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## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *H. Annan*  
 DATE: 13 May 1994  
 NUMBER: 1614

SUBJECT: Security Council Consultations

... 1. We are herewith sending to you a copy of the Secretary-General's report on Rwanda (S/1994/565) which was issued this afternoon. The Security Council met for informal consultations on Rwanda soon after the report was issued this afternoon. A draft resolution was discussed and amended. We are herewith sending to you a "blue" draft of the resolution which will be taken up again on Monday.

2. While Council members were in general agreement about the mandate, size and rules of engagement of an expanded UNAMIR, as reflected in the resolution, just before today's consultations ended, it was noted that the Council had not yet had a chance to study and discuss the Secretary General's report. The Council will therefore discuss the report on Monday before returning to the resolution which could be adopted early next week.

3. The Council requested that, for Monday's consultations, the Secretary-General provide a brief on the latest situation in Rwanda. It was requested that the following issues, in particular, be addressed: the latest situation on the ground; the SRSG's and regional efforts in the political sphere; an update on the humanitarian situation including needs and ongoing activities; the situation regarding reported radio broadcasts that may be inciting the population to violence; and progress on obtaining the concurrence of the parties to UNAMIR's new configuration and mandate. We would be grateful if you could provide us ASAP with an update on these issues.

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4. You will note that para 28 of the Secretary-General's report states that the people in need of assistance in the interior of Rwanda outnumber, "by a factor of five", those in the border areas. While we have received the figures on displaced persons you sent to us today, it would be helpful for Monday's discussions if you could provide additional data which would help us explain this statement to Council members and reinforce the rationale for the proposed concept of operations of the expanded UNAMIR. We will be meeting on Monday morning with a US Government delegation which has requested clarifications on our concept of operations and has expressed, as you know, a preference for a modus operandi based on the establishment of protective zones along the country's borders. We greatly appreciate your assistance.

5. A note on the informal consultations held yesterday, prepared by the Secretariat of the Council, is attached for your information. Best regards.



## Security Council

Distr.  
GENERALS/1994/565  
13 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

## REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to the letter of the President of the Security Council of 6 May 1994 (S/1994/546), requesting me to provide indicative contingency planning with regard to the delivery of humanitarian assistance as well as support to displaced persons in Rwanda.
2. It will be recalled that the resumption of the civil conflict following the tragic events of 6 April 1994, and the ensuing violence and massacres, created a situation that called into question the ability of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to carry out its mandate under Security Council resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993. Hence, with Council resolution 912 (1994), adopted on 21 April 1994, the Security Council authorized the adjustment of UNAMIR's mandate (a) to act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire; (b) to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and (c) to monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR. In compliance with resolution 912 (1994), the force was sharply reduced, and now stands at 444, all ranks, in Rwanda, and 179 military observers at Nairobi pending repatriation or redeployment to the Mission. Reductions to the authorized level have been suspended pending the outcome of the ongoing consideration by the Council.
3. The situation in Rwanda remains highly unstable and insecure, with widespread violence. Combat between the Rwandese government forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) continues, even though both the Rwandese government forces and RPF have separately expressed their readiness to enter into a cease-fire. The Rwandese government forces controls the west and south-western parts of Rwanda, while RPF is in control of the northern and eastern parts of the country, as well as areas in the south-east. The capital, Kigali, is divided between the Rwandese government forces and RPF, but the front line is fluid and changing as military actions continue. The Rwandese government forces continue to control the airport but hostilities in its vicinity interrupt its operations from time to time. Armed militia and other unruly elements continue to operate, although less frequently than at the beginning of the conflict, killing and terrorizing innocent civilians. It is estimated that nearly 2 million persons have been displaced, seeking safer places within Kigali, in

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various regions of the country and in border areas in neighbouring countries, principally the United Republic of Tanzania. Under these conditions, a major humanitarian crisis has developed.

