continue. You were talking about the bishops at Kabgwayi. You were telling us the abuses that had been committed among them were the result of an interpretation that there were people...

JK: Yes, and I was saying that the people who had been executed weren't necessarily executed because they were moderates or extremists. They were because they were Hutu. Because there were people who had nothing to do with political parties, who didn't even know what was going on, who didn't even know who was there. People who hadn't even wanted to flee, because they told themselves that it didn't matter to them whether it was the FPR, the MRND or the Interahamwe who took power. What mattered for them was to that they wanted to stay in their country, they wanted to survive.

PD: When you say "people", are you referring to the bishops?

JK: No. I am referring to the bishops or other persons.

PD: Okay.

JK: The bishops didn't want to flee. We were with them. We had even advised them to flee. But we couldn't oblige them to flee.

MD: They didn't deem that they had played any role in the events that could have made them accomplices or actors?

JK: No. The point is, before the RPF took the town of Kabgwayi, they wrote a letter to the Pope, a copy of which I received, but which unfortunately I no longer have because it was among the documents I lost in Goma. In this letter they were asking the Pope to intervene so that the town is declared a neutral town. Their argument in support of this was the fact that they had been able to protect the Hutu and Tutsi refugees alike in their community, that Hutu and Tutsi priests had continued to coexist, that it was about the only place where people had continued to live together during the war. So they wanted the town to be declared a neutral town and protected by international law. I think it was on the basis of this letter that they had faith in the authorities for the protection of the site.

PD: Okay. We are discussing this part because you say it is an important element which deserves investigation. And then you state why you think the investigation should be carried out.

JK: Yes.

PD: So that sums up the document that was prepared?

JK: Yes.

PD: The next document is identified as K-0041566: proposal for the internal restructuring of the MDR and its opening up to other democratic forces on the common theme: the awakening of democracy in Rwanda. A document prepared in August 93. Is there anything in this document that can be of interest to us?

JK: Well, no, because it is a document on the internal organisation of the MDR. The period in which this document was written corresponds to the period when there was a split in the party, and they were making a proposal to get the party out of the vicious circle of squabbles.

PD: When you say "they", who do you mean?

JK: The people of the Benelux. They identified themselves as such. It is the MDR Benelux section. It was in Belgium.

MD: It was in Belgium?

JK: Yes.

MD: They were dissidents of...

JK: They were not dissidents.

MD: They were not dissident?

JK: They were not dissidents. It was for the purpose of making a positive contribution to the party. They were actually against the split, against dissidence. They wanted the party to remain united, for the good of everyone.

MD: Was it in the multiparty era?

JK: It was in the multiparty era, yes. It was when there was the split within the MDR.

MD: Was it partly cause by the multiparty system? Was it these roots they wanted to change?

JK: Sorry?

MD: They wanted to change the roots on which the party had been grounded? Did they want to give the party a new orientation?

JK: Yes.

MD: A new ideology?

JK: As well.

MD: Did they give a list of the problems the party was facing at the time?

JK: Yes. A certain number of problems were analysed, yes. They were giving their position on a number of themes that were topical at the time, especially what was called was called the sovereign national conference, the peace accords, the democratisation process. They took a number of positions and made proposals for the internal restructuring of the party, be it as concerned the ideology, the organisation or the programme of the party.

PD: Does the document contain any incitement to commit crimes?

JK: It was the opposite.

PD: It was the opposites?

JK: It was the opposite. It is a document which, had it been followed, may have prevented crimes from being committed.

PD: Okay.

MD: Was this document officially forwarded or notified to the party?

JK: It was forwarded, but it wasn't examined.

MD: It wasn't examined by the party?

JK: No...

MD: Why?

JK: ...not as far as I know.

MD: Why...

JK: ! don't know, since I wasn't in the management of the party.

MD: Yes, but it is a document you were able to obtain...

JK: It is a document I was able to obtain and which I kept because I considered it as an important document which preceded the tragedy of April-July 94.

MD: But you say that if the document had been considered and followed, it may have avoided...

JK: No, perhaps not. I don't think one should minimise or give extreme weight to an idea or a group of people, but the ideas in the document are valid even today. And if people had understood the message, the various messages, and

not only that of this group, but the messages the various opposition groups had at the time, perhaps the worst could have been avoided.

