

France Genocide Tutsi Database

<http://francegenocidetutsi.org>

Information Letter n° 2

March 17, 2019

State of the database FGT

The database “France Genocide Tutsi” (FGT) includes currently 7,905 documents loaded on the web site <http://francegenocidetutsi.org>. Several new sections have been created since the letter n° 1 : documents from UNAMIR, USA, New Zealand, Czech Republic, RPF. A “Multimédia” section gives access to online videos (YouTube) or on the web site, as to some radio broadcasts.

It is recommended to copy, distribute the documents of this site and even to copy the whole site. It is not forbidden to reference it.

Mails concerning this database may be sent to contact@francegenocidetutsi.org.

The following comments are all related to documents readable on this website.

Search engine

The search engine at <http://78.217.242.21> has been upgraded. It gives access to the author-card associated with each document allowing to determine its origin. The search is done on these cards and not on the documents (usually pdf files). Gradually, the text of these documents will be extracted by character recognition (OCR) and placed in the author-card.

Pictures, maps

454 pictures have been uploaded. They are accessed by the search engine choosing **Type = Photo**. Similarly, **Type = Carte géographique**,

photo aérienne ou satellite gives access to maps, particularly, maps of today Rwanda’s districts.

Statistics

Here are the most common sources of documents :

Source	Freq.
Reuters	739
UNAMIR	404
ICTR	346
L’Humanité	326
Le Monde	262
Billets d’Afrique	258
Quai d’Orsay	233
United Nations	209
Libération	177
Élysée	174
Amb. France, Kigali	169
Getty (photos)	140
AFP	118
New Zealand	111
Kangura	97
Mission d’information	92
US Dep. of State	84
Jeune Afrique	81
Le Soir	74

Chronology

Situation reports of UNAMIR, Reuters dispatches, allow to follow the course of events during the period of genocide. AFP dispatches have yet to be processed. However, there is few references to the massacres.

Fred Rwigema’s death

In his book *Paul Kagame, un De Gaulle africain*, Philippe Lardinois

notes that “on October 2, Fred Rwigema has been killed by a bullet in the forehead at Nyabwishongwezi” by RGF (Rwandan Government Forces) (p. 46). Contrary to what is written by Gérard Prunier (December 21, 2018), we read in Pascal Simbikangwa’s book *La guerre d’octobre* that, on October 2, 1990, A squadron of the reconnaissance battalion advances in Nyabwishongwezi corridor, loses two vehicles and goes back. “But we just left Rwigema lying dead. Deadly wounded, this one who thought he was conquering Rwanda without effort and in less than six days at the lowest cost will have traveled only two kilometers in Rwandan territory in one day and half, making his soul like a large number of his subordinates” (p. 136). Further on, Simbikangwa describes how the successors of Rwigema, Majors Peter Bayingana and Chris Bunyenyezi, were killed in Ryabega on October 21, 1990 (pp. 197-198). Simbikangwa, after the rejection of his appeal in cassation on May 24, 2018, was finally condemned for genocide by French justice.

War against Tutsi

As early as October 1990, Admiral Lanxade and President Mitterrand are fighting against “tutsi forces” (Lanxade, Octobre 11, 1990). The combat helicopters, provided by France, have exhausted all their rockets, the president agrees with the restock (Lanxade, Octobre 8, 1990). From June 1991 to January 1992, Lieutenant-Colonel Chollet, head of the DAMI, trains RGF units fight-

ing and laying antipersonnel mines (Chollet, June 10, 1991). A commando recruited among the students of the gendarmerie school of Ruhengeri (EGENA), trained by French co-operants, participates to the massacres of Bugesera (Swinnen, March 27, 1992). The text defining the enemy as the Tutsi, written in French, is broadcast on September 21, 1992. The preparation of the genocide then passes into operational phase. In his speech of November 22, 1992, Léon Mugesera is already calling for massacre. The French present in Kigali would have seen nothing, heard nothing ? The Defense attache René Galinié, expresses concern that the conflict will degenerate into an ethnic war and speaks about the elimination of Tutsi by Hutu (Galinié, October 12, 24 1990).