## II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

4. In accordance with resolution 912 (1994), and in support of the efforts of the organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Republic of Tanzania, in its capacity as the facilitator of the Arusha peace process, and other interested parties, my Special Representative, Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, and the UNAMIR Force Commander, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, have undertaken, both inside Rwanda and at Arusha, all possible efforts since the resumption of the conflict to bring about a cease-fire agreement between the parties. Unfortunately, their efforts have been of no avail, but they are determined to persevere. Obviously, a cease-fire agreement is the first step in establishing a stable and secure environment in the country, thus allowing the organized, coordinated and secure delivery of humanitarian assistance and the reactivation of the Arusha peace process. In the prevailing conditions, however, it is essential that the United Nations consider what measures it can take even before a cease-fire is achieved.

## III. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

5. Given the pace of developments and the security situation, it has not been possible to assess accurately the humanitarian situation in Rwanda. However, early reports indicate that there are 250,000 displaced persons in the north, 65,000 in the east, and 1,200,000 in the south and south-west. Although there are some concentrations, the internally displaced appear to be widely scattered. At Kigali itself, some 30,000 displaced persons have taken refuge in public places and religious sanctuaries, where they are running out of food, water and basic medical supplies. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 80,000 of the original 272,000 refugees from Burundi have remained in Rwanda. This situation is complicated by the fact that, prior to the war, some 1.2 million drought-affected people in the south who required emergency food assistance had been identified. In neighbouring countries, the Rwandese-refugee population is estimated at more than 300,000, and UNHCR reports that as many as 1,500 refugees continue to arrive daily in the United Republic of Tanzania. It is most important that the basic humanitarian needs of these populations are met as soon as possible.

6. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat has established the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO), in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The office, temporarily located at Nairobi, has overall responsibility for coordinating humanitarian relief activities, including the prepositioning of relief supplies. Close coordination with the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other international organizations and bilateral donors concerned is an essential part of the work of the office. An advance humanitarian assistance team has been positioned at Kigali to work with UNAMIR in carrying out

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humanitarian operations and to advise in the expansion of activities where the situation permits. Other sub-offices in Rwanda or neighbouring countries are envisaged. A "flash" appeal covering immediate emergency assistance needs totalling about \$16 million was issued on 25 April 1994.

7. In spite of the difficulties, limited emergency operations have been initiated. For example, medical and nutritional supplies from UNICEF have been distributed in Kigali. WFP has been able to deliver more than 500 tons of food in the north and 840 tons in the south. Currently, three NGOs are active in Rwanda. Médecins sans Frontières is active in the north and Médecins du Monde is active in the south. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has remained without interruption in Rwanda, focusing on emergency medical care and carrying out food deliveries in the north and south and in Kigali. UNAMIR has assisted in the delivery of food and other relief supplies to displaced persons in the Kigali area and has provided security for the activities of the advance team and NGOs. UNHCR is responding to the needs of refugees in neighbouring countries.

8. The United Nations humanitarian organizations, in consultation with UNAMIR and ICRC, have agreed on the following principles, which should serve as the basis for humanitarian operations in Rwanda:

(a) Ensuring the security of relief staff (both national and international), the beneficiaries of relief assistance and of the relief materials themselves;

(b) Joint identification by the responsible authorities and the respective United Nations humanitarian organizations of distribution sites;

(c) Clear identification of interlocutors from the side of the authorities for the humanitarian aid organizations to liaise with regarding humanitarian operations, both at a central level as well as at the field level;

(d) Acceptance by the responsible authorities of the monitoring and reporting responsibilities of the United Nations organizations regarding the distribution and use of relief materials;

(e) An understanding that aid should be provided based on need, regardless of race, ethnic group, religion or political affiliation.

9. These principles have been submitted to the Rwandese government forces and RPF authorities for approval. The Rwandese government forces have formally notified the Humanitarian Coordinator of its agreement. RPF has also agreed to these principles.