MD: But throughout the questioning we have established that this group, had a major responsibility in the events, the MRND group of this party?

JK: It is not an MRND group. It is an MDR group.

MD: MDR.

JK: Yes. It had no responsibility. It was in Belgium. They were students...

MD: I had understood MRND, that is why I was going in that direction. I had understood MRND.

PD: It is MDR-Benelux. Was that the European wing of your party?

JK: Yes, in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

MD: I was going in the other direction because I don't have the document before me.

PD: Who were the strongmen in this Benelux faction? Do you remember who they were?

JK: I don't remember, but I could find it, yes.

PD: They were people who...

JK: They are still there.

PD: Yes? They forwarded it to you and then it wasn't...

JK: It wasn't examined.

PD: It wasn't examined, it wasn't put to use. Was it ever mentioned? During the conflict did these people get back to you and asked you to explain?

JK: They had sent an emissary to Bukavu just at the start of the exile who recalled it to me.

PD: Who reminded you of it?

JK: Yes.

PD: And what had been your government's reply at the time? There was no government. It was in exile?

JK: There wasn't a government anymore. They met me on an individual basis as someone of the MDR [inaudible].

PD: To admonish you, to tell you that if you had implemented it...What was your reaction at the time? Were you alone? Was it really on an individual basis, or was it the same group?

JK: They had certainly said it to other people as well, but when they told me, it was on a personal basis.

MD: Was that the first time you heard of the document, or did you know it existed?

JK: No, I had it.

MD: You had it.

JK: I knew it existed, yes. Not only did I know it existed but I had it.

PD: Did you have a reason for keeping it?

JK: Yes.

PD: You had noted that it was important and you had kept it. Why?

JK: It could be an explanation for the events that took place, and the fact that people had reflected on it. That the events that occurred didn't just happen by chance or couldn't have been foreseen. That the events were foreseeable, since people had also reflected on them, as the think-tank we have mentioned before, and the MDR-Benelux group. That it wasn't something which happened spontaneously, as some people are saying, that it couldn't have been avoided. No. It could have been avoided if some measures had been taken.

- PD: Do you have anything else?
- MD: No.
- PD: No? The next document is identified as K0041567. The title which is in bold is Rwanda: The Rwanda Patriotic Front: Veritable Authors of the massacre of Hutus and Tutsi since October 90. Cercle rwandais de réflexion, 1994, document 0151, 3rd revision, September 94. What does it mean?
- JK: It is a document I think was drafted by the Rwandan community in Canada, which was sent to me for information, after the exile. I received it in exile.
- PD: I think it is in order.
- JK: It is not in order. It is a document they revised each time. This was the third revision. So each time they had new elements, they added it to the document.
- PD: Ah, okay. And the annexes they have here, are they in the same sense as the one you had made...
- JK: No. It is more of a propaganda document than an objective analysis.
- PD: Okay.
- MD: Is it based on facts, on testimonies or [inaudible]
- JK: There are some fact in it that may be correct, but as far as I am concerned, it is a propaganda document. I may refer to it for some facts for which I had confirmation, to have the context, but it isn't a document I can use as a reference, as I have said.
- MD: It is not like your document on the investigation, because it is not based on facts or..
- JK: Let's say on concrete facts, with the required rigour.
- MD: What was the purpose of writing this document?
- JK: It is an information and propaganda document by Rwandans who are in exile, as it is done by other groups.
- MD: It therefore means that this document is somehow biased?
- JK: No. It is a propaganda document. I don't know if it can be said to be biased. If it is a propaganda document, it is a propaganda document.
- PD: [inaudible] compared to the other document, are there any elements you retained from this document?
- JK: Yes, there are elements that can be retained, especially certain responsibilities. Since they were not in Rwanda during the war, they had access to more information than us, to information we didn't have access to. There are certain connections they analysed, which we couldn't analyse at the time as far as responsibilities are concerned, particularly at the level of the international community.
- MD: So it is a document produced by people who didn't live the genocide?
- JK: No, they didn't live the genocide.
- MD: They were abroad?
- JK: They were abroad. They tried to compile information available to them and to make their analysis of the situation.
- MD: So it is mostly based on information they got from the media, from newspapers...
- JK: Yes.
- MD: The analyses that were being made at the time?
- JK: Yes.
- PD: We see that in the appendix to the same document they attach an RPF document?