Kangura

A collection of *Kangura* magazine (not complete) has been loaded on FGT. Note that *Kangura* n° 6 contains, written in french, the *Call to the Conscience of the Bahutu*, followed by the *Ten Commandments*. A photo of Miterrand is published at the end.

Jean Varret

General Varret, dismissed from his command of the Military Mission of Cooperation in 1993, recalls this fact in a book *Général, j'en ai pris pour mon grade* (Though general, I've been punished). On March 14, 2019, he remembers that in November 1990, Colonel Rwagafilita, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie, asked him for weapons and explained him "*the Tutsis are not very numerous, we will liquidate them*". The Defense attache had already considered the physical elimination of Tutsi by Hutu (Galinié, *supra*). He is replaced after criticizing Colonel Serubuga, Deputy Chief of Staff of RGF (Galinié, April 4, 1991).

Self-defense

The "*loyalty of the peasants who participate more and more in military action through armed self-defense groups bows and machetes*" is reported by the Defense attache (Galinié, October 13, 1990). Colonel Canovas notes "*the anger*" and "*zeal*" of the populations in the Ruhengeri area, during the search and control operations (Extracts from the Canovas report, April 30, 1991). Colonel Cussac informs Paris of the distribution of french-made weapons to the people of northern Rwanda through the gendarmerie. He is worried about Colonel Rwagafilita who replied him that there is a shortage of staff (Cussac, January 22, 1992). The Colonel Bagosora organizes the distribution of weapons (Agenda colonel Bagosora, 1993). He says he is very close to the lieutenant-colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin (Judge Bruguière, May 18, 2000).

Monique Mas (RFI)

Monique Mas, Radio France International's journalist, provided the documents she quotes in his book *Paris-Kigali 1990-1994; Lunettes coloniales, politique du sabre et onction humanitaire pour un génocide en Afrique* (Paris-Kigali 1990-1994; Colonial glasses, sword politics and humanitarian anointing for genocide in Africa). They are in the FGT database.

Nsanzuwera

The former prosecutor Francois Xavier Nsanzuwera, in a letter to Minister of Justice on May 20, 1997 about Emmanuel Gapyisi and Félicien Gatabazi's murders, contradicts accusations against the RPF.

Jean Carbonare

The voice of Jean Carbonare who, returning from Rwanda, alerted view-

ers on January 28, 1993 on France 2 TV, is the best answer to all who claim that the genocide of Tutsi has not been prepared (Home web site)

Sam 16 or Mistral ?

Contrary to the experts' assertion of the judge Trevidic (Oosterlinck, 5 January 2012), the Mistral missile of Matra was exported before 1994 and the RGF had 15 (Annan, September 1st, 1994). Were Mistral missiles used in April 6, 1994 attack ? French soldiers saw missile fragments (Fiche en possession du ministère de la Défense tendant à montrer que le FPR avec la complicité de l'Ouganda est responsable de l'attentat, 1998) (Sheet in possession of the Ministry of Defense tending to show that the RPF with the complicity of Uganda is responsible for the attack, 1998)

French plane on April 8, 1994

On the evening of April 8, Kofi Annan informs Boutros Boutros-Ghali that french plane just landed in Kigali. This confirms what adjudant José de Pinho writes in *Understanding the Rwandan genocide, testimonies, revelations, analyzes*, that is that a Transall French landed at the airport and immediately took off between 19 and 20 p.m. (pp. 96-97). This french military assistant is telling also that a plane landed 20 CRAP of the 1st RPIMa the evening of April 7 (pp. 88-90), information not confirmed.

Rusatira denounce AMSASU

During a telephone conversation on April 10, 1994 with Joyce Leader, No. 2 of the United States Embassy in Kigali, folded to Nairobi, RGF Colonel Leonidas Rusatira declares that the death of the President was the provocation necessary to trigger a plan de-

veloped since long time. He accuses the secret organization AMASASU of having ordered the atrocities in Kigali. With other senior officers, the Colonels Gatsinzi and Rwabalinda, he met with the minister of Defense Augustin Bizimana on April 9 to ask him to condemn the atrocities and dismantle the group that commits them. He urges the United States to encourage a French or Belgian intervention to stop the escalation of fighting and protect Rwandans (Brazeal, April 12).