10. While it is too early to present fully developed operational plans for the distribution of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda, the basic effort will be to respond to the urgent needs of all affected persons in all parts of the country whenever conditions so permit. With the consent of appropriate authorities in neighbouring countries, it is envisaged that extensive cross-border operations will be utilized to transport relief supplies. The detailed operational plans will take into account the need to avoid, as far as possible, further

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displacement of the population. The objective will be to deliver assistance to the distressed in their existing locations, provided that these sites can be made secure.

#### IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

11. In his letter of 6 May 1994 (S/1994/546), the President of the Security Council informed me that, in view of the unabated hostilities and killings taking place in Rwanda, urgent and effective means of action must be considered. This would require that the Council decide upon an expanded mandate under which UNAMIR would support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons and other groups in Rwanda who have been affected by the hostilities or are otherwise in need, and assist in the provision of assistance by humanitarian organizations. The efforts of UNAMIR in this regard would be coordinated with those of the humanitarian organizations operating in Rwanda and/or engaged in assisting Rwandese refugees in neighbouring countries. The mission, as it would function under this amended mandate, is referred to herein as UNAMIR II.

12. UNAMIR II would provide security assistance to humanitarian organizations in their programmes for distribution of relief supplies. UNAMIR II would establish access to sites where displaced and other affected persons are concentrated and could assure their protection. Such protected sites would include areas inside Rwanda along the border with neighbouring States where refugees and displaced persons are concentrated. All protected sites would be patrolled and monitored by UNAMIR II, in cooperation with the local authorities wherever possible. At the same time, UNAMIR II would devote equal attention to the needs of displaced persons in the interior of the country and would provide escorts to relief convoys and security to United Nations installations there.

13. UNAMIR II would monitor border crossing points as operationally required, as well as the deployment of the parties in conflict, in order to assure the effective conduct of UNAMIR II operations.

14. Kigali airport is the most practical point of entry into the country and is therefore important for the induction of personnel, equipment and humanitarian relief goods. The parties would be expected to establish the airport as a "neutral zone" under the exclusive control of the United Nations before commencement of the deployment of the expanded force. However, if continued fighting prevents this, UNAMIR II would use other points of entry and resupply, such as secondary airstrips within the country. In addition, UNAMIR II would establish lines of communication, deployment and supply routes by land through neighbouring countries, particularly for the resupply of those protected sites located on Rwanda's borders.



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A. Rules of engagement

15. UNAMIR II's rules of engagement do not envisage enforcement action. The Mission would depend primarily on deterrence to carry out its tasks. However, UNAMIR II may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations and the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief.

B. Force structure

16. In order to execute its mandate, UNAMIR II must be composed of a credible, well-armed and highly mobile force. The size of the force is determined also by the size and terrain of the area of operation, which is land-locked, difficult and mountainous with very limited infrastructure. With these criteria, it is estimated that a minimum viable force of approximately 5,500 troops, including 5 infantry battalions, will be required to carry out the tasks described above. Readjustment of the size of the force may be necessary as the situation evolves.

17. The composition of the force would therefore include:

(a) A force headquarters of approximately 219 personnel, built around the nucleus of the present headquarters, would include a supporting military signals/communication squadron. The force headquarters would continue to operate at Kigali;

(b) Five battalions (approximately 4,000 personnel) comprising two mechanized battalions and three motorized battalions, each of which would have a mechanized company;

(c) A force support battalion of approximately 721 personnel, which would provide logistical, maintenance, and medical services, and would include an engineer company capable of undertaking tasks such as mining clearance, bomb disposal and the rehabilitation of essential roads, bridges and the other infrastructure, as required by UNAMIR-II to carry out its mandate;

(d) A helicopter squadron of approximately 110 personnel and 16 helicopters;

(e) A military police force of approximately 50 personnel would provide internal force security;

(f) A military observer group of 320 officers would conduct the humanitarian security monitoring, liaison and escort-duty tasks throughout the area of operation, including at the border areas if necessary;

(g) A force of 90 United Nations civilian police would be deployed in a similar fashion to the military observers, but would be dedicated to maintaining liaison with the local civilian authorities on matters relating to public security.