JK: Yes. It was a document that circulated in Rwanda well before April 94 and which...I don't...the authenticity of the text. It may have been written on 14 January 94, and lists a number of Hutus who were opposed to the action of the RPF and who had to be eliminated. The point that came to my mind was that most of the people listed here had indeed been killed just before the period I have indicated, between the 6th and 7th. None of the people who were in contact with the RPF and who figured in this list survived.

MD: None of these Hutus survived?

JK: No.

MD: And it was necessary to make a list...

JK: Perhaps the list...They identified people who actually died.

PD: Yes, that's it. The cross before the name indicates that the person is dead?

JK: Dead, yes. But it isn't at all honest. It dates from a long time ago.

PD: I can see **Nzoriendo** [phonetic], I can also see **Hassan Ngeze**...

JK: No, the person who died is this one.

PD: Yes, but here...

MD: Yes, it means that he was listed.

PD: These people were listed as enemies at the time?

JK: Yes.

PD: Okay. Do you feature in the list?

JK: Of course.

PD: We were trying to find your name...

JK: I am there.

PD: Okay. Second column, second name.

MD: Column 2.

PD: Okay. And there is Agnès right down there.

JK: Yes.

PD: There are also newspaper cuttings...

MD: The list was signed by a colonel who was...

JK: The chairman of the RPF.

PD: The chairman of the RPF, **Kanyarengwe**.

JK: I alluded to it in my statement.

PD: To this list?

JK: Yes.

PD: I am sorry, but can you recall to me...

JK: No, the point is, in the document I submitted, which wasn't published, in the statement I had to make, I alluded to this list, and asked questions about what follow-up had been done at the level of the Tribunal. I was wondering why the Tribunal didn't take the list and carry out investigations, since it is one of the lists that was published before the massacres, and I confirmed that people had indeed been killed. That an investigation should be carried out to determine who had given the list, if it was propaganda [inaudible], it should be known, if it was indeed signed by the person...it should be known.

PD: Okay. You have another document, a memorandum from Rwandan refugees in Côte d'Ivoire?

JK: Yes.

PD: Which isn't dated, at least on the first page.

JK: It is dated, since it [inaudible]

PD: It is signed by a co-ordinator?

JK: Yes. Dr **Bambiki Eugène** [phonetic]

- PD: And when may it have been published?
JK: 21 March 95.
PD: [inaudible] These were all documents you accumulated, which you claimed could be used to establish...
JK: No. I do not consider that all documents here could be used at the level of the Tribunal. There are some which I could use for my personal reflection, since I was writing.
PD: Okay. When you came across a document you got it in order to analyse it?
JK: Yes.
PD: Okay. And that last document, or one of the last, what is it?
JK: It's the same. I don't even understand why it is here.
PD: It was probably in duplicate. Or there were two...
JK: Yes, it is from the first document, since it is a forwarding note, the note forwarding the document to Mr Richard Goldstone, Prosecutor at the ICTR at the Hague in the Netherlands. It is a letter dated 3 June 95. A letter forwarding this document.
PD: Okay. When you say document you mean the information for the instituting of proceedings...correct?
JK: Yes.
PD: But that is not the way you told us it had been done. Hadn't it been by Mr...
JK: Yes, it is a forwarding letter, but the document was taken along...
PD: Okay. So the letter was included in the document taken there by Mr...
JK: Yes.
PD: Johannes Scheers, right?
JK: Yes. It wasn't sent by him.
PD: Okay. Here we see the people to whom...
JK: The circulation list.
PD: People to whom true copies were sent.
MD: Can you repeat the IIF number of the chapter we have just seen.
PD: It should be 382.
MD: [inaudible]
PD: That will be all in that case, all under 1.
MD: Yes. It was the same chapter.
PD: Okay. This takes us to 384 which was seized by the same person, detective Mnumgai of the Nairobi police. There is document number K-00415568. These are copies of your notes?
JK: Yes.
PD: When were these notes written?
JK: I don't know. But I believe that when I received someone, when I had discussions or attended a meeting, I took notes. So I can't say when they were written. It was all the time.
PD: Yes, but I mean the period.
JK: But it was all the time, even in exile I continued to take down notes.
PD: Okay. These are notes...
JK: Even today I am taking notes.
PD: They are notes you took down at the time the events you went through took place?
JK: Yes.
PD: Is there a way of seeing the date on your notes?

