Citation
2482 – 12-04
Secretariat information
The situation is getting ever more complicated. According to the
Secretariat it is chaotic, the killing continues. The provisional
government has left Kigali for Butare in the south of the country.
Only the defense minister has stayed on in Kigali. Disturbances are
spreading to other parts of the country. The private radio station
in Kigali (it is unclear whether it is the only one there) sides
with the government and is militating against foreigners, especially
Belgians.
RPF units arrived in Kigali from the demilitarized zone in the North
of the country and control all important points, except for the
airport. They do not recognize the defense minister. (Note: In a
very sharp letter to the SC President, the New York representative
of the RPF described the transitional government as one of
criminals. He didn’t mention a word about the Arusha peace
agreements.)
The evacuation of foreigners went well. The RPF has given the
French-‐Belgian expedition until 1900 hrs local time on 14 April
to pull out of the country – because after that it intends to
attack government units at the airport.
UNAMIR absolutely hasn’t managed to induce the parties to a cease
fire or a truce. Both parties, however, assure the force that it
is safe. SG’s recommendations, based on the analysis of his SRSG
– Booh Booh from Cameroun – will be available tomorrow.
Discussion
The core of the discussion concerned the future of UNAMIR. In other
words: Will the UN leave Rwanda to its catastrophic fate or will
it continue to be involved there in some way? The non-‐aligned
are preparing a draft resolution which will be available on 13
April but any suggestions will still have to follow from the SG’s
recommendations.
The contribution of the UK was the most useful one. It clarified
four possible alternatives:
1. Strengthen UNAMIR and give it a new mandate (note: one which
would of course have to be based on Ch VII of the Charter, as
we mentioned earlier). This would be difficult according to the UK.
2. Pull out completely – which, however, would send a negative signal
about UN’s involvement
3. Leave UNAMIR as is -‐ but what could it do?
4. Leave some elements of UNAMIR in Rwanda, as earlier in Angola –
which might be the safest solution, a signal that the UN continues
to be engaged.
Before the UK spoke, France had considered only alts. 2 and 3, then
he spoke off the top of his head and only on his own behalf,
without instructions from home. SP clarified that the “Angola
solution” may seem to be the best but it has its own problems:
“It is easy to squeeze the accordion but it can be difficult to
stretch it later.” He also drew attention to the possible problem
of troop contributors which will have to be consulted.
The US were a shade more skeptical to UNAMIR’s continuation. If it
were to stay with its current mandate, it could become a
destabilizing factor. “It may become necessary to withdraw UNAMIR
but that should not mean we’ll stop being concerned with Rwanda.
Perhaps we should have this force ready somewhere so that it could
return straight away.” Arg. agreed with this view.
Amb Kovanda pointed out that events in Rwanda will also necessarily
influence the situation of UNOMUR – another Rwanda-‐related PKO but
operating in Uganda. The Secretariat confirmed this.
Delegation comment
A representative of the Belgian delegation telephoned Amb Kovanda
requesting that tomorrow we support in the SC the withdrawal of
UNAMIR and suspending the operation. In his view, this alternative
will be submitted by the US or the UK. The Belgians are in
contact with the SG who should tomorrow formulate a recommendation
to this effect. In their [Be] view, any other alternative is
unrealistic. He stated that they are fully aware of the fact that
this proposal will likely not be acceptable for the non-‐aligned. We
are therefore requesting instructions on how to proceed.
