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| TO: | WELLINGTON | WGTV UNSC | Immediate |
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MFAT (MEA, HRU, UNC, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

Summary

- Council has extensive discussion on various proposals for urgent action on Rwanda including possible arms embargo
- New Zealand calls for Council action including possible arms embargo
- President asked to draft statement following strong and unanimous support for urgent action in the face of continuing reports of horrific and overwhelming tragedy amounting to genocide

Action

For instructions overnight

Report

2 It seems that the continuing reports of butchery in Rwanda are at last galvanising members of the Council to respond to the prodding we have been giving on the need for further action. There has been a steady stream of NGO reports of brutality continuing.

3 Our accompanying fax (Wgtn only) contains RPF press release alleging that France is resupplying arms to "government forces" under cover of "humanitarian flights" made to Zaire. (We have drawn this to the attention of the French delegation who were dismissive but undertook to check with Paris).

4 Also included is "Human Rights Watch" release detailing atrocities, ICRC update, call from Amnesty International for RPF not to engage in killings, and article about inability

(because of rules of engagement) for other peacekeepers to intervene in Belgians' deaths.

5 At this afternoon's consultations Nigeria emphasised that there are two types of fighting going on in Rwanda, that between the RPF and the "government forces" (RGF), and that being perpetrated against innocent civilians behind their lines. The Council had tended to concentrate on only the first in emphasising the need to have a cease-fire before the UN could take action.

6 Letter from OAU was distributed reporting on a meeting of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Resolution in Addis today (copy by fax to Wgtn only). Nigeria informed the Council of the outcome of a meeting the African group held in NY this morning where it resolved to take the following action:

- convene an emergency meeting of the OAU Central Organ at the Foreign Minister level even before the meeting scheduled for Tunisia soon is held;
- have OAU Central Mechanism for Conflict Resolution assist in the coordination of efforts including those of the regional states (eg to avoid the situation over the weekend where the RPF went to Tanzania to sign a cease-fire agreement and the RGF went to Zaire to sign a separate document)
- consider proposals for stopping the killing such as sending a contingent of armed forces and military police, and place this contingent in an expanded UNAMIR (eg like the ECOWAS contribution in Liberia)
- establish a contact group to follow up these points and to develop proposals for Security Council action
- consider recommending to Council that a preventative group be deployed to Burundi (eg as in the case of Macedonia) to try to prevent problem engulfing the whole region.

7 Following this, Czech characterised Council action as having been focussed 80% on getting UNAMIR out of Rwanda and 20% on getting a cease-fire, with no substantive consideration of how to stop the ongoing genocide. For Czech they recalled their experience with the "scrupulous" reports of human rights organisations during "less happy times than now in Czech". Noting they had no particular "axe to grind" and being neither a past "colonial power", an "arms exporter" nor a "regional power", they tabled a draft Presidential Statement (worked up without too much consultation with other delegations). The draft firmly points the finger of blame for genocide at the Rwandan "government forces" (copy by fax to Wgtn only).

8 There was a long and substantive debate about the various options before the Council. The US (Albright) noted that all Council members were frustrated about the situation and the Council had to "do better". In this vein, US referred to a number of ideas "floating around" including:

- Security Council arms embargo (given that US had "heard" that the Rwandan army was actively seeking to buy arms at present)
- Council action to call on the Rwanda army to instruct its forces to cease killing civilians
- encouragement to neighbouring states to facilitate cross border humanitarian assistance (in this connection US noted it had been in touch with Dept of Humanitarian Affairs and offered assistance with the delivery of humanitarian assistance)

9 At this point one or two odd positions were taken. The French were quick to support Nigeria's proposal but showed a distinct lack of enthusiasm with either the Czech or US suggestions. They did however support giving thought to the idea of a preventive force deployment to Burundi.

10 Russia (quite duplicitously since two weeks ago they had been vigorous proponents of withdrawing UNAMIR altogether) noted that the Council had taken "very timid steps" in connection with the "terrible extermination of people in Rwanda" which "deserved greater attention" and was not "doing anything to put an end to it" (despite the "good steps to protect UNAMIR"). "Why haven't we thought about collectively putting an end to this?" Russia asked, "it is not enough to observe this, we must do something".

11 Djibouti expressed readiness to consider a statement, though the Czech draft was "not helpful" under the circumstances of there being no cease-fire. Yet again Djibouti manifested its unwillingness to point the finger at the RGF. Spain referred to the widespread violation of international humanitarian law and supported the OAU, and US approaches and "some" of the ideas in the Czech draft and invited President to draft an appropriate statement on behalf of all.

12 Pakistan expressed the view that the Council action has "not been sufficient" and that "silence is not to be tolerated further". They expressed the view that the statement should also focus on the cease-fire question and on the 2 types of killing identified by Nigeria. Having a Presidential statement tomorrow "at the latest" was "the minimum".