JK: Sometimes I put the date, or if for example here...even if it isn't visible, there certainly was a date.

PD: Yes. In July. We can see that it was in July.

MD: And there are notes on various topics, notes on all sorts of things?

JK: On all sorts of things.

MD: They were not notes that were taken in a specific context, on a specific topic?

JK: No. They were notes on all what I did, on all those I met.

PD: This is the cabinet meeting...correct?

JK: Yes.

PD: Information on...

JK: That I can't read. I think the photocopies are not legible.

MD: The quality isn't that good.

PD: Information on the state of the war...

MD: It is very difficult to read. Did you use these notes to prepare other documents? Did you include them elsewhere?

JK: No. When you are in a meeting and people, for example ask questions, you have to take them down, and when they speak, you have to note what they say, things like that.

MD: Are there pages inside which are...let's take the one on the acolytes of the RPF... and try to read.

PD: We are now going to read the notes.

MD: To get elements, but the copies [inaudible]

PD: Among the sub-prefects...was it the prefects attending the meeting?

JK: I don't recall.

PD: You no longer recall.

JK: I think those were rather candidates who were proposed for posts.

MD: Here we see a list of prefectures and names. [inaudible]

PD: That takes us to the next page. Are these appointments at the cabinet meeting?

JK: 28 April 94.

PD: Appointment of judges and advisers...

JK: No, military courts...

PD: Was that what you did?

JK: Yes.

PD: The appointment of sub-prefects? Was it like the agenda? So the agenda of 28 April was the appointment of sub-prefects, the appointment of judges and advisers in military courts, the appointment of Mr...

JK: **Nyamuremye** [phonetic]

PD: Who was he?

MD: Embassy abroad. Further up...

JK: Situation of our embassies abroad...

PD: Then we have names...

MD: Appointment of sub-prefects and names...

PD: **Nyumba** [phonetic] wasn't...

MD: Consulted?

JK: Yes.

MD: He was a sub-prefect in the zone...

PD: Combat weary...accuse them of?

JK: Failings.

PD: By who? Were the persons concerned consulted before hand?

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MD: The president...
PD: Is that what you said at the cabinet meeting?
JK: I believe so. I no longer recall, but I believe so.
PD: Would it be easier if you were to see the original?
JK: Probably, yes. Because I will at least be able to read it.
MD: RPF does not recognise interim government...that's what I can read.
PD: Are we going to find direct statements in these notes such as this massacre was committed, this or that thing was committed, or were these topics that weren't discussed?
JK: I have explained to you that it wasn't...
PD: It wasn't discussed?
JK: It was never said in a meeting that "I have killed this or that person" or "You have killed this or that person".
PD: Okay.
MD: When a minister made a statement or a suggestion, did you in principle take it down?
JK: I took it down, yes.
MD: So you noted the topics that were discussed...
JK: I noted the topics that were discussed, I took down what each person said, and then I drew a conclusion at the meeting.
MD: You took down the conclusion?
JK: Yes, following the various statements.
MD: So you took it down in a pad like this one?
JK: Sorry?
MD: It was noted in...
JK: It was in an exercise book.
MD: An exercise book?
JK: A big exercise book, yes.
MD: An exercise book with ruled leaves?
JK: Leaves with squared lines.
PD: We see a lot of cease-fire. What does it mean? It is here again. Accept the cease-fire. It is quite difficult. I think we need the original. But these were notes you took down on the spot...
JK: Yes.
PD: ...at the meeting.
JK: Yes.
MD: Are they only on meetings or do they cover all your activities?
JK: If I had a discussion with you, I took notes, if I had a discussion with someone else, I took notes. That's it.
MD: Was it always like that?
JK: But I also made notes even when I was alone and reflecting on something. I took note even when I was alone.
MD: Okay.
PD: Do you need to go out for a while?
JK: No.

