Your 1 e: 3/88/1

Our file: 115/23/37

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FROM:	Wellington		C06545/WN2	06-Jul-1994
TO:	New York	5		Immediate
cc:	Beijing Brussels Defence Harare Madrid Ottawa Santiago Washingt	)	Bonn Canberra Geneva London Moscow Paris Tokyo Wgtn UNSC	Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine Routine
MFAT (MEA, UNC, LGL, ISAC, HI (DSP1, EAB)		SAC, HRU, EUR, DP3, DSP3)		
P/S MFA DEFENCE HQNZDF (DSIA, OPS, DDI DEFENCE MOD (GENTLES)			I)	

## Subject

SECURITY COUNCIL: RWANDA

## Action

2 See paras 3-4 below.

## Report

- 3 Thanks your CO4710. The following talking points which have been prepared for use in the event of any media follow-up at this end may be of interest:
- Our abstention on SCR 929 was a very difficult decision. Our reservations related to the means chosen and the likely effect on an expanded UNAMIR and its early deployment; we fully shared and share the French humanitarian objectives and motives.
- We have been reassured by the continued French emphasis on the impartial nature and humanitarian objectives of their mission, as authorised by SCR 929.
- But we are cautious about the latest initiative to organise a secure humanitarian zone which by its size and location runs the risk of

jeopardising the neutrality of the intervention and of its becoming caught up in the fighting and being inter-positioned, contrary to SCR 929. It also has the potential to complicate the handover to and the mission of the expanded UNAMIR.

- While we agree that technically the creation of such a zone is within the mandate authorised by the Council, it is not what we understood was envisaged by secure humanitarian areas when SCR 925 op 4(a) was considered.
- We urge France to pursue its dialogue with both sides with a view to avoiding confrontation or action that would permit the fighting to escalate.
- We also encourage continuing close consultation with UNAMIR and its contributors.
- We look forward to the handover to the expanded UNAMIR at the earliest possible time.
- We agree that a stop to the fighting and a resumption of talks in the framework of the Arusha agreements offers the only real prospect of stabilising the situation and achieving a political settlement. We encourage all efforts to that end.
- We look forward to the Sec-Gen's progress report on the situation in Rwanda due 9 July.
- 3 Although discussions among countries which abstained on SCR 929 is natural enough, we would be cautious if it appeared that a group was meeting to coordinate positions prior to Council discussions. Those members who abstained on SCR 929 did so for very different reasons and we would be reluctant to contribute to the impression that there continued to be two "camps" (those who supported and those who had reservations of one sort or another about the French intervention), with the potential for this to detract from the constructive and forward-looking debate that is needed.
- 4 As you know our own abstention was a very close call. The French intervention is now a reality and we see the primary concern as being to work together to minimise further complications and to accelerate efforts to achieve a clear

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handover to the expanded UNAMIR.

5 The Minister has seen this message

End Message