


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TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
 DATE: 11 May 1994  
 NUMBER: UNAMIR: 1584



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SUBJECT: Informal consultations on the "non-paper"

1. During informal consultations held this afternoon, the Security Council began consideration of the "non-paper" on the possible expansion of the mandate of UNAMIR. Several members of the Council expressed support for the concept of operations outlined in the paper. They agreed that an expanded operation should focus on the humanitarian emergency in the country, although some members of the Council stressed that the efforts to achieve a cease-fire and reactivate the Arusha peace process should be pursued actively at the same time.

... 2. The Perm. Rep. of the United States, speaking on the basis of the attached "talking points", did not object to the proposed concept of operations but expressed a preference for the creation of a "protective zone" along the border with Burundi, where an international force would provide assistance and security to refugees and displaced persons. She also felt that it would be logistically difficult to deploy a large force out of Kigali, in view of the intense fighting taking place in the city and around the airport, and stressed that it would be preferable to "work from outside in" rather from "inside out". The Perm. Rep of Russia also expressed a preference for the establishment of "protective zones" along the borders with Burundi and Tanzania.

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3. A few members of the Council recognized that, while it was important to establish Kigali airport as a neutral zone, the deployment of the operation should not be entirely based on this premise since it was not sure at this time whether the consent of the parties could be secured. It was, therefore, suggested that the deployment plan should include some flexibility and that part of the deployment could perhaps be undertaken from neighbouring countries. General Baril later clarified that this possibility, as well as the use of other airstrips within Rwanda, had already been looked into. He added that, while the use of Kigali airport was obviously important, it did not have to be the only staging area.

4. The Perm. Rep. of Rwanda, Ambassador Bizimana, said that the "Government of Rwanda" was prepared to cooperate with the efforts of the United Nations to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to people in need. He stressed, however, that the cease-fire should also continue to be a priority and indicated, in this context, that his Government was ready to agree to an "immediate and unconditional cease-fire". He added that the proposed operation should be deployed and operate in the areas controlled by both sides and not just in one part of the country.

5. Mr. Gharekhan briefed the members of the Council on the latest developments on the ground. He indicated that the Special Representative and the Force Commander had been asked to discuss the non-paper with both sides and to seek their concurrence to it. He promised to inform the Council of the reaction of the parties. Several members of the Council stressed the importance of obtaining the consent of the parties and some suggested that an effort should be made to obtain that consent in writing.

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6. In response to queries regarding military activities along the Uganda-Rwanda border, Mr. Gharekhan indicated that while there did not seem to be any significant cross-border movements, UNOMUR had reported that some restrictions had been imposed on its movements in parts of the border area. He indicated that a detailed report had been requested from you and that the necessary information would be provided to the Council as soon as we received the necessary feedback.

7. There were also questions about the rules of engagement of an expanded operation. General Baril clarified that the basic principle of minimum use of force in self-defence would continue to be observed. He stressed, however, that self-defence would be interpreted to include the defense of the mandate entrusted to the operation.

8. In conclusion, the members of the Council agreed to continue their discussions on the proposed humanitarian operation tomorrow. Some members stressed that the Council should take the necessary decisions promptly. It was decided, in this connection, to begin work on a draft resolution which will draw on the ideas contained in our "non-paper". The Perm. Rep of the UK expressed the view that a more formal document and a budget outline should be submitted by the Secretary-General before the adoption of a resolution. Mr. Gharekhan agreed that a formal report would have to be prepared. He pointed out, however, that it would be useful, for the preparation of this report, to receive additional guidance regarding the course of action which the Security Council intended to take.

9. We are adjusting the "non-paper" so that it can be issued as a formal report and would appreciate receiving any additional points which you would like to see included in the report, beyond those contained in your MIR-946 of today. Many thanks and best regards.

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TALKING POINTS  
RWANDA

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-- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands immediate international action.

-- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.

-- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas further, here in the Council, as well as with representatives of concerned African states.

-- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN, OAU, the Tanzanian government and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of displaced persons on both sides of the border.

-- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement an arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.

-- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.

-- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone along the Rwandan border with an international force to provide security to populations, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.

- Such a mission could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but could also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The operation would require robust rules of engagement.



- This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.
- It would, however, need the active support of neighboring countries, such as Burundi and Tanzania, and the assent of the Rwandan parties.
- In considering the actual humanitarian/peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, we must be mindful not to upset the delicate political balance that presently exists in Burundi.
- We must also work together to define clearly achievable objectives and an end-state such as resettlement of the displaced persons and refugees and/or a sunset provision requiring reconsideration of the operation in six months to preclude the mission becoming an open-ended one.
- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would fully support the operation politically and diplomatically and endeavor to help by providing financial resources, some lift, equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon agreement of a clear concept of operations.
- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

(If asked what direct support U.S. could provide:

-- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.

-- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would seek the normal reimbursement for contributions of equipment or services.)

-- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.

-- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:

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- Neither the UN nor the OAU have demonstrated a capability to mount large-scale peace enforcement missions with success.
- This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.
- It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.
- Thus far, it is unclear that any country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.
- Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done through an airport at the epicenter of a civil war.
- It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.
- Finally, the chances of success appear slim.

-- The SYG's indicative contingency planning falls between these two approaches. However, we believe that many of the problems we just laid out would also bedevil the SYG's proposed mission - particularly the logistical and recruitment aspects.

-- Again, let me say that we hope we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as a result of this tragic conflict.

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