DGSE

The french secret service DGSE presented a different point of view than that of the french armies headquarter and other french secret services. The February 18, 1993 notice explains the RPF attack of February 8, 1993 by the massacres of Tutsi and opponents. It assumes that they have been fomented by the Habyarimana's inner circle to stop the process of Arusha negotiations.

On April 11, 1994, a notice considers unlikely that RPF organised the attack against Habyarimana's plane. On September 22, 1994, another one considers Colonels Bagosora and Serubuga as probable sponsors of the attack.

During his hearing on July 8, 1998, Claude Silberzahn, former Director of the DGSE, tells he has regretted, since 1991, the growing commitment of the French military apparatus in the case of Rwanda and advocated, as early as 1992, the military disengagement of France.

Security Council

At the symposium "*International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1994*" in The Hague on June 1-2, 2014, several participants made public documents relating to Security Council discussions in 1994, especially at informal meetings. These are in particular docu-

ments from Colin Keating, representative at the United Nations of New Zealand (NZ UN Mission), from Karel Kovanda, representative of the Czech Republic (CZ UN Mission), Madeleine Albright for the United States (US UN Mission) and David Hannay for the United Kingdom (UK UN Mission).

On April 29, 1994, the Presidential statement of the Security Council is discussed (Kovanda, April 29 ; Keating, April 29). The ambiguous role of NAM (Non Aligned Members) is underscored by Keating. According to them, the word "genocide" would prevent the cease fire talks (Keating, April 30). France and Rwanda have made withdraw from this declaration the sentence stating that the Government forces were responsible for most of the massacres (Keating, May 2).

The representative of Spain plans to investigate on the massacres (Hannay, April 26). He will draft a resolution on a commission of experts to investigate a possible genocide. This project is ready in mid-June 1994 (Keating, June 14-15). It is put to the vote only on the 1st of July, where it makes it possible to overlook the report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, René Degni-Ségui, published on June 28, which concludes that there is genocide. The experts of this commission will be appointed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali only on August 1st. They will conclude that there has been a genocide only on October 4th.

Let go genocide

François Mitterrand declares on May 10, 1994, in full genocide: "*We are not destined to make war everywhere, even when it's the horror that takes us to the face. We do not have the means to do it and our soldiers can not be the referees of international passions that today are upsetting, tearing up so many countries*". Alain Juppé overbids, telling on May 11 at John Hopkins's university in Wash-

ington : "*I do not think the international community can go to make police everywhere on the planet and send, wherever people get beat, interposition forces*". On May 18, he admits that there is a genocide, but on June 16, he speaks about several genocides telling that France "*demandes that all those responsible for these genocides be judged*". After obtaining a warrant to intervene under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, we read in a note of Quai d'Orsay of July 15th : "*The attitude to adopt with regard to political leaders in Gisenyi, almost all of whom are deemed responsible for the massacres, must be defined. At this point, there is no provision for arrest and judgment*" (Note n° 1963/DAM). The major part of the Government of the genocide will remain in Cyangugu in the Humanitarian Zone from 14 to 18 July, the last ones leaving only the 19th (Duclos, May 22, 1998, K76).

Weapon supplies

On April 16, 2014, Hubert Védrine told the Commission of the National Defense and Armed Forces of the National Assembly : "*So there were deliveries of weapons for the Rwandan army be able to hold the shock. Because if there was no army able to hold the shock, you can forget about Arusha and everything else. There are no more elements, there is no longer the lever to achieve a political compromise. So, it remained weapons relations and it's not worth discovering on a outraged that there have been deliveries that have continued*" (footage on the home page). This blunder was quickly caught and does not appear in the official report (Patricia Adam, April 16).

Védrine often repeats that France lobbied for the Arusha Accords (Védrine, June 15, 2004). He seems to ignore that these contained a ceasefire agreement (August 18, 1992) which prohibited arms deliveries. France continues them in 1994, January 21

and April 9 for what is well established. In a book published in 2019, General Bantégeat wrote: “*When the scale of massacres appears (500 000 deads), Mitterrand decrees, on proposal by Balladur, a total arms embargo on destination of Rwanda*”.

