Mission d'assistance opérationnelle d'urgence aux Forces Armées Rwandaises [Rapport du chef de corps du 1er Régiment parachutiste d'infanterie de marine]

Tauzin, Didier

2 avril 1993

19930402

Mission d'assistance opérationnelle d'urgence aux Forces Armées Rwandaises [Rapport du chef de corps du 1er Régiment parachutiste d'infanterie de marine]

N° 01/1er RPIMA/BRSD

RapportMissionDassistanceAuxFarTauzin02041993.pdf

6857752 bytes

8

Min. Défense, Paris

Duclert

Rapport

FR

SD

N° 001153 du 12 mars 2021

This report on Operation "Chimère", for which Admiral Lanxade says it is under his responsibility, shows the autonomy of the French army and its degree of involvement alongside the FAR even though French support is at the time disputed (it is subsequent to the intervention of Carbonare, among others). Extracts:
- "indirectly supervise an army of about 22,000 men, and […] command it, always indirectly" (p. 4);
- "one slightly wounded by enemy fire which led to a response from the French side" (p. 5);
- "the greatly improved precision of support shots" (p. 5);
- "the RPF is therefore stopped on the positions it had acquired" (p. 6);
- "However, the FAR did not regain ground in a significant way […], because of delay in setting up the means, then for political reasons, finally because […] it is necessary to strengthen the mechanism of the capital" (p. 6);
- "the losses are estimated at 200 killed for the FAR and 750 for the RPF" (p. 6);
- "the only FAR units which behaved correctly in combat are those which had been instructed by the DAMI PANDA […]; 4 of these units, in the first rank of which the Para Battalion, behaved very well" (p. 6);
- "I propose to the Chief of Staff of the FAR to carry out […] a rapid audit of the Rwandan army […]. This audit demonstrates the need: - To increase the strength and resources of the FAR […]; - To proceed with a significant recruitment of executives […] and their training " (p. 6);
- "in Franco-Rwandan cooperation, defense and counter-attack plans have been drawn up" (p. 7);
- "this mission […] therefore ends in success. It is […] the first large-scale application for 20 years of the concept of emergency operational assistance" (p. 7);
- "the overall cost (financial, human, media) of this indirect strategy operation seems to me extremely low […] compared to what the cost of a direct engagement against the RPF would have been" (p. 8);
- "However, the results obtained could have been considerably improved by the dispatch of the operational assistance detachment from February 9 or 10, and by the establishment […] of technical intelligence resources on the RPF rear" (p. 8).