

CRN 007/11 30/4
 OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
 DATE: 30 NOVEMBER 1993
 NUMBER:

SUBJECT: WEEKLY SITREP NO. 7, 22 TO 29 NOV 93.

1. GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

OVER THE LAST WEEK, A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS THAT HAVE CAUSED CASUALTIES ON THE GENERAL POPULATION AND THE BELGIQUE RED CROSS (ONE KILLED AND TWO INJURED) HAS CONTINUED TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF TENSION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND IN THE CAPITAL. OUR INABILITY TO CONFIRM THE PERPETRATORS OF THE MASSACRES ON 17/18 NOV 93 HAS FUELLED SPECULATION ON UNAMIR'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE THE SECURITY IN THE DMZ. LAST NIGHT'S ALLEGED ATTACK BY THE RPF IN THE NORTH-WEST NEAR THE DMZ HAS CAUSED 17 CASUALTIES AND A NUMBER OF MISSING PERSONS. THIS INCIDENT, AS A NUMBER OF OTHERS, IS NOT BEING TIMELY DOCUMENTED AS THE MISSION CANNOT GET THE UNMOS INTO THE AREA DUE TO A LACK OF VEHICLES AND INCREASINGLY CONFLICTING DEMANDS.

2. MILITARY

(A) DEPLOYMENT

(1) HQ/CP

THE KIGLAI SECTOR HQ HAS COMMENCED WORK USING OFFICES IN THE FORCE HQ BLDG UNTIL THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE IS READY. THE CYANIKA OP/CP1 WAS OFFICIALLY OPENED ON 27 NOV 93.

(2) PATROLS/ESCORTS

THE PATROLS IN THE DMZ HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO ONE A DAY IN THE WESTERN PART AND ONLY IN DAYLIGHT. ALL OTHER EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DEDICATED TO ESCORT AND PROTECTION DUTIES INTO AND THROUGH THE DMZ FOR VIP, DIPLOMATIC, NGO AND JOINT MEETINGS. IN UNOMUR, THE OVERALL PATROL ACTIVITY HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED AS A RESULT OF THE FORMATION OF ANOTHER UNMO REAM AS WELL AS THE ARRIVAL OF 4 VEHICLES FROM UNOSOM. APART FROM THE

DAY PATROLS, NIGHT PATROLS ARE ALSO CONDUCTED TO REINFORCE AS WELL COMPLEMENT THE DAY PATROLS, BUT THE ABSENCE OF NIGHT VISION AIDS IS SERIOUSLY IMPEDING OUR OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ON THIS REGARD.

(B) PERSONNEL

(1) STRENGTH

(A) SEE ATTACHED CHART

(B) CASUALTIES - NIL

(2) LEAVE - 13

(3) MEDICAL SITUATION

SUPPLIES HAVE ARRIVED AT UNOMUR AND VACCINATIONS ARE COMMENCING. UNAMIR HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY OF ITS SUPPLIES AS YET BUT OVERALL THE PERSONNEL ARE HEALTHY.

(C) RELATIONS WITH FACTIONS AND HOST NATION

UNOMUR. RELATIONS WITH THE NRA ARE LUKE WARM. THE CHIEF LIAISON OFFICER HURRIEDLY LEFT KABALE FOR KAMPALA ON 23 NOV 93, CLAIMING THE HE WAS ORDERED TO DO SO BY HIS ARMY COMMANDER. BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, HE OFFICIALLY INFORMED US THAT THE HIGHER AUTHORITIES WERE NOT AMUSED WITH CROSS BORDER MOVEMENTS BY BOTH UNAMIR/UNOMUR OFFICIALS AND A RESULT THEREOF, HE WAS STRICTLY INSTRUCTED TO STOP THE CROSS BORDER RUNS UNTIL A SOLUTION IS FOUND AND TO DATE NO OFFICIAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN WRITING. RECENTLY THE NRA WAS ISSUED WITH NEW CHINESE CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORMS. COINCIDENTALLY, THE ISSUES OF UNIFORMS HAPPENED TO COINCIDE WITH ALLEGATIONS OF TROOPS AMASSING ALONG THE BORDER. HOWEVER NO CLUES WERE FOUND. TWO NRA POSITIONS WERE FOUND DESERTED BY OUR TEAMS. WE ARE INVESTIGATING.

(D) UNAMIR. OPEN DISCUSSIONS HAVE CONTINUED AND JOINT SESSIONS ARE ABOUT TO RECOMMENCE. COOPERATION FROM BOTH SIDES HAS BEEN GOOD ALTHOUGH ESSENTIAL INFO REQUESTED ON MILITARY MATTERS HAS NOT BEEN READILY FORTHCOMING. THIS HAS NOT TILL NOW CAUSED ANY SIGNIFICANT DELAYS IN OUR SCHEDULE OF WORK. THE INCREASES IN CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS AND ALLEGED INCIDENTS REPORTED BY BOTH SIDES ARE BUILDING UP TO A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION AT THE NEGOTIATION TABLES IF NOT ON THE GROUND. NEITHER SIDE HAS PROVIDED ANY SUBSTANTIVE PROOF OF THE SOURCES OF THEIR ALLEGATIONS.