End of Side A of cassette 79.

Side B.

MD: This is the beginning of Side B of tape 79.

PD: Cabinet meeting, Tuesday, 17 May 94?

JK: Yes.

PD: And what was on the agenda?

JK: Instructions on the civil defence, support to the FAR, visits to the FAR, knowledge of the Czech and Slovak republics, management of the Murambi centre, mission by a journalist to Europe, request for political asylum by Mr **Georges Ruggiu**.

PD: He had asked for political asylum from you?

JK: Yes.

PD: That was the discussion. We see that the rest of the page is blank; That was...

JK: The agenda.

PD: The agenda...How to win the war...is that it? And the next page is how to win the war?

MD: [inaudible] the resumption of hostilities...

PD: Communiqué on the resumption of hostilities...for the RPF, how to win the war. I don't know if it was a reflection or was it someone who proposed that to you.

JK: I don't know.

PD: Denounce Belgium, leave MINUAR... refuse...?

JK: Belgian soldiers from entering Rwanda.

PD: To the UNO general announce...Belgian planes to supply the RPF, stop the Belgians of the MINUAR...that was what was discussed at the ...

JK: I don't know, since I can't link it to a context. The page is there, but I can't link it to a context.

PD: It is the page following that on the meeting of 17 May?

JK: No, I don't know.

PD: It appears it may be easier to read the original document. You will be able to recognise your handwriting in it?

JK: Yes.

PD: In reading these notes, you may be able to recall certain things, the context or the events...

JK: I don't see what I will recall. I have said what I recall.

MD: Yes, but often, when you consult notes you may be able to recall certain things...

JK: I don't see anything special.

MD: Here we see Bourgmestre already taken by the RPF...

JK: It isn't Bourgmestre already taken. It is Bugesera [inaudible]

MD: Ah, Bugesera, Bugesera.

PD: Is it sufficiently clear? Can you read the rest? What does it say?

JK: Bottlenecks to current arms orders.

PD: Defence which is responsible...for arms...these are notes you took as...

JK: Yes.

PD: [inaudible] as you...

JK: Yes.

PD: These are just the main points, not a verbatim record of what happened. These are notes.

JK: I didn't take down everything. You can't take down everything people say. You take down the main points. That is what I have explained concerning arms

- orders. The defence minister issued order vouchers and sent a note to the vote-holder/treasurer. So the services involved were the defence ministry, the finance ministry and the Banque nationale.
- PD: You are reading your notes, right? And you say it corresponds to the explanation you have given?
- JK: Yes.
- MD: And immediately after that we go on to the responsibility of embassies...
- PD: Relations with unstable Zaire, the president and the prime minister desire to get involved...make amenities...even if it means buying them. Is this in reference to you?
- JK: What?
- PD: When there is mention of the prime minister and president of the republic...
- JK: It was in Zaire.
- PD: It was in Zaire. It was them.
- JK: I didn't need to make any amenities or to be bought.
- PD: And the management of the war...is that it? Prime minister's office, the defence ministry...
- JK: The military staff, the Banque nationale, the finance ministry, the commerce and handicraft ministry, the planning ministry.
- PD: Cease-fire commission and... they were from...the defence ministry?
- JK: [inaudible] the justice ministry, the higher education ministry, the public service ministry, the transport ministry, I think.
- PD: Minister **Kinerewa**, Kinerewa [phonetic]? Wasn't that the minister who...
- JK: No. These are lawyers. **Karemera Emmanuel**, Maître.
- PD: Ah, maître. Okay.
- JK: The analysis of the root causes of the events of April 94.
- PD: Then the civil defence management committee: the defence ministry, the ministry of family affairs and the advancement of women, the ministry of tourism, the youth ministry, the ministry of primary and secondary education, the interior ministry.
- PD[?]: So these were the ministries that were in this committee?
- JK: Yes.
- PD: Okay. Here we have a list of those who were responsible within the civil defence at the time.
- JK: Yes.
- PD: And this was at a meeting of 17 May 94, going by the date above?
- JK: Yes.
- MD: And here we have an analysis of the situation?
- PD: April 94.
- MD: We see the names which are [inaudible]
- PD: Supervision of the people displaced by the war...
- JK: The youth minister for Ruhengeri, the social affairs minister for Gitarama and for the co-ordination, the minister of family affairs and the advancement of women for Butare and Gikongoro, and the minister of primary and secondary education for the supervision of the victims of the trouble.
- PD: Communication by the head of state. Is that the chief of staff?
- JK: No. The president of the republic.
- PD: Okay.
- JK: It's the people he had appointed in his services.
- PD: And then we get to... **Nzanahimbanda François** [phonetic]?

