CONFIDENTIAL

3/88/1 Our file: Your | le: 115/23/37 700/NYK/00000/00000 \$304.98 22:23 (5187) FROM: NEW YORK C04422/NYK 05-May-1994 Immediate WGTN UNSC TO: WELLINGTON Routine CC: BONN BEIJING Routine BRUSSELS CANBERRA Routine GENEVA HARARE Routine LONDON MADRID Routine MOSCOW OTTAWA Routine PARIS SANTIAGO Routine WASHINGTON TOKYO Routine DEFENCE (MEA, UNC, ISAC, HRU, LGL, EUR, DP3, DSP1, EAB) MFAT P/S MFA

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(GENTLES)

Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

RPF rep called today to brief us on their perspective of the present call for an intervention force in Rwanda. estimate that they control some 2/3 of the country. They claim that massacres have ceased in those areas and that life is gradually beginning to retun to more normal conditions. They maintain that they have been successful in restoring law and order to the areas they control and that contacts with international assistance organisations has been made and that operations are resuming in these areas.

- 2 RPF's argue that there are not significant numbers of people in danger in Rwanda right now. In areas controlled by the "interim government" all those endangered have now been either killed or have fled. RPF's concern put to us was that if the UN interposed itself as a peace enforcement operation between the two parties, RPF would be obliged to come the intervention force. Their judgement is that the RPF are not committed to power sharing with the Tutsi's or with cohabiting, in peace, with them over the longer term. The real problem in Rwanda therefore related to the continuing existence of a dictatorship and not to two ethnic groups simply not being able to get along together. The RPF objective was to get the remnants of the former government out of power and it would oppose any measures the UN might take which were inconsistent with this.
- RPF recognised that if they were to achieve a military victory, then some would legitimately wonder whether they

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would simply replace the exisiting regime with another military dictatorship. In response to this the RPF was willing to commit itself to implementing the framework of the power sharing arrangements envisaged under the Arusha Peace Agreement, ie the composition of Cabinet, constitution of parliament and the timing of elections. They were not/not seeking to "imposing themselves on the people of Rwanda".

6 RPF recognised however the difficulty of essentially asking the UN to endorse the continuation of warfare between the two parties. They were not opposed to a UN force to help with humanitarian assistance or protecting civilians and are open to discussing how the UN could help people at risk.

End Message