3. VIOLATIONS, INCIDENTS AND COMPLAINS

(A) UNOMUR. NTR

(B) UNAMIR SEVERAL INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED THIS WEEK INCLUDING SHOOTINGS, KIDNAPPING AND SIGHTINGS IN THE DMZ IN PARTICULAR. THE PATTERN IS VERY MUCH AIMED AT DESTABILIZING THE WESTERN DMZ SECTOR WHICH IS A STRONG HOUTU AND MRND AREA. ALL ALLEGATIONS ARE DIRECTED AGAINST THE RPF BUT NO SUBSTANTIVE PROOF HAS AS YET BEEN FOUND. AS WE ARE REACTING, AND USUALLY LATE, TO THESE INCIDENTS, OUR INVESTIGATIONS ARE STILL VERY SUPERFICIAL DUE TO THE LIMITATIONS OF MOBILITY AND NUMBERS.

4. POLITICAL

(A) THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY TENSE WITH REPORTED MASSACRES IN THE NORTH WEST OF RWANDA, PRECEDED BY EARLIER MASSACRES IN THE RUHENGERI AREA. THOUGH THESE INCIDENTS ARE LOCALIZED, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS.

(B) SINCE MY ARRIVAL IN THE MISSION AREA, I HAVE ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE RPF AND MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS. I HAVE BEEN ASSURED OF THEIR SUPPORT IN CARRYING OUT OUR MANDATE. I AM SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH THE LEADERS OF ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES ON 1 DECEMBER 1993.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EFFORT BEING DEPLOYED TO PROVIDE THIS MISSION WITH THE MINIMUM AND URGENT VEHICLE AND RADIO MEANS TO MEET THE RAPIDLY ESCALATING TENSIONS AND ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE THE ESTABLISHMENT THE WEAPON SECURE AREA IN KIGALI. THE NEED TO GET A CRITICAL MASS OF FORMED UNITS AND UNMOS IN THEATRE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE BY INCREASING THE PACE OF DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHASE 1 AND 2 PERSONNEL MUST REMAIN A PRIORITY.

6. LIAISON, CONTACTS AND MEDIA

THE LARGE PRESS CONFERENCE HELD ON 26 NOV 93 REGARDING THE MASSACRE INVESTIGATION RESULTS PROVED TO BE EVENHANDEDLY RECEIVED EXCEPT FOR THOSE WHO INSIST THE RPF DID THIS TERRIBLE ACT. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO BE MORE PRO-ACTIVE IN THE MEDIA BATTLE IN ORDER TO QUELL THE ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF DISINFORMATION PARTICULARLY ON THE RADIO. ALL OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATION ARE OPEN WITH BOTH FACTIONS WHICH HAS BEEN MOST HELPFUL IN PASSING INFORMATION RAPIDLY.

7. OBSERVATIONS

- (A) UNOMUR. THE SUDDEN AND UNCALLED FOR ACTIONS BY THE NRA TO STOP CROSS BORDER MOVEMENTS BETWEEN UNAMIR AND UNOMUR OFFICIALS SHOWS THAT THE NRA ARE LESS THAN SATISFIED WITH OUR PRESENCE. OUR ACTIVITY RATE WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE AS WE ATTEMPT TO FOLLOW CERTAIN LEADS REGARDING TROOP AND CIVILIAN MOVEMENT.
- (B) UNAMIR. THE OVERALL SITUATION HAS SIGNIFICANTLY DETERIORATED IN THE DMZ AND THE AREA OF RUHENGERY. SOME DESCRIBE THE SITUATION AS VERY SIMILAR TO WHAT HAPPENED JUST BEFORE THE 8 FEB 93 RPF ATTACK. THIS MISSION HAS DEPLOYED EVERY POSSIBLE ELEMENT IN ORDER TO GAIN A REASONABLE HAND ON THE VIOLATIONS IN THE DMZ WHILE CONTINUING TO BUILD UP ITS FORCES IN KIGALI. ONLY THE TIMELY DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS, VEHICLES AND RADIOS WILL PERMIT US TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE THAT WE ENJOYED AT THE START OF THE DEPLOYMENT. IF WE DO NOT SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING THE BBTG SOON IN KIGALI, THERE WILL NEVER BE A PHASE 2, 3 OR 4. AS CLEARLY INDICATED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE TECHNICAL REPORT, THIS MISSION WILL SINK OR SWIM WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE 1.

REGARDS.

UNAMIR / *UNDP*
WEEKLY MILITARY COMPONENT PERSONNEL STATE

DATE: 30 Nov 93

L4102-1028

SRL NO	COUNTRY	TROOPS										UNMOS		GRAND TOTAL	
		INF BN	LOG COY	ENG COY	MED COY	MOVCON	MP SECT	DMZ COY	SUB TOTAL	STAFF	TOTAL				
1.	ARGENTINA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.	AUSTRIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3.	BANGLADESH	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4.	BELGIUM	370	—	—	—	—	—	370	2	372	—	—	372	—	—
5.	BOTSWANA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6.	BRAZIL	3	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7.	CANADA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
8.	CONGO	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9.	ECUADOR	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10.	EGYPT	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
11.	ETH	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
12.	GHANA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
13.	HUNGARY	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
14.	MAI	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
15.	NETHERLANDS	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
16.	NIGERIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
17.	PAKISTAN	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
18.	POLAND	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—
19.	RUSSIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20.	SENEGAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
21.	SLOVAKIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
22.	TANZANIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
23.	TOGO	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
24.	TUNISIA	—	—	—	—	—	—	59	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
25.	URUGUAY	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
26.	ZIMBABWE	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	GRAND TOTAL	373	—	—	—	20	—	59	451	39	491	132	623	—	—