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### C. Deployment schedule

18. The deployment of UNAMIR II would be conducted in three phases, subject to the timely availability of the necessary troops, equipment and airlift. "D-Day" is the date on which the Security Council resolution would be adopted authorizing the expanded mandate of UNAMIR II.

19. Phase 1 (D-Day + 7). The Ghanaian battalion would be brought to its full strength of 800 personnel and equipped with armoured personnel carriers. This unit would ensure the protection of Kigali International Airport, as well as other sites in the city, where thousands of displaced persons have sought refuge under UNAMIR protection. This battalion would also subsequently act as the force reserve.

20. Phase 2 (D-Day + 14). Deployment of two battalions (one mechanized and one motorized), some advance elements of the support battalion and all of the force headquarters and signal squadron. These troops would be deployed where the security situation is of greatest concern and where there is the highest concentration of displaced persons, including at border areas if necessary.

21. Phase 3 (D-Day + 31). Induction of the rest of the force support battalion and two other infantry battalions. The rest of the support battalion would establish logistic and engineer advance bases in the Ruhengeri, Byumba and Butare prefectures in order better to serve the field force. The two infantry battalions would be deployed to certain specific areas of the country in order to provide the necessary support and assistance to people in need in these areas and provide security arrangements to humanitarian assistance programmes.

### D. Logistics

22. The deployment and logistical support of a force of 5,500 under the schedule described above is a difficult undertaking. In addition, Rwanda is a land-locked country with only one major airport (Kigali) and three secondary airports. Land movement between regional seaports (Mombasa, Dar es Salaam) and Rwanda requires several days in the best of conditions. It is therefore essential to deploy self-sufficient military contingents capable of operating independently, while logistical support is put in place by the United Nations. The concept of operations calls for the first three units to be moved by air, requiring military and commercial strategic airlift, that is, up to 10 passenger flights and 40 cargo flights (C-5A aircraft). The remainder of the force and its material would be transported by sea and air as soon as technically possible.

23. Because of the need to stabilize the security situation in Rwanda as quickly as possible, deployment of UNAMIR II will have to be carried out rapidly. The longer the delay in the deployment of the force from the time of a Security Council decision, the greater the prospect of the mission not achieving its purpose in operational terms.

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24. The most rapid deployment would be achieved with two formed infantry brigades with their integral logistical support. If formed brigades cannot be made available, it would be necessary to draw on the recent United Nations stand-by arrangements, but specific contributions for this Mission must still be negotiated. It is estimated that this process would require one to two months. Simultaneously with stand-by arrangements, the traditional method of requesting Governments for military forces would be used. Experience shows that it would take at least two to three months to achieve full deployment of forces. If forces are accepted without adequate equipment, experience shows that a further delay of several months would be incurred in providing the necessary equipment for those forces. It is therefore essential that Member States agree to make arrangements on a bilateral basis to provide the troops, equipment and airlift required for UNAMIR II.

#### E. Command and control

25. UNAMIR II would be headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who would have overall authority for all the activities of the Mission. The military component of the Mission would be commanded by the Force Commander. The present UNAMIR force headquarters would be expanded as indicated in paragraph 17 (a) above and would remain located at Kigali. Battalions would be deployed to designated regions or sectors in accordance with the modus operandi described in paragraphs 19 to 21 above. Battalion commanders would act as sector commanders within their assigned regions, under the direction of the Force Commander. The military signal unit would establish communications between the force headquarters, battalion headquarters and other designated units as necessary.

#### V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

26. The cost associated with the deployment of the force described above would be approximately \$115 million for a six-month period (see annex). It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly that the costs would be considered an expense of the Organization in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and the assessments would be levied on Member States and be credited to the UNAMIR special account.

