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Date:

7 June 1994

TO:

WELLINGTON WGTN UNSC -DEFENCE

No.

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

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LD:

SFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3, EAB)

DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI)

DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)

Gpied to UNSC, MEA UNC, CGL, HRU, EUR, BP3 Page 1 of: 6

## SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Our earlier message refers.

- Following is text of draft resolution on Rwanda as it emerged after 7 painstaking hours of working group consideration this afternoon and evening. Negotiations proceeded on the basis of a revised US draft which incorporated most of the points we had made to the US.
- If the outstanding points of difficulty can be ironed out in informals tomorrow morning, the draft may be put to a vote in the afternoon. Otherwise, the vote will be on Thursday, 9 June.
- Points to note are:
- Given the support expressed in informals, we proposed a more direct reference to genocide. We think the outcome is very PP6 good. Having secured that, we and the others of similar mind (Spain, Czech Rep, US) agreed that there was no need to push for an operative reference as well, especially as there was no follow up proposal. We noted, however, that the Council would have to consider this issue further.
- The US was persuaded to accept these preambular references in PP9&10 substitution for their earlier operative proposals.
- After lengthy discussion of a number of alternatives, our PP16 simpler and more direct formulation on the appointment of a Special Rapporteur was widely supported. The Chinese delegate, however, had to insist on brackets, pending consultation with Beijing. The US and Brazil worked out the formulation on OP10.
- In the interests of transparency, Brazil insisted that the OP2 resolution be specific about the endorsement of the SecGen's proposals. The US, UK and France opposed; hence the brackets. We also had reservations about the potential rigidity that this could impose on the operation, and noted that a plan of deployment is different from a mandate. The issue will be considered further tomorrow.

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The most worrying proposal came from the Russians who, taking a leaf from the US book on Somalia, proposed that the mandate be limited to three months and that it be subject to a one month review. We opposed this strenuously, noting the very detrimental effect that that would have on the process of encouraging potential troop contributors. The US and UK supported us. The Russians agreed not to insist that their proposal be reflected in the text and to consult further with

The US took some of our amendment on this para but retained "essential". Others were content to go along. We registered that the term "essential" went close to making cooperation of the parties a precondition to the operation, but noted that it might be barely tolerable given the reference to "effective implementation" of the mandate.

7 June 1994, 10.00 p.m.

## The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994 which expanded the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and authorized an expansion in UNAMIR's force level.

<u>Having considered</u> the report of the Secretary-General dated 31 May 1994 (S/1994/640),

Bearing in mind the statement made by the President of the Council on 3 May 1994 (S/PRST/1994/22),

Reaffirming its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 on the security of United Nations operations,

Noting with concern that, to date, the parties have not ceased hostilities, agreed to a cease-fire, or brought an end to the violence and carnage affecting civilians,

Noting with the gravest concern the reports that genocide has occurred in Rwanda and recalling in this context that genocide constitutes a crime punishable under international law.

Reiterating its strong condemnation of the ongoing violence in Rwanda and, in particular, the systematic killing of thousands of civilians,

Expressing its outrage that the perpetrators of these killings have been able to operate and continue operating within Rwanda with impunity,

Noting that UNAMIR is not to have the role of a buffer force between the two parties,

Noting also that UNAMIR will continue only as long as required for it to carry out the tasks for which it was established,

<u>Underscoring</u> that the internal displacement of some 1.5 million Rwandans facing starvation and disease and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries constitute a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions,

Reiterating the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement as the basis for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda,

Commending the countries which have provided humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees, as well as emergency aid to alleviate the sufferings of the Rwandan people, and those countries which have contributed troops and logistical support to UNAMIR, and reiterating the urgent need for coordinated international action in this respect,

Welcoming the cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the contributions of the countries of the region, especially that of the facilitator of the Arusha peace process, and encouraging them to continue their efforts,

<u>Welcoming</u> the visit to Rwanda and to the region by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,

[Noting the appointment, pursuant to resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994 adopted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, of a Special Rapporteur for Rwanda,]

Reaffirming its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda,

- 1. Welcomes the Secretary-General's report of 31 May 1994 (S/1994/640);
- 2. Endorses the Secretary-General's proposals for the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR [in particular
- (a) the immediate initiation of the deployment of the two additional battalions in phase 2 in close synchronization with phase 1;
- (b) the continuation of urgent preparations for the deployment of the two battalions envisaged for phase 3; and
- (c) flexible contingency planning during all three phases to ensure effective use of available resources to respond to an unstable situation.]
  - 3. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until [9 December] 1994;
- 4. Reaffirms that the consolidated mandate of UNAMIR includes the following:
- (a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
- (b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations; and
- (c) To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire;
- 5. Recognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations. United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief;
- 6. <u>Demands</u> that all parties to the conflict cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire and immediately take steps to bring an end to systematic killings in areas under their control:

- 7. <u>Welcomes</u> the assurances of both parties to cooperate with UNAMIR in carrying out its mandate, <u>recognizes</u> that such cooperation will be essential to the effective implementation of the mandate, and <u>demands</u> that both parties adhere to those assurances;
- 8. <u>Demands further</u> that all parties cease forthwith any incitement, especially through the mass media, to violence or ethnic hatred;
- 9. <u>Urges</u> Member States to respond promptly to the Secretary-General's request for resources, including logistical support capability for rapid deployment of additional UNAMIR forces;
- 10. Requests that UNAMIR extend its close cooperation with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office to include the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda appointed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights;
- 11. <u>Demands</u> that all parties in Rwanda strictly respect the persons and premises of the United Nations and other organizations serving in Rwanda, and refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping work;
  - 12. Emphasizes the necessity that, inter alia:
- (a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure the security and safety of the operation and personnel engaged in the operation; and
- (b) The security and safety arrangements undertaken extend to all persons engaged in the operation;
- 13. <u>Commends</u> the efforts of States, United Nations agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, <u>encourages</u> them to continue and increase such assistance, and <u>urges</u> others to provide such assistance;
- 14. <u>Welcomes</u> the intention of the Secretary-General to establish a special trust fund for Rwanda and <u>invites</u> the international community to contribute generously to it;
- 14. <u>Commends</u> the tireless efforts of the UNAMIR Force Commander to prevent more innocent lives from being lost, and to bring about a cease-fire between the parties;
- 15. <u>Commends also</u> the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement, <u>invites</u> them, in coordination with the OAU and countries in the region to continue their efforts, and <u>demands</u> that the parties undertake serious efforts to bring about political reconciliation;
- 16. <u>Decides</u> to keep the situation in Rwanda and the role played by UNAMIR under constant review and, to that end, <u>requests</u> the Secretary-General to report to the Council as appropriate, and in any case no later than 9 August 1994 and

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9 October 1994, on progress made by UNAMIR in the discharge of its mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress toward a cease-fire and political reconciliation;

17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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