JK: Yes.
PD: Who was he?
JK: He is the person I have said became the chairman of the RDR.
PD: Ah, okay.
JK: And who was in Belgium at the time.
PD: 19 May...
JK: That was a meeting I had with General **Dallaire**.
PD: This is a scenario you outlined with him to...
JK: Yes, he had brought a text to discuss with me.
PD: Is it the discussion he had with you on...20 May?
JK: It's a meeting I had with the association of NGOs and one Mr **Frantz Rubamufu** [phonetic] who was working with NGOs in Rwanda.
PD: On the 25th you met Mr Yss...
JK: Where's that?
PD: 25 May.
JK: **Baraniza** [phonetic], special envoy of the UN Secretary General.
PD: And this had to do with humanitarian assistance?
JK: It had to do with Resolution 918.
PD: Okay.
JK: That's my intervention.
PD: It's what you had said...a third of the population had been displaced...
JK: Yes. That we needed assistance for them. There was an embargo on us, but not on the RPF... That's what he told me.
PD: He gave you some conditions which were: putting an end to the massacres, a cease-fire... Those were the conditions.
JK: Yes.
PD: Which he handed to you. Here on the last line you have. Dallaire dossier, attention... UNO in New York.
JK: Yes.
PD: And then Booh-Booh.
JK: Yes.
PD: Was it a dossier you forwarded?
JK: Yes.
PD: [inaudible] activities of General Dallaire. If there had to be a cease- fire at the technical level it required controlling the networks. Correct?
JK: I didn't believe it.
PD: What does controlling the... mean?
JK: That's something else. Another title, so...
PD: Ah, it's another matter. It's another idea that came up. What do you mean here by foreign currency...?
JK: Excluding the gross reserves.
PD: On 28 May you had a meeting with the prefects, is that it?
JK: No, I think it is a reference to the meeting of 11 April.
PD: Okay You were referring to the meeting of 11 April. Meeting with prefects: 11 April.
JK: Yes.
PD: What is this?
JK: It is the situation in the fighting.
PD: The situation in the fighting on 28 April?
JK: Yes.

- PD: And what does civil defence here refer to?
- JK: Support to the army.
- PD: And what's this?
- JK: These were questions that were asked by the minister, Edouard Karemera, who said that soldiers were deserting their positions, and that those who deserted their positions should be disarmed.
- PD: Civil auto-defence, is that it? For these people. Civil auto-defence for these people. Impossible. Is that it? What does it mean?
- JK: I can't establish the link between the two.
- PD: You can't establish the link. Some parts are in French and others in Kinyarwanda, is that right?
- JK: Yes.
- PD: The prefect of Byumba... This is a chapter you know, well not a chapter, but a note on him specifically? What was the matter with him?
- JK: I think it was a meeting with the prefects, because I put down the name of each prefecture, so it must have been a meeting with the prefects.
- MD: It corresponds to the title of 6, 28-5-94 [?] and then we go on to have the names of the prefects...is it a continuation of the notes at this meeting?
- JK: Yes.
- PD: If we go to 2, PVK, is that the préfecture de la ville de Kigali (prefecture of Kigali town)?
- JK: Yes.
- PD: It's in Kinyarwanda. Can you read it to us?
- JK: It says: vehicles are full of soldiers; and decisions should be taken and they put in prison. Or Organisation of certain units. People who have been involved in looting, specialised service...they should be pursued. RPF propaganda. The taking of the airport and Kanombe camp by the RPF. Deny RPF lies. Wish [?]...Organisation of the population. Arms. Look for friends.
- PD: The prefect of Ruhengeri was...
- JK: It says he informed Ruhengeri that the enemy couldn't penetrate there, that the soldiers and the population who were present had not allowed him to penetrate that prefecture.
- PD: Okay. And it still goes on. What had Ruhengeri said?
- JK: No, I can't read it.
- PD: It may be...
- JK: I can't, but I know that it was a conflict he had with the population under him about some positions he took.
- PD: Okay. The third chapter, the third paragraph is the prefect of Byumba?
- JK: It is on the army. It says that the army had been infiltrated, that even among those who didn't desert their positions there were infiltrators, and that they should be identified within the army. He stated that Uganda was helping the RPF, and president **Museveni** in particular. That as long as he was alive we were never going to have peace. That's all.
- PD: The fourth is Gisenyi?
- JK: Gisenyi. He talked about people who were disturbing the peace in his prefecture.
- PD: Okay. That's...
- JK: Gikongoro.
- PD: Gikongoro.

