

CONFIDENTIAL

115/23/37

Your file:

Our file:

---

22:06 (4990)	700/NYK/00000/00000	\$419.32
FROM: NEW YORK	C04323/NYK	15-Apr-1994
TO: WELLINGTON	WGTN UNSC	Priority
CC: BEIJING	CANBERRA	Routine
LONDON	WASHINGTON	Routine
MOSCOW	OTTAWA	Routine
PARIS	HARARE	Routine
BRUSSELS		Routine

MFAT (MEA, EUR, UNC, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Your C22009.

Summary

- Belgians mount intensive campaign for all of UNAMIR to come out of Rwanda with Belgian contingent.
- NAM press for resolution premised on maintenance of UNAMIR at current strength.
- US say that the only resolution they could countenance today would be one winding up UNAMIR.
- UK attempt to promote compromise based on Secretariat's option 2 (reducing UNAMIR to a political presence with necessary security protection) was acceptable to US but rejected by NAM and was ruled out by Secretariat because of security implications.
- Consensus was finally reached on Presidential proposal not to decide today on the future of UNAMIR but to convey the Council's insistence on a ceasefire and to signal a willingness to pull UNAMIR out should the situation become too dangerous.

Action

For information.

Report

Belgian Foreign Minister called President early this morning to advise of their intention to withdraw all Belgian troops, both those sent in to secure the evacuation of Belgian nationals and those in UNAMIR, by the end of the coming

---

CONFIDENTIAL

weekend. Claes went on to paint a very grim picture of the situation in Rwanda and urged that all of UNAMIR troops be pulled out as part of the Belgian evacuation. He basically said that the remaining troops would have neither the equipment or the ability to protect themselves if the Belgians left. Subsequent contact with the Secretariat revealed that he had given a similar message to the Sec-Gen. We learned soon after that the Belgians had mounted a lobbying campaign, particularly in Europe, along the same lines and had made public statements to the same effect in Brussels.

2 Secretariat (Riza) agreed that Belgian assessment had to be taken seriously but at the same time said it did not square with what they were hearing from UNAMIR. While fighting was continuing between RPF and Government Forces and killings were being carried out behind the Government lines, the situation behind the RPF lines at least had stabilised. Both sides continued to affirm their wish for UNAMIR to stay and the Special Rep and Force Commander were holding direct talks with the parties today. Riza said that the Special Rep and the Force Commander continued to believe that the threat to withdraw was their best leverage over the parties, but indicated that the people in the field would prefer to be left with some flexibility on the point and not to be bound to a fixed time frame by a Council decision.

3 At the morning informal consultations, Nigeria, on behalf of the NAM caucus, reiterated their support for a modified version of the Sec-Gen's option A, viz maintaining UNAMIR at current strength. The US (Walker) then spoke to say that the US was conscious that the situation was very fluid and unstable but that if a decision on UNAMIR's future was to be taken today, then the only resolution the US could support would be one calling for the withdrawal of the force.

4 Prior to the lunch time adjournment, Hannay proposed that the Council adopt a resolution today based on the NAM draft and incorporating the Sec-Gen's option B entailing the maintenance of a military presence in Kigali with a much reduced military presence only to provide security for UN personnel.

5 We used the early part of the afternoon for informal discussions with US, Nigeria, France and UK. US (Albright) said, after talking to Christopher, that they could go along with Hannay's proposal. Gambari also indicated a willingness to explore NAM tolerance for Hannay's compromise. However, he paused when we raised the point which the British had conveniently overlooked, namely that option B was premised on the achievement of a ceasefire. We noted that the Belgians and the Secretariat all considered that the security of the airport was essential in current circumstances (which was why UNAMIR was deploying half of the Ghanain battalion there to take over from the Belgians) and questioned whether option B was credible in the absence of a ceasefire.

6 Riza and Baril (Military Adviser) subsequently confirmed our hesitations. They reiterated that option B was only sustainable if there was a ceasefire. Otherwise, the political presence would have no assured exit route if UNAMIR became the target of attacks. They were also gravely concerned at the implications of an announcement today by the Council that they would be withdrawing or scaling down UNAMIR. This risked both sides indulging in a scramble for territory and perhaps in attacks on UNAMIR to grab their equipment.

7 Word came out of the NAM caucus that they too had rejected the British proposal and Gambari told us he would prefer that there be no decision today rather than one which would signal a diminution of the UN's commitment to Rwanda. We then showed him a paper we had prepared, and with which the Secretariat expressed strong agreement, which would record the Council's position on the Belgian withdrawal, its insistence on a ceasefire and its determination not to allow the security of UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk. Our initial draft also had paragraphs indicating the Council's willingness to consider a revised UNAMIR mandate if the parties agreed to a ceasefire and, conversely, to pull UNAMIR out if they did not and the situation continued to deteriorate.

8 After consulting his NAM colleagues, Gambari told us he could go along with the paper. The British, Americans and French also said they could live with it.

9 When the informal consultations resumed, Riza, at our request, gave his assessment of the security implications of any announcement by the Security Council today of a withdrawal or a suspension of UNAMIR. His assessment effectively put an end to the British proposal for the meantime. A substantial Chinese intervention to the effect that their Embassy in Kigali, which was continuing to function effectively and was reporting that there was no general animosity towards foreigners, also had a marked effect. We were able to advise, on the basis of consultations this afternoon, that Ghana and Bangladesh, the two major contributors to UNAMIR, were willing to maintain their troops in place as long as the UN considered they had a useful role to play.

10 Our paper was then circulated and found to be generally acceptable. Hannay lamented that the Council was not being more robust in its consideration of the situation in Rwanda but the limitations of the situation were made apparent when the US and Nigeria indicated that they would have difficulty with certain aspects of the draft - namely the paragraphs hinting at a willingness to contemplate an extension of UNAMIR's presence under a revised mandate (a problem for the US) and at a willingness to pull UNAMIR out in the absence of a ceasefire (a problem for Nigeria). Walker asked that both

paras be dropped.

11 At Hannay's proposal, the paragraphs that were deleted were replaced by one indicating the Council's intention to keep UNAMIR's strength and mandate under constant review. This addition, when coupled with the previous paragraph stating the Council's determination not to allow UNAMIR personnel to be placed at serious risk retains the essential message to the Rwandan parties that UNAMIR may be pulled out if they do not agree to a ceasefire.

12 Given the political sensitivities, we judged it unwise to press for our paper to be converted into a presidential statement. Instead, it was agreed that it would be used as the basis of the President's comments to the press. We also made it available to delegations and, indeed, to the media. Copy of the paper as agreed is contained in our accompanying fax.

Comment

13 As we had pointed out at the morning informals, a decision not to pull out UNAMIR or to amend its mandate is itself a decision. We and the Secretariat consider that what was done today was appropriate to the political situation in the Council and to the circumstances on the ground in Rwanda. The Belgian campaign for total withdrawal was seen by Council members as motivated at least as much by a desire for political cover back home as by concern for UNAMIR's safety. Given what we were hearing from the field, it would have been precipitate and dangerous to have suddenly gone public with a resolution authorising total or even partial withdrawal at this stage. The Special Representative and the Force Commander continue to believe that UNAMIR are in no immediate danger and can continue to play an important role. We can only hope they are correct.

14 Whatever happens over the next few days, it is clear that the Council will soon have to consider the future role, if any, of UNAMIR. Today's discussions show that it will be no easy task to reach an agreed position.

End Message