#### VI. OBSERVATIONS

27. The solution to the crisis in Rwanda must, in my judgement, be found through implementation of the Arusha agreement, which both sides say that they accept. For this to be achieved, it is clearly necessary that a cease-fire be agreed and put into effect at the earliest possible date. I have instructed my Special Representative and the Force Commander to continue to give the highest priority to the pursuit of both objectives. The Security Council may wish to issue another urgent call for the parties to agree to a cease-fire and, even before it comes into effect, to accept the designation of Kigali airport as a neutral zone under the exclusive control of the United Nations.

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28. Meanwhile, there is an urgent requirement for the United Nations to increase its efforts to address the desperate humanitarian crisis created by the conflict. I welcome the idea that protected sites should be established close to Rwanda's borders with Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania in order to facilitate the provision of relief to displaced persons who are already present in those areas. But I believe that it is essential that any such initiative should be matched by action to assist persons in need in the interior of Rwanda. These outnumber, by a factor of five, the displaced persons who are in the border areas or have already crossed into neighbouring countries. To concentrate the international community's efforts on the latter would be to address only a small part of the problem. Moreover, there would be a risk that protected sites in the border areas would act as a magnet to people in need in the interior of the country and would therefore increase even further the number of displaced persons.

29. Expanded humanitarian operations, both in the border areas and in the interior, would also clearly be facilitated by a cease-fire, which would contribute immeasurably to the effective and secure distribution of relief supplies. However, if a cease-fire is not in place by the time the expanded force is deployed, my Special Representative and the Force Commander will continue to pursue this objective as the force is being put in place. I met with my Special Representative in Paris today and encouraged him to continue his efforts with a view to achieving a cease-fire agreement as soon as possible.

30. As noted above, should UNAMIR II need to initiate deployment and resupply through neighbouring States, the Mission would require the active support of those States. UNAMIR II would also require the cooperation and support of the Rwandese parties. In this connection, I should like to note that my Special Representative and the Force Commander have presented the concept outlined herein to both the Rwandese government forces and RPF. I am encouraged by their initial positive responses. I have asked my Special Representative and the Force Commander to obtain confirmation from both parties of their support to this operation without preconditions.

31. The world community has witnessed with horror and disbelief the slaughter and suffering of innocent civilians in Rwanda. While the chances for a lasting peace are fundamentally in the hands of the political and military leaders of the country, the international community cannot ignore the atrocious effects of this conflict on innocent civilians. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it approve the phased expansion of UNAMIR, as described above, to enable the Mission immediately to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. The mandate for UNAMIR II should be for a period of six months from the date of initial deployment, on the understanding that it would be reviewed by the Council as necessary and, in particular, following an agreement on a cease-fire.

32. In concluding, I must again emphasize that in order for UNAMIR II to attain its objective, there can be no delay in its deployment.

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33. I would like to express my deep gratitude to my Special Representative, the UNAMIR Force Commander, and all UNAMIR personnel, for their outstanding performance in the pursuance of UNAMIR's mandate under the extremely dangerous conditions in Rwanda.

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Annex

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

Summary cost estimate for the deployment of approximately  
15,500 troops for a six-month period


(In thousands of United States dollars)

|   | <u>Amount</u>  |
|---|----------------|
| 1. Military personnel costs                       | 60 100         |
| 2. Civilian personnel costs                       | 11 100         |
| 3. Premises/accommodation                         | 1 300          |
| 4. Infrastructure repairs                         | 700            |
| 5. Transport operations                           | 6 000          |
| 6. Air operations                                 | 8 600          |
| 7. Naval operations                               | -              |
| 8. Communications                                 | 3 100          |
| 9. Other equipment                                | 4 500          |
| 10. Supplies and services                         | 4 500          |
| 11. Election-related supplies and services        | -              |
| 12. Public information programmes                 | 300            |
| 13. Training programmes                           | -              |
| 14. Mine-clearing programmes                      | 500            |
| 15. Assistance for disarmament and demobilization | -              |
| 16. Air and surface freight                       | 12 000         |
| 17. Integrated Management Information System      | -              |
| 18. Support account for peace-keeping operations  | 800            |
| 19. Staff assessment                              | <u>1 500</u>   |
| Total   | <u>115 000</u> |