- JK: He was asking for arms for his population because according to him, the war was progressing quite fast, and his population needed to defend itself.
- PD: What are you rereading?
- JK: I am trying to recollect.
- PD: Chapter 6. It's...the sub-prefect representing the prefect?
- JK: Kibungo.
- PD: Kibungo?
- JK: He asked a question about the prefect of his prefecture who at the time may have been a refugee in Ngara [phonetic] in Tanzania.
- PD: He talks of a list...
- JK: Of a list of soldiers who refused to fight.
- PD: That takes us to the prefect of Butare.
- JK: He talked of, he asked for arms that could be bought, or that could be asked for from countries like Israel. He gave suggestions. He said it was necessary to carry out an ideological campaign, a moral campaign among the soldiers. According to him, the RPF had many more friends outside the country than us.
- PD: It ends with Kibuye.
- JK: He asked a question on the election of the president of the republic...No, of the Senate. This was a matter that remained pending and to which we never found an answer.
- PD: The cabinet meeting of 1 June. At what time?
- JK: 9 o'clock.
- PD: 9 o'clock. The health minister...is that the wish?
- JK: Yes, it is the wish.
- PD: Wish?
- JK: A possible meeting between the members of the government, the government had to be in Kigali, a small group could reflect on it for two days. A note...for the minister of tourism. It was necessary to strengthen security in Gitarama, for the minister of social affairs, it was necessary to have a working party on confidence in our armed forces, ammunition. Minister of transport and communications, the armed forces were going to reorganise themselves to crush the situation. Gitarama had to be protected. Are our armed forces capable of protecting us? The defence minister: our armed forces are holding on, but there is still a problem of ammunition. A speech made by one of our ambassadors. Embargo, mission to Zaire. Oblige the Banque de Kigali to open its coffers to have foreign currency. Disorganisation of our army. Emergency law, see RPF, emergency measures, payment of tickets for our students. Cohesion within the FAR, FAR-government cohesion. Situation on the ground. Gitarama, effort of the government in Gitarama. Scramble at Rukongo [phonetic], [inaudible] Nyanza. Kigali, pressure so that our elements shouldn't go to rescue Gitarama. The enemy wanted to surround the hospital in order to the high in Kigali. Ruhengeri, preparation of a major attack on Ruhengeri. Shelling of the town of Ruhengeri. Do we return to Kigali or not? Do we move from Gitarama? No. Civil defence, material and [inaudible] the defence was equipped. The salary of soldiers. Honours for soldiers who have distinguished themselves. Embargo respected. Go through Zaire for arms. [inaudible] transport [inaudible]. Make members of government available. Strategy. Missions abroad. Strategic reserves.
- PD: Could you speak a little louder, because I have noticed that the red light doesn't come on when you are speaking. Considering the way we are obliged

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to sit, you are a bit far away from the microphone, so the reception may not be very good. Do you need to go out for a while?

JK: Yes.

MD: In any case, it is a quarter to 12 o'clock. This is the end of tape 79.

PD: Okay. So they should be coming for us in a couple of minutes?

JK: Yes. They should be here any moment now. They are perhaps...

PD: We will continue tomorrow.

End of cassette 79.