Védrine says that these weapons did not serve the genocide. It is false, because the elite units of the Rwandan army (RGF) were the spearhead of massacres. On April 7, 1994, the Belgian peacekeepers are targeted by French armored cars (Dewez, September 20, 1995). The RGF provides arms to militia (Hélène, May 17, 1994). The militiamen appealed to the army to overcome the Tutsi’s resistance (Chatain, June 13, 1994, Otto Mayer, September 1st, 1994; African Rights, *Resisting Genocide: Biseseo April–June 1994*, 1998, *Murambi. Go If You Die, Perhaps I Will Live*, April 2007).

These deliveries continued while the Rwandan army was back to Zaire (Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, June 24, 2017; Guillaume Ancel, August 29, 2014; Walfroy Dauchy, March 12, 2019).

Denard in Rwanda

The letter that Augustin Bizimana sends to Jean Kambanda on September 13, 1994 about the purchase of weapons or services, mentions an assistance contract by the genocidal Government with a some Martin who turned out to be the alias of the well known mercenary Bob Denard (Survie, February 1, 2018).

The judge Bruguière’s report had already revealed the presence in Rwanda of Jean-Marie Desses, with whom Denard will lead his last blow to the Comoros in 1995. This intervention by Denard in Rwanda would involve its sponsor, Jacques Foccart, and Jacques Chirac ? Was there an agreement between Mitterrand and

Foccart on the basis of the observation that, with the Arusha Accords, Rwanda escaped french “*pré-carré*” and the need to oppose it?

Jean Chatain

The reports of Jean Chatain published in May-June and July 1994 in *L’Humanité*, written with restrained emotion, remind the horror of the massacres discovered by RPF combatants in eastern Rwanda.

Seychelles

The purchase of arms in Seychelles in June 1994 was denounced by Human Rights Watch (Rwanda/Zaire, *Rearming with Impunity*, 1995). It has resulted in a UN commission of inquiry into violations of the embargo decided on 17 May 1994 by the Security Council. This one revealed the role of a French bank, BNP, in the transaction. Documents gathered in the FGT database have fueled a lawsuit against the BNP, filed by Sherpa, Ibuka and the CPRC being civil parties.

Biseseo

Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Minister of the Family of the Interim Government reports that at the Council of Ministers meeting of 17 June 1994, it is said that “*Gisenyi will be attacked from Biseseo and Kabuhanga (Gisenyi)*” (Nyiramasuhuko’s Agenda, 18-19 May). On June 22, François Léotard declares in Council restricted that the RPF makes effort to Kibuye. The map of the front line of June 28 that the general Quesnot presents to Mitterrand shows that the RPF is still far from Kibuye (DRM, June 28, 1994).

While the french commandants claim that the lieutenant-colonel Duval aka Diego did not report on his meeting on June 27, 1994 with Tutsi hunted in Biseseo, a video of the next day shows Sergeant Meynier informing of this tragic situation the Colonel Rosier who seems not to care (Arfi, October 25, 2018). He will not give any order to rescue them but prefers evacuate nuns by helicopter. He will repeat to journalists that RPF fighters arrived in the hills of Biseseo and terrorize the region (Duquesne, France 2, June 27, 1994 Dernière).

US Archives

State Department documents have been declassified and loaded into FGT. As early as 15 June 1994, the question of the arrest presumed guilty is addressed by US diplomats. They seem to have been the most active to establish a court to try the alleged criminals (ICTR). On 1st September, they submit the first draft of court which limits its jurisdiction to crimes committed from 6 April 1994. France would not therefore be at the origin of the limitation of the jurisdiction of the ICTR in the year 1994 ! In fact, France is approaching this court question “backwards”. On July 13, 1994, François Rivasseau of the Quai d’Orsay argues that France has no mandate to arrest the guilty parties and that the Convention against genocide is not integrated into French law (Bohlen, 13 July). But it has been since the new Penal Code of 1st March 1994.

On August 12th, the Quai d’Orsay rejects the American proposal to stop presumed guilty before the formation of the court (Harriman, August 12).

On August 24, Louis Joinet, advisor at the Elysee Palace, believes that “*to do away with the executions is a condition of the reconciliation*” (Carle, August 24).