13 UK took the position that the Council needed to work with the African group. A statement of condemnation was not useful. It would be an apology for action but no real action

could be taken except to look at improved coordination between the OAU and regional states efforts and those of the Special Rep and the Force Commander. There was a "disconnect" in this respect highlighted by the events relating to the different locations apparently attended by the parties last weekend.

14 It would be important in this regard for the neighbouring states to consult closely with the UN. He wanted to avoid the construction of an "overambitious" proposal which relied on UN resources or didn't "fit well with UNAMIR". The UK delegation was "open to consideration of a statement" but it would need to contain elements which were intended to bring together the OAU and the UN efforts.

15 Oman noted a need for caution in supporting any initiative involving the neighbouring states and agreed with the UK on the form of the statement. Oman suggested it was important for the OAU to visit the region to assess what is happening and to "pinpoint" the causes and background to the conflict. Oman was also upset by the reference in para 9 of the OAU letter to OAU "dismay" at the Council's decision to reduce drastically UNAMIR forces.

16 China recalled that it had always held the view that the international community should not give up its efforts and should exert greater efforts in view of the worsening situation. China identified 3 levels of coordination required: that between African states themselves (eg Zaire and Tanzania), between African states and the Special Rep and Force Commander on site, and that between the Council and the OAU. The problems they could see with the Czech draft was that it did not address the 2 types of killing identified by others, did not identify a future solution to the problem and may not take into account the views of the secretariat (especially those of the Special Rep). Nonetheless China was ready for the "arduous task" of producing something urgently.

17 Brazil recalled that the situation in Rwanda is one of the most dreadful events since World War II and noted the emerging consensus in the Council to consideration of action on an urgent basis. Brazil said it could support "some" of the OAU proposals in a statement but others would require looking into further. In Burundi the question was not only of preventive deployment but also of preventive diplomacy.

18 Argentina referred to the need for action also on the means available to the African states, highlighting the capacity problem for the area and agreed with Pakistan that it was a serious moral problem which was capable of infecting other areas in the region. The statement needed to be generic rather than specific and to be a warning about human rights abuses but not to cut across any responsibilities of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

19 In our national capacity we recalled that from the outset

we had been among those who had strongly advocated an ongoing commitment from the UN to Rwanda. We noted that we did not find it disturbing to see the OAU referring with "dismay" to the Council's decision to downsize UNAMIR. The fact that we had had to take this decision had been to all of our dismay. We agreed that what was not being addressed was the killing of civilians. It would continue even if a cease-fire was obtained. This was where the Council was subject to criticism and constituted the rationale for the Czech draft. A statement would be better, though, if it were action orientated and went beyond merely expressing statement of horror. It was increasingly difficult to explain to the media why the Council had not taken action.

20 If there is credible evidence that one party is in the arms market then the Council had a serious responsibility to consider an arms embargo. It would be difficult to justify taking no action if later it was found that one party purchased significant quantities of arms. There was also the Nigerian points about the need for cooperation with the OAU, though it had to be realised that the OAU in fact had limited resources to take the lead in the effort on the ground. As the OAU rep had pointed out the UN would need to be "the glue" which helped the OAU to work out the issue. We also endorsed the Nigerian idea of needing to reflect on the Council taking preventative action in Burundi. We emphasised that if an arms embargo would require a resolution which could be worked on, in the meantime a statement would allow some action in the immediate future. The negotiation of it however could not be allowed to go on too long.

21 Secretariat (Gharekhan) endorsed idea of a statement but cautioned against the use of those words in the Czech draft which could endanger UNAMIR lives (ie the reference to the information having come from the secretariat). It was hoped the African contact group would keep closely in touch with DPKO and DPI about mutually reinforcing each others efforts. The need for coordination was also emphasised, though there was currently no difficulty with coordination of humanitarian efforts given that UNAMIR was involved in what humanitarian relief remained. Secretariat also emphasised what would be most helpful to UNAMIR would be reference to need to secure the airport as required by UNAMIR.

22 President concluded discussion by noting that all agreed that there was an urgent need to adopt a Presidential statement but that most delegations required instructions. We undertook to produce draft for consideration tomorrow with a view to its adoption tomorrow also. (Our IFF contains our draft.)

Meeting with Rwandan PR

23 We should also report meeting between President and Rwandan PR yesterday, during Ministers visit to NY at which Rwandan PR sought to make a "clarification" to the effect

that the involvement of regional states would be unwelcome. In particular he said it would "not be acceptable" for Uganda to participate in any "help in the conflict", especially in any UN force which might be expanded in the future. He said that "it would not be productive for Rwanda to have the presence of neighbouring countries in any Peacekeeping role in Rwanda."

24 President expressed the clear sentiment that under the "inhuman" circumstances prevailing in Rwanda now, this was bordering on the "outrageous". President emphasised that there is no sympathy in the Council believes that the regional countries do have a role in helping to stop the killing and in getting the parties back into a peace process. President said it was offensive for Rwanda to be asking for the Council's help in sorting out the situation and at the same time seeking to lay down conditions as to which troops would and would not be acceptable. President urged Rwandan PR to avoid taking such provocative positions.

End Message