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## Security Council

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PROVISIONAL

S/1994/571\*

13 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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Draft resolutionThe Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), its resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994, and its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 by which it adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR,

Recalling the statements made by the President of the Council on 7 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) and 30 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/21),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 13 May 1994 (S/1994/565),

Reaffirming its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993 on the security of United Nations operations,

Strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda and particularly condemning the very numerous killings of civilians which have taken place in Rwanda and the impunity with which armed individuals have been able to operate and continue operating therein,

Stressing the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda and the necessity for all parties to recommit themselves to its full implementation,

Commending the efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its organs, as well as the efforts of the Tanzanian Facilitator, in providing diplomatic, political, humanitarian support for the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council,

Deeply concerned that the situation in Rwanda, which has resulted in the death of tens of thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children,

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the internal displacement of a significant percentage of the Rwandan population, and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries, constitutes a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions,

Expressing once again its alarm at continuing reports of systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, as well as other violations of the rights to life and property,

Recalling in this context that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law,

Urging all parties to cease forthwith any incitement, especially through the mass media, to violence or ethnic hatred,

Recalling also that it had requested the Secretary-General to make proposals for the investigation of reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict,

Underlining the urgent need for coordinated international action to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people and to help restore peace in Rwanda, and in this connection welcoming cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU as well as with countries of the region, especially the facilitator of the Arusha peace process,

Reaffirming its commitment to the unity and territorial integrity of Rwanda,

Recognizing that the people of Rwanda bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their country,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

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1. Demands that all parties to the conflict immediately cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and bring an end to the mindless violence and carnage engulfing Rwanda;

2. Decides to expand UNAMIR's mandate under resolution 912 (1994) to include the following additional responsibilities, within the limits of the resources available to it:

(a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, as appropriate, of secure humanitarian areas,

(b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;

3. Recognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United

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Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief;

4. Authorizes in this context an expansion of the UNAMIR force level up to 5,500 troops;

5. Urges the Secretary-General to commence the deployment of the expanded force, in phases as appropriate, in the shortest possible time;

6. Encourages the Secretary-General to accelerate his efforts, in conjunction with the Secretary-General of OAU, to obtain from Member States the necessary personnel to enable deployment of the expanded UNAMIR to proceed urgently;

7. Invites Member States to respond promptly to the Secretary-General's request for logistical support capability for rapid deployment of the UNAMIR expanded force level and its support in the field;

8. Strongly urges all parties in Rwanda to cooperate fully with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in particular in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance;

9. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, and urges others to provide such assistance;

: B.

Determining that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

10. Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Rwanda by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts;

11. Decides also to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations;

(a) To seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 10 above;

(b) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make



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recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;

(c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo imposed by paragraph 10 above and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States;

12. Calls upon all States, including States not Members of the United Nations, and international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of the adoption of this resolution;

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13. Requests the Secretary-General to present a report as soon as possible on the investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict;

14. Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with the Organization of African Unity and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

15. Decides to keep the situation in Rwanda under constant review and requests the Secretary-General to report further, including on the humanitarian situation, within five weeks of the adoption of this resolution and again in good time before the expiration of the current mandate of UNAMIR;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Thursday, 12 May 1994

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## Rwanda

There was general agreement that the size and mandate of UNAMIR should be expanded as soon as possible with the prime objective of providing humanitarian assistance to Rwanda. However, the Council was divided over other issues, including the availability of troops, the scope of the mandate, the rules of engagement, and whether the operation should be launched with explicit reference to Chapter VII of the Charter. The President wants the Council to finalize the draft resolution (text attached) and act on it tomorrow or over the weekend.

