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TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
PRUDENCE BUSHNELL
BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
ON
THE CRISIS &IANDA
MAY. 4, 1994
Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa:
On April 6, the private plane of Rwandan President Juvenal
Habyarimana crashed outside Kigali under suspicious
circumstances, killing President Habyarimana and President
Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi and sparking massive violence on
two levels. First, elements of the Hutu-dominated_Rwandan
military, hardline party militias; and Hutu extremist gangs
began killing Hutu opposition politicians (including Prime
Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana) and Tutsi opposition leaders
and civilians. The killings began in Kigali, but eventually
spread throughout the country. Second, fighting quickly broke
out between Rwandan government forces and the Tutsi-dominated
rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), effectively resuming the
civil war that began in October 1990 and was to have ended on
August 4, 1993, with the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord.
Both the fighting and the violence continue. The RPF has
pushed government forces to the south and west and controls
much of the capital of Kigali. The violence has left at least
100,000 dead and displaced hundreds of thousands of Rwandans.
Over 300,000 Rwandans have fled to neighboring countries, most
to Tanzania. The Rwandan government and the RPF agreed to meet
in Arusha, Tanzania on May 3. (update this last sentence)
The U
S. ReSDOTISP fn
the Crisis
Since the crisis began, the U.S. has pursued an aggressive
strategy with five main goals:
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Stop the killings.
Achieve a durable cease-fire.
Return the parties to the negotiating table.
Contain the conflict.
Address humanitarian relief needs.
We have taken several actions designed to achieve these goals.
First, we have put diplomatic pressure on the parties
themselves. I and other U.S. officials have spoken directly to
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Rwandan government officials, the Rwandan military, and the
RPF, in. Washington, via diplomatic channels in other locations,
and by telephone to Rwanda. Our message has been simple and
direct: we want an immediate end to the killings, a cease-fire
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- 2 -
in place, the resumption of peace talks, and complete
cooperation with relief efforts. We have reinforced these
private contacts with high-level public appeals and statements
by the President and the State Department.
Second, we have worked to mobilize the international
community. We encouraged and support the efforts of the
Tanzanian Government, as Facilitator of the Arusha process, to
reconvene peace talks. As in the past, the U.S. will be
represented at any substantive talks. We have encouraged the
Organization of African Unity, other regional states, and our
European allies to join us in urging the Rwandans to agree to a
cease-fire and resume talks. Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck and our
Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, will be traveling to the
region to continue these efforts. Our diplomatic contacts
confirm that all major players agree with and support our goals
and strategy.
Third, we have been pursuing an active policy in the UN
Security Council. We pushed for approval of a strong Security
Council presidential statement, issued April 29, which demands
that the interim government of Rwanda and the RPF take
effective measures to prevent attacks on civilians. The
statement condemns the breaches of international humanitarian
law that have occurred and calls on party-states to cease
shipments of arms to Rwanda.
Fourth, the State Department is chairing regular
interagency meetings to coordinate an effective response to the
humanitarian crisis in the sub-region. We have undertaken
contingency planning to provide humanitarian relief and have
identified several million dollars from various sources that we
intend to tap for the crisis. The U.S. government has already
contributed approximately $28 million in food, relief items,
and earmarked funds to organizations assisting Burundi refugees
and persons displaced following last October's coup attempt and
subsequent widespread violence. we will build on these efforts
in responding to the increased needs resulting from the
fighting in Rwanda.
Fifth, we are continuing to monitor the situation in
Burundi very closely. we have sent high-level visitors to the
country to show our support for Burundi's fragile nascent
democracy and are continuing humanitarian relief efforts. We
have also provided support to the 47-member monitoring force
that the OAU is in the process of deploying in Burundi.
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The efforts outlined above are a continuation,pf the
longstanding U.S. support for the Rwandan peace process. We
were active observers throughout the year-long Arusha peace
talks and provided $1 million in assistance to support the
talks and help the OAU field cease-fire monitors. The U.S.
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- 3 supported deployment of UN peacekeepers once a peace accord was
reached, paying our 30 percent assessed share of the
2500-person UN operation. It must be recognized, however, that
the influence of the international community in an internal
politico-ethnic conflict of this type is limited. In the end,
only the Rwandans can bring peace to their country, and no
outside effort can succeed without a commitment to peace by the
combatants themselves.
future Policy Options
At the same time that we are pursuing the policies outlined
above, we are examining further measures to ratchet up the
pressure. First among these is a formal UN arms embargo
against Rwanda, which we intend to pursue this week. We would
also like to increase the involvement of the UN Human Rights
Commissioner, who could launch an investigation into human
rights abuses and perhaps become involved in mediation
efforts. In addition, we are exploring the possibility, if
necessary, of having the UN or OAU establish protected areas
for refugees and displaced persons around border areas.
Assessment of the UN Mission
From the start, the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda
(UNAMIR) was a peacekeeping, not a peace-making, operation.
It was deployed only after a cease-fire was in place and both
sides had signed a peace accord. The force had the limited
mandate of monitoring and facilitating implementation of the
accord, as the parties had requested.
Circumstances have changed drastically since the April 6
plane crash. Heavy fighting and widespread violence have
resumed, UNAMIR troops were attacked and at least 12 UN
peacekeepers were killed, and there was serious doubt in the
early stages whether the lightly armed UNAMIR troops had the
capability to defend themselves in such circumstances. As a
result, the U.S. supported withdrawal of the bulk of the force
for reasons of safety, provided satisfactory arrangements were
made to ensure the safety of Rwandans under direct UNAMIR
protection.
It appears now that at least some portion of the force has
been able to remain safely in Rwanda. Under such circumstances
we strongly supported the Security Council decision to maintain
a small force to help broker a new cease-fire, facilitate
humanitarian relief efforts, and help ensure the safety of
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those Rwandans already under UNAMIR's direct protection.
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