Mr. Gharekhan updated the Council on the situation in Rwanda. Fighting continued in Kigali and other parts of the country with rockets being fired on the capital from unidentified sources. RPF was reportedly advancing westward. UNAMIR was in contact with the Ugandan Army Commander on the restrictions on its movements. Reports on the talks would be available shortly.

Mr. Gharekhan informed the Council that OAU had received offers of troops for an expanded UNAMIR from Tanzania, Ghana and Nigeria. However, no concrete numbers were available.

The President said that both the Rwandan Government and RPF had indicated to him their support for a new UN operation. The difference was that while the Rwandan Government wished to see the operation covering all parts of the country, RPF wanted a smaller mandate limited to humanitarian assistance.

Frustrated with the continued fighting on the ground despite the repeated verbal statements by both sides on the need for a cease-fire, Oman said it was high time for the Council to take action, though without a cease-fire nothing could actually be done. France and some others agreed. France, however, made clear that the mandate of UNAMIR should stick to humanitarian aspects, maintaining that the operation should, at least for now, not get involved in the political sphere.

Rwanda made reservations about the immediate imposition of an arms embargo, saying that such a measure could benefit one party to the conflict. It also stressed the urgent need for a cease-fire.

With respect to the nature of an expanded UNAMIR, China, Argentina and other delegations said that they would like to see the operation remaining under Chapter VI, rather than shifting to Chapter VII with enforcement implications. However, New Zealand stressed that the important thing was not whether those terms



carried "some token importance," but what the Council would actually ask the United Nations to do. Spain preferred Chapter VI, if possible. However, it said it could live with the "modified invocation of Chapter VII" as in the case of UNPROFOR.

New Zealand also argued that it was not credible for the Council to seek the consent of the parties. Citing difficulties UNPROFOR had encountered in securing the consent of parties at every stage of its activities, it indicated that the mandate of UNAMIR should be carried out with or without the consent. In this context, the Czech Republic held that the emphasis on a cease-fire should not be a prime objective of the Council now. However, Argentina did not agree, stressing the need to make every effort to obtain the consent of the parties. On the use of force, New Zealand went further to say that the draft should be very specific about the authority to be given to UNAMIR, pointing to possible difficulties the force could face in the performance of its duties without an explicit statement of the Council on the level of force expected to be used.

Citing the "terrible tendency" of the Council to load its resolutions with too many tasks, the United Kingdom was in favour of a simpler text focusing on humanitarian aspects which, it said, would be most likely to be welcomed in Rwanda. Spain and the Russian Federation concurred. Specifically, Russia indicated it had difficulties accepting tasks like assistance for demining and rehabilitation of essential facilities and services, expressing the concern that such a mandate would make it hard for the United Nations to "get out." "The operation should be short-term in nature," it added.

The United Kingdom also underscored the need for more flexibility with regard to the scope of the operation, including its size and deployment. It said the current text was too detailed and prescriptive and could lead to misunderstanding. It also urged the Secretariat to present a formal report on the proposed expansion of UNAMIR, including estimates of its financial implications. The Russian Federation suggested that a special voluntary fund should be established to help finance the operation.

The United States was primarily concerned about the availability of resources. It asked specific questions about 1) the number of troops available, 2) what equipment they could bring, 3) how soon such troops could be deployed, 4) whether contributing countries put any restrictions on their troop deployment, especially when and if the operation was launched under Chapter VII, and 5) what countries could provide logistical support.



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At the end of the day a drafting group was put to work to try and sort all this out.

Bosnia L0003057

Mr. Gharekhan briefed the Council on the recent developments in Bosnia and Hercegovina, including the passage of humanitarian convoys to Gorazde, the issue concerning the Serbian tanks in exclusion zone, and the current situations in Tuzla and Gorazde

Citing the recent actions of Bosnian Government troops, the Russian Federation asked what had been done by UNPROFOR to prevent the recurrence of such violations. Mr. Gharekhan replied that he would try to find an answer to that later.

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